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Abstract 
 
The supposed liberalising effects of higher education have been documented since 
Newcomb’s landmark Bennington study in the 1930s. However, other research has 
suggested that the effect of education on beliefs and values may differ between 
academic disciplines. The main mechanisms by which differing beliefs are believed to 
develop include the self-selection hypothesis (where students chose disciplines which 
match their pre-existing belief systems) and the socialisation hypothesis (where 
students are socialised into the worldview of the discipline through continued 
exposure). Three correlational design questionnaire studies were conducted. Study 1 
and 2 featured 223 and 531 students, respectively, and Study 3 included 143 recent 
graduates of Murdoch University, from different academic disciplines (primarily 
commerce, psychology and the social sciences). Study 4 involved interviews with nine 
students who had switched between the three main fields of study. The quantitative 
results generally supported the self-selection hypothesis, although some participant 
accounts suggested possible accentuation effects (where pre-existing values were 
strengthened by university study). Future research should consider a longitudinal 
study, tracking students in different academic disciplines over the full-length of their 
degree. A cross-sectional community study would also be valuable, in determining 
whether large scale difference exist between the those with tertiary, compared to 
those with lower levels of education, and whether discipline differences persist 
following graduation (and whether this is linked to occupation). These findings have 
important implications for the way universities view themselves, in terms of shaping 
the minds of the next generation of leaders, and for disciplines, in terms of the types 
of students they attract and how they can best retain them. In conclusion, there are 
significant differences in the belief systems of students in different academic 
disciplines, although not as large as may be expected, and that this seems primarily 
due to self-selection, rather than socialisation or accentuation.    iv
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
People’s worldviews are important: they clearly affect the way people think and 
behave, at the personal, social and societal levels. Insights into the nature of people’s 
belief systems, both how they work and how they are formed and modified, allow us 
to better understand how people shape and are shaped by social institutions and 
ideologies. The research described in this thesis examines how the worldviews of 
university students differ across disciplines, and whether those disciplinary 
differences reflect pre-existing student differences or are produced by different 
disciplinary worldviews. 
 
Research has long suggested that those with higher levels of education tend to be 
more socially liberal than those with lower levels of education, and that people tend 
to become more liberal as they progress through their degrees (e.g., Feldman & 
Newcomb, 1969; Newcomb, 1943/1957; Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991). However, most 
of this research was conducted with American samples during the 1950s and 1960s, a 
period of social upheaval temporally and politically distant from modern-day 
Australia. Also, more recent research has suggested that there are differences in level 
of ‘liberalisation’ depending on the academic discipline in which people study (e.g., 
Baer & Lambert, 1982; 1990; Guimond & Palmer, 1990; 1996). Two key processes to 
explain these differences have been proposed. The self-selection hypothesis suggests 
that people choose the discipline whose worldview most closely matches their own, 
while the socialisation hypothesis posits that people’s belief systems will alter to 
match the discipline that they chose. The compromise position, accentuation, 
whereby initial self-selection based differences are increased through socialisation, is 
probably the most plausible, given that neither hypothesis is likely to be supported 
outright.   
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Given the somewhat conflicting findings of past research, and the dearth of general 
belief systems studies, let alone university students’ belief systems, in Australia, the 
current research programme was developed. In the attempt to develop an 
appropriate measure of worldview, research from social and political psychology, 
sociology and political science was drawn on. While there is still much research to be 
done, the current studies provide a starting point for the investigation of the role of 
self-selection, socialisation and accentuation in influencing the sociopolitical 
orientations of university students in different academic disciplines in Australia 
today. 
 
1.1 Overview of the Thesis 
 
The thesis consists of three sections. Chapters 2 through 5 are literature reviews, 
designed to set the scene for the studies, which are covered in Chapters 6 through 9. 
Finally, Chapter 10 provides an overview of the entire thesis as well as a general 
discussion and conclusions.  
 
Chapter 2 aims to outline the evidence for the effects of tertiary education on 
sociopolitical orientation, primarily in terms of whether it makes people more ‘liberal’ 
in their worldviews. The main mechanisms by which this increased liberalism is 
presumed to develop are also discussed. Research supporting both the socialisation 
and self-selection hypotheses is considered.  
 
In order to investigate whether university education has an effect on worldview it was 
necessary to select particular measures to assess this. Chapter 3 provides evidence for 
the utility of causal attributions for social phenomena as important components of 
people’s belief systems. The research considered primarily covers attributions made 
for poverty, wealth and unemployment, as well as how these attributions are linked to 
other aspects of worldview. Chapter 4 covers the research on the nature of belief  
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systems, particularly their structure and issues of constraint, as well as research on 
ideological beliefs and values, and their connection to other aspects of worldview.  
 
Chapter 5 focuses on the Australian political and education systems, so that those less 
familiar with that cultural context can have a better understanding of the 
environment in which Australian university students live. Certain aspects of these 
systems are likely to have particular relevance to the interpretation of the findings of 
this research programme. Detail about the specific institution in which this research 
was conducted, Murdoch University, is also covered in this chapter.  
 
The first three studies, detailed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, all involved cross-sectional, 
correlational surveys. Each comprises an introduction, method, results and 
discussion section. Study 1 was principally exploratory and included 223 university 
students, while Study 2 involved a further 531 students. The participants in both 
studies were from various academic disciplines, but the main subgroups were from 
the social sciences, commerce and psychology. Study 3 involved 143 recent graduates 
(within the last five years), mostly from the three disciplines which were the major 
focus in the previous two studies. The final study incorporated the questionnaire 
from Study 2 but was primarily focused on interviews with nine students who had 
changed between the three main discipline groups. The introduction, method and 
analysis of the results for Study 4 are included in Chapter 9. 
 
The final chapter provides a complete overview of the thesis and a general discussion 
and conclusions. As Chapters 6 through 9 each include a specific discussion of each 
study’s results, Chapter 10 summarises the main findings and provides an overall 
integration of the research outcomes. The reasons for inconsistencies with past 
results are covered, along with theoretical and real-life implications and 
recommendations for future research are discussed.  
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2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATION 
AND IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION 
 
The relationship between education and ideological orientation has been examined 
by numerous investigators in psychology, sociology and political science. Most of this 
research is based on the belief that education affects people’s sociopolitical attitudes 
and beliefs. Initially, most research looked at the generalized ‘effects of college’; 
however other work examined academic discipline-specific effects. There are two key 
explanations for the impact of education which have driven this research; self-
selection (where students chose the discipline which best reflects their own beliefs 
and values) and socialisation (whereby students adopt the values and beliefs 
predominant in their chosen area of study).  
 
What follows is a summary of the literature from the past 70 years regarding the 
evidence for increased liberalism among the university educated, from both student 
and community samples. This research suggests both general and (more pronounced) 
discipline-specific effects, with students from the social sciences displaying greater 
liberalism than those in other disciplines, such as commerce and engineering. 
Evidence for both the self-selection and socialisation explanations is also considered, 
with a view to establishing which is the more parsimonious, or whether the combined 
model, of accentuation of pre-existing differences, is best. The link between education 
and ideological sophistication is also highlighted, but is discussed in more depth in 
Chapter 4. The research discussed here, and in particular its shortcomings with 
regard to the time period and preponderance of American-centric evidence, provide 
justification for the research programme undertaken. 
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2.1 EARLY RESEARCH ON INCREASED LIBERALISM 
AMONG THE UNIVERSITY EDUCATED 
 
2.1.1 EVIDENCE FROM STUDENT SAMPLES 
 
2.1.1.a The Bennington Studies  
The first major research linking ideological change and university attendance were 
Newcomb’s Bennington studies. This groundbreaking longitudinal research provided 
evidence that a liberal arts education had profound and long-term effects on 
ideological beliefs and orientation. Newcomb’s (1943/1957) original study examined 
students at the women’s college of Bennington, which opened in 1932. The college 
itself was not typical, having been established as an experimental, liberal arts 
institution. It was quite isolated, which encouraged the development of a well-
integrated community of students and faculty (Newcomb was a member of the latter). 
The students mostly came from sheltered, conservative upper-middle class 
backgrounds and Newcomb was interested in how the small group environment, 
where faculty were young and very liberal, would shape the students’ attitudes and 
political orientations, with particular regard to ‘the New Deal’ issues which were then 
reshaping Americans’ sociopolitical attitudes. 
 
The main measure used by Newcomb was a Political and Economic Progressivism 
scale (PEP), which contained twenty-six items described as liberal or conservative 
and rated on a five-point Likert agreement scale (predominately left- and right-wing 
economic items with some liberal and conservative social items).1 Higher scores 
indicated greater conservatism. Students also underwent interviews and their 
                                                           
1 e.g. “The only true prosperity of the nation as a whole must be based upon the prosperity of the 
working class”; “The people who complain most about the depression wouldn’t take a job if you gave 
it to them”; “You can’t expect democracy to work very well so long as so many uneducated and 
unintelligent people have the vote”; “Most employers think only of profits and care little about their 
employees’ welfare” (Newcomb, 1943/1957, see Appendix A).  
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academic records, which included commentary about their personalities as well as 
academic performances, were accessed. The study included students in all year 
groups for the years 1935 through 1938. The results indicated that most students 
became less conservative (more liberal) over their time at Bennington (Newcomb, 
1943/1957). There was evidence for both cross-sectional and longitudinal change, 
with entering cohorts more liberal than previous freshmen, but less liberal than 
seniors. However, the longer the students spent at the college, the lower the 
correlation between their last PEP score and their first. A mail-out questionnaire sent 
to graduates showed little evidence of regression to the mean among extreme liberal 
scores, which suggested that attitudes at graduation persisted. 
 
Most students reported the same political preference for themselves as their parents 
at the start of their degree (approximately 75% from Republican families; Alwin et al, 
1991) but most were Democrat supporters by the end (90% of Democrat or other left 
party supporters remained so, only 60% of Republicans did not change). Interestingly 
though, while those in the upper-classes demonstrated greater support for the 
Democrats than first-year students (54% versus 29%), they also reported that their 
parents were more likely to vote Democrat (35% versus 26% of freshman parents; 
Newcomb, 1943/1957), which suggested some bias in reported vote. Even with the 
overall increases in liberalism, there were some differences between disciplines, with 
students from the social sciences and literature being less conservative than those 
from science and music, both initially and after four years.  
 
Newcomb (1943/1957) thought that the changes seen at Bennington were due to “the 
nature of its community life” (p. 33). Non-conservative attitudes were the norm and 
there was close integration of the students and the (very liberal) faculty, with a great 
deal of “friendly and informal” interaction. Comparisons with the students of other 
colleges also suggested that greater knowledge about international issues particularly 
(especially “Loyalist Spain”) may have led to the pronounced attitude differences.  
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Indeed, the students who were most popular had the lowest PEP scores (most 
liberal), while those with the highest PEP scores were more likely to be classified by 
other students as “most resistant to community codes” and to “faculty authority” 
(Newcomb).  
 
There were a number of criticisms of Newcomb’s (1943/1957) study. Period effects 
were quite likely, given that the study took place during a time of social and economic 
upheaval (the Great Depression and the ‘New Deal’), especially given that newer 
cohorts were more liberal than older ones on entry to Bennington. Another issue was 
selection bias, which Newcomb acknowledged; Bennington was known as an 
experimental liberal arts college so parents and students were presumably 
comfortable with that. Those who did not fit into the environment may have left 
(gone somewhere else or got married) and those students who were conservative may 
have avoided taking part in Newcomb’s research because they were aware of what it 
was about (Alwin, et al, 1991). There was also a strong possibility of demand 
characteristics; Newcomb acknowledged that he was known as one of the more 
‘radical’ faculty members and that students may have been giving the answers they 
knew he wanted to hear. 
 
Newcomb, Koenig, Flacks and Warwick (1967) follow-up study of the Bennington 
Alumni in the 1960s, indicated that political orientation had been largely persistent 
and stable since graduation. The data included follow-up interviews with 129 of the 
147 women who had graduated in 1938, 1939 o r  1 9 4 0  ( a n d  t h u s  h a d  s t u d i e d  a t  
Bennington for three or four years) and mail-out questionnaires for 329 people for 
whom addresses were available, with 207 responding (62.9%). Questionnaires and 
interviews included the original PEP scale, an index of political conservatism based 
on current domestic issues and information about their home, work and social lives. 
Of those who were interviewed, all of whom were graduates of Bennington, only 17% 
reported that they were conservative, but of those who completed the questionnaires  
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34% described themselves as conservatives (the questionnaire sample included both 
graduates and non-graduates). While this could be explained by less exposure to the 
Bennington environment, there was also the strong possibility of demand 
characteristics interfering with the results, especially when comparing the two 
graduate groups. Overall though, the alumni were predominately liberal (Newcomb 
et al., 1967). 
  
The interviewed alumni were generally liberal on current issues, interested and 
involved in political and public affairs and were predominately Democrats, in terms 
of vote and favoured issue positions. When comparing their current selves to 
themselves as seniors, 57% felt there had been no change in their attitudes since 
leaving Bennington, while equal proportions claimed to have become more 
conservative or more liberal. Two-thirds of this group had worked for a liberal cause 
or organisation (including political parties/candidates).  
 
While the results were less dramatic among the questionnaire sample, they were 
similar, with those who were more liberal in the 1930s being more liberal 25 years 
later, on issue stands, favourability ratings of liberal figures, and voting and other 
behaviour. Conversely, those who were more conservative in the past were more 
likely to endorse conservative positions on issues, rate liberal figures negatively and 
conservative figures positively, and vote for Republican or right-wing candidates 
(Newcomb, et al., 1967). Generally, it was found that those whose attitudes had 
persisted and those who had changed since leaving college were in social 
environments which supported their current orientation. It was impossible to 
determine whether the women sought out those the same as them, or changed 
themselves or others, to create this fit. 
 
A third follow-up on the Bennington women in 1984 suggested that they were at least 
as liberal, if not more so, than they had been at graduation (Alwin, et al, 1991). Of the  
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original 527 participants, 383 were able to be contacted and 335 agreed to participate 
( r e s p o n s e  r a t e  o f  8 7 . 5 % ) .  A  r a n d o m  s a m p l e  o f  2 8  p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  f a c e - t o - f a c e  
interviews, which allowed for the collection of detailed qualitative data and the pre-
testing of questions. The remainder were interviewed via the telephone as well as 
completing and returning self-report questionnaires. Checks for bias suggested that 
the sample was “broadly representative of the Bennington students who participated 
in Newcomb’s original research” (Alwin et al, 1991, p.71); however, those who refused 
to take part had slightly higher PEP scores in the original study.  
 
While the results were generally consistent with previous findings, there was also 
some evidence for an accentuation effect, with the majority of participants reporting 
that they became more interested in political issues after college, compared to only 
about 5% who said their interest decreased (Alwin et al, 1991). Participants also 
displayed a response bias in favour of greater liberalism. For example, more 
participants retrospectively reported that they preferred the Democratic to 
Republican Presidential candidates in the past, compared to the 1960s follow-up. In 
Newcomb and colleagues (1967) sample, 56% reported favouring Kennedy (in the 
1960 election) and 50% Stevenson (1956), while 74% claimed they preferred 
Kennedy,  and 63% Stevenson, in 1984 (Alwin et al, 1991).  
 
The Bennington women were also compared to samples of women aged over 60 and 
women aged over 60 with college-level education (attained from the 1984 National 
Election Survey; N.E.S.), in order to determine whether the change in, and 
subsequent persistence of, their sociopolitical orientations were due to their specific 
experience at Bennington or a cohort effect. The results suggested that the 
Bennington women were more extreme in their views than other women their own 
age, and much more liberal than other college-educated women their age. These 
differences were seen in voting patterns, party identification, issue positions and 
attitudes toward particular liberal and conservative social groups (Alwin et al, 1991).  
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These findings confirmed the persistence of sociopolitical orientations over time; 
however, they also provided evidence against the position that those with higher 
education were more liberal than the general population, as the N.E.S sample of 
college-educated women over 60 years of age was more conservative than the general 
sample of women over 60.   
 
2.1.1.b Other early research 
Feldman and Newcomb’s (1969) book provided an overview of four decades of 
research on the effects of a college education. Their summary of past research 
findings generally reported socialisation effects, whereby changes in attitudes 
emerged between freshman and seniors. However, they cautioned that overall mean 
differences could easily hide individual or sub-group changes, and there was no way 
of knowing the extent and intensity of the changes experienced at these levels. Also 
selective attrition was likely to have occurred, which would have affected the 
comparison between the freshmen and senior groups.  
 
Most research reviewed found seniors to be more liberal and less conservative than 
freshman (e.g., Hunter, 1942; Peterson, 1965, cited in Feldman & Newcomb, 1969).2 
Plant (1966) found decreased authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and dogmatism after 
only two years of college. Some studies reported decreased liberalism among some 
students, but those who increased were a much larger group and their change was 
more likely to be long lasting (e.g., Finney, 1967, cited in Feldman & Newcomb). 
Religious values and beliefs, traditionally associated with conservatism (e.g., the 
‘Religious Right’), decreased significantly over the years of higher education (except 
among those attending religious colleges, where it remained stable). There were 
strong freshmen to senior changes in social liberalism, with significant decreases in 
authoritarianism, dogmatism, prejudice and ethnocentrism, indicated in both cross 
                                                           
2 Feldman and Newcomb defined liberal as favouring change and being “based on the desire for 
political and social equality, full suffrage, civil liberties, labour unions, welfare legislation and 
pacifism” (p. 19); socially liberal and economically left-wing. Conservatism was defined as favouring 
the status quo.  
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sectional and longitudinal studies.  
 
However, much of this research was conducted at a time of change throughout the 
Western world, particularly the U.S. Plant (1962; 1965, cited in Feldman & Newcomb, 
1969) found that young adults who did not attend college also became less 
authoritarian, dogmatic and ethnocentric, although his noncollege sample consisted 
of rejected applicants, who may have been significantly different from the general 
population anyway. Cutler and Kaufman (1975) examined differences in political 
attitudes between ten-year birth cohorts (from 1894 to 1933) in the years 1954 to 
1972, based on two national surveys of American adults. In terms of tolerance of 
nonconformists (atheists, socialists and Communists), they found that the differences 
between generations were due to each birth cohort being more liberal than the 
previous one, not to older people becoming more conservative with age. All cohorts 
became more tolerant over the time period, but the increase was greatest among the 
youngest.  
 
Feldman and Newcomb (1969) also acknowledged a self-selection effect for 
discipline, reporting that it was “very likely that different major fields attract students 
who are already different in distinctive ways” (p. 152). Besides sex differences (which 
are still clearly evident today; see Jacobs, 1995) students from lower socioeconomic 
backgrounds were especially likely to be found in engineering and education while 
their more privileged counterparts were overrepresented in medicine, social science, 
arts and humanities, and law (e.g., Goetsch, 1940, cited in Feldman & Newcomb). 
Davis (1965, cited in Feldman & Newcomb) even found that demographic 
characteristics predicted both entry to and persistence in a particular discipline, with 
those who shared the same demographics as peers less likely to leave a discipline. 
 
With regard to political ideology, social science majors generally scored highest in 
liberalism, while business students were consistently among the lowest, along with  
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engineering (e.g., Peterson, 1965b, cited in Feldman & Newcomb, 1969). Business 
and engineering students were also underrepresented among activist groups studied 
on campuses, while those in the social sciences were overrepresented. Finney (1967, 
cited in Feldman & Newcomb) found that students in business and engineering were 
the least likely of all disciplines to start with high levels of liberalism or to attain them 
during their degree. Gamson (1967) found that while the natural science faculty of a 
small college rewarded students who performed the best, the social science faculty 
rewarded those whose values and attitudes were closest to those positions favoured 
by staff. This may be due to the greater emphasis on knowledge rather than ways of 
thinking about the world in the natural versus social sciences.  
 
When their main reason for attending university was assessed students in business, 
education, nursing and engineering tended to, not surprisingly, emphasise vocational 
training. In contrast, liberal arts students (social and natural sciences, humanities) 
focussed more on developing critical thinking, exposure to new ideas and the desire 
to learn (Feldman & Newcomb, 1969). Extrinsic, reward-oriented careers (offering 
security, status and money) were most prized by business students, in comparison to 
all other disciplines. While those in business valued people-oriented careers the least, 
social science and humanities majors rated both people-oriented and self-expressive 
(opportunities for creativity) aspects of future careers as important.    
 
Astin (1979) undertook a 10-year study involving students from 300 colleges in the 
U.S. in order to determine what effect tertiary study had on students. Students 
completed pre-testing in freshman year, which examined personal characteristics, 
such as attitudes, values and self-concept. Results indicated considerable differences 
between disciplines; social science students showed the greatest increases in 
liberalism, as measured by self-rating, while those in engineering and mathematics 
showed the smallest rises.  
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A number of “involvement” factors were tested (degree of contact with particular 
groups) which indicated that the peer group, as well as faculty, may have influenced 
ideological orientation (Astin, 1979). Astin also suggested that the process of 
“progressive conformity” led seniors within majors to be more homogeneous than 
freshman. There was a lot of movement between disciplines, generally thought to be 
related to a lack of fit. For instance, students who moved out of business showed the 
greatest decline in “business interest” (one of the values measured), while those who 
remained had the greatest initial level, and the lowest decline over their degree.   
 
2.1.2 EVIDENCE FROM COMMUNITY SAMPLES 
 
McClosky (1958) undertook a large scale study of ‘conservatives’ for his PhD. The 
sample included members of the general community and “two special samples of 
extreme Right-Wing and Left-Wing believers” (McClosky, 1958, p.34). His primary 
conclusion centred on how conservatives projected the negative aspects of their 
personality onto others, hence their unfavourable view of human nature and their 
belief that people needed to be controlled to prevent their darker urges from 
surfacing.3 Of most interest, however, was the finding that that the more conservative 
people were, the less education they tended to have and the lower their intelligence 
(as measured by several scales). While 47% of McClosky’s liberals had at least some 
college education, only 21% of moderate, and 12% of extreme, conservatives had 
attained this level. The conservative scale consisted primarily of social, moral, 
human-nature type items, as the author felt attitudes to do with class and party 
affiliation (e.g., socioeconomic issues, such as attitudes towards free enterprise, trade 
unions, welfare etc.) were “situationally determined” (McClosky, p.30) and therefore 
                                                           
3 McClosky considered the possibility of socialisation- “learn(ing) through indoctrination and group 
influence” (p.39) - however, he dismissed this notion as being unable to account for the personality 
differences evident in his sample. 
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not relevant to the “conservative personality”. 
 
Curtis and Lambert (1976) assessed the relationship between level of education and 
preference for social and political homogeneity (social conservatism). They used a 
large, nationally representative Canadian sample. The key dependent variables were 
‘feeling thermometer’ ratings of nineteen social groups (<40 classified as “rejecting”), 
an item on preference for cultural and religious uniformity and an “authoritarianism” 
scale (social conservatism; items about illegal strikes, homosexuals, Communists and 
the death penalty). Age, occupation and “status dissatisfaction” were control 
variables. Education had three levels (primary, secondary and at least some tertiary). 
Participants were categorised into language (English or French) and religious groups 
(Catholic or Protestant). 
 
The results indicated that, across subsamples, those with higher levels of education 
were less rejecting of minority groups (Jews, Negroes and ‘ethnics’). However, higher 
education led to greater rejection of labour unions and left- and right-wing groups 
(except for Francophones’ feelings about left-wingers, which remained consistently 
favourable over education levels). Authoritarianism scores and preference for 
homogeneity were inversely associated with level of education. Overall, education 
seemed to increase tolerance for social heterogeneity but decrease favourability 
ratings of political groups, although it was possible that different people within each 
sample were rejecting these groups, based on their political preferences. However, 
Curtis and Lambert (1976) dichotomised the social group ratings (rather than using 
them as continuous measures) and provided no significance statistics, which throws 
doubt on whether their results represented real differences. 
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2.2 LATER RESEARCH ON INCREASED LIBERALISM 
AMONG THE UNIVERSITY EDUCATED 
 
2.2.1 EVIDENCE FROM STUDENT SAMPLES 
 
Pascarella and Terenzini (1991) conducted a review of the effects of college on 
students, following on from Feldman and Newcomb (1969). Tertiary students were 
found to have experienced change in many areas of their lives, most notably cognitive 
skills and intellectual growth, but also changes in identity, self-concept, autonomy, 
moral development, and (most importantly here) sociopolitical attitudes and values. 
The authors acknowledged the key shortcomings of the research presented, which 
predominately involved white, middle-class, young, full-time students who lived on 
campus. The samples also varied in size and in the number of universities from which 
they were drawn. 
 
Pascarella and Terenzini (1991) documented a shift towards greater liberalism during 
the college years, as well as a greater interest in political and social issues. Generally, 
there was evidence of greater support for altruistic and humanitarian values and civil 
r i g h t s  a t  s e n i o r  c o m p a r e d  t o  f r e s h m a n  l e v e l .  H y m a n  a n d  W r i g h t  ( 1 9 7 9 ,  c i t e d  i n  
Pascarella & Terenzini) reported that those with higher education were more tolerant 
of nonconformists and more supportive of humanitarian programmes. Higher levels 
of education were also associated with more egalitarian sex role beliefs (e.g., Mason & 
Bumpass, 1975, cited in Pascarella & Terenzini). There was also further evidence of 
large decreases in authoritarianism, dogmatism and ethnocentrism; for example, 
Trent and Medesker (1968, cited in Pascarella & Terenzini) indicated that college 
students were significantly less authoritarian than a similar (non-college) employed 
group.  
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Pascarella and Terenzini (1991) also found differences between students who had 
studied in different disciplines, primarily that social sciences and humanities majors 
increased in liberalism far more than those in business and engineering. Humanities, 
arts and social science students were also found to endorse egalitarian sex roles more 
than those in business and engineering. However, this was most likely significantly 
affected by sex, with women, unsurprisingly, less likely to endorse traditional sex 
roles. Each successive generation was also less traditional on entry, but still gained in 
egalitarianism during college years (Pascarella & Terenzini).  
 
The authors believed some self-selection into disciplines was occurring, but that 
socialisation was also important: “students come to college with moderately well-
formed attitudes and values… (which)…appear to predispose students to participate 
in activities consistent with those values” (Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991, p.313). They 
also indicated that attitudes and values held at graduation predicted those found 
among adults, most likely due to leading post-college lives which reinforced those 
attitudes (Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991), as reported in Newcomb’s Bennington 
studies (1943/1957; Newcomb et al., 1967; Alwin et al., 1991). It was likely that 
graduates chose environments in which their existing attitudes and values would be 
reinforced, because those milieu were the most attractive to them. 
 
Wasburn (1970) conducted a large scale study involving 748 first-year students from 
f o u r  d i f f e r e n t  A m e r i c a n  u n i v e r s i t i e s  ( o n e  e a c h  o f  “ i v y  l e a g u e ”  a n d  “ b i g  t e n ”  
universities and “a small city college and a state teacher’s college”, p. 377). He was 
interested in whether the acquisition of social science knowledge was greater among 
those who were more liberal. Wasburn posited a dual causal relationship, in that 
those who were more conservative would retain less social science information, as it 
was discrepant from their existing beliefs, and that accepting social science 
knowledge would lead to belief, and therefore attitude, change. This was based on the  
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belief that such knowledge “leads to the general tendency to view psychological and 
social phenomena in ‘systems’ terms” (Wasburn, p. 376), which in turn would lead 
people to consider the social consequences of policy more than those who did not 
have such information.  
 
The measures included a party identification (eight-points, conservative Republican 
to Socialist), conservatism-liberalism (social liberalism) and “Philosophy of 
Government” (economic liberalism) scales. There was also a forty item true-false test 
of social science knowledge. The results indicated that the more liberal the 
participants’ party identifications were, the higher their social science knowledge. 
The same result was found for the social and economic liberalism measures, except 
that those with higher social science knowledge were against laissez-faire economics 
but for social liberalism, (i.e., left-wing). The relationship was stronger, however, for 
social than economic beliefs.  
 
The findings held across discipline groups, with greater social science knowledge 
associated with more liberalism among those from the social sciences, 
education/home economics, business/administration, engineering, journalism and 
humanities/arts. Only slight differences were found for agriculture, the biological 
sciences and ‘other’ disciplines. The greater the students’ social science knowledge, 
the more likely they were to be involved in politics (e.g., rated it as important, showed 
interest, joined political organisations and protests). Wasburn’s (1970) results 
supported both self-selection and socialisation interpretations, as clear differences 
were seen in social science knowledge and liberal beliefs, and support for liberal 
causes, however, students could still have been self-selecting into courses where they 
would have differing levels of exposure to social science information (and presumably 
v a r i e d  l e v e l s  o f  i n t e r e s t ) .  N o  c o m p a r i s o n  w a s  m a d e  b e t w e e n  l e v e l s  o f  
liberalism/conservatism between discipline groups and there was no way of knowing 
if participants’ political involvement and activity increased as a result of increased  
 
 
18
social science knowledge.  
 
Feather (1984) assessed the relationship between conservatism (socially liberal and 
conservative items; three point, yes, no,? response scale) and the Protestant work 
ethic (six-point scale) among a sample of Australian psychology students. While the 
results indicated a moderately strong correlation (r= 0.57, p<0.001), the mean 
conservative score was quite low (37.14 out of a maximum 100), while the PWE mean 
score was about midway on the scale at 82.28 (minimum of 19, maximum of 133). 
This confirmed other research that had found university students to be more 
liberal/left than the general population, but was limited by its inclusion of psychology 
(social science) students only. 
 
Rubinstein (1997) examined differences in authoritarianism and political ideology 
among 796 Israeli undergraduate students from various disciplines. Students 
completed a translated RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1988), indicated their gender, age, 
country of origin party identification, level of religiosity and academic discipline. 
Political parties were classified as left- or right-wing or ‘religious’, and academic 
discipline as social sciences (e.g., psychology, social work, education, political 
science), hard sciences (e.g., physics, computing, mathematics), life sciences (biology, 
medicine) or humanities (history, philosophy, languages). Rubinstein reported a 
“significant correlation between political identification and field of study” (p.564). 
The ANOVA for authoritarianism (with age, gender and religiosity all controlled) 
indicated that social science students scored significantly lower on the RWA than all 
three other discipline groups.  
 
2.2.2 EVIDENCE FROM COMMUNITY SAMPLES 
 
Education has also been found to be significantly negatively related to social 
traditionalism (conservatism) but positively related to economic conservatism (right- 
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wing), (Johnson & Tamney, 2001). However, most other research has found that 
economic and social conservatism were positively related, while both were negatively 
related to left-wing views (Furnham & Heaven, 1988). Fleishman (1986) found that 
those defined as liberals (based on consistent responses to twelve issue items; 
economically left and socially liberal) had much higher levels of education than those 
labelled conservatives (economically right and socially conservative); 76.9% of 
liberals had attended college, compared to only 34.9% of conservatives. Conservatives 
were also more likely to be older, male and to have higher incomes, compared to 
other ideological groups.  
 
Chong, McClosky and Zaller (1983) examined support for democratic and capitalist 
values among American mass publics and “political influentials” (e.g., national 
political party convention delegates, “opinion leaders”). Data were drawn from 
numerous large-scale studies, two of which were conducted between 1975 and 1979 
and the other from 1958. Results from the different time periods were compared. The 
forty-four “democratic” (e.g., freedom, individualism, free enterprise) and twenty-
eight “capitalist” (e.g., private property, economic competition, profit system) items 
used to create the two measures seemed to be primarily forced choice, where 
participants were given a fragment which supported or opposed the value and a 
“decline to choose” option (finish-the-sentence format).  
 
Participants were then classified as 20th century liberal (high democratic, low 
capitalist), 19th century liberal (high both), Strong conservative (low democratic, high 
capitalist) and Anti-regime (low both). No cut-off information was provided as to 
what was low or high. For the 1958 data, there were far more college-educated 19th 
century liberals (46%), compared to those with only primary (24%) or secondary 
(36%) education. Those with tertiary education were also less likely to be Anti-regime 
(20%, vs. 35% primary and 31% secondary educated) or Strong conservatives (9% vs. 
16% and 26%).   
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In the 1970s data, education level was combined with political participation and 
knowledge to create a “political awareness” measure (Chong et al., 1983). Of those 
participants who were in the top tenth of awareness, 49% were 19th century liberals 
and 27% 20th century liberals. The equivalent percentages for the bottom tenth of 
awareness were 3% and 15%, respectively, while 56% were anti-regime, compared to 
only 6% of the most aware. Both sets of results suggested that higher education was 
associated with greater support for democratic values4 and, to a lesser extent, 
economic liberalism.  
 
H e a v e n  ( 1 9 9 2 )  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  A u s t r a l i a n s  w i t h  h i g h  l e v e l s  o f  e d u c a t i o n  w e r e  
significantly less economically conservative and punitive, and significantly more 
supportive of racial equality than those with low levels of education. Those who 
supported right-wing political parties (LP and NP) were more conservative, religious, 
racist and punitive than those who supported left-wing parties (ALP and AD). 
However, Heaven did not indicate the criteria for high or low education (only that it 
was measured on five levels) and did not report a comparison of left- and right-wing 
voters’ education levels. 
 
 A study of voting intentions among Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) for 
upcoming bills indicated that higher levels of education were associated with more 
liberal voting intentions (Wilson & Caldwell, 1988). These results were especially 
i n t e r e s t i n g  a s  i t  w o u l d  b e  e x p e c t e d  t h a t  m o s t  M E P s  w o u l d  b e  h i g h l y  e d u c a t e d  
anyway, (all of the Communist and Green representatives (far-left/left parties) and 
most of the Euro-Democrats (centre-right) had university educations). Knight (1985) 
found that ‘ideologues’, the most politically sophisticated citizens, had higher levels of 
education, and higher interest in politics, compared to those with low or moderate 
                                                           
4 McClosky, Hoffmann and O’Hara (1960) also found that the more politically sophisticated 
(Republican and Democratic convention delegates) endorsed democratic values more than the general 
public. 
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political sophistication. However, her sampl e  i n c l u d e d  t h r e e  t i m e s  a s  m a n y  s e l f -
identified conservative ideologues than liberal ideologues. Generally, education has 
b e e n  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  o f  political and ideological sophistication, 
regardless of orientation (e.g., Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes, 1960; Converse, 
1964; 1975; Jacoby, 1991; Stimson, 1975; see Chapter 4). 
 
Alker and Poppen’s (1973) study of the university students reported that a humanistic 
or left ideology was more closely related to a principled moral orientation while right 
ideology was related to dogmatism (closed belief systems). They also found a 
significant negative relationship between endorsement of left values and 
Machiavellianism, while the latter had a positive relationship with right-wing values. 
Furnham’s (1984) overview of the Protestant Work Ethic (PWE) research findings 
reported little relationship with socioeconomic status (of which education is generally 
a major indicator), but there was a strong and consistent positive relationship 
between PWE and conservatism. 
 
Data from the 1983 Australian Values Study and 1983/4 National Social Science 
Survey were used in Zagórski’s (1988) analysis of the Australian self-identified left 
and right. While the right were a much larger group (13/18% of the samples) than the 
left (7/10%), the left was far younger and better educated, with the majority having 
tertiary education (although the sample included tertiary students). The left also 
included more professionals, semi-professionals and public service employees, while 
the right had more business owners and managers, in line with other previous 
research. 
 
Much recent research has also confirmed differences in sex role egalitarianism based 
on education level. Apparala, Reifman and Munsch (2003) analysed the Euro-
barometer data from 1993, which included national stratified samples from thirteen 
E u r o p e a n  n a t i o n s .  T h e  a u t h o r s  w e r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  h o w  w e l l  a  n u m b e r  o f  b o t h   
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individual and country level variables predicted egalitarian attitudes towards 
household work. Egalitarianism was determined by the degree to which participants 
favoured the sex segregation of household tasks. Using within-country regression 
they found that people who were younger, female and left-wing (self-placement scale) 
were the most egalitarian. Also, those who stopped education at an early age were 
significantly less egalitarian than those who ended their education at the traditional 
or later age (education was coded as “age at finish” in data, rather than level). Those 
with, presumably, the most education had the highest egalitarian beliefs about 
household work, even when current age was controlled for (those who ended school 
early were also significantly older than the other education groups).  
 
2.2.3 SOCIALISATION AS RESPONSIBLE FOR GREATER 
LIBERALISM AMONG UNIVERSITY STUDENTS 
 
The Bennington studies clearly demonstrated that socialisation could have significant 
and long-lasting effects on sociopolitical orientation (Newcomb, 1943/1957; 
Newcomb, Koenig, Flacks & Warwick, 1967; Alwin, Cohen & Newcomb, 1991). This 
was clearly an exceptional situation though, with a very liberal environment and a 
self-contained well-integrated “college community” (Newcomb). There was, however, 
some evidence for self-selection, in terms of those who chose to attend Bennington, 
given its ‘progressive’ reputation, and also into discipline. Those in the social sciences 
and literature were more liberal on entry and as they progressed, compared to those 
in science and music (although all students were more liberal than those from 
comparable women’s and men’s colleges; Newcomb). Most students demonstrated 
this accentuation effect, as, despite the general move towards liberalism, most 
remained in the same position relative to other students (i.e., those most liberal 
initially remained so, while those originally most conservative were still the most 
conservative after four years). The following studies explicitly test whether 
socialisation is responsible for the consistent finding of greater liberalism among  
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those with higher education. 
 
Baer and Lambert (1982) conducted a study about the relationship between 
education level and ‘dominant ideology’ endorsement.5 The study tested four 
alternative explanations for the way education functioned in relation to support for 
the dominant ideology. These were the: enlightenment (education leads to rejection 
due to ability to recognise injustice), socialisation (more education means greater 
exposure, leading to increased support), reproduction (like socialisation, but support 
stable at all levels; mere exposure effect) and investment hypotheses (interaction 
between education level and post-education experiences, such that support was 
determined by whether or not people’s expectations were met by the system). 
 
The data for Baer and Lambert’s (1982) research came from the 1977 Quality of Life 
survey of a national probability sample of 3288 adult Canadians. The measure of 
support for the dominant ideology was participants’ endorsement of “normative 
beliefs” about economic inequality (economically liberal/right-wing ideology); four 
items regarding the gap between the rich and poor, increased taxing of the rich and 
government provision of full employment, and a composite item based on attitude to 
government spending in key areas (e.g., health, public housing, unemployment 
assistance). The key independent variable was level of education (nine divisions, from 
some primary school to professional degree or academic doctorate). Numerous 
control variables were included (e.g., age, sex, parents’ education). In order to assess 
the investment hypothesis participants were also asked to rate their current financial 
situation (from 0 to 10) and the financial situation they “deserve(d) to have right 
now” (Baer & Lambert, p. 179).  
 
 
                                                           
5A dominant ideology was defined as “belief systems, promulgated by and for the dominant classes, 
which make palatable to them, and in varying degrees to subordinate classes, the large inequalities in 
the social distribution of power and wealth” (Baer & Lambert, p. 174). This is similar to Jost and 
Banaji’s (1994) later system justification model.  
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The socialisation hypothesis was the most supported; the results indicated that, 
generally, the higher the participants’ level of education, the greater their 
endorsement for all four dominant ideology variables. Endorsement of reduced or 
maintained levels of government funding began at the level of high school completion 
and basically increased through to doctorate level. The same pattern was seen on the 
employment and inequality variables. For increased taxes, the switch to the dominant 
ideological position (disagreement) began at the post-secondary level. Below these 
levels the dominant beliefs were repudiated. The enlightenment and reproduction 
hypotheses were rejected. The investment hypothesis was not supported, as there was 
no interaction between level of education and “rewardedness”.6 The only significant 
control variable was language, with English-speaking Canadians more supportive of 
dominant beliefs. Background class indicators had no real effect when own education 
level was included (although attained education level was likely a product of class of 
origin). 
 
The results of Baer and Lambert’s (1982) study suggested that socialisation into the 
dominant ideological belief system increased over the period of education. Those who 
were most dissatisfied with their financial position were the least likely to support the 
status quo. It was clear that those who benefit from the system were the most likely to 
support its continuance, or vice versa. However, the items used to assess support for 
dominant ideological beliefs were limited to economic issues only (although the items 
considered would probably still be strongly endorsed by most). Also, much has 
changed within western societies and their education systems since 1977, notably a 
(rightwards) shift towards more neo-liberal economies and an increased rate of 
participation in higher education, both of which could have changed support for the 
‘dominant ideology’. 
  
                                                           
6Those who felt under-rewarded were less supportive of the dominant ideology items though.  
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Further support for the socialisation hypothesis was found by Phelan, Link, Stueve 
and Moore (1995). They concluded that “education socialises students to the ‘official 
culture’, which in the United States includes values of equal opportunity and equal 
respect - but not equal outcomes” (Phelan et al., p.126), which was similar to Baer 
and Lambert’s (1982) notion of the dominant ideology. Their sample included 1453 
participants who were generally representative of the population (slightly more 
female, white and well-educated). Gender, age ,  e t h n i c i t y ,  s i z e  o f  t o w n  a n d  r e g i o n  
were controlled. Three political attitudes, in relation to the homeless (support for 
economic aid, tolerance and support for civil liberties), were assessed through large 
scales (developed via PCA).7  
 
Phelan and colleagues compared socialisation, “ideological refinement” and 
developmental models as possible explanations for the more liberal attitudes of the 
highly educated. The developmental model suggested education encouraged social 
liberalism by “expanding the student’s frame of reference and stimulating cognitive 
and personality growth” (Phelan et al., 1995, p.127), therefore it predicted that 
education would have a positive relationship with all three attitude measures. Under 
the socialisation model, education would be positively related to tolerance and civil 
liberties but negatively related to support for economic aid. The ideological 
refinement model predicted that the more educated would only be more liberal on 
issues where their interests are not jeopardised (i.e., individual rights issues such as 
access to employment, rather than collective rights). Under this model it would be 
expected that education would have no relationship to tolerance, a negative 
relationship with support for aid and a positive relationship with support for civil 
liberties. 
 
                                                           
7 Despite having good reasons to believe these variables may have been related, Phelan et al. used 
orthogonal rather than oblique rotation. The highest correlation was between civil liberties and 
tolerance at r=0.41, with civil liberties and economic aid correlated at 0.31.  
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Education was found to be positively related to tolerance of the homeless but 
negatively related to support for economic aid. Both these relationships were 
significantly reduced when family income was controlled (although these two factors 
are virtually impossible to separate). Education had no relationship with the civil 
liberties scale generally, but there was a small positive relationship for those who 
attended graduate school (postgraduates). Greater support for civil liberties was 
negatively associated with age. These results generally favoured the socialisation 
hypothesis. 
 
Weil (1985) challenged the notion that university education was always liberalising in 
his study which compared tolerance (anti-Semitism) among the educated in different 
nations at different times. Weil relied on public opinion data from the U.S. (1959-
1981), Austria (1968-1982), France (1966-1969) and West Germany (1960-1974). 
Three levels of education were used, the highest being tertiary. The use of different 
studies meant that identical questions w e r e  n o t  a s k e d  i n  e a c h  c o u n t r y ,  b u t  
inspections were made of the correlations between education and the various anti-
Semitic items.  
 
The results varied widely, although the correlations seemed much larger across 
numerous measures for the American sample. The only real over time comparisons 
that could be made were for the U.S. and Germany. However, the pattern within each 
nation was a mirror of the other, with the U.S. showing smaller correlations, and 
Germany larger, over time. This was most likely due to decreased levels of anti-
Semitism in the community generally, although Weil reported that reviewers had 
suggested he remove his discussion of this anomaly, so no explanation was offered. 
These results were interesting, in that they acknowledge that education could have 
different effects based on the dominant ideology of the nation in which it occurred. 
This disagrees with the predominant ‘Enlightenment’ notion that higher education 
liberalises and increases tolerance, which has been found in most of the previous  
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research, which has been conducted almost exclusively in the U.S., and to a lesser 
extent in Britain.  
 
Weil (1985) had proposed that the level of ‘liberalism’ would differ along two 
dimensions: history of liberal-democracy and religious heterogeneity, such that 
higher levels of both would lead to liberal socialisation during tertiary education. The 
U.S. and France both had long histories of democracy compared to the other nations, 
while the U.S. and West Germany supposedly had greater religious heterogeneity.8 
Certainly, both these factors seemed logically connected to the ‘dominant ideology’ of 
a nation, and the increased experience of democracy may have led to the more 
tolerant attitudes of the West Germans, although the generational impact was just as 
likely. Many Germans swung away from the anti-Semitic views of their parents after 
the Holocaust became known. This explanation was not considered by Weil. Also, if 
there were generally lower levels of anti-Semitism in the community, then the 
correlation would naturally be diminished (restricted range), which may explain the 
inconsistent results for France and Austria (although Austrians may also have 
experienced some conflict about their nation’s, less prominent, role in WWII). The 
data was limited though; it was not designed to explicitly to test these questions.   
 
2.3 FIELD SPECIFIC EFFECTS 
 
The disciplines most interested in investigating people’s attitudes and values have 
been the social sciences, so naturally they have drawn on their own students when 
conducting research. However, the continued finding that students are typically more 
liberal than the general population may be an artefact of the particular samples of 
                                                           
8The notion of the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s as being religiously heterogenous seems slightly odd; 
while it may have sectarian divisions within Christianity, estimates place the current level of “belief in 
God” in the U.S. at around 90% (Bishop, 1999), (although this was based on telephone public opinion 
surveys, which typically undersample minorities and non-English speakers). This level would surely 
have been about the same or higher forty years ago.     
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students used, and may not even be generalisable to other students, let along the 
mass public (also see Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1975; Sears, 1986). The research 
considered here primarily deals with the impact of having studied in different 
disciplines at the higher education level. Generally these studies have suggested, as 
reported by Feldman and Newcomb (1969) and Pascarella and Terenzini (1991), that 
social science students are more liberal/left-wing in their sociopolitical attitudes and 
values than other those from other disciplines, such as commerce and engineering. 
These findings have predominately been within the framework of socialisation or 
self-selection explanations for such differences. 
 
2.3.1 SELF-SELECTION 
 
2.3.1.a The Academics 
Ladd and Lipset (1975) undertook the largest study to date of the sociopolitical 
attitudes and values of university professors. Their data were drawn largely from the 
1969 Carnegie Survey of the American Professoriate and included undergraduates, 
graduate students, administration and faculty. The data examined included 60,028 
fulltime faculty from the Carnegie study and a smaller sample from telephone 
interviews and mail outs, conducted in 1972 with 472 faculty members nationwide.  
 
Ladd and Lipset (1975) had posited that the three key functions of modern 
universities were socialisation, innovation and scholarship, and community service. 
The tertiary education system underwent unprecedented expansion from the 1960s 
(due to increased demand resulting from the move towards a post-industrial 
economy and the coming-of-age of the largest ever birth cohort in the West; the 
‘baby-boomers’). One of the biggest changes created by this development was the 
shift from socialisation into secular rather than religious values, as the growth of 
public institutions accelerated, relative to that of the religious universities and 
colleges. As a result, large numbers of new faculty, employed to meet the growing  
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demand for tertiary education, would now be passing on their values, and those of 
their discipline, to the next generation.9  
 
Given this history, the findings of the 1969 survey were hardly surprising. Faculty 
disproportionately supported egalitarian and liberal policies, such as racial 
integration in schools, legalisation of marijuana, civil rights and withdrawal from 
Vietnam, compared to both other members of the middle-class and manual workers 
(Ladd & Lipset, 1975). Academics were also far more likely to be Democrat voters, 
compared to the general population, or even to support left-wing third party 
candidates, and this was  fairly stable over time (1944- 1972; according to the Gallup 
polls and research by Howard (1958) and the authors, cited in Ladd & Lipset).  
 
Faculty were also more supportive of anti-establishment activity within the 
university; two-thirds indicated there had been student protests on their campus, and 
of these 51% approved of the aims of students (though not always their methods) and 
only 29% disapproved. Tolerance within the community was much lower; a Gallup 
poll in 1972 revealed that “campus unrest” was rated the most important problem in 
the U.S. (Ladd & Lipset, 1975). While most academics were merely liberal or 
progressive, many were “radicals” who occupied “the political extreme” (Ladd & 
Lipset, p.36). Ladd and Lipset concluded that “this privileged stratum manifest(ed) a 
relatively greater inclination than any other to oppose existing authorities ‘from the 
left’” (p.36). 
 
H o w e v e r ,  w h a t  w a s  e s p e c i a l l y  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  L a d d  a n d  L i p s e t  ( 1 9 7 5 )  w e r e  t h e  
differences between the disciplines in the “multiversity”. The experience of a huge 
                                                           
9Of course, elements of academia had previously been involved in challenging the status quo. Many 
repressive regimes have targeted the ‘intelligentsia’ (and continue to do so), with intellectuals playing a 
key role in the French Revolution and American academics initially supporting the Russian Revolution, 
but protesting against the Spanish-American and Vietnam wars (Ladd & Lipset, 1975). More recently 
however, there was little organised protest against the invasion of Iraq by academics, in comparison to 
numerous other groups who sent public letters of protest to the PM, including former diplomats and 
religious leaders. 
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range of disciplines within the one institution would be particularly relevant in the 
Australian context, where all universities offer a broad range of courses (see Chapter 
5). Not only do most academics only spend time within their own discipline (Ladd & 
Lipset), it has become common for them only to be informed about their own sub 
discipline, such has been the growth rate of knowledge.  
 
According to Ladd and Lipset’s liberalism-conservatism scale of national issues 
(primarily social: e.g., attitudes towards civil rights, Vietnam, marijuana), 35% of the 
social science academics were very liberal and 29% liberal, with only 6% very 
conservative. In contrast, 32% of those in business were very conservative, 27% 
conservative and only 8% very liberal. Over all discipline groups, 19% were very 
liberal, 22% liberal, 23% conservative and 20% very conservative. The social sciences 
(anthropology, sociology, psychology, political science and economics) were 
consistently the most liberal grouping, followed by humanities and law, with the 
applied fields such as business, engineering and agriculture the most conservative. 
This applied to a broad range of policies, self-placement and behaviour (voting and 
petition signing). 
 
These clear differences between disciplines were attributed by Ladd and Lipset (1975) 
to self-selection. They argued that a field’s subject matter, characteristic style, 
interests and associations with groups outside the university combined to create a 
unique subculture into which students were selectively recruited. In the case of the 
social sciences, those enrolled clearly had social concerns, and their values were 
reinforced by their disciplines’ critical views of social norms and political practices 
within society. The authors also believed accentuation of values and beliefs was likely, 
due to continual exposure “to the distinctive academic subculture which is his (sic) 
subject” (p. 56). In fact, overall academics reported that they were more liberal now 
than they had been at graduation, but the magnitude of this increase was far greater 
among those in the social sciences and the humanities, with few changes in  
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ideological orientation reported for those from business and engineering. However, 
this study was conducted in 1969 and the dramatic changes which occurred in 
Western societies at the time mean that these may have been cohort or period effects. 
 
One other major study covered the ideological orientations of academics, this time in 
the U.K. Halsey and Trow (1971) used data from the Robbins Committee’s survey of 
university teachers, undertaken in 1961 to gather some of the information which was 
used by the committee in making their recommendations about the future of higher 
education in Britain. They were particularly interested in how academics felt about 
expansion of the university system in the U.K., as well as information about the 
academics’ backgrounds and comparisons between those from universities with 
differing levels of prestige. Of specific interest was their finding that academics were 
usually more left-wing than the general population, particularly compared to other 
upper-middle class professionals. A five-point self-placement scale, from far left to 
far right, was used to determine orientation, however, there were so few far right 
cases that the two right-wing categories (far and moderate) were collapsed. Also, 
compared to the general population, academics were more likely to vote for the 
British Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats (left, centre-left) rather than the 
conservative Tory party.  
 
Halsey and Trow (1971) also suggested that self-selection into subject and 
accentuation of values occurred; “the choice of a particular subject implies the 
formation of views about the nature of the world and further study continues to shape 
them. This is particularly clear; perhaps, in the case of the social sciences…their 
studies compel them to confront the social and political dilemmas of their world” (p. 
429). As other research has suggested, social science academics were significantly 
more likely to self-identify as left-wing (70% moderate or far left, 8% moderate or far 
right) compared to other disciplines such as “technology” (45% left, 26% right),   
medicine (44% left, 23% right), the natural sciences (49% left, 20% right) and arts  
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(58% left, 17% right). Similar results were found for vote, with two-thirds of social 
scientists voting Labour, compared to only one-third of technologists and one quarter 
of medical academics. When asked about possible expansion of the higher education 
system, those on the left were far more supportive, and less likely to believe that 
growth would decrease the quality of students, compared to those on the right.  
 
One possible explanation for these differences between disciplines, in terms of 
background, was examined by Halsey and Trow (1971), although only descriptively. 
They found some differences based on fathers’ occupations, but these were generally 
small, with around 40% of academics in each subject area having fathers with 
intermediate level occupations (second highest level, largest n of 519). Fewer of those 
teaching the natural sciences (16%) and technology (13%) had professional fathers, 
compared to those from arts (22%) and the social sciences (23%). Surprisingly, 50% 
of those with unskilled fathers taught in the natural sciences, which were not overly 
left-wing, but this group was quite small (n=14).  
 
The general exception to this was medicine, with more professional (29%) and 
intermediate (52%) level fathers than the other disciplines. Only 3% were the sons of 
semi-skilled workers and none had unskilled workers as fathers. This may explain the 
greater relative conservatism of this discipline group, although it also suggested 
selection factors, possibly non-meritocratic, in entering medicine. However, Halsey 
and Trow concluded that the differences between disciplines were not due to 
differences in backgrounds but still felt that they might represent “other patterns of 
selective recruitment”, rather than the “differing views of the world that arise out of 
differing subjects and methods of study” (1971, p.433).  
 
2.3.1.b Students 
Spaeth and Greeley (1970) also concluded that selective recruitment was responsible 
for differences in values between students. They saw little point in universities  
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focusing on changing values as “broad value frameworks for most have been fairly 
firmly established long before the young person comes to college” (Spaeth & Greeley, 
p.180). Their research involved a longitudinal study of the “class of 1961”, with 
f o l l o w - u p  d a t a  e v e r y  y e a r  f r o m  1 9 6 1 - 6 4 ,  t h e n  1 9 6 8 .  S p a e t h  a n d  G r e e l e y  w e r e  
particularly interested in what college alumni thought about recent activism on 
campuses in the U.S. They reported that the alumni studied were more liberal than 
their parents, but not as left/radical as current students. The alumni were more 
c o n s e r v a t i v e  t h a n  “ c u r r e n t ”  s t u d e n t s  ( a n d  L a d d  &  L i p s e t ’ s  a c a d e m i c s )  i n  t h e i r  
disapproval of student protests, with 52% believing they should stop, while 67% felt 
that they were “needlessly dividing America”. Unsurprisingly, graduates from the 
humanities and social sciences were far more supportive of militant actions by civil 
rights and student groups. 
 
2.3.2 SOCIALISATION 
 
Guimond, Bégin and Palmer (1989a) investigated the use of system- or person-blame 
explanations in accounting for inequality in Canada, among students and young 
unemployed people. Guimond and colleagues argued that people were socialised to 
favour internal (person-blame) or external (system-blame) explanations and that 
education was an important facet of the socialisation process. Participants rated 
attributions for poverty, unemployment and the “economic inferiority of 
Francophones” (French speaking Canadians). Students came from five levels of 
education (Year 12, CEGEP I or II or university I or II)10 and three academic 
disciplines (science, administration or social science) and all were Francophones. 
Among the non-tertiary students only those who planned to attend university were 
included and intended major was used to classify discipline. Background variables 
                                                           
10 A college-like feature of the Quebec education system, where students complete two years of study 
before being allowed to apply for university (Guimond et al., 1989a).  
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(e.g., sex, parental levels of education, language, academic average) were also 
assessed. 
 
After factor analysis, four dependent variables were created: system-blame and 
person-blame for poverty and unemployment, and system-blame and person-blame 
for Francophones’ economic inferiority (responses to the latter issue loaded 
separately from the first two). Internal reliabilities for these scales were generally 
moderate, with some items excluded to increase the alpha levels. Differences between 
the disciplines only occurred at university level, where social science students’ 
person-blame scores decreased, while those in the other disciplines remained steady. 
Social science students also endorsed system-blame attributions significantly more 
than those from other disciplines, from the CEGEP level up, increasing with further 
education. The effects were more apparent with the poor and unemployment 
measures than the economic inferiority scales; however, from the graphs provided, it 
appeared that all groups preferred system-blame to the corresponding person-blame 
explanations.  
 
The first study had indicated that it might have been socialisation into academic 
discipline that was creating system- or person-blame beliefs, as no significant 
differences existed between the groups at high school level (Guimond et al., 1989a). 
The results from the social science students from study 1 were compared with a 
sample of unemployed people of the same age group. The unemployed sample was 
less educated and of lower socioeconomic status than the students, which was not 
controlled for in the analysis, due to its important role in socialisation (Guimond et 
al.). The same four dependent variables were used, with the scales having similar 
internal reliabilities as in the first study. No mention was made of whether a second 
FA was conducted. 11 
                                                           
11 Clearly a confirmatory FA was required to establish whether the same factor structure existed in the 
unemployed sample and, therefore, that the two groups were comparable, especially given that others 
had found differences (e.g. Feather, 1985).   
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ANOVA results indicated that social science students blamed the person significantly 
less than the unemployed did for both Francophones’ economic position, and for 
poverty and unemployment. An age interaction occurred, whereby older social 
science students’ (20-25 years) blamed the person less than younger students, but 
there was no difference for the unemployed. There was no main effect for the system-
blame measures, but younger social science students (16-19) blamed the system 
significantly more than their same-aged unemployed counterparts (but no significant 
difference between the older groups).  
 
Rather than supporting an actor-observer effect, these results suggested that social 
science students were less likely to blame the person, and more likely to blame the 
system, than the unemployed. However, despite their age, most of the jobless sample 
would be considered long-term unemployed, with a mean unemployment length of 
21.9 months and less than half had ever worked (Guimond et al., 1989a). Feather and 
Barber (1983) had previously found that the longer the period of unemployment, the 
greater the use of internal attributions in explaining one’s own unemployment, which 
would surely translate to unemployment generally (see Chapter 3). The most 
important finding to be gleaned from this study was that students in different 
academic disciplines endorsed both person- and system-blame attributions 
differentially. The amount of time the participants had spent in their discipline also 
affected their endorsement of internal and external causes, which suggested a 
socialisation effect of discipline.  
 
The previous authors also conducted another study, using the same participants, 
which dealt with a similar issue, examining differences between students in different 
academic disciplines in relation to affect towards particular social groups (Guimond, 
Palmer & Bégin, 1989b). Previously discussed research had suggested that higher 
education either led to greater tolerance of other social groups (either real or through  
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a better ability to disguise prejudice) or possibly to rejection of extreme groups who 
threatened the status quo (due to increased support for the dominant ideology, e.g., 
Curtis & Lambert, 1976).12 However, Guimond and colleagues favoured a “field-
socialisation” model, whereby liking for different groups depended on field of study. 
The participants were again classified by year of education and discipline (as in 
Guimond et al., 1989a).  
 
Participants rated seven groups on a five-point scale, from “very unfavourable” to 
“very favourable” (Francophones, Anglophones, the military, unions, socialists, 
immigrants and conservatives). Several background items were used as control 
variables (e.g., sex, age, parents’ level of education, having friends who were 
Anglophones or in the military). Academic discipline had a significant effect on the 
ratings of socialists, unions, immigrants (social science more favourable) and the 
military and conservatives (commerce students more favourable). Divergence 
between social science and commerce students was most pronounced at the 
university level, significantly so for socialists, the military and conservatives.  
 
Overall, attitudes towards Francophones and immigrants became more positive with 
increased education, which provided a little support for the tolerance hypothesis, but 
this was not consistent across all the social groups. The dominant ideology 
socialisation hypothesis was rejected, due to the differences between disciplines 
(Guimond et al., 1989b). The finding that the most significant differences between 
the students occurred at higher levels of education supported the field-socialisation 
hypothesis. The results also suggested that affect towards certain groups may be 
connected to affect towards other groups (e.g., the military and conservatives), 
indicating a possible ideological effect, where favourability ratings may be connected 
to other aspects of values and beliefs (also see Chapter 4).   
                                                           
12 Also, affective ratings of social groups have been found to closely mirror ideological beliefs, 
particularly among the more politically sophisticated, and often the more educated. It has even been 
suggested as an alternative to standard ideology measures (see section 4.2.2.a).  
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Baer and Lambert (1990) specifically addressed whether there was a difference in 
support for the dominant ideology among those educated in different disciplines at 
university level. They claimed that this was an extension of Guimond, Palmer and 
Bégin (1989b). The data was drawn from the employed participants (n= 1785) in a 
1 9 8 3  C a n a d i a n  n a t i o n a l  s t u d y  ( t h e  u n e m p l o y e d  a n d  ‘ h o u s e w i v e s ’  w e r e  e x c l u d e d ) .  
Eight items dealing with funding for the military, health and education, and attitudes 
towards corporations and unions were used as dependent variables.13 Control 
variables included age, sex, occupation, income and parental education. Type of 
university education was categorised as social science, business, professional (doctor, 
lawyer etc.), arts, science and other. Each of these categories was compared to those 
with no tertiary education.  
 
Generally the results indicated that more education led to greater support for the 
dominant ideology. However, the introduction of control variables reduced the 
significance of many of the effects (although variables like occupation and income are 
obviously intimately connected with education and socioeconomic status). Social 
science and arts graduates did not significantly reject any aspects of the dominant 
ideology; however, businesspeople and professionals endorsed most items at much 
higher levels (in most cases significantly). Baer and Lambert (1990) concluded that 
studying the social sciences had little effect on support for the dominant ideology. 
However, if the socialisation hypothesis was correct, as they claimed, social science 
graduates (and arts and sciences) should have supported the status quo as strongly as 
business and professional degree-holders, which was clearly not the case.  
 
                                                           
13 None of these items seemed to specifically address the issue of inequality in society, which the 
authors had previously considered the key to the function of the dominant ideology (Baer & Lambert, 
1982), but were consistent with economically liberal, or right-wing, beliefs.  
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Rather than attempting to form a more cohesive measure of support for the dominant 
ideology, Baer and Lambert again relied on item level analysis, which raised the 
chance of making a Type I error (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996; although they were 
limited by the use of secondary data). The use of adult participants (not students) 
increased the external validity of the findings but an analysis by occupational 
category may also have been valuable (e.g., arts graduates who become welfare 
workers versus managers). The authors were specifically looking for whether the 
social science students moved in the opposite direction to the business and 
professional students (towards “counter ideology”; i.e., the left). While this obviously 
did not occur, the lack of difference between those educated in other disciplines and 
those with no university education was noteworthy, if the socialisation hypothesis 
was to be endorsed.  
 
Guimond and Palmer (1994) offered criticism of Baer and Lambert (1990; which had 
included criticism of Guimond et al., 1989b) based on the finding of no difference for 
the social science graduates. Guimond and Palmer argued that the failure to find 
evidence of “radicalisation” (Baer & Lambert) did not mean that academic discipline 
was not affecting the results, particularly given the very strong support for the 
dominant ideology evidenced by business and professional graduates. Baer and 
Lambert’s assertion that they used similar measures to Guimond and associates was 
clearly wrong (dominant ideology beliefs vs. ratings of groups). Baer and Lambert’s 
(1995) reply to this critique claimed that the socialisation hypothesis did not have to 
work in every case. They also began using the words “liberalizing” and 
“conservatizing” when previously they had only spoken of the “dominant ideology”. 
Baer and Lambert also admitted that there were “different versions of dominant 
ideology” (1995, p.245), but maintained that social science students were not 
liberalised by their discipline (although they certainly were not conservatised).  
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Each group of researchers were using different conceptions of people’s beliefs: 
dominant ideology versus liberalism and conservatism. Baer and Lambert’s notion of 
the dominant ideology seemed closest to right-wing beliefs (particularly focused on 
government spending priorities) rather than also including the moral and social 
aspects seen in most traditional measures of ideological values (especially liberalism 
and conservatism). Unlike well-defined ideological belief systems (e.g., conservatism, 
socialism) the dominant ideology would easily be subject to change, depending on 
who was in power and the current circumstances of both the society and the world 
(witness the switch from predominately conservative to liberal economies after the 
1974/75 recession). Given its changeability then, to say people have been 
indoctrinated into the dominant ideology is pointless, as it is undoubtedly a dynamic 
concept. 
 
 
2.4 SOCIALISATION VERSUS SELF-SELECTION 
 
Guimond and Palmer (1990) conducted another study that looked at attributions for 
poverty and unemployment, this time involving students from an English-speaking 
Canadian university and including a longitudinal component, to tease out the self-
selection versus socialisation effects. At the beginning of the academic year first-year 
students in social science (including humanities), commerce or engineering were 
tested. At the end of the year, freshmen were retested, and third and fourth year 
students were assessed for the first time.  
 
The questionnaire was similar to that used in the authors’ previous research. It 
consisted of eighteen attributions for poverty, unemployment and the economic 
inferiority of Francophones and a background variables section (e.g., sex, anticipated 
difficulty in attaining unemployment). The four dependent variables from the  
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previous studies (Guimond et al., 1989ab) were again used (two individualistic: 
blame poor and unemployed, and blame Francophones; two systemic: blame system 
for poverty and unemployment, and blame system for Francophones’ economic 
difficulties). While the internal reliabilities were good, a new FA should have been 
conducted to assess whether the same factor structure applied with the new 
population, particularly as there were reasons to suspect that the English- and 
French-speaking Canadians were different.  
 
The initial analysis indicated that there were no significant differences between the 
first-year students in different disciplines on any of the dependent variables. The 
follow-up data, however, indicated that social science students now blamed the 
system significantly more than either commerce or engineering first-years, and 
significantly more than they had originally. Engineering students blamed only the 
Francophones significantly more than other students did, and significantly more than 
they had initially. A comparison between first and upper-year students in the same 
field indicated that senior social science students endorsed system explanations 
significantly more than freshman for both problems, while the reverse was true for 
the commerce students (freshman significantly higher than seniors). No interactions 
were found for individualistic attributions, although social science students scored 
significantly lower at both levels.  
 
Anticipated difficulty in attaining employment was significantly correlated with both 
individualistic (negatively) and systemic (positively) explanations for poverty and 
unemployment. However, these correlations were both quite weak (-0.10 and 0.22) 
and when anticipated difficulty was controlled there were no changes to the results. 
Senior students provided lower expected difficulty ratings and commerce students 
were significantly more positive about their employment prospects than either the 
social science or engineering participants. 
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The findings leant further support to Guimond and Palmer’s previous research 
detailing dissimilarities between students in different academic disciplines. Support 
was also attained for their field-socialisation hypothesis, as differences emerged by 
the end of the first year. The finding that upper-year social science students were 
even bigger “system-blamers” than their first-year counterparts indicated that 
socialisation continued throughout the university years. However, the use of factors 
not based on the present data created some doubt about these findings, although they 
were consistent with previous research. 
 
Guimond and Palmer (1996) reported findings after a further three years, building on 
the data presented in Guimond and Palmer (1990). Social science and commerce 
students were tested at the start of their three-year degrees and again at the end, if 
they had retained the same major, (final ns were 57 and 34, respectively). The study 
also aimed to assess whether it was peer groups, academics or course content that 
had the greatest influence on students’ ideological values. 
 
Both questionnaires included individualistic and systemic explanations for poverty 
and unemployment, which were combined into person-blame and system-blame 
scales, as in Guimond et al. (1989ab). Students were also asked to rate the 
favourability of five social groups (the military, unions, socialists, immigrants and 
capitalists). The first questionnaire assessed demographic information but this was 
omitted for the second testing, replaced with items designed to assess academic and 
peer group influence. Measures gleaned from these items included: academic 
influence, peer group influence, affiliation,14 and a self-report measure of influence; 
by course content, professors, other students and other sources (Guimond & Palmer, 
1996). The follow-up questionnaire included one other section, designed to 
determine how willing people were to act in line with their beliefs. Participants were 
                                                           
14 Academic influence included: quality of course and teaching, respect for staff. Peer group influence 
included: numbers of friends in different disciplines, closest friend’s discipline. Affiliation included: 
closeness to others, in same and different disciplines, commonality with others in field.  
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asked about government spending in key areas (e.g., immigrant and native 
unemployment programmes, welfare payments) and if they would sign and post a 
petition to establish a retraining programme for workers recently made redundant 
(no stamped self-addressed envelope was included).  
 
An ANCOVA was used to compare the change scores of social science and commerce 
students between first and third year, with first-year score and age as covariates 
(some older students, 21+, were in the social science sample). Results indicated that, 
by third-year, the social science students blamed the person significantly less, while 
the commerce students blamed the system significantly less, than as freshmen. 
Commerce majors liked unions significantly less, and capitalists significantly more, 
after three years. Social science students showed no significant changes in affect 
ratings.  
 
Among first year students a few significant, but weak, correlations between blame 
measures and group ratings were evident (system-blame positively associated with 
unions and socialists, socialists also with immigrants and unions, and capitalists with 
the military). At third-year level systemic attributions were found to be significantly, 
but moderately, correlated with affect towards immigrants, unions, socialists (all 
positive) and capitalists, and with individualistic attributions (both negative). Person-
blame was also found to be significantly, but weakly, positively correlated with affect 
towards the military and capitalists, and negatively for socialists. System-blame and 
person-blame had no relationship among first-years but had a Pearson’s r of -0.31 
three years later. 
 
In terms of the influence variables, both types of students reported significantly more 
friends in their own area of study. Those in commerce rated peers and other sources 
a s  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  i n f l u e n c e s  t h a n  c o u r s e  c o n t e n t  o r  p r o f e s s o r s .  S o c i a l  s c i e n c e  
students rated professors low, but peers, content and other sources were around the  
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same. Identifying with peers was positively correlated with their influence rating, 
while evaluation of their degree’s quality was positively associated with influence of 
professors and course content. Tellingly, those who believed course content had 
influenced them showed the greatest change on the person-blame measures 
(decreased among social science and increased among commerce majors).  
 
The results from the government spending items demonstrated that, generally, the 
higher the system-blame score, the more supportive the participants were of 
increased spending. Conversely, person-blame was negatively (or not significantly) 
related to support for increased spending. Signing and returning the petition was 
negatively correlated with person-blame, but strongly positively related to favouring 
systemic attributions, and liking socialists and unions (Guimond & Palmer, 1996).15 
 
The results of this study did not support the self-selection hypothesis, with no 
significant differences between students in different disciplines at the start of their 
first year (as initially reported in Guimond & Palmer, 1990). There was some 
evidence of the socialisation hypothesis, with differential change within each 
discipline. Attitudes were also found to be linked with policy decisions and 
willingness to engage in behaviours consistent with attitudes. Overall, the reported 
changes were small (as was the sample size) though highly significant. Of greater 
interest were the changes within the discipline samples, most notably, those from 
both samples who reported being influenced by their course content changed 
significantly on the person-blame measure.  
 
Also of note were the various interconnections between the measures (although 
previous reservations about these particular scales remain), which were much 
                                                           
15 All of these comparisons were based on second score, with first score controlled. There were only a 
couple of significant correlations between the spending measures and scores in first-year, with affect 
towards socialists positively associated with supporting most of the government programmes.  
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stronger at senior level. This suggested that university education increased the 
cohesiveness and consistency of people’s beliefs and values, although it is not known 
if this occurred for both discipline groups. Results indicated many more significant 
interactions between variables for the social science students than those in 
commerce, but this may have been an effect of sample size.  
 
2.5 EDUCATION AND IDEOLOGICAL SOPHISTICATION 
 
Political sophistication has long been seen as a key factor in people’s sociopolitical 
attitudes, beginning with Campbell and colleagues (1960) and expanded by Converse 
(1964). Political sophistication has been understood to represent an interconnected, 
complex political belief system, allowing people to comprehend and retain political 
information. However, most people do not consider political, social and economic 
policy at such an abstract, overarching level, being dominated by self or group-
interest. Many studies have shown that elites (e.g., members of political parties, the 
highly educated and politically sophisticated) are much more likely to use ideological 
frameworks in political thinking, compared to mass publics (e.g., Jackman, 1998; 
Jacoby, 1991, Jennings, 1992; McClosky, Hoffmann & O’Hara, 1960; Sidanius, 1990; 
Stimson, 1975; Wyckoff, 1980). Most people show inconsistency when tested on 
ideological scales, with a tendency to favour the centre or the position of the party 
they identify with (although parties often display ideological inconsistency 
themselves, usually for pragmatic reasons).  
 
People’s use of political ideology to structure their social and economic beliefs and 
values tends to increase with their level of education, such that those with higher 
levels of education demonstrate the most constrained and comprehensive ideological 
thinking, although this relationship is by no means universal (e.g., Converse, 1964; 
Jacoby, 1991). Researchers have suggested that tertiary education develops abstract  
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thinking abilities, which allow for ideological structuring of political, social and 
economic beliefs and values. Chapter 4 includes a detailed discussion of the structure 
of and constraint within political attitudes, as well as a section dealing explicitly with 
elite and mass public comparisons. Information about constraint among academics 
only is covered here. 
 
The issue of the ideological consistency of professors’ attitudes and values was 
specifically addressed by Ladd and Lipset (1975). They believed that as the work of 
academics required consistency of thought and ideas, their opinions would “be more 
highly structured and interrelated than those of most groups outside of the 
university” (Ladd & Lipset, p.39). Responses to items about national issues and 
universities (e.g., relationship to larger society, decision making issues) were 
included in a factor analysis, which revealed five dimensions. The first of these 
comprised broad social issues and was represented by a liberal-conservative scale 
containing items on reasons for Negro riots, legalisation of marijuana, support for 
‘busing’, position on Vietnam war and self-placement scale (“left, liberal, middle of 
road, conservative, strongly conservative”). The presence of a factor which clearly 
linked all of these issues was taken by Ladd and Lipset to indicate high levels of 
ideological consistency among the academics included.  
 
The other four factors were all related to university issues and consisted of campus 
activism, black support (favouring more blacks in higher education), student role 
(e.g., influence on academic appointments, curriculum, admissions) and faculty 
governance scales (role of academics compared to administration). The liberalism-
conservatism scale was significantly correlated with all others, particularly campus 
activism and black support; those relatively more liberal on national issues were also 
more liberal on campus matters. Faculty governance had the lowest correlation with 
all the other scales. Of those who described themselves as “strongly conservative” 
55% strongly opposed campus activism, while a further 25% were moderately  
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opposed. Of the “very liberal”, 53% strongly supported more blacks in universities, 
while only 23% of “liberals” felt the same way.  
 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
 
Generally, past research has suggested that college students become more liberal over 
their degree and that social science students become relatively more liberal than 
those in other disciplines, with business and engineering the least likely to increase 
their levels of liberalism or exhibit change in associated attitudes. However, most of 
this research was confounded by the historical period in which it was conducted, with 
the 1960s being a period of massive social change in the Western world and 
corresponding to a general increase in social liberalism, and especially tolerance 
towards ‘deviant’ groups. Both self-selection and socialisation have been implicated 
in changes to university students’ attitudes, with researchers differing in the extent to 
which they believed each process is responsible for the consistent, and generally 
lasting, changes seen in sociopolitical attitudes and values.  
 
Many different measures and samples, of both community members and students, 
h a v e  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  o f  e d u c a t i o n ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  a t  t e r t i a r y  l e v e l ,  w e r e  
associated with greater social liberalism and tolerance of others, along with decreased 
dogmatism, authoritarianism and social conservatism (see Feldman & Newcomb, 
1969 and Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991). Such effects appear to persist in adult life 
(e.g., Alwin, Cohen & Newcomb, 1991; Baer & Lambert, 1990; Newcomb, Koenig, 
Flacks & Warwick, 1967; Spaeth & Greeley, 1970). The results for economic measures 
tend to be more mixed, with most university attendees favouring economically liberal 
(right-wing) positions (e.g., Baer & Lambert, 1982). These mixed findings were most 
likely due to the differences between academic disciplines, noted in earlier studies,  
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particularly of faculty members (Halsey & Trow, 1971; Ladd & Lipset, 1975), but 
elaborated on more recently by Guimond and colleagues (1989a;b; 1990; 1996).  
 
The samples have been almost exclusively North American, so the application of 
these results to Australian samples must consider cultural differences, most notably 
in the use of liberal-conservative as the measure of political ideology. The distinction 
between social and economic values also seems critical to assessing any changes in 
university student attitudes; liberal/right-wing economic beliefs may not be 
supported as strongly by the highly educated in other nations, where social welfare 
systems and government economic intervention are more strongly supported. Also of 
note is the interconnectedness of patterns of beliefs and values with particular 
background characteristics, such as socioeconomic status, parental occupations and 
education levels, and how these connect to the value placed on education, and access 
to it, both in the past and today.   
 
There has been some evidence to suggest that today’s tertiary students are 
significantly different from those in the past. Beginning in 1965, the Higher 
Education Research Institute in the U.S. has asked students how importantly they 
rated particular goals of education as freshman and seniors. In 1965, the highest 
ranked goal was developing a meaningful life philosophy, with 80% of freshmen 
endorsing this as an essential goal of a college education, and only 45% selecting 
being well-off financially as essential. However, by 1985, 70% rated financial security 
as essential and only 44% supported developing a philosophy (cited in Pascarella & 
Terenzini, 1991). The importance of being well-off dropped a little in the 1990s, but 
by the corresponding 1998 survey 75% of freshman indicated that being well-off was 
an essential goal, and only 41% rated developing a philosophy as essential (Society, 
1998). It seems that with the growth of mass education, and its increasing necessity 
for entrée to or maintenance of a middle-class lifestyle, ‘vocationalism’ among 
students has risen, with students seeing university education as a means to an end, as  
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stop on the road to adulthood, rather than an opportunity to learn about the world 
and themselves. This change in motivation would obviously have significant effects 
on both the university experience and its corresponding effect on students. 
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3. ATTRIBUTIONS FOR SOCIAL PHENOMENA 
 
Research into lay attributions for social phenomena such as poverty, unemployment 
and wealth was initiated in America in 1972 by Feagin, although the evidence for 
people’s use of such explanations goes back much further. Since then this area has 
generated voluminous literature, all of which would be impossible to cover here. 
Generally, research has indicated that people from Western nations (particularly the 
U.S.) favour individualistic explanations for social phenomena; ascribing blame, or 
commendations, to individuals as architects of their own lives. However, differences 
appear when samples are split along ideological, political preference, ethnic, 
religious, socioeconomic status or age cleavages.   
 
Such differences in attributions also tend to fit with differentiation in other 
sociopolitical attitudes and values along the same cleavage lines, such that those who 
favour systemic, or social-system explanations, also tend to hold left-wing and liberal 
beliefs, favour distributive justice and reject the Protestant Work Ethic and Belief in a 
Just World. Those who support individualistic explanations tend to hold opposing 
beliefs, such as support for right-wing and conservative beliefs and retributive justice 
(also see Chapter 4). It seems, therefore, that the way people explain social 
phenomena is a key part of their overall sociopolitical value system. Evidence 
presented below confirms this and justifies the inclusion of causal attributions for 
poverty and wealth as a component of students’ sociopolitical value systems.  
 
An attribution is a causal explanation for an event. The concept of attribution and its 
related theories have been a core concern of social psychology since the 1960s, 
although attribution research has become less prolific since the heights of the 1970s. 
As such, a detailed theoretical explanation does not seem warranted here (refer to 
Jones, Kanouse, Kelley, Nisbett, Valins & Weiner, 1972, or Kelley & Michela, 1980,  
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for reviews). Generally, there are two types of causal attributions: internal and 
external, whereby an event is seen as due to something within the person or 
something outside of the person involved in that event. Attributions help people to 
make sense of the world around them; locating causal patterns within the 
environment allows people to predict the consequences of their own and others’ 
actions, bringing a sense of order to the world.  
 
Generally, attributions have not been studied in terms of how accurate they are, but 
because of what they say about the person making them. The type of attribution made 
clearly depends on the perceiver; people bring their pre-existing social construction 
of the world to bear on their beliefs about causality. Examples of qualities which can 
effect the types of attributions people make include sex (e.g., Barnett, Quackenbush, 
Sinisi, Wegman & Otney, 1997; Calhoun, Selby & Warring, 1976; Howard, 1984), 
culture (Lee, Hallahan & Herzog, 1996; Moghaddam, Taylor, Lambert & Schmidt, 
1995; Morris & Peng, 1994), voting preference (Feagin, 1972; Furnham, 1982b; 1983; 
Pellegrini, Queirolo, Monarrez & Valenzuela, 1997), political ideology (Carroll, 
Perkowitz, Lurigio & Weaver, 1987; Zucker & Weiner, 1993) and socioeconomic 
status (Bullock, 1999; Kluegel & Smith, 1986). Particular pre-existing causal beliefs, 
also known as illusory correlations (e.g., all poor people are lazy), tend to be strongly 
resistant to disconfirmation and to the recognition of other possible causes (Kelley, 
1973).  
 
 
3.1 THE BEGINNING 
 
The research credited with originating the study of causal explanations for social 
phenomena was Feagin’s (1972) “Poverty: We still believe that God helps those who 
help themselves”. The study, conducted in 1969, involved interviews with a random,  
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r e pr e se nt a t iv e  s am pl e  of 10 17  A m er ic a n  adults which were aimed at investigating 
attitudes towards the poor, principally “beliefs about the causes of poverty in 
America” (Feagin, p.103), with specific focus on the concepts of individualism and the 
Protestant Work Ethic (PWE). Attitudes towards welfare were also assessed, along 
with three anti-poverty proposals: guaranteed-job, guaranteed-income and equal-
income plans.  
 
The main measure of the perceived causes of poverty was a list of eleven possible 
explanations, which were gleaned from pre-test interviews and public discourse on 
the topic. Feagin identified three types of explanations a priori: individualistic 
(personal responsibility), structural (social and economic factors) and fatalistic (luck, 
chance).1 Respondents rated each explanation on a three-point scale: very, somewhat 
or not important. Only descriptive comparisons between items were made, with three 
items rated very important by more than half the participants: “lack of thrift and 
proper money management”, “lack of effort” and “lack of ability” (all individualistic). 
The items considered least important were “just bad luck” and “being taken 
advantage of by rich people”. The majority clearly rated individualistic items as most 
important, with structural and fatalistic explanations predominately of somewhat 
importance. Structural factors were the most likely to be deemed “not important”.  
 
However, when socioeconomic and demographic cleavages were considered 
noticeable differences were observed in the ratings of the eleven explanations. 
Individualistic items were endorsed most by White Protestants and Catholics, the 
over-50s, middle-income earners and those with middle levels of education. Black 
Protestants, Jews, the under-30s,2 low-income earners and the less educated all 
                                                           
1Items were: “Lack of thrift and proper money management by poor people”, “Lack of effort by the 
poor themselves”, “Loose morals and drunkenness”, “Low wages in some businesses and industries” 
(Individualistic); “Failure of society to provide good schools for many Americans”, “Prejudice and 
discrimination against Negroes”, “Failure of private industry to provide enough jobs”, “Being taken 
advantage of by rich people” (Structural); “Lack of ability and talent among poor people”, “Sickness 
and physical handicaps”, and “Just bad luck” (Fatalistic); (Feagin, 1972, p.103). 
2 Today’s over-50s.  
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favoured structural over individualistic or fatalistic explanations. Fatalistic 
explanations were rated as very important by a maximum of one-third of participants 
in each group, but were relatively more popular among Blacks and Black Protestants 
(compared to other religious/racial groups). They increased in popularity with age, 
but decreased with increasing education and income levels. The results suggested 
that the disadvantaged (Jews and Blacks, the poor, and the less educated) were most 
likely to endorse structural and fatalistic explanations for poverty.  
 
The results of the “attitudes towards welfare” scale revealed that the majority of 
participants were anti-welfare;3 however, this also differed along social and 
demographic lines. Whites, White Protestants and Catholics and high-income earners 
obtained the highest anti-welfarism scores, which increased with age and middle-
levels of education, although there was a drop among the college educated. Scores on 
anti-welfarism were strongly positively correlated with endorsement of individualistic 
explanations for poverty, as would logically be expected. 
 
The three anti-poverty proposals offered by Feagin (1972) were rated on a three-point 
scale (favour, not sure, oppose), with the greatest support for guaranteed-jobs (64% 
in favour, about one quarter opposed). However, this support plummeted when it 
was suggested higher taxes would be needed to fund it (35% favoured). The majority 
opposed the guaranteed-income (30% for, 61% against) and equal income (13% for, 
80% against) plans (the remaining respondents were “not sure”). Again, similar 
patterns of differentiation based on sociodemographic factors were evident. Blacks 
were more supportive of all three plans, while those least in favour were the White 
Protestants, then the White Catholics.4 Support for each of the proposals decreased as 
education and income levels increased but there were no real differences across age 
                                                           
3Items included: “There are too many people receiving welfare money who should be working”, “many 
people getting welfare are not honest about their need” and “generally speaking, we are spending too 
little money on welfare programs in this country” (reverse scored). 
4For Black sample: guaranteed-jobs plan= 83%; guaranteed-income= 59%; equal-income=25% in 
favour.    
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groups. One notable anomaly occurred. Jewish participants were only slightly less 
supportive than Black participants of the first two plans; however, they were the most 
negative towards the equal-income plan (4% favoured). Feagin did not elaborate on 
this finding, but it may be linked to the generally high education and income levels of 
American Jews. 
 
Overall, Feagin’s (1972) sample favoured individualistic explanations for poverty over 
structural or fatalistic ones and were generally anti-welfare. Their rejection of 
income-based solutions to poverty comes from this rejection of welfare and the belief 
in individualism.5 Being in a minority or disadvantaged group (e.g., Black, other non-
White, Jewish, low-income earner, low-education level) decreased support for 
individualistic explanations and increased endorsement of structural and fatalistic 
explanations, relative to comparison groups. These groups were also the least anti-
welfare and comparatively more supportive of all three welfare proposals. It was 
natural that the people most likely to experience poverty and inequality would be 
more aware of factors beyond the control of individuals that can cause it, and would 
also be more motivated to favour such factors.  
 
The first major follow-up of Feagin (1972) was done by Feather (1974) in Adelaide, 
Australia. The research was part of a larger study of social attitudes and the 
“generation gap”. The 667 questionnaires, collected from 328 households (all had 
agreed to take part after initial random selection), were mostly from “heads of 
households” (including some women) and “wives”, but also “children” and 
grandparents. Feather’s study used the same poverty explanations as Feagin,6 also 
with a three-point scale. Several differences emerged when the results of heads of 
households and wives were compared to Feagin’s sample. “Sickness and physical 
                                                           
5Guaranteeing people a job (‘work-fare’) still forces them to earn their money, while income-based 
strategies are seen as ‘hand-outs’ (although, one-quarter rejected the jobs proposal as well). 
6 “Australian” was substituted for “American” on the schools item and “poor people” for “Negroes” on 
the prejudice item.  
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handicaps”, a fatalistic item,7 was ahead of the individualistic poor money 
management as the most important item.8 Lack of effort and low wages shared equal 
third. The highest “not important” ratings in both samples were for bad luck, 
followed by exploitation by the rich (similar percentages). Overall, the Australian 
adults generally rated the individualistic explanations as less important, and 
structural explanations as more important, than the Americans. 
 
There were also some differences within Feather’s (1974) sample. Men endorsed 
some systemic items significantly more than women, who favoured fatalistic 
explanations more.9 “Prejudice and discrimination” was favoured significantly more 
by the offspring in the sample (ranked third compared to eighth in both parents’ and 
Americans’ ratings). Children perceived the individualistic factors as significantly less 
important in explaining poverty than their parents did. Systemic explanations were 
generally considered more important by those who were younger, and had lower 
occupational status, levels of education and income (household heads only).  
 
Factor Analysis (FA) of the poverty explanations revealed three-factors, which 
corresponded to those reported by Feagin (1972); “structural or socioeconomic” 
(which explained most of the variance), “individualistic or personal responsibility” 
and “fatalistic or personal misfortune”. Overall, these results supported Feagin’s 
findings about lay explanations for poverty in Western societies, in so far as the factor 
structure remained the same. However, Australians clearly placed a greater burden of 
the responsibility for poverty on socioeconomic factors, rather than the individual. 
Neither sample considered fatalistic (luck) factors particularly important. Feather’s 
(1974) findings also reinforced that different groups within a society may not endorse 
                                                           
7It could also be argued that this was an individualistic (responsible adults who took care of themselves 
would be more likely to avoid sickness and handicaps) or a structural factor (e.g., lack of medical 
treatments and vaccines available to poor, impoverished living conditions, poorer nutrition).   
8Lack of thrift was most important when only heads of households (predominately men) were included.  
9 Men rated prejudice and discrimination and being taken advantage of as significantly more important, 
while women were significantly more in favour of lack of jobs and sickness and handicaps. 
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the same explanations for poverty, or at least not to the same extent, although the 
sample was significantly more racially and religiously homogeneous than Feagin’s (as 
was Australia at the time, having only recently adopted the notion of 
‘multiculturalism’). 
 
 
3.2 STRUCTURE OF ATTRIBUTIONS 
 
Following on from Feagin (1972) and Feather (1974), most research has made use of 
the individualistic, structural and fatalistic categories of explanations for various 
social phenomena (e.g., Bullock, 1999; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Smith & Stone, 1989; 
Zucker & Weiner, 1993). Numbers of items have varied widely and generally both 
item-level and then factor-level comparisons have been made. This has been 
problematic in terms of the factor analytic techniques used, especially as the use of 
computers as tools for conducting statistical analysis was accelerating during the 
same time period as much of this research was done (1980s). Criticisms which seem 
obvious today can be a little harsh, in light of the massive technological advances 
which now allow researchers to perform numerous complex analyses in seconds, as 
well as notifying the user of data problems. However, there is no denying that higher 
order FA, and oblique instead of orthogonal rotation, may have yielded a more 
ordered pattern of results.  
 
Nevertheless, most research did find distinctions along the same lines as Feagin and 
Feather; although the fatalistic factor often disappeared with only an internal and 
external factor remaining (partly due to low support for fatalistic causes, therefore 
they were not prominent in FA, which also led to only one or two such items being 
included, which also reduced their importance in FA). There was also a tendency for 
greater fragmentation within the systemic factors, most likely because they cover a  
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broader range of potential causes (and were often represented by more items). 
Feather and Davenport (1981) found two factors (“external difficulties” and 
“competence deficiency”) from the 28 items offered as potential explanations for 
youth unemployment to 212 unemployed young people. However, Feather (1985) 
offered nineteen items regarding unemployment to 650 high school students and 
uncovered seven factors, only five of which were interpretable (and these only 
consisted of two items each, making them highly unstable; Tabachnick & Fidell, 
1996).10  
   
Furnham’s (1982c) study of explanations for unemployment, among both employed 
and unemployed samples, used twenty possible causes. FA yielded five factors, one 
individualistic, two societal (education system and government policy) and two 
fatalistic factors (incompetence and outside influences), although the names implied 
slightly more order within factors than was evident from their content. Furnham 
(1982b) conducted a FA on fifteen poverty explanation items (as rated by a 
community sample of about 200) which yielded two societal, one individualistic and 
one fatalistic factor. There was no clear differentiation between the two societal 
factors, but it was possible that one set was more strongly dis/agreed with, as this can 
create separate factors (although a solution with fewer factors can be forced; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Explanations for affluence were also assessed by 
Furnham (1983). He had a British community sample rate fifteen potential 
explanations, similar to those used for poverty and unemployment. FA revealed four 
factors; individualistic, fatalistic, societal and privilege, however the last two factors 
only contained two items each; four a priori societal items failed to load and four 
items had very low loadings (just above the 0.40 cut-off). 
 
Forgas, Furnham and Frey (1989) assessed attributions for affluence cross-culturally 
                                                           
10Of course, we would expect that as people get older their attitudes and beliefs will become more 
coherent and consistent, but the gap between these two samples was less than five years. 
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(British, Australian and German samples). They found four factors: family 
background, individual qualities, social factors and luck. The extra category of 
background seems logical, as the family could be seen as individualistic, systemic or 
fatalistic. Other cross-national studies (Furnham & Hesketh, 1989; Payne & 
Furnham, 1990) have found six factors for explaining unemployment, but not the 
same ones. Generally though, the individualistic/systemic distinction could be 
applied.  
 
 
3.3 ATTRIBUTIONS FOR DIFFERENT SOCIAL 
PHENOMENA 
 
3.3.1 POVERTY AND WEALTH 
 
Generally, the findings regarding poverty and wealth have been in line with those 
reported by Feagin and Feather, such that explanations tend to fall into 
individualistic and systemic patterns11 but that differences exist in the types of 
attributions favoured by different groups within society. Specifically, connections 
were found between types of attributions for poverty and wealth and voting 
preferences (Forgas et al., 1989; Furnham, 1982b, 1983; Lewis, 1981) and ideological 
groupings (Pandey, Sinha, Prakash & Tripathi, 1982; Zucker & Weiner, 1993). Some 
differences were also found in types of explanations preferred for different social 
groups within society (Furnham, 1982b; 1983). 
 
 Adrian Furnham conducted a series of studies into causal attributions for poverty, 
unemployment and affluence, mainly in England. The first of these (Furnham, 
1982b) examined lay explanations for poverty, particularly for differences in 
                                                           
11 Not surprisingly, given the items were typically designed to demonstrate this.  
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explanations favoured by the sexes and by supporters of different political parties. 
Furnham included four individualistic, seven societal and four fatalistic explanations, 
eleven of which were Feagin’s (1972) originals and four added from pilot interviews 
(rated on a seven-point scale). No sex differences were found at the item level but, as 
expected, Conservative voters endorsed individualistic explanations more than 
Labour voters and Labour supporters favoured systemic explanations more than 
Conservatives. Liberal Party voters fell in between. No significant differences were 
found among the fatalistic items. FA revealed four significant factors; two societal, 
one individualistic and one fatalistic. Labour voters endorsed both the societal factors 
significantly more, and the individualistic factor significantly less, than 
Conservatives.  
 
The second part of Furnham’s (1982b) study was the application of the explanations 
to different target groups: working-class Blacks and Whites, and middle-class Blacks 
and Whites. While similar results were found here as in the generalised explanations 
section, one notable difference was the endorsement of more systemic explanations 
by all participants when describing working-class Blacks, most likely in recognition of 
discrimination. Conservatives particularly favoured societal explanations for poverty 
among both classes of Blacks, compared to the explanations favoured for Whites. 
Labour voters favoured individualistic explanations more for the middle-class than 
the working-class. These findings suggested key differences in the way Tory versus 
Labour supporters thought about society, in terms of class versus race. It also implied 
a more complex causal ideology than Feagin or Feather had accounted for, in which 
individualistic explanations were only favoured in the absence of clear structural 
limitations.     
 
Furnham (1983) investigated the causal attributions people made for affluence, 
assuming that people would favour the same types of explanation for wealth as they 
did for poverty. Fifteen possible explanations were included, drawn from research on  
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explanations for poverty, and success and failure. There explanations were a priori 
classified as individualistic (four), societal (seven) and fatalistic (four). Participants 
rated how important these explanations were for wealth generally, and for four 
specific groups (working-class Blacks and Whites, middle-class Blacks and Whites). 
FA revealed four factors, labelled individualistic (four items), societal (two), privilege 
(two) and fatalistic (three). The individualistic factor included items that Furnham 
had classified as societal (“society rewards those who work hard”) and fatalistic 
(“being born with good business sense”). The societal factor consisted of the 
economic system creating inequality and the belief that “the rich are ruthless and 
determined”. The fatalistic factor included the individualistic “hard work and great 
effort by the rich”, while four of the societal items failed to load on any of the factors.  
 
A comparison of political party supporters indicated that Labour voters endorsed the 
privilege factor significantly more than Conservatives, while the reverse was true for 
the individualistic factor. Neither sex nor education (numbers of levels not specified) 
had significant effects. When the explanations for target groups were assessed, no 
differences were found between Labour and Conservative supporters in terms of 
which explanations were most important in accounting for wealth among Blacks from 
the working- or middle-class.12 The explanations favoured for Whites from different 
classes were quite different, and a significant effect for vote was found in preferred 
explanations. Again, Conservatives favoured individualistic explanations for the 
middle-class and Labour supporters favoured societal, although inheritance was 
rated most important overall.13 
 
Lewis (1981) also found similar results to Furnham (1983) when examining 
attributions for wealth among a British sample. He reported that Conservative voters 
                                                           
12For both Black groups “being born with good business sense”, “having a lucky break” and “being 
very intelligent” were important; “inheriting wealth” was important for middle-class only. 
13For working-class Whites: good business sense, luck and “very high wages in some businesses and 
industries” were favoured. 
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were significantly more likely to see the wealthy as having worked hard and made the 
most of their opportunities, compared to Labour and Liberal supporters. The 
Conservatives were also less likely to believe wealth was due to luck or “help from 
others”. While Lewis had a large, representative sample, the attribution measure was 
limited, consisting of only four items.  
 
Forgas and colleagues (1989) examined attributions for wealth in Australian, British 
and German samples. Participants were provided with fifteen possible explanations 
for wealth and, in an open-ended response section, were asked to indicate the six 
reasons most important in accounting for wealth. Four scales emerged from FA: 
family background, individual qualities, social factors and luck. Family background 
was supported most by the British participants, while Australians endorsed 
individual qualities far more than the other two groups. These findings can be 
understood in terms of the entrenched and overt class structure of British society as 
opposed to the (proclaimed) egalitarianism of Australia (Forgas et al.). However, vote 
was the most important variable in assessing differences on the social factor; left-
wing voters supported it significantly more than right-wing voters. No significant 
effects were found for the luck factor.   
 
The free-response explanations were grouped into seven super-ordinate categories: 
effort, ability, family, exploitation, social rewards, profession and luck. The British 
favoured family, individual effort and exploitation explanations most. The 
Australians felt effort, ability and profession were most important, while for the 
Germans it was family, exploitation and ability. These findings confirmed the 
differences between the three societies in the types of attributions they made for 
wealth, although family and individual effort responses were the most common cross-
nationally (Forgas et al., 1989). Unlike with poverty, the Australians favoured 
individualistic explanations more than systemic ones, possibly connected to strong 
Protestant Work Ethic beliefs in Australia (e.g., Feather, 1984). Overall, it seemed  
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that the entrenchment of privilege was acknowledged, but that individual effort could 
overcome this.  
 
A study in India specifically examined whether student supporters of different 
political organisations would differ in the importance they assigned to different 
causes of poverty (Pandey at al., 1982). Students were selected on the basis of their 
membership of either a left- or right-wing group.14 Non-aligned students were also 
included. The importance of eight explanations for poverty in India, which had been 
classified as self, fate, government and economic dominance (two items each), were 
rated.15 Overall, the results indicated that the students endorsed systemic over 
individualistic explanations for poverty. However, right-wing and neutral 
respondents attributed poverty significantly more to the self, compared to the left-
wing group. The leftists endorsed both the government and economic dominance 
items significantly more than the other groups. There were no significant differences 
between the right-wing and neutral groups.  
 
3.3.2 UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
There have been numerous studies involving causal attributions for unemployment, 
particularly among young people (perhaps reflecting public concern over this issue at 
the time this research was conducted). Feather and his colleagues conducted several 
studies, using students or young people as participants. Researchers have generally 
expected to find evidence of the actor-observer effect16 when comparing the 
unemployed to other young people; however, the results have varied depending on 
t h e  c o m p a r i s o n  g r o u p .  H i g h  s c h o o l  s t u d e n t s  h a v e  b e e n  s h o w n  t o  f a v o u r  
                                                           
14 Participants were tested to ensure that their beliefs matched those of their professed political 
affiliation. 
15 However, FA would have been appropriate (to determine whether or not responses were better 
explained by fewer factors), or at least an assessment of internal reliability. 
16People are more likely to attribute their own behaviour to situational factors, but blame the behaviour 
of others on their dispositions (Jones & Nisbett, 1972); favour systemic for self, individualistic for 
others. 
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individualistic explanations (Feather, 1985), while the unemployed prefer systemic 
attributions (Feather & Barber, 1983; Feather & Davenport, 1981). University 
students have tended to support systemic explanations more (Feather, 1985), even 
when directly compared to the unemployed (Guimond, Bégin & Palmer, 1989a). 
Furnham (1982c) compared the preferred explanations for joblessness of employed 
and unemployed British adults. His results were mixed, with some individualistic 
items endorsed more by the employed and some by the unemployed; however, both 
groups blamed current and past government policies the most.  
 
3.3.2.a Youth unemployment 
Feather and Davenport (1981) found two factors which matched the internal/external 
distinction from the 28 items offered as possible explanations for the joblessness of 
212 unemployed Australian youths. Those participants who reported (retrospectively) 
that they were more confident of obtaining employment initially were more inclined 
to blame external difficulties for their failure to gain employment and less likely to 
blame themselves. Feather and Barber’s (1983) study of unemployed young people 
(n=116) found that although external explanations were favoured overall (eight items: 
four systemic, four individualistic), the endorsement of internal causes increased the 
longer the period of unemployment. These findings were contrary to other research 
where people in negative situations were less likely to blame themselves (e.g., Feagin, 
1972; Feather, 1974). Higher levels of depression, however, were also reported among 
those unemployed the longest; hence internal blame may be a consequence or a cause 
of participants’ depression.  
 
Feather (1983) compared causal attributions for unemployment among Australian 
high-school children. The 650 Year 9 and 10 students were provided with nineteen 
possible explanations for unemployment (nine individualistic, nine societal and one 
fatalistic), which they rated using Feagin’s (1972) three-point scale. Individualistic 
i t e m s ,  s u c h  a s  “ l a c k  o f  e f f o r t ”  a n d  “ l a c k  o f  i n t e r e s t ” ,  w e r e  m o s t  f a v o u r e d  b y  t h e   
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participants. The fatalistic item, “temporary bad luck”, was rated “not important” by 
71.1% of respondents. High-school students, with limited experience of the workforce, 
clearly favoured an individual-blame model for joblessness.  
 
Some differences were found between students from different types of schools 
though, with public school students endorsing several systemic explanations17 
significantly more than those from wealthy private schools, who, in turn, supported 
individualistic explanations significantly more than those from State schools.18 
Feather reported seven factors from a FA of the nineteen items, but only five were 
considered interpretable, each with only two items, and therefore likely to be 
unstable.19 There seemed to be one structural and four individualistic factors, and an 
ANOVA of school type showed that public school students scored significantly higher 
on the structural factor (“economic situation”), while private school participants 
endorsed one individualistic factor more (“interview/appearance inadequacy”). These 
findings were most likely linked to background characteristics such as socioeconomic 
status, as well as likelihood of contact with unemployment. 
 
The relationship between ideological values and causal attributions for youth 
unemployment was also examined by Feather (1985). Twenty-seven possible 
explanations were rated for their importance on a five-point scale by 265 Australian 
psychology students. Students’ conservatism and voting preferences were also 
assessed. FA revealed eight factors (after orthogonal rotation) which were converted 
into seven scales: lack of motivation, competence deficiency, defective government, 
personal handicap, social change, economic recession and specific competition. 
Overall, the external explanations were seen as more important than the internal 
ones. The lack of motivation, personal handicap, social change and specific 
                                                           
17“The economic situation in Australia”, “Failure of private industry to create jobs”, “Government 
failure to create jobs” and “too many married women in the workforce” (Feather, 1983, p.222). 
18The State schools were in working class areas; the one Catholic and two Protestant Independent 
schools were considered elite and located in affluent areas (Feather, 1983). 
19 The later extracted factors in FA are more likely to have few variables and to actually be outliers, 
rather than real components (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).  
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competition scales were positively correlated with conservatism score and 
conservative voting preference (Liberal Party). Conservatism was negatively 
correlated with the defective government and economic recession scales.20 
Conservatism and conservative voting preference were moderately, but significantly, 
correlated.  
 
In the second study reported in Feather (1985), 334 Year 11 students (16 year-olds) 
rated the same twenty-seven explanations for youth unemployment. Participants 
were also required to rank Rokeach’s (1973) terminal and instrumental values and 
provide a (hypothetical) voting preference. Again, FA revealed eight factors which 
Feather converted into six scales that were similar, but not identical, to those found 
previously (lack of motivation, recession and social change, competence deficiency, 
defective job creation, personal handicap and specific discrimination).  
 
Overall, the recession/social change, defective job creation and competence 
deficiency scales were seen as most important in explaining youth unemployment. 
The high-school students saw lack of motivation as more important than did the 
university participants in Study 1. This was consistent with findings from Feather’s 
previously mentioned research involving high-school students. Defective job creation 
was negatively related to conservative voting preference, while conservative voting 
preference was positively related to social class.  
 
General social values (e.g., “a world at peace”, “equality”) were found to be positively 
related to favouring external explanations for youth unemployment. More 
individualistic values (e.g., “capable”, “courageous”) were positively related to 
endorsing internal explanations. Feather (1985) concluded that the attributions 
endorsed for general social phenomena, such as unemployment, were “especially 
                                                           
20At the time the data was collected the Hawke ALP Government had just won power, after eight years 
of Liberal Government. 
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likely to reflect underlying sociopolitical attitudes and values” (p.886), but the 
explanations provided for specific cases, at specific times may be different, especially 
if people have first-hand knowledge of the event. However, the discrepancy between 
psychology and high-school students was noteworthy, with the former favouring 
external explanations more, and was more likely due to their shared characteristics 
than to their age or workforce experience.  
 
Guimond, Bégin & Palmer (1989a) compared attributions for both poverty and 
unemployment made by Canadian social science students and unemployed young 
people. Results indicated that the social science students blamed the person 
significantly less than the unemployed for both Francophones’ (French-speaking 
Canadians) economic position, and poverty and unemployment. Again, the actor-
observer effect was not supported when social science students were compared to the 
unemployed (see Chapter 2 for more detail). However, despite their age, most of the 
jobless sample would be considered long-term unemployed, with a mean of 21.9 
months; less than half had ever worked (Guimond et al., 1989a), therefore this 
finding was consistent with  Feather and Barber (1983) regarding increased use of 
internal attributions in explaining own unemployment the longer the period of 
joblessness.  
 
3.3.2.b Adult unemployment 
Furnham (1982c) examined attributions for unemployment among both the 
employed and unemployed British samples. There were 20 explanations for 
unemployment (eight individualistic, eight societal and four fatalistic), drawn from 
pilot interviews and media content analyses. The items regarded as most important 
by both employed and unemployed participants were the policies of the present and 
previous governments and “worldwide recession and inflation”. FA indicated five 
factors best fit the data: one individualistic, two societal (labelled education and 
government policy) and two fatalistic (incompetence and outside influence).  
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However, most of these factors were mixed, according to Furnham’s a priori 
classifications.21 A second FA (employed only) produced four factors: one 
individualistic, two fatalistic and one societal. No mention was made of any testing 
for pre-existing differences between the two subsamples, but there was most likely a 
difference in education level, at the very least, which may explain the more cohesive 
nature of the second FA.  
 
One-way ANOVAs on the first set of factors revealed that the unemployed favoured 
the societal/education and fatalistic/outside influence factors more than the 
employed (supporting the actor-observer effect). The unemployed were significantly 
less likely to support the fatalistic/incompetence factor than those with jobs. 
Individualistic explanations were not considered particularly important by the whole 
sample or the subgroups. Labour voters endorsed individualistic explanations less 
than Conservatives. Labour supporters blamed government policies significantly 
more than Conservatives, who blamed unions significantly more than Labour voters. 
Some educational differences were found at item-level, with a linear trend noticeable 
(no factor-level analysis by demographic variables was reported). The higher the 
participants’ levels of education, the less likely they were to endorse lack of effort, 
being fussy, an influx of immigrants or weak trade unions as reasons for 
unemployment.  
 
3.3.2.c Cross-cultural comparisons 
Furnham also conducted a series of studies with different colleagues comparing 
attributions for unemployment between different countries. Furnham and Hesketh 
(1989) compared the British employed sample from Furnham (1982c) with full-time 
                                                           
21The individualistic factor included “trade unions have priced members out of a job”; the 
societal/education factor included “weak trade unions that do not fight to keep jobs”, and the 
societal/government policy factor included “lack of intelligence or ability among unemployed”. Only 
small amounts of variance were explained by the non-individualistic factors. Another FA, with a 
smaller number of specified factors (e.g., three) may have produced more meaningful results, although 
perhaps separate structures were appropriate for the two groups, given likely background differences. 
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employed New Zealand participants. Six factors were extracted from the twenty 
explanations: two each of individualistic, societal and fatalistic. The New Zealanders 
endorsed the individualistic factors for unemployment significantly more than the 
British participants, who endorsed the societal factors significantly more. However, 
both groups rated the same two societal items as the most important overall, so these 
differences were more a matter of strength than direction. Those who supported 
right-wing parties endorsed the individualistic factors more, and the societal factors 
less, than left-wing voters. The much higher unemployment rate in Britain at the time 
of the data collection may have accounted for the differences (Furnham & Hesketh), 
although the New Zealand sample also had less extreme scores than the British.22  
 
Payne and Furnham (1990) examined explanations for unemployment among young 
people in Barbados using Furnham’s (1982c) twenty attributions for unemployment. 
At the time of the data collection the unemployment rate was relatively high and still 
rising (18.3%; Payne & Furnham). The participants were divided roughly evenly 
between employed, looking for work and not looking (mostly students). FA yielded 
six factors labelled: lack of effort, lack of ability, trade unions, government policy, 
regional/worldwide change and industrial management. Overall, the last two factors, 
containing fatalistic and economic items, were endorsed the most. Barbadians may 
have been particularly aware of the influence of international factors as their 
economy relied heavily on tourism and manufacturing for multinationals (who were 
leaving the area for cheaper markets in South-east Asia at the time) (Payne & 
Furnham, 1990). Participants’ employment status did not have a significant effect on 
their responses, which suggested the importance of culture and specific situations 
when examining explanations for complex social phenomena.  
 
                                                           
22 This may have been due to cultural, sample or procedural differences (New Zealanders were all 
undertaking university degrees by correspondence, most of the British sample were “regular” workers; 
former tested in class, latter multiple testing situations).  
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Ward (1991) attempted to replicate the factor structure found in the previous studies 
(Furnham & Hesketh, 1989; Payne & Furnham, 1990) with an American business 
student sample. Principal components analysis (PCA) revealed seven factors which 
Ward named macroeconomics (societal and fatalistic), fecklessness, lack of flexibility 
(both individualistic), political (government policies), chance (fatalistic), automation 
and unemployment compensation. Some factors were very small (factors 4 and 5 had 
two and 6 and 7 one item) and likely to be unstable, and the sample size was small 
(n=114); confirmatory FA (with oblique rotation) would have been more appropriate. 
 
Unlike the previous studies, Ward (1991) found a societal factor was most dominant 
(both previous studies found an individualistic factor accounted for the most variance 
within the sample). Ward attributed this to the relatively high unemployment rate in 
the area where the study was conducted (13.2%), however, he did not provide any 
mean scores for the factors, so it was not known which actually received the most 
support. Rather than using FA to create independent variables, Ward seemed to 
believe that the factor that accounted for the most variance was the most supported. 
In fact the two items with the most support made up two thirds of the fecklessness 
factor, which suggested that individualistic explanations might have been the most 
favoured by the sample. No comparisons were made on the basis of demographic 
information or voting cleavages, both of which had previously been found to produce 
significant within-sample differences.23   
 
3.3.4 ATTRIBUTIONS FOR THIRD WORLD POVERTY 
 
Much of the research in this area has been more recent, and been explicitly linked to 
belief in a just world. The notion of Just World Beliefs (JWB) is that people are 
motivated to believe that the world is a just and ordered place (Lerner, 1965). Later 
                                                           
23 Vote was likely to have been particularly important; “policies and strategies of previous 
administrations” and “…the present administration” were rated differently, (means= 3.8 and 4.2, 
respectively).   
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research has focused on JWB as an individual difference variable (e.g., Rubin & 
Peplau, 1975; also see Chapter 4). Third World poverty research has typically relied 
on Harper, Wagstaff, Newton and Harrison’s (1990) Causes of Third World Poverty 
Questionnaire (CTWPQ). The CTWPQ contained eighteen items and was originally 
found to form four scales: blaming the poor, Third World Governments, nature, and 
exploitation. However, Harper and colleagues only utilised sample of 89. They 
assessed the Just World Scale (JWS; Rubin & Peplau) as two scales: pro-JWB and 
anti-JWB. Harper and colleagues found that pro-JWB were positively correlated with 
blaming the poor. Others have found that both pro- and anti-JWB were associated 
with blaming the poor (Campbell, Carr & MacLachlan, 2001; Carr & MacLachlan, 
1998). Community samples of Australians and Malawians24 showed evidence of the 
actor-observer effect in explaining Third World poverty (Campbell et al., 2001), but 
the reverse was found among university students (Carr & MacLachlan, 1998).   
 
Harper and Manasse (1992) examined the relationship between attributions for 
poverty in the Third World and JWB (using data from Harper et al., 1990). The study 
used a community sample of British adults, who were classified as high, medium or 
low in JWB, based on the Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975), and who 
completed the CTWPQ (Harper et al., 1990). Those who had low JWB endorsed three 
items from the CTWPQ significantly more than high believers (blaming exploitation, 
war and world economic systems), demonstrating a slightly greater preference for 
systemic explanations.  
 
The relationship between JWB and attributions for Third World poverty was also 
investigated by comparing Australian and Malawian psychology students (Carr & 
MacLachlan, 1998). An actor-observer effect was expected, whereby Australian 
students would favour dispositional explanations and Malawians situational ones. 
                                                           
24 Malawi is a small, landlocked central African nation. It was ruled by the British (as Nyasaland) until 
gaining independence in 1964, and became a republic in 1966. It has a literacy rate of about 41%, a life 
expectancy of 46 and a population of 12 million (in 1999, Malawian Ministry of Information, 2000).  
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The study used large samples, although the sex distributions were vastly different 
(71% of Malawians were male versus 31% of Australians). The authors argued that 
this reflected the distribution of university students in their respective countries, and 
while this may be true for the discipline of psychology, around 45% of Australian 
university students are male (AusStats, 2003), with a slight decrease in males over 
time (in 1991, 46.7%; AusStats). The CTWPQ and the JWS were the dependent 
measures. Attitudes towards foreign aid and individual donations were also assessed. 
 
FA of the CTWPQ yielded four factors (blame the poor, government, nature and 
exploitation) and for the JWS two factors (pro-JWB and anti-JWB), as found by 
Harper and colleagues (1990). The results indicated that Australians supported all 
three situational factors significantly more than the Malawians, who blamed the poor 
significantly more than the Australians. Blaming outside exploitation was found to be 
negatively related to pro-JWB. Unusually, blaming the poor was positively associated 
with both the pro- and anti-JWB factors. Generally, those who blamed the poor the 
least were the most supportive of personal donations, but no relationship was found 
between donating and JWB. The finding that blaming the poor was positively related 
to both pro- and anti-JWB was unusual, but still logical. Those who believe the world 
is just think that the poor get what they deserve; those who believe it is unjust realise 
that it is everyone for themselves (Carr & MacLachlan, 1998).   
 
The finding of a reversed actor-observer effect was most likely due to the inclusion of 
solely university student samples. Malawi has only one university, with very 
competitive entry, and those who graduate enter the nation’s small elite. In such a 
competitive environment they had to believe that their extraordinary individual effort 
was responsible for their success (Carr & MacLachlan, 1998). In contrast, previous 
research with Australian psychology student samples has shown that they favour 
systemic over individualistic attributions (e.g., Feather, 1985). However, the issue of 
the samples’ sex difference was not considered. Results indicated that women  
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endorsed the situational factors significantly more, and blamed the poor less, than 
men, which could have been due to more women in the Australian sample or more 
Australians in the female sample.  
 
Campbell and colleagues (2001) followed on from Carr and MacLachlan (1998) by 
using community samples, instead of students. Data were obtained from participants 
in major shopping areas in Malawi (n=98) and Australia (n=100). Measures included 
the CTWPQ, JWS and questions about donations to developing nations. The CTWPQ 
again yielded four factors: blame the poor, government and nature, but the fourth 
factor was now blame war. A comparison of the two nations indicated that 
Australians favoured blame the poor and war significantly more than Malawians, 
supporting an actor-observer effect. 
 
Analysis of only the Australian sample indicated four factors from the CTWPQ (with 
blame war now blame war and exploitation) and three from the JWS (pro- and anti-
JWB and a “reserved belief in a just world”; Campbell et al., 2001, p.418). The last 
factor was disregarded and six scales were calculated. Blaming the poor was again 
significantly positively correlated with both pro- and anti-JWB. Anti-JWB were also 
positively associated with blaming nature. Students were less likely to blame the poor 
compared to those in managerial, professional, white-collar or blue-collar 
occupations, confirming previous findings. Men had significantly higher pro-JWB 
than women did. The results largely supported the previous study, while highlighting 
the difference between psychology students and the general population. However, the 
r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  F A  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  s h o u l d  b e  r e g a r d e d  w i t h  c a u t i o n ,  g i v e n  t h e  s m a l l  
sample size. 
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3.3.5 CHILDREN’S ATTRIBUTIONS 
 
Beliefs about poverty and wealth have been found among children from about the age 
of four, suggesting that the distinction was recognised early. Leahy has been a major 
researcher in this area, investigating American children’s beliefs about the poor and 
the wealthy. Leahy (1983) outlined a model for the development of social class and 
inequality conceptions, based on the findings of his major study, which involved 720 
children (aged 6-18) from four social classes and two races (Black and White). The 
first stage of the model, Peripheral-Dependent (~6-11 years), featured the use of 
definitional explanations for poverty and wealth (e.g., “got no food”; wealthy have 
things, poor don’t). The rich and poor are identified by their clothing, car, house and 
other peripheral details. 
 
The second stage is Psychological, where older children/adolescents (~11-14) rely on 
psychological qualities to define rich and poor (e.g., traits, thoughts, motivations). 
Children at this stage often used equity (individualistic) explanations, based on 
education, work, effort and motivation, to explain inequality. The last stage is termed 
Sociocentric, where adolescents recognise psychological commonalities between the 
groups and attributed their differences to life chances (especially when discussing the 
wealthy). Very few adolescents mentioned class-consciousness in Leahy’s research 
and individualistic explanations still dominated (as among adults). Some lower status 
adolescents in the study did mention the need to change the social structure but most 
(especially the upper-middle class) believed that inequality was inevitable. Leahy 
concluded that “with increasing age, generally regardless of the child’s group 
membership, there is increasing justification of economic inequality” (1983, p.106), 
which was clearly consistent with the dominant values of their society.  
 
Ramsey’s (1991) research in this area, involving four and five year olds, demonstrated 
an early awareness of socioeconomic differences. Her study included ninety-three  
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children, half from working and half from middle class backgrounds. When children 
were required to classify people in photographs as rich or poor they were significantly 
more accurate than would have been expected by chance, and girls were better than 
boys. This was attributed to gender differences in social development. Most of the 
children matched Leahy’s (1983) Peripheral-Definitional stage, mentioning details 
like clothing and defining each category by ‘having things’ (or not). Most children 
could not think of a way to stop people being poor; however, “sharing” was the most 
common response when one was provided, representing the norm sharing which 
develops in the early primary school years, as well as the redistributions of wealth 
model inherent in income taxation and social security systems. The beginnings of 
m o r e  r e a l i s t i c  c o n c e p t i o n s  o f  w e a l t h  w e r e  e v i d e n t ,  w i t h  8 %  o f  c h i l d r e n  c l a i m i n g  
money came from work. No major class differences were found.    
 
 
3.4 RELATIONSHIPS TO OTHER VARIABLES 
 
Kluegel and Smith conducted the most comprehensive study in this area, detailed in 
their book Beliefs about Inequality: Americans’ views on what is and what ought to 
be (1986). The study, conducted in 1980, included a large, representative sample of 
adult Americans. It was generally focused on support for the “dominant ideology”, 
which was defined as including beliefs that both poverty and wealth were determined 
by individualistic factors. Kluegel and Smith utilised Feagin’s (1972) poverty 
explanations and numerous wealth explanations (e.g., inheritance, hard work, willing 
to take risks, exploitation). PCA of both sets of explanations revealed each had 
individualistic and structural factors (luck items failed to load on any factor). Both 
individualistic factors received greater support overall than their structural 
equivalents, with individuals being held most responsible for their situations.   
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There were several group differences in support for the economic outcome factors. 
The groups most supportive of structural explanations for both poverty and wealth 
were women, the young, non-Whites, and those with low incomes and education 
levels. Those most supportive of individualistic explanations for wealth were men, the 
old, Whites and high-income earners, with no effect for education. Individualistic 
explanations for poverty were endorsed significantly more by older people and the 
less educated. The impact of education on the endorsement of individualistic 
explanations led Kluegel and Smith to conclude that the “socially liberalizing effects 
of education counteract the status effects” (1986, p.92).  
 
Policy attitudes of participants were also examined. Those who favoured structural 
explanations for poverty were significantly more inclined to support welfare and most 
other redistributive policies.  T h o s e  w i t h  h i g h  l e v e l s  o f  e d u c a t i o n  w e r e  a l s o  m o r e  
supportive of welfare (with income controlled). High support for individualistic 
explanations for poverty led to rejection of all welfare measures. Guaranteed jobs was 
again the most supported anti-poverty policy (as in Feagin, 1972). There was a 
substantial positive correlation between the use of structural explanations and 
support for a more egalitarian society (as measured by different items about the need 
for equality). 
 
Smith and Stone’s (1989) oft-cited study took a slightly different approach to 
previous research, focusing on four pervading “metatheories” used to explain poverty 
and wealth in American society. These were: individualism, culturalism, 
structuralism and fatalism.25 Smith and Stone argued that these metatheories 
“filter(ed) perceptions and provide(d) the cognitive framework for evaluating all of 
the alleged causes of wealth and poverty” (p.95), much as Campbell and colleagues 
                                                           
25 The other three matched typical categorisations while culturalism referred to when the social 
structure and personality traits worked together to maintain position, both high and low, also known as 
subculturalism (a combination of individualistic and systemic; socialisation within a specific 
subculture, e.g., rich, White, high SES).  
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(1960) viewed party identification. Scales were created for both poverty and wealth, 
which included explanations from all four metatheories, and each item was rated on a 
three-point scale of importance (as in Feagin, 1972). The participants were a 
randomly selected sample of adults from one American state. 
 
FA of both the poverty and wealth scales produced three factors each: individualistic, 
systemic and fatalistic. The culturalism factor failed to emerge on either scale, while 
the fatalistic wealth factor was “poorly patterned” (Smith & Stone, 1989, p.100), 
although all the others had reasonable internal reliability. However, Smith and Stone 
chose to use the items’ original categorisations to determine which theory best fit the 
data, rather than their FA results. For poverty, the individualism theory was by far 
the best supported, while for wealth it was culturalism, although individualism was 
also important here. No effects were found for age, sex, race or income. An 
assessment based on the actual underlying structure of the data (as indicated by FA), 
rather than the hypothesised one, may have provided more accurate evidence of the 
type of explanations people favoured. 
 
Heaven (1989) examined the relationship between attributions for poverty and 
beliefs about economic locus of control among an Australian community sample 
(n=285). Using Furnham’s (1982b) poverty explanations, Heaven reported three 
factors; societal, negative individualistic, and “characterological”. The last scale 
included lack of ability and talent and lack of intelligence. It was found that those 
who believed their economic situations were due to internal factors were more 
supportive of negative individualistic explanations for poverty. Favouring societal 
attributions was significantly related to believing that chance and powerful others 
(external influences) were responsible for people’s economic situations. While 
supporting the factor structure found by previous research, this study also 
demonstrated another link between explanations for social phenomena and other 
beliefs about the world.       
  76
 
Zucker and Weiner (1993) focused on the relationship between attributions for 
poverty and ideology, in their case, ‘conservatism’ (right-wing economic beliefs).26 
They also suggested that the perceived controllability of the causes of poverty would 
impact on people’s willingness to offer assistance to those in need. Three factors 
emerged from a PCA conducted on the poverty explanations, matching the 
individualistic, societal and fatalistic factors found previously. The conservatism 
measure was found to be positively related to endorsement of individualistic 
attributions, believing that poverty was controllable and blaming individuals for their 
situations. Conservatism was also negatively related to favouring societal 
explanations for poverty and willingness to help or provide welfare assistance. It was 
concluded that the “data clearly support(ed) a linkage between ideology and 
attributions” (Zucker & Weiner, 1993, p.938). 
 
Another study investigated the relationship between ideology and attributions for 
homelessness with a college student sample (Pellegrini et al., 1997). However, the 
measures offered were quite limited, with three forced choice items (internal or 
external cause of homelessness, funding for homelessness increased, same or 
decreased, and Republican or Democrat identifier). The results indicated that 
Democrat supporters preferred the external option significantly more than 
Republican identifiers. Democrats were also significantly more in favour of increasing 
spending on programmes to alleviate homelessness. No significant sex differences 
were found. While these results were consistent with previous research the measures 
were decidedly crude and non-parametric statistics were used.   
 
Bullock (1999) compared middle-class and poor Americans’ attitudes towards the 
welfare system and the causes of poverty. None of the middle-class participants had 
                                                           
26 Assessed by a combined measure of self-report and Sidanius’s (1976) Conservatism Scale, economic 
dimension (the racial dimension was initially used but the results were significantly skewed towards the 
liberal end).  
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ever received welfare, or had any family members who had received welfare, and all 
had college degrees. All of the poor respondents were either current welfare 
recipients, or had recently been excluded,27 and were recruited through social service 
agencies. Those in the middle-class sample were more educated, more likely to be 
married and more likely to be regular voters, compared to the poor respondents.  
 
Bullock used Furnham’s (1982b) attributions for poverty scale, with a FA revealing 
three factors (structural, individualistic and fatalistic/structural). An “Attitudes to 
Welfare Questionnaire” was also used; an ‘Americanised’ version of Furnham’s 
(1985) “Attitudes to Social Security Questionnaire”. FA indicated three components: 
social legitimacy (e.g., “welfare is a right not a privilege”), dishonesty/idleness (e.g., 
“encourages people not to work”), and shame/stigma (only one item above 0.4 
loading; “people are often ashamed of being on welfare”). There were also questions 
about the reform of the AFDC (Aid for Families with Dependent Children) benefits 
system, which the welfare authorities were reviewing at the time of testing. 
 
Analysis of variance results indicated that middle-class respondents did not favour 
individualistic explanations significantly more than poor participants, although they 
did favour individualistic over systemic explanations overall. Welfare recipients 
endorsed systemic explanations more than the middle-class sample, and supported 
systemic more than individualistic attributions overall. For the attitudes to welfare 
factors, the poor respondents endorsed both social legitimacy and dishonesty 
significantly more than the middle-class participants. The middle-class sample, not 
surprisingly, was more in favour of increasing restrictions on welfare, with significant 
differences found on eight of the nine AFDC reform items included.28 The middle-
class participants were also more likely to believe in permanent welfare dependency. 
Republican voters had significantly higher individualistic and lower structural factor 
                                                           
27Due to the time limits placed on the receipt of some benefits in the U.S. 
28For example: “people should be limited to two years of AFDC”, “the AFDC should not be available 
to single, teenage mothers”, “AFDC should be completely eliminated”. 
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scores, compared to Democrat voters (only middle-class sample analysed due to lack 
of voters in poor sample).  
 
These results again highlighted the discrepancies in attitudes between those in 
different circumstances. Just as the high school students are more likely to blame the 
individual than are unemployed youths (Feather, 1983; Feather & Barber, 1983), so 
those who have never experienced welfare are more likely to blame the individual and 
to believe that welfare should be restricted. The benefits of believing that the 
individual is responsible for their own situation are twofold: no possibility it could 
happen to them, and it allowed people to avoid helping the poor, because they are 
held responsible for their own situation.  
 
Griffin and Oheneba-Sakyi (1993) assessed the relationship of some demographic 
and political variables to causal attributions for poverty. However, their dependent 
measure was a single statement to which participants had to agree or disagree, with 
all other responses excluded (“many poor people simply do not want to work hard”). 
Using logistic regression, all other variables were compared for their ability to predict 
response to the dependent variable.29 Those significantly less likely to agree that poor 
people did not want to work hard were from working-class backgrounds, identified as 
liberal and opposed the death penalty, when all other variables were controlled. 
While it could be concluded that blaming individuals for their poverty was more 
common among the bourgeoisie and conservatives, the single item used to assess 
attributions for poverty may have been unreliable or been subject to a social 
desirability effect. Multiple items are the preferred method in this area, with multiple 
response categories included. 
 
                                                           
29 Age: <=20 vs. >=21, Sex, Parents’ social class: upper-middle vs. working, Political affiliation: liberal 
vs. middle-of-the-road/conservative and Death penalty: favour vs. oppose.  
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Cozzarelli, Wilkinson and Tagler (2001) went beyond attributions for poverty and 
also examined the relationships between cognitive and affective components of 
attitudes to the poor and ideological values. As well as twenty-two possible 
explanations for poverty (based on Feagin, 1972, and Smith & Stone, 1989), they 
included a twelve-item affect scale (e.g., “I generally like poor people”) and thirty-
eight characteristic items, which were rated in terms of how well they described both 
the poor and the middle-class. These items formed the cognitive attitude component 
(e.g., “capable”, “proud”, “weak”, “criminal”). The ideological values assessed were 
the Protestant ethic (Mirels & Garrett, 1971), Just World Beliefs (Rubin & Peplau, 
1973) and Right-wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981).  
 
PCA was conducted on the poverty attributions, with a three-factor solution specified. 
The three factors that emerged were labelled external (primarily economic), internal, 
and cultural attributions (related to a “subculture of poverty”; Cozzarelli et al., 2001, 
p.217). The latter factor included items such as “being born into poverty” and “the 
breakdown of the nuclear family” (evidence of Smith and Stone’s, 1989, culturalism). 
A PCA of the characteristics scale revealed two factors, one of positive and one of 
negative traits, although not all items loaded sufficiently highly to be included. These 
factors were labelled positive and negative stereotypes and were negatively 
correlated. The affective items were combined to create a single score.    
 
Generally, the participants indicated positive affect toward the poor, and the greater 
the positive affect, the greater the endorsement of positive stereotypes about the 
poor. However, respondents were also significantly more likely to hold negative 
stereotypes about the poor than the middle-class, and significantly more likely to 
endorse positive stereotypes about the middle-class. The participants also supported 
individualistic attributions significantly more than either societal or cultural 
attributions. Internal attributions were also positively correlated with negative 
stereotypes about the poor.   
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A regression analysis indicated little impact of the ideological measures in predicting 
affective or cognitive responses to the poor. Even with these variables controlled, 
however, voting preference was a significant predictor of attitude towards the poor, 
with Democrats and Independents significantly more positive and less negative, 
compared to Republican voters. Republicans were also significantly more supportive 
of internal, and less supportive of external, attributions for poverty, while the reverse 
was true for Democrats and Independents. Again the relationship between political 
preference and attitudes towards social phenomena was emphasised.  
 
Cozzarelli and colleagues (2001) took an innovative approach in the study of poverty 
attitudes by including cognitive and affective aspects, rather than just causal beliefs. 
However, their study was limited by the nature of the sample (college students, 
predominately White, middle-class and from a rural background). While their results 
may not have applicability to the general population, they were relevant to the study 
of differences in the attitudes of university students towards the causes of poverty 
and further support past research that had linked attributions for poverty to other 
attitudes and values.  
 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Much research has been conducted in the area of people’s beliefs about the causes of 
social phenomena since Feagin’s (1972) seminal study. Generally, his findings have 
continually been supported, with the majority of people from Western nations 
(particularly the U.S.) being found to hold the individual responsible for their own 
situation, whether it is poverty, unemployment or affluence. Beliefs about the causes 
of these situations and their controllability have been found to affect blaming of  
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individuals, attitudes towards welfare and willingness to help those who are 
struggling (e.g., Bullock, 1999; Campbell et al., 2001; Cozzarelli et al., 2001; Feagin, 
1972; Zucker & Weiner, 1993). These beliefs have been linked to age and sex (Feagin, 
1972; Feather, 1974; although more recent research has found no effects, suggesting 
further closing of the gap between the genders), occupation (particularly ‘student’: 
Carr & MacLachlan, 1998; Feather, 1985; Guimond et al., 1989a) and being an actor 
versus an observer/direct experience (e.g., poor, unemployed favour societal 
explanations; Bullock, 1999; Feagin, 1972; Feather, 1983; Feather & Davenport, 1981; 
Campbell et al., 2001). 
 
The bulk of later research has focused on the links between sociopolitical attitudes 
and belief systems and attributions for social phenomena. Preferring individualistic 
explanations is positively associated with conservatism  (Feather, 1985; Griffin & 
Oheneba-Sakyi, 1993;), conservative voting patterns (Furnham, 1982b, 1982c, 1983; 
Lewis, 1981; Forgas et al., 1989), right-wing views (Pandey et al., 1982; Zucker & 
Weiner, 1993) and belief in a just world (linearly by Harper et al., 1990; and u-curved 
in Campbell et al., 2001, and Carr & MacLachlan, 1998). Those who believe that 
social and economic forces are responsible for individuals’ situations tend to be more 
liberal and to vote for liberal or left-wing political parties. Those who prefer fatalistic 
explanations are small in number and scattered across demographic and ideological 
groups.  
 
There was further evidence of differences between university students and the 
general community, most starkly in Carr & MacLachlan (1998) and Campbell and 
colleagues (2001), but also Feather (1985) and Guimond and associates (1989a). It 
has long been a problem for psychological theory that the majority of its supporting 
evidence comes from studies of tertiary students, especially in first-year psychology 
programmes (e.g., Sears, 1986). Most of the original studies made use of community 
samples when discussing how people explain poverty, unemployment and wealth.  
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However, those studies which link ideological beliefs to preferences in explaining 
these social phenomena should still be valid. There is little reason to believe that the 
conservative beliefs of university students will lead them to see the world differently 
from other people who also hold the same beliefs, although their differences with 
‘liberals’ tend to be more relative than absolute. However, it would be expected that 
university students, particularly in the later years of study should display more 
coherent and cohesive patterns of beliefs and values. It is the specific issue of 
ideological attitudes which will be discussed next, with reference to belief system 
structure and differences based on education and ideological sophistication. 
 
  
 
 
83
4. POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND ATTITUDES 
 
The concept of political ideology is obviously very important to researchers who seek 
to understand people’s belief systems. Ideological beliefs provide information about 
how attitudes and values are structured, and the logic behind their relationship with 
each other. Beliefs about political, social and economic issues can predict political 
party and policy preferences, and attitudes towards particular groups in society. They 
play a key role in the way issues are conceptualised and investigated in the social 
sciences. As such, it is necessary to understand the structure and functions of political 
attitudes in order to understand why there may be differences in people’s belief 
systems as a result of experiencing higher education. 
 
An ideology is a coherent and comprehensive set of beliefs which explain and 
evaluate social conditions, create an identity for individuals and provide a 
programme of political and social action to establish an ideal society, based on 
particular conceptions of human nature and freedom (Ball & Dagger, 1999). 
Ideologies shape thinking about the world; as it is and how it should/could be. 
Political ideologies are generally described as left and right or liberal and 
conservative. Originally, leftists and liberals wanted change and rightists and 
conservatives did not, but now these terms are linked to specific ideologies about the 
relations between capital, labour and the economy, as well as notions of the role of 
government (minimal versus all-encompassing), equality and individual freedom. 
Generally, when discussing political ideology, the distinctions of left and right are 
favoured by Europeans and Australians, while North Americans favour liberal and 
conservative. 
 
Ideologies are usually distillations of political philosophies designed to appeal to the 
masses (Ball & Dagger, 1999). However, most people do not consider political, social  
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and economic policy at such an abstract, overarching level, instead being dominated 
by self- or group-interest. Many studies have shown that only elites (e.g., members of 
political parties, the highly educated and politically sophisticated) use ideological 
frameworks in political thinking (e.g., Jackman, 1998; Jennings, 1992; McClosky et 
al., 1960; Sidanius, 1990; Wyckoff, 1980). Most people show inconsistency when 
tested on ideological scales, with a tendency to favour the centre or the position of the 
party they identify with (although parties often display ideological inconsistency 
themselves, usually for pragmatic reasons). Generally, the higher people’s education, 
the more consistent and comprehensive their ideologies and the greater the effect 
these will have on their party identification; they are more politically sophisticated.1  
 
What follows is a discussion of the research about the structure of ideological beliefs, 
particularly regarding the concepts of left and right, and liberal and conservative. The 
issue of constraint in people’s belief systems, and its relationship to ideological 
sophistication is also considered. The role of party identification, which is often taken 
as a substitute for political ideology, will then be examined to determine the extent of 
the relationship between the two concepts. The evidence presented provides 
justification for the content and method used to assess sociopolitical attitudes in the 
research programme which follows. 
 
4.1 THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
 
4.1.1 POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES: THE PROBLEM OF LEFT-RIGHT 
VERSUS LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE  
 
Generally, the major types of political ideology which are used in research, or spoken 
about generally, are the left-right or liberal-conservative dimensions. The left-right 
                                                           
1 However, this can rapidly become a circular argument; most researchers operationalise ‘political 
sophistication’ as education + political knowledge and/or interest.  
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dimension tends to be favoured by European and also Australian researchers, while 
North Americans tend to use liberal-conservative. Often the two belief systems 
become conflated in practice, with the terms left and liberal, and right and 
conservative used interchangeably, which can create confusion as they tend to apply 
differentially to economic and social issues. Each belief system has its own key 
features and commonly understood aspects; however, only one of the two is usually 
used in any particular context.2 As a result the commonly understood definitions of 
both liberal and left-wing contain socially liberal and economically left-wing 
elements, while ‘conservative’ and ‘right’ will include both socially conservative and 
economically right-wing components. However, the use of these mixed definitions 
prevents examination of those whose beliefs follow the opposite patterns. Empirical 
evidence will be presented which suggests that social and economic issues, while 
obviously linked, should nevertheless be considered separately when assessing belief 
system content, and that the social dimension is best conceived as a liberal-
conservative, and the economic dimension as a left-right, continuum.   
 
4.1.1.a Definitions of left, right, liberal and conservative  
Left and right-wing ideologies were originally oriented around economic issues, 
primarily the relations between capital and labour. This knowledge was then applied 
to explain social issues, such as inequality. Left-wing belief systems are generally 
characterised by socialist beliefs, whereby government control of the means of 
production and an all-encompassing welfare state are favoured. All people are 
considered equal within such belief systems, which leads to support for social policies 
such as socialised education and medicine. Right-wing belief systems are generally 
characterised by a focus on private enterprise and property, economic competition 
and the importance of the individual. It is believed that people should be left to their 
own devices, free from government interference in their economic activities. 
                                                           
2 This is most likely simply for practical purposes, and also because one dimension tends to be more 
commonly relied on in some places than others (e.g., for describing political parties). Other researchers 
would of course be aware of this.   
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Inequality of individuals is seen as a natural state, with those who work hard being 
rewarded, and those who do not losing out. Left (and liberal) orientations are 
generally thought to be secular, in contrast to the religious focus of those on the right 
(and conservatives). 
 
Liberalism is also characterised by a strong belief in the individual. Initially, this was 
focused around freedom from authority, and applied in both social and economic 
c on t ex t s.  How e v e r,  over  t ime  t he  te r m l ibe ra l , pa r t ic ul a rl y in  N ort h Am e r ica ,  has 
come to be associated primarily with social liberalism; equal rights for all, respect for 
those who are different, and social welfare to aid those in need (a foreign concept to 
the ruling classes when liberalism first originated). Economic liberalism, or ‘market 
liberalism’ was adopted throughout much of the western world following the 1974/75 
recession, corresponding with the rise of the ‘New Right’, as epitomised by the British 
Thatcher Government and American Reagan administration3  (although even 
supposedly social democratic governments like Hawke Labor in Australia and Lange 
Labour in New Zealand introduced similar reforms).4 As a result, social and economic 
liberalism now tend to be in conflict; the former advocates greater government 
involvement in caring for the disadvantaged, while the latter claims all should be left 
to the individual. 
 
Conservatism has been positioned as diametrically opposed to liberalism. While 
conservatism has historically been seen as favouring the status quo, primarily in 
terms of social stability, and in more recent times it has been associated primarily 
with social issues, with a desire to change the current ‘permissive society’ back 
towards more ‘traditional’ or ‘moral’ values. Conservatives tend to believe people will 
                                                           
3 Although both governments, and their respective parties (Tories and Republicans) are described as 
“conservative”. 
4 Also known as neoliberalism, these reforms involved reducing the role of government generally, 
particularly in the managing of the economy, through deregulation, privatisation of government owned 
assets and decreasing the size of the public service (through limiting activities and contracting out of 
services). This became the model favoured by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund for 
reforming all other economies, starting with those of Eastern Europe and later in South America, 
South-East Asia and Africa.  
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behave irresponsibly unless those in authority act to control them; hence they 
s t r o n g l y  s u p p o r t  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  p e o p l e s ’  a c t i v i t i e s ,  a g a i n  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  l i b e r a l i s m .  
Economically, it is often associated with the idea of small government (particularly in 
relation to the welfare state) and low taxes; however, it can also be protectionist, 
contrasting with economic liberalism. In practice it seems many conservatives favour 
right-wing/liberal economic beliefs, allowing market forces to control the economy.  
 
The intersection of these four ideologies has produced several different types of belief 
systems; left economic and liberal social beliefs lead to democratic socialist/social 
democratic parties (like Labor in Australia), right/liberal economic and conservative 
social beliefs lead to centre-right parties like the Liberal Party of Australia; 
conservative/left economic beliefs lead to communist-type parties5 and right/liberal 
economic and liberal social beliefs lead to ‘third-way’ parties like Blair’s ‘New 
Labour’. It appears the most parsimonious explanation, especially given the way that 
each belief system now embodies both economic and social aspects in the minds of 
many, may be to consider left and right economic beliefs and liberal and conservative 
social beliefs as separate, but obviously related, ideologies. The conjunction of social 
and economic liberal beliefs, as well as conservative social and left economic beliefs, 
has been less common in Western societies (e.g., Furnham & Heaven, 1988; Heaven, 
1992), however, that does not mean that the less expected combinations do not occur 
(e.g., the ‘Log-cabin Republicans’- homosexual economic conservatives, religious 
Labor Party voters and of course the third-way of New Labour).   
 
 
 
 
                                                           
5 This further highlights the problem of what are conservative economic beliefs- ideas about 
protectionism vs. free trade or small versus large government. Here it is assumed that conservative 
economic beliefs imply government intervention in the economy (even if it is in favour of business, 
rather than the State or the people) and hence left ideological beliefs should be considered 
economically conservative, particularly given the commonly accepted definition of economic 
liberalism.  
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4.1.1.b Evidence for an ideological distinction between social and 
economic beliefs 
Traditionally, both liberalism and conservatism and left-wing and right-wing beliefs 
have been considered to have continuous relationships, that is, that people vary in the 
degree to which they are either liberal or conservative, left or right. This is most 
commonly conceptualised as the self-placement scale, whereby respondents must 
position themselves on a continuum and, on this basis, they are assigned a number 
which measures their degree of liberal/conservative (e.g., the National Election 
Survey, U.S.), or left/right orientation. There are obvious shortcomings to such a 
strategy, in that it assumes firstly that people understand what the two concepts 
mean and, secondly, that they are capable of placing themselves accurately. Most 
likely due to this lack of understanding, the majority of participants place themselves 
in the centre (“middle of the road”), making it difficult to distinguish between the 
genuine centrists and the merely confused, disinterested or apathetic.  
 
One way to overcome the problems of the self-placement scale is through the use of 
items designed to tap the (presumed) underlying factor of liberalism-conservatism, 
or left-right, as required. Participants are usually required to respond to items via a 
Likert scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree, or some other variation), which are 
then summed to create a score, often with reverse scoring for ‘negatively worded’ 
items. This method, however, continues to presume, and only allows for, a 
continuous, non-orthogonal relationship.  
 
Kerlinger (1984) proposed the most detailed critique of the bipolar ideological model. 
He questioned whether the belief systems of liberalism and conservatism were in fact 
polarised in the community (past research had suggested no, given the lack of 
coherent organisation found among the beliefs of mass publics, e.g., Converse, 1964), 
as well as the belief that left radicalism was an extreme of liberalism, and therefore  
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the opposite of conservatism (e.g., Baer &  L a m b e r t ,  1 9 9 0 ) .  T o  t e s t  h i s  t h e o r y ,  
Kerlinger generated a 50-item attitude referent6 scale, reflecting a broad range of 
liberal and conservative social attitudes, and had participants rate item each on a 
seven-point Likert scale in terms of how positively  or negatively they felt about each 
(e.g., United Nations, Jews, money, civil rights, social security, free enterprise, 
church). The sample (n= 530) consisted mostly of education students, with some 
community members, from different southern American states.  
 
The liberal and conservative subscales, each with twenty-four items, showed very 
good internal reliability (alphas above 0.80); however, initial factor analysis (FA) 
with oblique rotation revealed a six factor solution was best. Liberal and conservative 
items tended to load on different factors, with only small levels of negative loading. 
Second order FA yielded two clear components, but this analysis was based on the 
correlations between the first-order factors, rather than between the items 
themselves. Certainly the evidence provided some support for Kerlinger’s claim that 
liberalism and conservatism were independent sets of beliefs, although the 
applicability of this finding generally may be limited by the reliance on student 
samples, even in follow-up cross-national research. 
 
Fleishman (1988) also examined whether sociopolitical attitudes were 
unidimensional (bipolar), although he used the more conventional attitude measures 
of the national 1984 General Social Survey. The 1473 participants were all aged over 
18, English-speaking and residents of the U.S. The forty-nine items selected aimed to 
cover a wide range; most were issue positions (e.g., defence vs. welfare spending, 
tolerance of dissent) rather than behaviours (e.g., church attendance) or demographic 
                                                           
6Kerlinger (1984) developed the criterial referent theory of attitudes, whereby people’s attitudes could 
be determined by their response to an object in the environment (such as unions, money, Jews, moral 
values and private property). Criterial referents differed between people and in strength, depending on 
the importance of the attitude represented by the referent to the person. However, he claimed that there 
was no evidence for negative attitudes; if something was not a criterial referent in a positive sense then 
a non-attitude was implied.  
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variables. FA initially indicated twelve factors (most seemed quite small and were 
likely to be unstable), with two higher order factors ‘economic welfare’ and ‘individual 
liberty”.  
 
The four first-order factors loading on economic welfare were labelled welfare and 
urban spending, government aid and economic conservatism; this was clearly an 
economic variable and could easily have been named left-right. The economic 
conservatism factor, in particular, seemed to represent a left-right continuum (e.g., 
economy benefits if business makes profits, income in U.S. is fairly distributed, high 
status people must be deserving of their position). The individual liberty factor, in 
contrast, contained mostly social elements, with its components labelled: sexual 
mores, abortion (medical), abortion (social), racial discrimination, defence, atheist, 
communist and homosexual (the last three dealt with the level of freedom such 
individuals should have, e.g., allowed to teach to schools or give public speeches). 
While Fleishman’s (1988) findings seemed to favour the bidimensional structure 
advocated by Kerlinger, it did not show that liberalism and conservatism themselves 
were independent, at least according to commonly held understandings of the items 
utilised, but yielded separate economic and social factors (left-right, liberal-
conservative).  
 
Stone, Ommundsen and Williams (1985) also attempted to discover the structure of 
sociopolitical attitudes in their research which included both Norwegian (n= 273) and 
American students (n= 286), drawn from first-year psychology courses. Their 60 
items, in various formats, were designed to correspond to Eysenck’s (1954) 
radicalism-conservatism (which they referred to as left-right) and tough-tender-
mindedness (analogous to authoritarian-humanism) dimensions of social attitudes, 
except for 20 filler items from an introversion-extraversion scale. For the Norwegian 
data, FA with orthogonal rotation indicated two factors, which corresponded to the 
expected left-right and tough-tender dimensions. The two factors which emerged  
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from the American sample, however, were more mixed; “non-political humanism” 
(which seemed to be social liberalism) and an authoritarian/conservative-type scale, 
described as “mixed normative and tough-minded with a tinge of conservatism” 
(Stone et al., p.172).  
 
It seemed as though the American sample may have produced separate liberal and 
conservative factors, although the description of the items did not seem to include 
any economic issues and the tough-tender dimension, as conceptualised, seemed to 
be more of a ‘personality trait’ than a basis for a political and social belief system (in 
line with the Eysenck’s original theory). To address the lack of consistency in factors 
between samples Stone and colleagues ran further factor analyses, this time including 
the introversion-extraversion items, for reasons unexplained. The subsequent series 
of factors (again orthogonally rotated) did not provide clear patterns; for the 
Norwegians “conservatism, authoritarianism, fear of weakness, tender-mindedness, 
not luck factor and masculinity” (Stone et al., 1985, p.173) and for the Americans 
“nonpolitical humanism, powerlessness, Machiavellianism, conservatism, not luck 
factor and political control” (p.173).  
 
Interestingly, the self-placement left-right scale was critical to the left-right factor for 
Norwegians in both analyses but not for the Americans, where it loaded negatively on 
the later appearing conservatism factor. It may be that the reason a different 
organising principle has been used in research from the U.S. compared to other 
Western nations is that the belief systems of the people from these countries are 
organised along different lines; the distinction between liberalism-conservatism and 
left-right is not in name only but actually represents real differences in the critical 
principle which structures sociopolitical attitudes. With the U.S. possibly the most 
successful capitalist nation it makes sense that there would be little room within 
people’s ideologies for alternatives to that, with modern liberalism focusing on  
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tinkering at the edges of capitalism, rather than suggesting for a new system7 (see 
also section 4.3.3 below).   
 
Stone and colleagues did note large cultural differences between the samples, and 
suggested that a single left-right dimension would be the best way to conceptualise 
attitude structure, as it incorporated all other distinctions (authoritarian/humanist, 
“political radicalism” etc.). They also noted that the Norwegian sample was more 
politically sophisticated than the American one, which may have explained their use 
of a unidimensional ideology to structure their political attitudes. Of course, the 
generalisability of these findings is limited by use of the student sample.  
 
Johnson and Tamney (2001) specifically investigated whether social and economic 
conservatism were separate ideologies among the American public. The researchers 
expected that the “social traditionalists” would be more religious and dogmatic, while 
economic conservatives would have higher incomes. However, the definition of 
economic conservatism seemed to actually be economic liberalism/right-wing beliefs. 
There were only two items, both of which were traditional left-wing measures, asking 
whether the government should create jobs for people who want them and whether 
wealth should be redistributed, rated on a three-point scale (yes, not sure, no). The 
dogmatism scales included four items about tolerance for non-mainstream people 
while the five item social traditionalism scale was typical of measures of conservatism 
(e.g., need for religion in schools, anti-abortion, anti-gay).  
 
The results revealed that while social and economic conservatism were indicative of 
intended Presidential vote (1996 election), the addition of party identification (self-
placement scale) doubled predictive value. In line with Johnson and Tamney’s (2001) 
                                                           
7This is not meant to imply that all left-leaning people want revolution, or that they even try to 
accomplish this- witness the privatisation and neoliberal policies of Blair’s New Labour in Britain, and, 
earlier, the Hawke-Keating Labor Governments in Australia (1983-96). It is about the structuring of 
attitudes generally, along the continuum.  
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expectations, no relationship was found between the social and economic measures, 
which did lend support to the idea that these facets of beliefs were separate in the 
minds of the general public. However, the nature of the items and limited response 
categories makes treating them as continuous variables in the regression 
questionable. Level of education was found to be significantly positively related to 
economic, and negatively related to social, conservatism, although the nature and 
number of education categories used was not indicated. Only conservative 
(evangelical) Protestant church attendance was predictive of social traditionalism, 
and at a far higher level than any of the other variables (mainstream Protestant and 
Catholic Church attendance was not significant). Income had small but significant 
positive relationships with both conservative variables, while dogmatism was 
positively related to social conservatism and slightly negatively related to economic 
conservatism.  
 
The gulf between the supporters of the two ideologies did not seem especially 
pronounced, except in the case of conservative Protestant church attendance. The 
findings for education seemed slightly anomalous, in terms of support for “economic 
conservatism”, but the measures used were of questionable validity (certainly more 
categorical than interval). The sample consisted of 420 residents of the same 
community, which may have limited the range of responses. Both of these issues 
seem to arise continuously in the research in this area, primarily because data has 
often been from secondary sources (e.g., the NES) so investigators have no control of 
its content, and its structure, as a telephone interview, limits the lengths of scales and 
response options.  
 
Two more studies also addressed the nature of the relationship between social and 
economic beliefs. Furnham and Heaven (1988) were specifically interested in class 
related differences, such that they thought that those from the middle-class would be 
socially liberal but economically conservative. The study though seemed to be set up  
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to establish what it meant to be right-wing, with the economic and social scales 
compared to self-placement on a five-point left-right scale. The economic scale itself 
was designed around a “Capitalist-Socialist” dimension (i.e. right-left), while the 
social scale contained a “Conservative-Liberal” dimension. This was further evidence 
of the social/economic distinction being assessed with liberal-conservative and left-
right measures, respectively. The participants were 80 Australian and 51 British 
middle-class professionals approached in a variety of settings (home, work etc.).  
 
The results indicated highly significant, though moderate, correlations between each 
of the measures, which were of highly similar magnitude between nations. The 
ideological identification scale was correlated with both other measures, such that 
right-wing placement was positively associated with both social and “economic 
conservative” attitudes. Contrary to Furnham and Heaven’s (1988) expectations, the 
social and economic measures were significantly and positively associated with each 
other. In this case, given the actual content of the measures, it was seen that social 
liberalism was negatively related to economic liberalism (i.e. right-wing economic 
beliefs, but described by the authors as economic conservatism).  
 
Heaven (1992) followed up the previous study with a larger sample of 273 Australian 
adults (‘snowball’ sampling; respondents were known to the data collectors, who were 
all psychology students). Again, he was aiming to determine whether there were 
disparities between the classes, in this case that the working-class would be 
“economically radical” and socially conservative, while the reverse would be true for 
middle-class respondents. The 20-item economic scale was the same (left-right) as in 
Furnham and Heaven (1988) while the social attitudes scale (50 items) was different, 
but still focussed on liberal-conservative attitudes. The social measure was factor 
analysed, giving a four-factor solution (only items loading greater than 0.50 
included): religion/morality, punitiveness (both conservative), racial equality and 
hedonism (both liberal). Measures of education (five levels, primary to completed  
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university) and occupational prestige were attained to determine social status, along 
with sex and age data.  
 
The results indicated significant differences in education level, with those with high 
levels of education (undefined) less “economically conservative” (right-wing) and 
punitive (in contrast to Furnham & Heaven, 1988), but significantly more supportive 
of racial equality than those with low education. Only one significant difference was 
found for occupational prestige, where those with higher prestige were more 
supportive of racial equality (the two social status measures were significantly but 
moderately correlated). However, there were significant differences in the expected 
direction across all five measures based on party identification, with those who 
supported left-wing parties (Australian Labor Party and Australian Democrats) 
significantly more supportive of left-wing economic and liberal social beliefs, and less 
favourable towards conservative social beliefs, than those who supported right-wing 
parties (Liberal Party of Australia and the Nationals).8  
 
Heaven (1992) concluded that “attitudes tend to be logically rather than 
inconsistently related” (p.289). He suggested that sociodemographic changes since 
early research on political ideologies may have led to the changes. This seems likely, 
particularly with the growth of the self-identified middle-class, partly in response to 
increased education levels, and the decline of primary and secondary industries and 
rise of service industries and white collar work, all of which were interlinked. 
However, the endorsement of right-wing economic beliefs by those with low levels of 
socioeconomic status remains a logical anomaly, which has grown more widespread 
in recent times with the rise of the ‘new right’ (economically liberal and socially 
conservative).   
 
 
                                                           
8The Liberal Party of Australia is economically liberal but socially conservative, in the mould of the 
Republicans although more centrist. See Section 5.2.1 for details on Australian political parties.  
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The mixed findings from these various studies, particularly when comparing 
Americans with others, suggests that social and economic attitudes should be 
assessed separately. While the evidence suggests that they are related as would be 
expected conceptually (i.e. left economic/liberal social versus right 
economic/conservative social) among Australian samples, the findings for Americans 
suggest independence. As such, conceiving of social and economic dimensions as 
separate belief systems, best described as left-right and liberal-conservative, 
respectively, seems the best way to avoid confusion and allows for both expected and 
unexpected relationships between them to be revealed. 
 
4.1.1.c Ideology as motivated social cognition 
Rather than an ideological belief system, conservatism particularly has also been 
conceived of as an instance of motivated cognition. Such a perception most likely 
betrays the thinking of researchers that such a belief system is ‘deficit’ or ‘deviant’, as 
with authoritarianism.9 Only a brief overview of such research is provided (see Jost, 
Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003, for a comprehensive review of conceptions of 
conservatism, and Knight, 1999 for a review of liberalism and conservatism research). 
 
Wilson and colleagues, whose C-Scale (Wilson & Patterson, 1968) has been one of the 
most widely used measures of conservatism, conceptualised conservatism as an 
underlying attitude structure based on “a generalised susceptibility to experiencing 
threat or anxiety in the face of uncertainty” which served a “defensive function” 
(Wilson, 1973, p.261). While this understanding of conservatism was close to Adorno 
and colleagues (1950) authoritarian personality, it emphasised conservative thinking 
as offering a means of order and control, rather than the more Freudian/parenting-
style explanation offered by the authoritarian model (Feather, 1979). More recent 
                                                           
9 McClosky (1958) in investigating the “conservative personality” focussed not on attitudes or policy 
positions, but measured supposedly less “situationally determined” (p. 30) values and personality 
aspects. He concluded that “far from being the elite or the masters or the prime movers, conservatives 
tend on the whole to come from the more backward and frightened elements of the population, 
including the classes that are socially and psychologically depressed” (McClosky, 1958, p. 37).  
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work has also further supported the claim that conservative beliefs are motivated by 
the need to manage uncertainty and threat (e.g., Jost et al., 2003).  
 
Recent research has also suggested that there may be group-based motives for 
supporting conservative (and right-wing) political ideologies. The system justification 
perspective (Jost & Banaji, 1994) proposes that people are motivated to accept 
existing social arrangements as legitimate, fair and justified, therefore all members of 
society, not just the dominant group, adopt ideologies that defend the status quo (‘the 
dominant ideology’- presumed to be ‘conservatism’ by Jost and colleagues). Sidanius, 
Pratto and colleagues’ social dominance orientation (SDO) research also includes the 
concept of ‘legitimising myths’, which can be ‘hierarchy-attenuating’ (i.e., socially 
liberal, economically left) or ‘hierarchy-enhancing’ (i.e., socially conservative, 
economically right). People’s stated issue positions, occupations and beliefs can 
adhere to either of these positions (or be neutral), with those high in SDO favouring 
enhancing the hierarchical structure of society, while those low in SDO want to 
reduce it (e.g., Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz & Federico, 1998; Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999; Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo, 1996; Sidanius, van Laar, Levin & Sinclair, 2003). 
 
It has also been suggested by social cognition researchers that conservative responses 
to attitude objects are automatic in social thinking, while liberal responses require 
conscious intervention to overcome the initial conservative reaction. Skitka, Mullen, 
Griffin, Hutchinson & Chamberlin (2002) found that both liberals and conservatives 
were equally likely to initially make individualistic attributions for others’ behaviour, 
but when given the chance to effortfully process information, liberals were more 
likely to make systemic attributions. Skitka and her colleagues labelled this the 
“motivated correction model” of ideological reasoning. Similarly, Devine (1989) 
found that both high and low prejudice participants automatically engaged negative 
stereotypes without conscious awareness, but those with low prejudice inhibited the 
expression of stereotype congruent responses when processing information  
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consciously. There is some controversy over these findings though, with others 
suggesting that knowledge of a stereotype or culturally-preferred attribution does not 
mean it will be utilised in social decision making (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). 
Subsequent research has indicated that the affective responses of low and high 
prejudiced people towards members of negatively stereotyped groups are 
substantially different (Augoustinos, Aherns & Innes, 1994), suggesting that such 
knowledge is used in different ways.  
 
4.1.2 RELATIONSHIPS TO OTHER SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES 
 
4.1.2.a The Protestant Work Ethic 
The concept of the Protestant Work Ethic (PWE) has been in use for some time, with 
Weber describing the norms and values of Protestantism as critical to the success of 
the capitalist system (Furnham, 1984). The PWE has typically been conceptualised as 
focusing on hard work, delayed gratification, asceticism and frugality; the belief that 
if you work hard you can get ahead. Nations where the PWE has been found to be 
particularly strong include the U.S. and Australia, where it is enshrined in the 
national anthem (“With golden soil and wealth for toil”). Theoretically, the PWE 
should be positively related to conservative social beliefs and right-wing economic 
beliefs, as well as individualistic attributions, and the belief that everyone gets what 
they deserve. The PWE literature confirms that it is closely related to other 
conservative beliefs and the demographic characteristics often associated with them, 
including right-wing economic and conservative social attitudes (e.g., Feather, 1984; 
Furnham & Bland, 1983), individual-blaming for poverty and unemployment (e.g., 
Furnham, 1982a), religious beliefs (e.g., Ray, 1982), high achievement motivation 
and ambition, age (older) and ethnic background (white). However, it has not been 
found to be related to class, education or sex (Furnham, 1984).   
 
More recent research, with American university students, suggested a different  
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pattern of results for this particular group. Keyser Wentworth and Chell (1997) found 
significant differences in mean PWE score by gender, age and level of study. Men and 
undergraduate students endorsed PWE beliefs significantly more than women and 
graduate students did. Of most interest was the decrease in adherence to PWE beliefs 
with age, with the 17-20 year-old group being significantly different from those aged 
26-29, 30-39 and 40 plus. Clearly non-school leaver tertiary students would be quite 
different from the general population, but this finding suggested that the reality of 
people’s lives may have affected their belief in these values (i.e. obviously they did not 
get what they deserved, even when they worked hard, hence their pursuit of higher 
education). This pattern may also be borne out in Australian data, such that older 
students may be less conservative/right-wing, although it may also be a discipline 
effect, with older students differentially attracted to particular fields of study. 
 
4.1.2.b Just World Beliefs 
Lerner, with various colleagues (e.g., Lerner, 1965; 1971; 1977; Lerner & Matthews, 
1967; Lerner & Miller, 1978), did much of the early work on belief in a just world 
(JWB). He saw it as a need people had, in order to make sense of the world, which 
was only stimulated in situations where arousal occurred as a result of injustice. In 
order to make the world seem more just, some people would derogate those who had 
been the victims of this injustice.  
 
Work by Rubin and Peplau, however, focused on JWB as an individual difference 
variable, measured on a continuum via their Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 
1973). In their review of JWB relationship to other political and social attitudes, 
Rubin and Peplau (1975) defined JWB as the belief that “a person’s merit and his (sic) 
fate are closely aligned” (p.66), such that people get what they deserve (victim-
blaming). Examples of items included on the Just World Scale were “People who get 
‘lucky breaks’ have usually deserved their good fortune”, “By and large, people get 
what they deserve” and “Good deeds often go unnoticed and unrewarded” (reversed).  
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Past research has found that people with high levels of JWB denigrated the losers of a 
random lottery (the U.S. National Draft), whereas most people expressed sympathy 
and liking towards the losers (Rubin & Peplau, 1973). Those with high JWB also 
assigned more blame to rape victims and expressed more punitive attitudes towards 
criminal defendants, compared to those with low levels of JWB. Belief in a Just 
World has also been linked to authoritarianism, trust in authority, religiosity 
(negatively), the PWE and an internal locus of control (Lerner & Miller, 1978; Rubin 
& Peplau, 1975).  
 
Research among American students suggested men were more likely to endorse JWB 
(Ambrosio & Sheehan, 1990); however, an Australian student sample yielded no sex 
differences (Connors & Heaven, 1990). The Australian sample was identified as social 
science and humanities students, while Ambrosio and Sheehan did not indicate the 
majors of their sample. Intriguingly, Connors and Heaven did report a sex difference 
in the relationship JWB had with attitudes, with a significant correlation between 
JWB and negative attitudes towards people with AIDS. This information did suggest 
that sex differences in endorsement of JWB exist. 
 
JWB can be a valuable coping mechanism, as it allows people to believe that the 
world is orderly and consistent and can help them to cope with negative events, such 
as becoming a paraplegic (Lerner & Miller, 1978), by helping them regain a sense of 
control. On the other hand, over time constantly blaming the self could have a 
negative impact. Dalbert has more recently focused on JWB as a positive illusion, in 
terms of its benefits for mental health. Along with various colleagues she has 
conducted numerous studies looking at the difference between personal and general 
belief in a just world, primarily among Germans. Her findings suggest that personal 
JWB is independent of general JWB (the standard measures) and that support for the 
former is much higher than the latter (Dalbert, 1999). Similar to the illusion of 
control, the belief that the world is personally fair and just was related to higher self- 
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esteem and more positive mood. However, lower levels of general JWB suggested 
that people recognised that others were not always treated fairly, although this had 
no effect on their sense of a just world for themselves.  
 
4.1.2.c Beliefs about Justice 
Related to JWB, beliefs about justice encompass elements of liberalism and 
conservatism as well as aspects of locus of control and the “nature of deservingness” 
(Feather, 1994, p.129). Just as people with leftist and liberal social beliefs tend to 
prefer systemic explanations for social phenomena, they also tend to be more 
concerned with distributive justice, while those with right-wing and conservative 
values tend to be more punitive, focusing on retributive justice (Miller & Seligman, 
1999). It is these beliefs in alternative forms of justice which help explain why the two 
groups show differing levels of support for policies such as social security, affirmative 
action and the death penalty. Feather (1990) reported that in Australia, compared to 
Labor and Democrat voters, Liberal/National Party10 supporters were less supportive 
of equal allocation of resources in a scenario where one member of a pair contributed 
less due to illness, and chose to assign less money to the under-performer. Miller and 
Seligman (1999) found that, in the U.S., social conservatism and voting Republican 
was associated with less support for distributive justice and greater support for 
retributive justice. However, the correlations generated from the self-placement 
liberal-conservative scales were only marginally significant in most cases, despite a 
large community sample (n=510).  
 
Deservingness is generally determined by the relationship between valued behaviour 
and outcomes, such that when both have the same valence, an outcome can be said to 
be deserved (e.g., positive behaviours leads to positive outcome), with a mismatch in 
valence leading to an undeserved outcome (Feather, 1994). Here the distinction 
between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor can be seen (e.g., the widow versus 
                                                           
10 A description of all major Australian political parties is included in section 5.1.2.  
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the divorced woman), whereby the issue of personal control over the situation 
(‘behaviour’) that led to the negative outcome is critical to whether the person is 
perceived as deserving. This can also work in the opposite direction, i.e. the Tall 
Poppy Syndrome11, whereby a successful person seen as undeserving of their position 
is denigrated. Judgements of deservingness though are dependent on the value 
ascribed to the behaviour and outcome by the judge (Feather, 1994). For example, the 
belief that unemployment is caused by economic forces, rather than lack of effort to 
find work, would affect the attribution of deservingness (also see Chapter 3).  
 
 
4.2 CONSTRAINT IN BELIEF SYSTEMS 
 
4.2.1 CONCEPT OF CONSTRAINT 
 
Converse (1964) detailed the concept of constraint within belief systems and outlined 
a hierarchical classification system, “levels of conceptualisation”, from the most to the 
least politically sophisticated and consistent within the American electorate. The 
notion of constraint was based on the principle that a change in one element of a 
belief system would subsequently lead to changes in other elements, for the sake of 
stability (similar to other cognitive-consistency models, e.g., Festinger, 1957; Heider, 
1946). Converse proposed that some “idea-elements” were more central to belief 
systems than others; it was those beliefs with low centrality which would be expected 
to adjust in the event of changes to more fundamental components. While ideas of 
constraint could just as easily apply to other types of belief systems (such as in 
science or religion), they have primarily been used when discussing sociopolitical 
beliefs, or political ideologies.  
 
                                                           
11 ‘Tall Poppy Syndrome’, a common Australian expression, is used to describe not only the 
denigration of the successful but the relishing of their ‘fall from grace’, similar to the German concept 
of ‘schadenfreude’.   
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Converse (1964) envisaged constraint not only as holding consistent positions on a 
range of attitude objects relevant to the belief system, but also understanding the 
logic behind “what goes with what”. It was essentially this definition which 
circumscribed the levels for the stratification of the public. Converse saw society as 
pyramidal in terms of political knowledge and understanding, with only a “tiny elite” 
demonstrating true constraint, in terms of comprehensive and consistent political 
ideologies which were broadly applicable within the socioeconomic system. As one 
moves further down from this elite peak, the less constrained belief systems become, 
and the narrower their focus. Thinking about social, political and economic idea-
elements becomes less abstract and generic and more simple and concrete.  
 
The levels of conceptualisation outlined by Converse (1964) were ideologues, near-
ideologues, group interests, nature of the times and no issue content. These levels 
were determined by having participants in a 1956 election survey respond to an open-
ended question regarding their “evaluations of the political scene” (Converse, p.215). 
Those who used abstract conceptual dimensions, primarily liberal-conservative, were 
classified as ideologues. The semi-ideologues named ideological dimensions but these 
were not central to their discussion, or were used in such a way as to indicate only 
partial comprehension. The third level respondents relied on group relationships to 
order their political thinking, rather than ideology; for example, recognising the 
conflict between “big business” and the “working man”, but not discussing this in 
terms of the economic system. This group probably showed the most attention to 
parties as organising elements of their belief systems. The fourth level included those 
who mentioned specific policies or associated parties and other political actors with 
past events within society, such as the Great Depression and specific wars. Finally, 
the last group showed little evidence of interest or engagement with politics except at 
the most basic levels, in terms of their affect towards particular parties or candidates.  
Converse’s levels of conceptualisation were confirmed by the relationships they 
showed to education and political knowledge and participation, all of which  
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decreased as conceptualisation level decreased. It was estimated by Converse that 
only about 3.5% of voters were ideologues, 12% semi-ideologues, 45% group interest, 
22% nature of the times and 17.5% had no issue content (in most later work the top 
two groups were merged, e.g., Converse, 1975). The sample were reinterviewed in 
1960 and specifically asked about their understanding of liberalism and conservatism 
and whether these terms applied to either of the major political parties. About 37% of 
the sample was unable to define liberal and conservative, with 17% able to show a 
clear and distinct understanding. There were two middle groups, one with only vague 
notions and the other limited in their distinctions, which were mostly on a spend-
save dimension (Converse, 1964).  
 
Overall, these results supported the earlier ones, such that there seems to be varying 
levels of political knowledge within the population, the majority of who rely on vague 
understandings and party cues when asked to think about political and social issues, 
rather than ideological belief systems. Of note was that increased education, which 
presumably improved abstract thinking, was clearly linked to use of constrained 
belief systems. With the idea of issue publics, Converse allows for localised constraint 
between idea elements among some people with particular interest in an issue, such 
as foreign intervention or race, although it seems unlikely that this could be 
considered true constraint within a belief system when these ideas show no 
connection with other elements or to an overarching dimension. 
 
4.2.2 LATER RESEARCH ON CONSTRAINT 
 
Stimson (1975) addressed the controversy over Converse’s findings using pre and 
post-election panel interview data from the 1972 NES. He selected the 1972 
Presidential election (Nixon vs. McGovern) due to its highly ideological and 
polarising nature, as “issue positions were unusually sharply defined” (Stimson, 
p.396). The sample was stratified into four groups based on “cognitive ability”  
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(education and political information; a common measure of political sophistication). 
Those with the highest ability were the most likely to provide an ideological self-
placement (7-point liberal-conservative scale); 93% compared to only 43% of those in 
the lowest stratum (2nd and 3rd were 83 and 65%, respectively). Ideological position 
explained 37% of the variance in Presidential vote for the highest group, but fell 
across each level, reaching 10% in the lowest group (26% overall). The relationships 
between ten attitude items, dealing with economic and social issues, showed far more 
constraint among the highest ‘ability’ group, with the second stratum relatively close, 
and then a big drop among the lowest two groups. The results supported Converse’s 
(1964) assertions and Stimson concluded that “the liberal-conservative dimension 
has more meaning for the higher ability respondents than for their lower ability 
counterparts” (1975, p.402).  
 
Nie and Andersen (1974) took exception to the findings of Converse (1964) and 
C a m p b e l l  a n d  c o l l e a g u e s  ( 1 9 6 0 ) ,  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  l a c k  o f  i n f o r m e d  v o t i n g  b y  t h e  
American mass public. They used cross-sectional data from election year national 
surveys between 1956 and 1972 to argue that belief system constraint had increased 
in the electorate, most notably between the 1960 and 1964 elections, though 
remaining stable up to 1972. Nie and Andersen believed both domestic (civil rights 
and women’s liberation movements) and foreign affairs issues (Vietnam war) 
combined with the coming of age of the first wave of post-war ‘baby-boomers’, led to 
increased politicisation of the public, hence they began to show far greater constraint 
in their belief systems.  
 
LeBlanc and Merrin (1977) criticised Nie and Andersen’s (1974) statistical 
methodology, but still reported an increas e  i n  a d h e r e n c e  t o  the unidimensional 
model, albeit less dramatic than had been claimed. Converse, in discussing the work 
of Nie and others, agreed that “impressive and theoretically instructive” (1975, p.92) 
changes seemed to have occurred to attitude structure in the 1960s “across-the- 
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board”, resulting in greater polarisation of public opinion. However, given that most 
scholars recognised the 1960s as a time of massive social upheaval, Converse 
suggested that the changes may be unique to that time period, and that the electorate 
would mostly return to its non-ideological (uninterested) state.  
 
Wyckoff (1980), in his study using national election survey data from 1972 and 1976, 
also found only a small proportion of the electorate exhibited unidimensional 
structuring of their beliefs (using primarily social issue positions). He was also able to 
demonstrate that this more constrained group was more likely to support the 
candidate closest to their own position on an issue. They were also more likely to 
have an accurate representation of where a candidate stood and did not simply 
project their own preferred position onto others. Hagner and Pierce (1982) confirmed 
the continued utility of the levels of conceptualisation across election periods, 
indicating that even though individuals may change, the characteristics of those 
within each level remained constant, according to election year data from 1956 to 
1976. Ideologues were again found to have the highest level of education (although 
this did not account for all the variance between levels) and group-referents had the 
strongest party identifications. Hagner and Pierce also criticised the alternative 
method of determining conceptualisation level used by Nie and associates.  
 
Knight (1985) compared several different ideological measures in order to see which 
best predicted 1980 presidential vote within the levels of conceptualisation as 
originally outlined by Campbell and colleagues (1960). Respondents who provided 
pre- and post-election interviews in the 1980 NES were included, with a sample size 
of around 1400. Participants were assigned to one of four levels, based on open-
ended responses to items about political parties and candidates. The ideologues were 
more highly educated and reported higher levels of political interest and knowledge, 
compared to the less sophisticated voters. Motivation to vote also decreased with 
each step down in ideological sophistication; ideologues reported a voting rate of  
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86.8%, group-benefits 77.0%, nature of the times 65.6% and no issue content 52.6%. 
An ideological orientation (7-point liberal-conservative scale, reclassified into liberal, 
moderate or conservative) and an ideological sentiment measure (100-point feeling 
thermometer rating of the groups “liberals” and “conservatives”, difference between 
two ratings was “intensity” of feeling, while standard deviation was “degree of 
polarization”) were used to determine whether different ideology variables were more 
accurate in predicting vote for the different levels of conceptualisation. Differences in 
ratings were significant when conservatives and liberals were compared over all 
levels, but there was far greater intensity and polarisation in the ratings of 
ideologues, and consistent declines corresponding to conceptual level.  
 
The relationships between liberal/conservative rating and seven issue items were also 
assessed. Ideologues showed moderate but significant correlations between issues, 
but coefficients decreased with level of conceptualisation. Most of the correlations 
were not significant at the lowest level of sophistication and only about half at the 
third level. All these findings supported the use of the conceptualisations as measures 
of ideological sophistication (Knight, 1985), with clear differences between the first 
and second and third and fourth categories, although differences between the two 
middle groups were small.  
 
Knight (1985) used linear regression to demonstrate that party identification (β= 
0.46) was more predictive of candidate evaluation (positive feelings for Carter minus 
Reagan) than ideological orientation (β= 0.12) or positions on seven individual issues 
(spending on defence: β= 0.12, and services: β= 0.10, were highest). The results were 
quite different when conceptualisation level was considered though, with ideological 
identification being more important than party for ideologues (β=0.32 and 0.27 
respectively). Issue positions had little further explanatory power for ideologues’ 
evaluations after ideology and party were considered. Party identification remained 
the most significant predictor for the other levels (β=0.50, 0.47 and 0.41 for group- 
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benefit, nature of times and no issue respondents, respectively). Ideological 
orientation had minimal impact for any of the other conceptualisations, being non-
significant in each case and having a beta of 0.10 or less (Knight, 1985). It was clear 
though, that the more ideologically sophisticated voters showed greater cohesion in 
their beliefs across measures and that their ideological identification not only 
explained a significant part of the difference in their evaluations of the candidates but 
also subsumed their issue positions.  
 
Jacoby (1986) investigated whether people at different levels of conceptualisation 
used different mechanisms when thinking about Presidential candidates. He drew 
data from an American national election survey in 1980. Six conceptualisation 
categories were used (as suggested by Nie, Verba & Petrocik, 1979, cited in Jacoby, 
1986; but criticised by Hagner & Pierce, 1982, as “suspect”, p.780)12; ideologue, near-
ideologue, issue reference, group reference, party reference and apolitical-
nonpolitical, although for the purposes of the study the top two groups were 
compared to the others to determine the extent to which ideology was used to 
evaluate candidates. Evaluations of the ten candidates were considered along two 
dimensions: liberal-conservative (7-point rating) and “personal appeal” 
( t h e r m o m e t e r  r a t i n g s ) .  J a c o b y  ( 1 9 8 6 )  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  “ t h e  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  o f  
conceptualisation do rely more heavily on the liberal-conservative continuum to 
organise and structure their candidate perceptions than the other levels” (p.430) and 
that the study “reaffirm(ed) the importance of the levels of conceptualisation in the 
study of mass political behaviour” (p.431).  
 
 
More recently Jacoby (1991) examined the role of education and level of 
conceptualisation in ideological thinking and issue positioning. Jacoby, drawing on 
                                                           
12 There has been considerable criticism of Nie and colleagues’ use of different coding systems for the 
levels of conceptualization, which seem much more lenient, and subsequent criticism of the original 
model using these findings; see Hagner & Pierce (1982).  
 
 
109
data from a 1984 election study, assessed three levels of conceptualisation (with the 
lowest two strata merged as “nonideological”), three levels of education (less than 12, 
high school graduation and some college), liberal-conservative and party 
identifications (7-point self-placement scales) and seven issue items (7-point scale; 
e.g., government spending on services and defence, guaranteed jobs and aid to 
minorities). An ideological consistency measure was calculated across issues, based 
on number of times liberal versus conservative positions were chosen.  
 
Overall, liberal-conservative identification was significant in attitudes towards three 
issues (intervention in Central America, equality of women and guaranteed jobs). 
Results indicated that the role of identification was greatest at the highest level of 
conceptualisation, where it was significant for all seven issues, compared with only 
two at the group-referents level. The effect of liberal-conservative identification on 
issue positions did not change significantly for different levels of education; however, 
the effect on attitude consistency did inc r e a s e  w i t h  e d u c a t i o n ,  s u c h  t h a t  i s s u e  
positions became more consistent with identification at higher levels of education. 
These results supported the idea that education allowed people to better organise 
their belief systems using ideological concepts, presumably aided by abstract thinking 
(Jacoby, 1991). The different levels of conceptualisation were confirmed as 
representing different ways of thinking about and comprehending social, economic 
and political issues; from ideological, through group-referents to more concrete and 
personal belief systems.  
 
4.2.2.a Group-referents level of conceptualisation: Affect towards 
social groups as an alternative structure to ideology 
Some researchers have argued that all non-ideologues within the mass public, not 
just those in the group-referents category, are able to organise their political thinking 
along group lines (Brady & Sniderman, 1985). However, it seemed likely that ratings 
of groups would be influenced by political conceptualisation level, such that the more  
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politically sophisticated would rely on fewer dimensions to organise attitudes towards 
social groups (primarily liberal-conservative), with others making use of affective 
feelings about groups (Zinni, Mattei & Rhodebeck, 1997a). Generally, work on these 
group-based models has found that they were differentially relevant between 
categories of political sophistication; having more meaning for those around the 
centre (i.e. group-referents) level rather than the ideologues (or elites/sophisticated) 
or those with low levels of political knowledge and engagement.  
  
Brady and Sniderman (1985) reported that most people used a “likeability heuristic” 
in their attributions about groups’ attitudes, such that they were able to indicate with 
reasonable accuracy where particular groups (liberals, conservatives, Democrats, 
Republicans, whites and blacks) stood on issues, such as government guaranteed 
jobs, minority aid and equality of women. Some distortion was evident in the data 
(based on NES from 1972 and 1976) such that conservative people perceived liberals 
to be more liberal than they actually were, while such bias did not impact on liberals’ 
perceptions of conservatives’ issue positions. Overall, it was reported that affect had a 
greater impact on perceptions than vice versa, with the highly educated not only 
more accurate in their estimates but also more likely to accentuate them based on 
their feelings about these groups. The latter finding suggested that not all people were 
using affect about groups in the same way, and that considerable differences were 
still likely between those at different levels of conceptualisation.  
 
The political sophistication (conceptualisation levels) and group hypotheses lead to 
different predictions about the structuring of attitudes towards groups, such that the 
former expects differences between levels, while the latter presumes all people use 
the same categorisations of affect towards groups (Zinni et al., 1997a). Zinni and 
colleagues compared three categories in the population: elites (party delegates) and 
sophisticates and novices (mass public), based on NES data from 1980 and 1984. 
Nine groups were given feeling-thermometer ratings in both years and by both public  
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and elite groups: Democrats, Republicans, liberals, conservatives, blacks, business, 
women’s movement, unions and the Moral Majority. The mass public was split at the 
median level of a political knowledge variable (including multiple items), which was 
clearly problematic, as the difference between those in the middle would have been 
negligible and such an approach does not fit any of the previous models (either levels 
of conceptualisation or sophistication as continuous).  
 
The results, however, clearly showed differences in the structuring of warmth 
towards different social groups across categories, which supported the sophistication 
hypothesis. Party delegates (elites) used a single, ideological dimension to organise 
their attitudes in both years, whilst the sophisticates used two dimensions; liberal-
conservative and affect (such that more liked groups scored differently). The novices, 
though, used up to three dimensions, one of which seemed to be an artefact of bias 
towards the mid-point.  
 
Further work by Zinni, Rhodebeck and Mattei (1997b) also showed evidence of 
differences between those at different levels of political sophistication in terms of 
their structuring of attitudes towards groups. Those with low political sophistication 
relied more on affect, while those with high levels placed more emphasis on ideology, 
in their attitudes towards groups. Their results also indicated that people had 
generally become more reliant on affective, and less on ideological, distinctions over 
time. However, the categories of low and high sophistication were decided by a 
median split of the sample, which was clearly problematic, as there would have been 
little to distinguish those in the middle. Results may have been even more dramatic if 
three levels of sophistication (assessed as political knowledge and interest) had been 
used.  
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4.2.3 IDEOLOGICAL SOPHISTICATION AND COMPARISONS 
BETWEEN THE ELITE AND MASS PUBLICS 
 
There have been many other studies which have examined the differences between 
the elite in society, or the politically sophisticated, and the mass, or unsophisticated. 
Generally, the ‘privileged’ group has been defined by or confirmed as having greater 
interest in and knowledge of the political process, system and actors as well as higher 
levels of education than the general public. Political sophistication has been believed 
to represent an interconnected, complex (constrained) belief system, which allowed 
people to understand and retain political information. It also enabled people to form 
attitudes towards novel situations and objects, based on their existing beliefs. 
Political sophistication has long been linked to education, to the point where higher 
education is often a prerequisite in classifying people as sophisticates, usually linked 
with self-reported interest in politics (e.g., Macdonald, Rabinowitz & Listhaug, 1995). 
Barton and Parsons (1977) reported a strong link between belief system constraint 
and education, however, education alone could not account for the large discrepancy 
in consistency between elites and members of the general public in their sample. 
Hagner and Pierce (1982) reached the same conclusion with regard to education and 
the levels of conceptualisation. 
 
Research on political sophistication has primarily operationalised the concept in one 
of two ways. Converse’s version assumed political knowledge was inherently 
ideological, in that not only did political sophisticates have high levels of knowledge 
but that their beliefs were ideologically consistent (e.g., liberal or conservative). Other 
theorists have seen political sophistication as purely cognitive; high levels of 
organised knowledge about the political system. This view does not presuppose any 
specific ideological connections between political beliefs, and seems to cast the 
sophisticate as the “rational voter” of earlier voting models (e.g., Downs, 1957). It is 
primarily the original conception of political sophistication which is used here, that of  
 
 
113
ideological sophistication, and its assumed partnership with knowledge of the 
political system.  
 
The first major study specifically addressing differences between elites and the mass 
public was McClosky, Hoffmann and O’Hara (1960), conducted in 1958. They 
compared the degree of constraint and issue consensus between and within samples 
of political party delegates (n=3020) and members of the public who identified with 
either the Republicans or Democrats (n=1444). Participants were asked whether 
support for twenty-four particular issues, categorised as “public ownership, 
government regulation of the economy, equalitarianism and human welfare, tax 
policy and foreign policy” (McClosky et al., p.408), should be increased, decreased or 
remain the same. Responses were scored as a ratio of support, such that a higher 
value indicated a greater mean level of support for that issue within the relevant 
subgroup.13 
 
There were clear differences, in the expected direction, between the Republican and 
Democratic delegates, with the largest difference on public ownership issues (natural 
resources and atomic energy), followed by welfare (e.g., social security, minimum 
wage) and government regulation of the economy equal second. Foreign policy 
yielded the smallest difference. For the “followers” however, differences in issue 
position were virtually non-existent; on the few items where they did appear though, 
they tended to split along expected lines. The most intriguing finding was that 
Republican followers were actually closer to Democratic leaders in their category 
positions than they were to Republican leaders, while the gap between Republican 
elites and the Democratic mass was sizable (but not as large as between the two 
delegate samples). This was explained by the authors as an effect of support for the 
Democratic New Deal and the decrease in “left-wing politics” (p.420) following World 
War II. What was clear, however, was that those with greater knowledge of and 
                                                           
13The questionnaire contained in excess of 400 items, hence the limited response categories.  
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interest in politics (those for whom it was most advantageous) demonstrated greater 
constraint in their belief systems, in terms of issue positions and other measures 
(such as ratings of different social and political groups and scales of conservatism and 
business attitudes). In contrast, the mass public showed less consensus within their 
party grouping, and less conflict with those outside it. 
 
Sidanius (1990) found that political experts (political science academics, journalists 
and politicians’ Legislative Assistants; n=108) showed greater consistency between 
their endorsement of different Rokeach (1973) terminal values and their political 
orientation than political novices demonstrated (university students; n=102). 
Political ideology was measured by a self-rated liberal-conservative scale (7-point) 
across three categories: domestic social and economic policy, and foreign policy. Not 
only did the same values have higher regression coefficients for the sophisticates than 
the students, but the values which explained most of the variance in political ideology 
were those most relevant to it. For example, the value “equality” was the most 
important in predicting liberalism among the experts (0.48), but there was no clear 
frontrunner in prediction of ideology among the novices.    
 
Jennings (1992) also compared elite and mass publics to determine their ideological 
differences, but on a larger scale. He used data from the NES 1980 and the 1972-76 
panel and surveys of Republican and Democratic convention delegates from 1980 
and the panels of 1972-80, 1980-84 and 1984-88. Jennings relied on the idea of 
“involvement” as the key to defining elites, with delegates clearly one of the most 
active groups politically. The mass public sample was also stratified into three levels, 
based on several items detailing the participants’ self-reported levels of activism in 
the relevant presidential campaign for that data set. The intercorrelations between 
three sets of items were compared for the elites and different levels of the mass 
public. These sets consisted of seven items about relevant issues (e.g., defence 
spending, busing, abortion), thermometer ratings of eight social groups (e.g., big  
 
 
115
business, blacks, environmentalists) and thermometer evaluations of eight “highly 
visible party leaders” (e.g., George H.W. Bush, Jimmy Carter).  
 
The results were as expected, with increasingly more significant relationships within 
each set as political sophistication increased. The most dramatic change was between 
the highest level of sophistication in the mass public and the party delegates, 
although this was much closer for the leader evaluations than the other two 
measures. When position on the issues was compared to self-reported political 
ideology (7-point liberal-conservative scale) the relationships were slightly stronger 
again, although the party elites were clearly the most cohesive in their beliefs 
(r=0.62) compared to even the most sophisticated members of the public (r= 0.46), 
(middle public: r=0.25, low public: r=0.15). In the case of this research, elites have 
been found to have “strong, unifying and fairly parsimonious belief systems” 
(Jennings, 1992, p.435) compared to the general population. Education level was not 
considered as a variable. 
 
The defining feature of the highly politically sophisticated seems to be their ability to 
think abstractly about political matters, in terms of having an overarching structure 
to their political and social thinking, onto which all existing sociopolitical groups, 
policies and objects can be placed. They rely less on party cues than other citizens, 
instead depending on ideology, as seen in Zinni and colleagues’ (1997ab) findings 
regarding structuring of attitudes towards different social groups. Robinson and 
Fleishman (1988) also reported that “self-identified liberals and conservatives differ 
more meaningfully and significantly on political issues than do self-identified 
Democrats and Republicans” (p.137), as a result of their study of the trends in 
ideological identification in the American electorate. The principal advantage of 
organising a belief system around ideology, rather than party identification, would be 
its fixed nature; ideology is idealistic, unlike mainstream political parties, which tend 
to be pragmatic, and therefore change over time.   
 
 
116
 
Because the politically sophisticated have a greater understanding of socioeconomic 
and political issues they are more inclined to make diffuse attributions for events, 
that is, to recognise that multiple factors are responsible for the current state of any 
situation. Those with high levels of political sophistication are more likely to attribute 
the state of the economy to many groups (e.g., Congress, business and the 
international economy) than low sophisticates, who tend to assign responsibility to 
just the President of the U.S. (Gomez & Wilson, 2001; 2003). Given this, it would be 
expected that those who are more politically sophisticated would be more likely to 
assign responsibility for poverty and wealth to more diffuse systemic sources, rather 
than to individuals alone.  
 
 
4.3 PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
 
4.3.1 THE CONCEPT OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
 
The concept of party identification was first introduced in Campbell, Converse, Miller 
and Stokes’ seminal work The American Voter (1960). Party identification is the 
psychological attachment voters feel towards a particular political party, and varies in 
both direction (in this case, Democrat, Independent or Republican) and strength 
(strong, weak or ‘leaning’). This attachment was supposedly socialised early and 
remained relatively stable throughout the lifespan, serving as an anchoring point for 
all other political attitudes, such as ideology, issue positions and leader evaluations, 
and was the major determinant of vote. The stability of political systems was 
attributed to party identification, within and between generations, as people voted 
consistently over time and children “inherited” their fathers’ party identifications  
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and, in turn, passed them on to the next generation.14  
 
Party identification is seen as a perceptual screen; all political evaluations, cognitions 
and responses are made through it. According to Campbell and colleagues (1960), 
parties supply cues to identifiers to help them interpret political objects and events. 
Rather than engage in effortful comparisons, time and resource challenged identifiers 
simply adopt their party’s position; therefore low levels of political knowledge and 
interest have often been associated with party identifications. Specific issues are only 
l i k e l y  t o  a f f e c t  v o t i n g  d e c i s i o n s  w h e n  p e ople have the time, cognitive ability and 
knowledge to consider them, or when they have special significance, personally (e.g., 
Vietnam War-era National Draft) or locally (e.g., racial desegregation in the southern 
states of the U.S.). While party identification obviously has particular relevance for 
those who understand politics in terms of group-conflict (group-referents level), it 
c o u l d  a l s o  b e  a  c o n v e n i e n t  h e u r i s t i c  f o r  t h o s e  a t  l o w e r  l e v e l s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
conceptualisation.15 
 
The presumed political information screen was thought to reinforce childhood party 
identification through the retention of selective information, favourable to people’s 
preferred party and/or negative towards those who opposed that party. This process 
of bias and distortion was amplified in proportion to the strength of party attachment 
and also led to an increased party attachment over time (Campbell et al., 1960). 
People were thought to base their opinions on their parties’ positions, rather than 
vice versa; although the discriminatory retention of information would have worked 
to create a positive feedback loop. It was postulated that in the event that voters did 
not know their party’s stand on an issue they would assume that the party held the 
same, or a very similar, position to their own. However, if a significant discrepancy 
                                                           
14 It was, of course, assumed that women took their party identifications from their husbands, being 
uninformed and uninterested in political matters. 
15Hagner and Pierce (1982) reported that of the five levels of conceptualisation, those categorised as 
group-referents had the strongest party identifications. 
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clearly existed between own preference and party position a switch in vote could 
occur and, if the incongruity was large enough, a change in identification. This was 
presumed to have occurred at times of partisan realignment, such as the increased 
support for the Republicans during the American Civil War and for the Democrats 
after the New Deal in the 1930s (Campbell et al.). The stronger the party attachment, 
the less likely a change in party allegiance was, probably due to the greater cognitive 
effort expended in maintaining the identification. 
 
Like most attitudes and beliefs, party identification was apparently acquired in 
childhood, and reinforced, or challenged, throughout the lifetime. The transfer of a 
specific attitude like party identification was easier than a constellation of values, 
s u c h  a s  t h o s e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  i d e o l o g y  ( W e s t h o l m  &  N i e m i ,  1 9 9 2 ) ,  a s  i t  w o u l d  
presumably be simpler to understand and retain. The development of a political 
ideology which would orient people towards specific parties would require far greater 
knowledge than the average voter has, let alone a child (Jennings, 1992). However, 
later development of a coherent ideology may result in alteration of people’s party 
identifications (or may even have originated from the initial party orientation, if 
assumptions about bias in memory of political knowledge hold). Generally, the more 
politics was discussed in the home, the greater children’s understanding and interest 
in politics and the stronger their party identification would be (Campbell et al., 1960). 
The knowledge and perceptions initially developed, however, would inevitably have 
been biased by their parents’ political attitudes and values, including party 
identifications and ideological beliefs. 
 
4.3.2 CRITICISMS OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
 
There have been several criticisms of Campbell and colleagues’ concept of party 
identification; firstly, that party identification was not transmitted as clearly as 
propounded. Westholm and Niemi (1992) claimed most attitudes, including party  
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attachment, were not clearly transmitted from parent to child. Others have found 
lower levels of partisan correspondence between parents and children over time, as 
offspring moved away from the family’s influence and other social forces impacted on 
attitudes (e.g., Beck & Jennings, 1991; Jennings & Niemi, 1981; Niemi & Jennings, 
1991). Education particularly affected party identification, as it allowed people to 
develop better understandings of politics and abstract thinking, thereby giving them 
the ability to conceptualise social and economic issues at the ideological level.  
 
Secondly, it may not be as stable as believed. Converse (1964) highlighted this issue 
in terms of instability of attitudes generally, although not party identification 
specifically. His later research (Converse, 1976) suggested that period effects alone 
(e.g., social turmoil of 1960s) were responsible for almost as much variance in party 
identification as “both cohort and life-cycle events summed together” (p.123).16 Many 
other studies have found systematic change in party identification in response to 
small-scale political events, possibly due to issue/policy discrepancies between self 
and party (e.g., Brody & Rothenberg, 1988; Clarke & Kronberg, 1993, Fiorina, 1981, 
Westholm & Niemi, 1992).  
 
The notion of increased strength of party identification over the lifetime has been 
disputed by the continued finding of decreased partisan attachment in Western 
society over time; there have been increasingly fewer strong or very strong identifiers 
and more weak identifiers and Independents (in U.S.: MacKuen, Erikson & Stimson, 
1989; Canada: Clarke & Kronberg, 1993; Britain: Abramson, 1992; Australia: Bean & 
Kelley, 1988). It has been argued that older people were socialised in a more partisan 
time than younger voters (cohort/generation effect). Increased dissatisfaction with 
governments following the social upheaval of the 1960s and economic downturn of 
                                                           
16Period effects are events which affect almost everyone around at the time, while cohort effects result 
from narrow period effect (focused particularly on one group, such as those coming of age, e.g., 
Vietnam generation, ‘baby boomers’). Lifecycle effects indicate change that happens to most people 
over the lifespan (e.g., increased conservatism, hankering for the ‘old days’). 
  
 
 
120
the 1970s led to destabilisation of partisanship (Rose, 1989) at the same time as these 
f o r c e s  w e r e  i n c r e a s i n g  c o n s t r a i n t  i n  t h e  m a s s  p u b l i c ’ s  b e l i e f  s y s t e m s  ( e . g . ,  N i e  &  
Andersen, 1974). Television was also believed to play a critical role by bringing 
political events, both domestic and international, closer to the public, thereby raising 
awareness of government activity (Bourdon, 1992). When older generations died 
their replacements have been less partisan, which has led to greater electoral 
volatility, due to weaker party attachments. Conversely, cohort effects have also been 
reported, where the circumstances at the time of entering the electorate (~18 years) 
have affected party identification in Britain (Russell, Johnston & Pattie, 1992) and 
Australia (McAllister & Bean, 1997). It may also be that the parties within different 
nations have narrowed the gap between themselves, which also makes vote switching 
more likely.  
 
The current literature on voting still ascribes a central role to party identification. 
Changes in levels of particular parties’ support have been attributed to conversion 
and unattached voters within the electorate, rather than intakes of new voters 
predominately attached to one party (Johnston, 1992). Fiorina (1981) proposed a 
dynamic model of electoral choice, claiming that voting decisions were based on the 
incumbent’s performance, expectations about future performances and party 
identification (which was a function of prior party performance). Others have started 
to consider party identification as a function of past voting or of intention to vote, 
rather than a key causal component of the voting process (e.g., Franklin & Jackson, 
1983; Jackson, 1975).  
 
4.3.3 PARTY IDENTIFICATION VERSUS POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
 
There has been considerable criticism of the concept of party identification, in terms 
of it being a concept only useful in the U.S. (e.g., Fleury & Lewis-Beck, 1993; 
Percheron & Jennings, 1981). As mentioned earlier, Americans seem to use the  
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liberalism-conservatism dimension for both social and economic beliefs, whereby 
aspects of leftism are considered liberal economics, when leftist systems are typically 
characterised by what are considered conservative economic beliefs (e.g., 
protectionism). It is likely that Americans’ ideological thinking has been shaped by 
their parties’ positions (or vice versa), such that they have no real left-wing parties, 
and liberal and conservative are the best labels for the Democrats and Republicans, 
respectively. Also, the nature of the American electoral system prevents the 
emergence of any other parties as electoral threats through the use of first-past-the-
post, non-preferential, voluntary voting, restricting ballot access and privately funded 
parties. McClosky and colleagues (1960) suggested several reasons for the lack of 
adherence to the left-right structure in Americans’ beliefs, including a lack of 
historical cleavages around republicanism, religion and democracy (as seen in 
western Europe) and lack of conflict between socialism and capitalism due to not 
having an entrenched aristocracy (and supposed great social mobility). Later though, 
they describe what clearly seems to be social and economic liberalism17 as “a deep 
seated ideological cleavage often found among Western parties” (McClosky et al., 
p.420).  
 
Multiparty Western democracies, which generally have proportional voting (such as 
France), show much greater use of the left-right ideological dimension. Even 
countries with electoral systems which could generally be described as two-party 
often have one left (social democratic) and one right party as their basis (e.g., Britain, 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada). As such it seems logical that non-U.S. nations make 
use of a different system to structure their social, political and economic attitudes and 
therefore are less reliant on party identification (although evidence from Converse 
                                                           
17 “One side of this cleavage is marked by a strong belief in the power of collective action to promote 
social justice, equality, humanitarianism, and economic planning, while preserving freedom; the other 
is distinguished by faith in the wisdom of the natural competitive process, and in the supreme virtue of 
individualism, ‘character’, self-reliance, frugality, and independence from government. To this 
cleavage is added another…namely, a difference in attitude toward change between ‘radicals’ and 
‘moderates’” (McClosky et al., 1960, p.420).  
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and others suggests great differences within the U.S., in terms of ideological and 
party voting). It is particularly noticeable that the multiparty democracies show 
greater levels of citizens using the left-right dimensions, while the two-party systems 
show fewer using ideology and more using party identification. The U.S. shows the 
least use of ideology and the relatively greatest use of party, perhaps because it has 
the most relevance as a structuring mechanism within the American political system, 
where left-right means very little (or at best extreme liberalism/conservatism).  
 
Of course, use of structuring dimensions differs within populations, with the most 
sophisticated relying most on distinct and coherent ideological beliefs; however, 
becoming knowledgeable in these dimensions depends on exposure, such that being 
constantly surrounded by talk of the left and right (or liberal and conservative) would 
naturally impact on the way people think about the world, even at elite levels, not 
least because people have to have shared understandings of what these concepts are 
in order to have meaningful discussions about them (social representations), even if 
these are not exactly the same (e.g., McClosky, 1964).  
 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
 
There are a number of keys points arising from the preceding discussion, primarily 
that people with higher levels of education tend to show greater constraint among 
their beliefs and values and are more likely to adhere to an ideological structure with 
regard to their political thinking. The more politically sophisticated, or ‘ideologues’, 
have greater understanding of the political process and knowledge about its actors 
and functions. The ability to think abstractly about political, social and economic 
systems allows people to use ideological concepts in ordering their attitudes, and this 
ability is believed to be increased by tertiary education. Those who do not use  
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ideological dimensions to structure their political thinking are more likely to rely on 
other cues, such as group based relationships (e.g., bosses and workers) or party 
identification. People who use political ideologies are more likely to vote in line with 
their own values on issues and to choose the party which best reflects their positions, 
due to both greater knowledge and awareness, and greater interconnectedness of 
beliefs.   
 
The levels of conceptualisation, originally proposed by Campbell, and colleagues 
(1960), and elaborated on by Converse (1964), have found continued support over the 
years, although the number of distinct levels have been reduced to four, or three in 
some cases (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Knight, 1985; Stimson, 1975; Wyckoff, 1980). 
Research has repeatedly suggested vast differences within the electorate in terms of 
political understanding, interest and knowledge, and in the use of political ideology to 
structure belief systems. The levels of conceptualisation were closely, though not 
precisely, related to level of education. Over time, researchers have dispensed with 
the separate strata (most likely due to its time consuming categorisation process) and 
instead made use of the concept of a continuous variable of political sophistication. 
Clear differences in political thinking and action can be seen between the more and 
less politically sophisticated, and between ‘elites’ (party candidates, parliamentarians, 
political academics etc.) and mass publics (e.g., Barton & Parsons, 1977; Jennings, 
1992; McClosky et al., 1960; Sidanius, 1991). Political sophistication has also been 
found to be related to education, although it has often been an element of its 
definition in practice.  
 
The controversies surrounding the issue of how people structure their political beliefs 
and values are still evident. In many cases, the distinction between liberal-
conservative and left-right has not always been accurate, with many researchers 
basing their measures on logical rather than theoretical grounds (e.g., Fleishman, 
1988; Furnham & Heaven, 1988; Johnson & Tamney, 2001). Also, the debate over the  
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relevance of party versus ideological identification can be seen, with the former 
having more relevance in the U.S. and the latter in Europe (e.g., Fleury & Lewis-Beck, 
1993). The work of Converse and colleagues and others would suggest that party was 
more relevant to those at the group-referents level of conceptualisation, but it is clear 
that certain political systems are more likely to produce party rather than ideology 
distinctions (e.g., McClosky et al., 1960). 
 
In summary, these results suggest that people’s political belief systems may be 
organised separately for social (liberal-conservative) and economic (left-right) beliefs, 
although these are likely to be related, such that liberal social and left economic 
attitudes and conservative social and right economic attitudes are often paired, but 
do not have to be. Those who attend university should demonstrate greater 
ideological constraint and coherence in their political attitudes and beliefs. They 
should also make voting and policy decisions consistent with these beliefs, including 
their party identification and the way in which they explain social phenomena. As a 
result of the connections between ideological values and other beliefs, it would be 
expected that those with socially liberal and economically left beliefs would ascribe 
responsibility for poverty and wealth to the system before the individual, while the 
reverse would be true for those with socially conservative and economically right 
attitudes. Conversely, political sophistication research suggests that those with a 
better understanding of the social and economic system would be more likely to make 
external (systemic) explanations for events, as they are more capable of recognising 
the role of distant events (seeing the ‘big picture’) and are, therefore, less likely to fall 
prey to the actor-observer effect.   
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5. THE AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL AND  
TERTIARY EDUCATION SYSTEMS 
 
Australia would best be described as a Western, post-industrialist nation, although its 
geographical isolation and small size mean it plays only a minor role on the world 
stage. The political and higher education systems of Australia are based on the 
equivalent English institutions, like most f o r m e r  c o l o n i e s  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  E m p i r e .  
However, they have developed some unique features which must be considered when 
examining the sociopolitical attitudes of Australian university students and when 
comparing these findings to others, particularly to research based in the U.S. The 
main features of the Australian political system, including its structure, the political 
parties and people’s political attitudes are outlined below. A brief history of the 
Australian tertiary education system, including details of funding arrangements and 
Government support structures for students is also provided. This is followed by 
details about Murdoch University, where this research programme was conducted. 
An understanding of the history, and current situations, of both the political and 
higher education systems is necessary for the interpretation of the research 
conducted.     
 
5.1 THE AUSTRALIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 
 
5.1.1 THE STRUCTURE 
 
The Australian political system has three levels of government: Local, State and 
Federal. The Federal government was established in 1901, after the six independent 
colonies agreed, via referendum, to unite. Each of the colonies became states, with 
two additional Territories which were controlled by the Federal Government. After  
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concerted efforts on the part of their citizens, both gained their own governments, the 
Northern Territory in 1978 and the Australian Capital Territory (the home of the 
national government) in 1988. Each of the States has two houses of parliament 
(except Queensland)1, while each of the Territories have only a Lower House.  
 
At the Federal level there are also two Houses of Parliament; the House of 
Representatives (Lower House), which has single member electorates, and the Senate 
(Upper House), which has fixed numbers of seats for each State (12) and Territory 
(2). The party, or coalition, which holds the most seats in the Lower House forms 
Government, with their (self-elected) leader becoming Prime Minister (PM). Voting 
in elections has been compulsory in Australia since 1924 (compulsory enrolment 
since 1911). Compulsory voting was introduced by the conservative government of the 
time, due to a fear of splitting the anti-Labor vote as a result of the emergence of the 
Country Party (Lucy, 1993). This was also the reason that preferential voting replaced 
first-past-the-post (Lower House: 1918, Upper House: 1919).2  
 
Under preferential voting electors must number all the candidates in order of 
preference, starting at 1. In the event that no candidate wins 50% + 1 vote, the 
candidate with the lowest number of first preference votes is eliminated and the 
second preference votes of those who voted for the eliminated candidate are 
redistributed as though they were first preference votes (Lucy, 1993). This process 
continues until the criterion of 50% + 1 is reached by a candidate. Preferential voting, 
combined with vote-weighting (smaller electorates in rural areas), has ensured that, 
despite winning fewer first preference votes than Labor at virtually every election  
                                                           
1Queensland’s Upper House was eliminated in 1922 by Theodore’s Labor Government. Between 1915 
and 1920 the Legislative Council, which was dominated by the Opposition, blocked 29 of the 
Government’s bills. After a failed referendum on the issue in 1917, Labor was able to gain control of 
the Upper House in 1922, and promptly passed legislation to abolish it (Fitzgerald & Thornton, 1989). 
2 The effects of this are still seen today, with far more right-wing/conservative minor parties than left-
wing ones found on most ballots. These groups then direct preferences to the major conservative party, 
the LP. However, Converse (1964) has argued that greater fragmentation on the right is likely as the 
left needs a ‘united front’, due to lower turnout among their typical constituents (not a factor in 
Australia) and because the right favoured charismatic leaders over comprehensive policies.    
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since they were formed in 1946 (except 1966 and 2004), the Liberal Party (LP) has 
held power for thirty-nine of the last fifty-eight years (Parliament of Australia, 2002).  
 
The Senate was often referred to as the “States’ House”, due to the fixed number of 
Senators from each State and Territory. Half Senate elections are held every three 
years, in line with the House of Representatives elections, however; Senators serve 
fixed six year terms, so only half the seats are available at each election (six for each 
State, one for each Territory) (Lucy, 1993), and new Senators may not take their seats 
until some time after the election (e.g., those elected in October, 2004 will not sit in 
the Senate until July, 2005, despite their Lower House colleagues taking their seats in 
November).  
 
Senators are elected via preferential proportional representation. Candidates must 
receive a certain percentage of the vote (about 14.29% for the States; Lucy, 1993) in 
order to receive one of the available seats. However, generally only four or five are 
claimed outright; thereafter, elimination of candidates with the lowest number of first 
preferences occurs, as in the Lower House. Preferences are redistributed until six 
candidates achieve the quota. However, in the Senate, voters have a choice of 
numbering all candidates (usually in excess of 50) or just voting for one party, with 
the party deciding where the preferences will go. This is obviously considerably easier 
for the voter, and puts minor parties in a stronger position, as the major parties jostle 
for their preferences (and they make deals amongst themselves). The proportional, 
preferential system of voting has allowed minor parties to have a much greater 
impact on policy than they would in a first-past-the-post system, both in terms of 
influencing party platforms in return for preferences and in forcing amendments to 
legislation when they hold the balance of power in the Senate (Jaensch & Mathieson, 
1998), which, until the 2004 election, had not been controlled by any government  
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since the 1980 election.3 
 
5.1.2 THE POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
Australia is regarded as a two-party system as there have only ever been, and are only 
ever likely to be, either Labor or “anti-Labor” governments (Lucy, 1993), with the 
latter far more electorally successful federally. Most Australians consider an election 
to be a choice between the major parties, currently the Australian Labor Party (ALP) 
and the Liberal Party of Australia (LP), (often as the ‘lesser of two evils’; Jaensch, 
1995). Political parties usually try to differentiate themselves along social divisions; 
their maintenance ensures continuing support (Berelson, Lazarsfeld & McPhee, 
1954). Conversely, the pressure to appeal to a majority of voters, in order to win 
power, has led to few discernable differences between the major parties; they have 
tended towards centrist policies, although both have moved further to the right, at 
least economically, since the 1980s. This makes it difficult for people to distinguish 
ideological differences between the two (Lucy, 1993).  
 
5.1.2.a The Australian Labor Party 
The ALP was Australia’s first political party, formed in the 1890s, and is the world’s 
oldest ‘workers’ party’.4 I t  w a s  b or n a s  t he  pol it ic a l  w in g  of t he  b u r geon in g  t r a de 
union movement, which emerged from an alliance of the Irish and British working-
class immigrants and emancipated convicts and their descendants, a group which far 
outnumbered the middle class (soldiers, officials etc.) in Australia at the turn of the 
century. As a result, ALP supporters have traditionally been working-class, trade 
union members, with some more educated socialists and progressives (Aitkin & 
Kahan, 1974).  
                                                           
3 The LP unexpectedly gained outright control of the Senate in the 2004 election (effective July, 2005). 
It is the first absolute majority in the Upper House since 1974 and allows the Government to pass all 
legislation unopposed and unamended. 
4 The world’s first labour government was elected in Queensland in 1915 (Fitzgerald & Thornton, 
1989).  
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The ALP has always claimed to be a democratic socialist party (e.g., Party Platform 
ALP, 2004), and it was Whitlam’s Labor Government (1972-1975) that introduced 
left-wing social reforms such as socialised medicine (via Medicare), free tertiary 
education and greater funding for the arts.5 Whitlam’s term in office, however, 
coincided with a worldwide economic downturn; the collapse of the post-war boom. 
After the Senate blocked its supply bill, paralysing the Government, the Governor-
General6 d i s s o l v e d  b o t h  h o u s e s  o f  p a r l i a m e n t  i n  1 9 7 5 ,  w i t h  L a b o r  l o s i n g  t h e  
subsequent election. Perhaps because of the perception that they were poor economic 
managers, the next Federal ALP Government (Hawke, 1983-1991) focussed on 
economic issues, particularly neoliberal reforms, aimed at restricting government 
activity (e.g., welfare, public service) and encouraging greater ‘efficiency’, primarily 
through privatisation of government owned assets and contracting out of services. 
These reforms were continued by the Keating ALP Government (1991-1996) and the 
current Howard Liberal Government (1996-present). The ALP’s economic focus may 
have contributed to the impression that the two parties are alike, although it is 
important to note that the Hawke-Keating years represent the ALP’s longest time in 
power federally (Parliament of Australia, 2002). They have lost the last four Federal 
elections, although they hold power in all the States and Territories. 
 
5.2.1.b The Liberal Party of Australia and the Nationals 
The main anti-Labor party has existed under many different names since Federation 
(Protectionists, Nationalists, United Australia Party); however, its policies have 
generally been more socially conservative and economically liberal than those of the 
ALP. The LP was officially formed in 1944 and it is a conservative (or neoclassical 
                                                           
5 Previous ALP federal governments had reigned during war times, therefore having little time or 
money for social reform. 
6 Australia is a constitutional monarchy, with the Queen of England as head of state. Due to the 
massive inconvenience of having her come all the way out here to fulfil her various duties (signing 
legislation, etc.) the Governor-General, who is appointed by the Queen on the recommendation of the 
PM, acts in her stead. Sir John Kerr was widely believed to have over stepped the bounds of his 
authority in this case, but he was pressured by the Opposition, who had nominated him.   
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liberal/right-wing) party, analogous to Britain’s Conservatives or the U.S.’s 
Republicans, but more centrist.7 The LP’s main objective is individual freedom, 
primarily of the economic rather than social kind (Lucy, 1993). Their key supporters 
have generally been the middle and upper-class, business people, high income 
earners and the socially conservative (Aitkin & Kahan, 1974). 
 
The LP emphasises leadership; an electorally successful leader with popular 
(populist) policies, is far more important than philosophical and ideological 
considerations (Lucy, 1993). Menzies is regarded as the greatest LP leader because he 
presided as PM through a period of great economic growth and social stability (1949-
1966). The LP has generally prided itself on its economic performance and the 
current PM, Howard, has ensured that economic, rather than social, issues have 
dominated politics, particularly in the 1998 and 2004 election campaigns. The focus 
of the 2001 election was the ‘Tampa crisis’, which clearly played to conservative, and 
racist, social values,8 most likely to take attention away from economic issues, like the 
GST (Goods and Services Tax) which had been introduced after the 1998 election. 
 
The Liberals have enjoyed a close electoral relationship with the National Party (NP) 
for much of the last century, with coalitions at both Federal and State levels (Jaensch, 
1994). Federally, the NP began as the Country Party (1920), became the National 
Country Party (1975) and finally the National Party of Australia in 1982. Often 
regarded as the rural wing of the LP, it is rurally focused and more socially 
                                                           
7 A distinction between “Liberals” and “small l” liberals in often made in Australia. Clearly the name is 
a misnomer in relation to the North American understanding of the term, and the LP is not akin to the 
British Liberal Party. 
8 On 26
th August, 2001 an unseaworthy ‘people smuggling’ vessel, the Palapa, sunk in international 
waters on its way from Indonesia to Australia. 438 people were rescued by the Tampa, a Norwegian 
cargo boat, which was then refused entry to Australian waters, with the Government suggesting that the 
asylum seekers were Indonesia’s responsibility. Howard roused the electorate with his “we decide who 
comes here and the circumstances in which they come” speech, and made a vote for the LP about 
stopping Muslim terrorists (the terrorist angle was included after 11
th September, when the crisis was 
still ongoing, but became less newsworthy internationally). The survivors were eventually transferred 
to small island detention centres across the Pacific to be ‘processed’ (‘Pacific Solution’). Ultimately, 
the vast majority were shown to be genuine refugees, but not before the LP’s sweeping election victory 
and significant changes to Australia’s immigration policy (Marr & Wilkinson, 2003; also Betts, 2003).   
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conservative than its senior coalition ‘partner’ (Lucy, 1993). The NP supports most 
economically liberal policies but favours ‘agrarian socialism’ (special benefits and 
economic protection for primary producers; Jaensch, 1994). While the support of the 
NP was critical in gaining power in 1996, by the 2001 election the LP had the 
numbers to rule in its own right, which has severely reduced the influence of the NP 
on Government policy. The exchange of preferences between the conservative parties 
and the concentrated support for the NP have given this minor party much more 
power than its overall popularity would suggest is justified (also aided by the fixed 
number of Senators per state, regardless of population). Vote-weighting has also been 
important, as rural electorates generally have fewer voters, giving them greater 
representation in parliament. 
 
5.2.1.c Significant minor parties  
While Australia is far from a multi-party system, the number, and influence, of minor 
parties is continually growing. In the 2004 House of Representatives election, 16.0% 
of first preferences went to a minor party or Independent, although this was a fall 
f r o m  2 0 0 1  ( 1 9 . 5 % )  a n d  1 9 9 8  ( 2 0 . 7 % ) ,  t h e  p e a k  o f  m i n o r  p a r t y  v o t i n g  ( A E C ,  
2004acd). The first influential minor party post-WWII (excluding the 
National/Country Party and the Democratic Labor Party, which is no longer a 
political force) was the Australian Democrats (AD). Formed in 1977, by the 
disgruntled former Liberal Minister Don Chipp, they originally advocated ‘post-
materialist values’, focussing mainly on social issues, and not siding with either of the 
major parties (Lucy, 1993); their campaign slogan was “keeping the bastards honest”. 
However, during the 1990s the AD began to move further to the left in their policies, 
and became known for forcing amendments to the Howard Government’s legislation 
when they held the balance of power in the Senate. The party’s leaders promised 
during the 1998 election campaign to block the Liberals’ proposed GST legislation in 
the Senate, but when the time came they allowed its passage, with minor 
amendments. This seemed to damage their credibility significantly, with their first  
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preference votes in the Senate falling from 8.45% in 1998 to 2.1% in 2004, leading to 
the loss of all four seats of the seats they won in the 1998 election (AEC, 2004b).9 
 
The minor party with the most electoral support currently is the Australian Greens 
(GP), with 7.7% of Senate first preferences (although only two seats) at the 2004 
election (AEC, 2004b). The Greens largely focus on environmental and social justice 
issues. The national GP was formed in 1992, although state-based green parties and 
community groups had been involved in politics for some time, with two Greens 
(WA) Senators elected in 1990 and 1993. Bob Brown, the party’s current (and only) 
leader was elected to the Senate in 1996, having previously been a member of 
Tasmania’s parliament. Generally, the GP have been close to the AD (the parties 
considered merging in 1991; Brown & Singer, 1996); as electoral support for the GP 
has increased, the AD’s has waned. The GP are closer to the ALP (than the LP) policy-
wise, and are often further left. Labor has shown itself to be willing to change its 
policies in return for Green preferences, while the Liberals often dismiss them as 
extremists.10 As well as attracting disaffected AD voters, some ALP supporters 
unhappy about the party’s recent shift to the right (e.g., supporting the Government’s 
policies on asylum seekers and the war in Iraq) have turned to the Greens.  
 
There are currently twenty-nine other registered political parties federally, with only 
two not contesting the 2004 Federal election (AEC, 2004e). They range from single 
interest parties (e.g., Nuclear Disarmament Party, Lower Excise Fuel and Beer Party, 
Australians Against Further Immigration, No Goods and Services Tax Party) to those 
with more comprehensive policies such as the Family First Party,11 Socialist Alliance 
                                                           
9 They still hold four seats which they won at the 2001 election, which will not be contested until 2007. 
Considerable infighting and the resignation of senior party members has not helped their position. 
10 During the most recent election campaign LP Ministers described the Greens as “wacky” and 
“watermelons”: “green on the outside, but red (communist) on the inside”. 
11 Family First (run by the Assemblies of God, a fundamentalist Christian church) has only contested 
one Federal election (2004). It emphasised ‘the family’, and attacked the GP as “extreme” (although 
one party volunteer reportedly said “lesbians are witches and should be burned to death”, AAP, 
4.10.04), which was widely condemned). The ALP and AD chose to direct preferences to FF ahead of 
GP in Victoria, allowing FF to win a Senate seat, despite having only a fifth of the GP’s primary vote.  
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and Progressive Labour Party.  
 
There was one other minor party of note in recent years, Pauline Hanson’s One 
Nation (ON). Hanson was disendorsed as a LP candidate in the 1996 election after 
making racist remarks but went on to win her seat as an Independent. She gave an 
inflammatory maiden speech and garnered support for her own party, mostly in rural 
and regional areas, particularly Queensland (her home state) and Western Australia, 
mostly to the NP’s detriment. However, infighting led to One Nation’s disintegration 
(not helped by the fact that the LP adopted most of the party’s policies, such as 
harsher treatment of asylum seekers and the abolishment of ATSIC). Hanson failed to 
win her seat in the 1998 election or a position in the Senate in 2001 or 2004 (when 
she ran as an Independent). A name change for the party is currently pending. 
However, Hanson, aided by Howard’s failure to condemn her views, provided an 
avenue for expression of intolerance and racism (e.g., see Adams, 1997), which would 
later see the LP triumph in the 2001 election, on the back of the denigration of 
asylum seekers (also see Betts, 2003).12 
 
5.2 AUSTRALIANS’ POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
 
5.2.1 PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
 
Although minor parties have become more prominent in recent times, the vote choice 
is still considered by most to be between the two major parties (Jaensch, 1994). Most 
Australians have a party identification, leading to consistent voting at both the 
aggregate and individual levels, making Australia one of the most stable party 
systems among Western democracies (Jaensch, 1995). The most recent data, from the 
                                                           
12 i.e., the Tampa crisis. Note the similarities between Hanson’s statement in her maiden speech to 
parliament (1996); “I should have a say in who comes into my country” and Howard’s 2001 
declaration; “we decide who comes here and the circumstances in which they come”. 
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2001 National Election Survey (Bean, Gow & McAllister, 2002), indicated that 37.5% 
of voters identified with the LP (3.5 with NP) and 35.6% with ALP (also 2.6% AD, 
2.7% GP and 2.5% ON). McAllister and Bean reported that two thirds of Australian 
voters had very or fairly strong party identifications (which had declined but 
remained steady during the 1990s). Almost two thirds of people claimed to have 
always voted the same (McAllister & Bean, 1990) and the congruence between vote 
and partisanship remained high (McAllister & Bean, 1997).  
 
Kelley (1988), based on data from the 1984 National Social Science Survey (NSSS), 
(with a stratified national sample of 3012 Australians), reported clear relationships 
between people’s party identification and their issue positions and demographic 
characteristics. Labor voters favoured greater government intervention in the 
economy, increased economic equality and were more pro-union than Liberal and 
National voters. Coalition voters, in contrast, were more pro-American and 
anticommunist and reported higher levels o f  C h r i s t i a n  b e l i e f .  P a r e n t s ’  p a r t y  
identification, subjective social class and rural/urban residence also significantly 
predicted party support, in the expected directions. There were numerous social 
issues, though, which had little effect on party identification including the situation of 
Aborigines, the environment, uranium mining,13 punitiveness (law and order), 
abortion and women’s careers outside the home. Age, sex and education also had no 
effect on party preference.  
 
Traditionally, many parliamentary seats were ‘safe’ (held by one party over time), so 
parties concentrated on winning marginal (‘swinging’) seats. This may have isolated 
traditional voters, with some formerly safe seats being lost or becoming marginalised 
recently, at both Federal and State levels. Meanwhile, newly created seats have 
tended to be swinging, rather than safe, as they are often based on new communities, 
or the drawing together of older communities which have suffered population 
                                                           
13 Although later the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Party would enjoy remarkable electoral success, with a 
candidate from WA elected to the Senate in 1987 and 1993.   
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decline. However, it requires far less effort for people to follow the traditional 
dichotomy of Labor or non-Labor, especially as the preferential system is made easier 
by the Parties’ how-to-vote cards.14 
 
Australians have generally been regarded as apathetic and sceptical voters (Jaensch, 
1995). Compulsory voting has not led to increased political interest and involvement, 
in comparison to nations with voluntary voting, although it has ensured that turnout 
is generally about 95% for full elections (less for by-elections and referendums) (AEC, 
2004f). Australians tend to be suspicious of authority figures and high achievers, 
most likely due to their origins as a convict colony. It has generally been held that 
politicians are untrustworthy and ‘only out for themselves’; therefore, largely 
interchangeable. This cynical, and indifferent, attitude can be found across groups 
within society, but does tend to be lessened for the supporters of the party who holds 
power federally (Bean, 1988). 
 
Jaensch (1994) claimed that there were only two major political cleavages in 
Australia: rural versus urban and middle- versus working-class. Rural voters have 
traditionally supported the NP and been more conservative than city-dwellers. The 
ALP was established as a party of the working-class, setting the non-Labor parties in 
opposition to this. Australian society itself was initially very culturally homogenous, 
with class (and a long history of conflict) being the main difference between the 
predominately British and Irish settlers, convicts and soldiers. Denominational 
religious differences between the Catholics and Protestants were mirrored in the class 
spilt (Aitkin & Kahan, 1974). The majority of Indigenous Australians were only given 
a Federal vote after a referendum was approved granting them citizenship in 1967 
(Jupp, 1982). The White Australia Policy, which required newcomers to take a 
dictation test in any language the immigration officer saw fit (including Swahili and 
                                                           
14In the 2001 NES (Bean et al., 2002), 50.2% of sample (N= 2010) reported using a how-to-vote card 
for the House of Representatives and 84.0% for the Senate ballot. 
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Celtic), ensured that non-Anglos were a tiny minority. 
 
The White Australia Policy was replaced by ‘Multiculturalism’ in the 1960s, after the 
arrival of Southern European immigrants fleeing the devastation of WWII. War and 
political unrest in South-East Asia resulted in increased immigration during the 
1970s and 1980s, including those applying for asylum as refugees. The arrival of these 
new ethnic and religious groups did not significantly alter the political landscape. 
McAllister and Makkai (1992) suggested that this was because the immigrants were 
more interested in economic success, security and stability than politics; although 
many were anti-communist as a result of their experiences. Australians regard 
themselves as egalitarian people who ignore difference, with the mainstream likely to 
view ethnic parties as divisive; however, there has always been a strong undercurrent 
of racism (Adams, 1997). Since the increase in Asian migration especially, there have 
been a rash of minor parties representing anti-immigration, anti-multicultural forces, 
often with conservative social and economic views (protectionism, nationalism etc.), 
such as ON and Australians Against Further Immigration (Jaensch & Mathieson, 
1998).15 
 
Post-industrialism has reduced the importance of the conventional sociopolitical 
cleavages, as traditional working-class occupations have dwindled and rural to 
(sub)urban drift has increased (Bean & McAllister, 1997). The growth of the service-
based economy, and accompanying increases in levels of education and the self-
described middle-class have also contributed, along with increased immigration and 
the decline of socialism and rise in economic liberalism worldwide. Australia now 
seems to have a socially and culturally heterogenous (self-identified) middle-class, 
both working and welfare-dependent poor and an elite group who control most of the 
                                                           
15 Attempts have been made to determine why One Nation in particular garnered so much support (e.g., 
Goot & Watson, 2001a), which has created some controversies in the academic community (e.g., Goot 
& Watson, 2001b; Turnball & Wilson, 2001). Generally, results have suggested political alienation, 
rejection of post-materialist values (multiculturalism etc.) and economic hardship.  
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wealth, as in most other developed nations. 
 
5.2.2 POLITICAL ATTITUDES  
 
Braithwaite (1988) in his discussion of the economic issues data from the 1984 NSSS 
reported that most Australians wanted the economy to remain as it was. Around two-
thirds of people favoured a mix of private and public ownership (primarily of 
utilities), and this remained constant across ALP and LP identifiers (although 35% of 
Liberals favoured complete privatisation and 9% of Labor voters wanted most or all 
businesses publicly owned). People were also generally opposed to deregulation (with 
ALP voters more so) and supportive of increased spending on public services, 
especially education and health, but also treatment of drug addiction. When offered a 
choice between tax cuts or services spending 40% opted for the latter.  
 
It is likely, however, that support for the mixed, conservative economy has declined 
in the last 20 years, particularly as it was the ALP government which began 
privatisation and deregulation not long after this survey was conducted. It may just 
be that people favour the status quo, and were therefore likely to support whatever 
model they were currently experiencing (particularly if the economy is going well, as 
it was in 1984 and is now).16 Braithwaite (1988) in fact suggested that the Hawke ALP 
Government’s pursuit of deregulation was misguided in light of community attitudes 
(which clearly favoured the existing arrangement) and “may pave the way for another 
kind of conservative ascendency which is just the opposite of its intentions” (p.34). 
This has particular relevance in light of the ALP’s current problem in distinguishing 
themselves from the LP (in a positive way) in the eyes of the electorate. 
  
                                                           
16Mackay’s (1993) review of his qualitative community research since 1979 suggested that Australians 
are very conservative, in terms of preferring the status quo, hence only three changes in party in power 
since WWII (with the 1975 election not counted as Fraser had already been installed as interim PM by 
Governor-General Kerr). 
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There has been some evidence of a shift back towards greater favouring of social 
spending though, particularly in light of the harsher consequences of market 
liberalism. Wilson and Breusch (2003) examined Australians’ preferences for 
spending or tax cuts between 1987 and 200 1  u s i n g  N a t i o n a l  E l e c t i o n  S t u d y  d a t a  
(collected in election years: 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998 and 2001). While the 
preference for tax cuts was higher in 1987 than 1984, it fell during each subsequent 
data set, with a gap of only 12% by 2001. The gap decreased most noticeably after the 
Howard Government was elected (and began reducing funding and staff numbers in 
the public sector) in 1996. The declining support for tax cuts was evident in all voters, 
with only 49% of LP voters preferring tax cuts in 2001, compared to 78% in 1987 
(Wilson & Breusch). The decrease was less among ALP supporters (56 to 36%) but 
was especially dramatic for AD voters (67 to 18%), perhaps reflecting their party’s 
policy shift to the left.  
 
Regression analyses to predict preference for spending versus tax cuts indicated that 
general policy preferences and attitudes were more important than socio-
demographic characteristics (like sex, age, income, share ownership and union 
membership). However, self-identifying as left, voting Green or Democrat (Labor not 
tested), home ownership, believing high taxes were bad and that the government gave 
too much support to Aborigines were significant predictors of preferring either tax 
cuts or social spending, in the expected directions. There was also evidence of direct 
linkages between Government policies and tax/spending preference, as those who felt 
the standard of health services had fallen under Howard being significantly more in 
favour of increasing spending over tax cuts. However, Wilson and Breusch (2003) 
concluded that “much of the support for social spending captures principled 
commitment to higher social spending among the respondents consistent with an 
ideological preference for welfare state institutions” (p.48), rather than being a 
reaction against the government currently in power. 
  
  139
 
5.2.2.a Political ideology- identification and constraint 
Zagórski (1988) investigated the ideological integrity and composition of the 
“Australian Left and Right”. He used data from two large, stratified sample studies 
taken in 1983/4, with membership of each group determined by self-placement on an 
ideological scale and self-reported high political interest. The Left was found to be 
half the size of the Right (10-15% compared to 30%) and exhibited greater ideological 
coherence. Members of the Left were also significantly younger, had higher levels of 
education and were more likely to be professionals, semi-professionals or students, 
and more were public sector employees than those in the Right or Centre. The Right 
was significantly older, less educated and less likely to be students, and more likely to 
b e  s e l f - e m p l o y e d  o r  m a n a g e r s ,  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h e  L e f t  a n d  C e n t r e .  E v e n  w h e n  t h e  
impact of education was controlled, those on the Left displayed considerably more 
ideological integrity (consistency) than those classified as Right. Zagórski suggested 
inconsistencies were the result of only partial adoption of ideologies and of Australia 
being a flexible society with low levels of political extremism.  
 
Using data from the 1984 NSSS, Bean (1988) also detailed Australians’ ideological 
identifications. He reported that 90% of the sample were willing to locate themselves 
on a seven point left-right scale (again, the right was almost twice the size of the left). 
Of these 3% were strongly and 12% somewhat left, 9% strongly and 22% somewhat 
right, while 55% described themselves as centrists. There were obvious differences in 
party attachment for those at each end of the spectrum but, in contrast to other 
findings (e.g., Converse, 1964; Hagner & Pierce, 1982; Knight, 1985); stronger 
ideological identification was associated with greater party support. Bean also 
examined political interest (although not in relation to ideological orientation), 
finding that 32% of participants indicated a “good deal” of interest and 47% had 
“some interest”, which was an increase over earlier time periods. People with 
stronger party identifications and tertiary education reported stronger political  
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interest, consistent with American findings. 
 
Kelley (1988) also discussed political ideology in Australia, using the 1984 NSSS data. 
Unlike American surveys such as the National Election Survey, which typically rely on 
single issue items, the NSSS was designed around multiple-item scales (Kelley). He 
examined responses to economic (e.g., unions, government ownership), inequality 
and social spending (e.g., redistribution of wealth, welfare spending), foreign policy 
(e.g., support for monarchy, pro-Americanism), social (e.g., Aborigines, 
environment) and moral issues (e.g., abortion, women’s liberation). While there was 
consistency within each subgroup (e.g., union attitudes within economic issues), 
none existed within the five issue categories (e.g., FA of economic issue responses 
yielded three factors, corresponding to the individual scales). However, no FA 
combining all items was mentioned, which would have seemed necessary in order to 
establish whether there was an overarching ideological structure to these various 
types of attitudes. In fact, the decision to conduct five separate analyses may have 
created problems of restricted range; it was not surprising that a three factor solution 
emerged when three individual (highly internally consistent) scales were used.17 In 
any case, Kelley reported high consistency in attitudes towards the same objects, but 
little constraint between objects, concluding that “clear and coherent attitudes on 
political issues are not rare, instead they are common. Attitudes are not irrelevant to 
choice of party” but there was an “absence of rigid ideologies” (Kelley, 1988, p.75). 
 
The most recent (raw) data from the 2001 National Election Study (Bean et al., 2002) 
indicated that of the 79.0% who chose a position on the eleven-point (0-10) ideology 
scale, 24.4% placed themselves left of centre, 41.8% centre (5) and 33.7% right. The 
difference was also pronounced at the extremes, with only 3.2% of the sample taking 
the two most left positions, compared to 5 . 6 %  o n  t h e  r i g h t .  N o  b r e a k d o w n s  b y  
demographic characteristics were available. Participants also rated the political 
                                                           
17 Most scales only contained two or three items hence would have been quite unstable, and orthogonal 
(varimax) rotation was used, despite the fact that scales were expected to be related.  
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parties on the left-right scale. The LP received a mean score of 6.49 (slightly right, 
mode=8), while the ALP’s was 4.71 (centrist, mode=5). The NP was also considered 
right-wing (6.31, mode=5), although ON was less so (5.90, but mode=10). The AD 
was slightly to the left (4.39) and the GP the most left (3.65), but both had modes of 
5.0. However, the most frequent response category for rating party ideology was no 
response (often around 1 in 4 participants), which indicated a lack of knowledge 
and/or apathy.  
 
 
5.3 THE AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITY SYSTEM 
 
5.3.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 
Australia has a long history of tertiary education, with both Sydney (1851) and 
Melbourne Universities (1853), established within seventy years of settlement. By 
1911, there was a university in each of the six states (Adelaide, 1874; Tasmania, 1890; 
Queensland, 1909 and Western Australia, 1911). The Australian university system was 
based on the British model, elite institutions providing general liberal arts education 
to the sons of the privileged (mainly publicly funded), and they subsequently faced 
the same problems after the Second World War (see Halsey & Trow, 1971).  
 
As in most developed nations, Australia’s tertiary education system greatly expanded 
after WWII, with particularly accelerated growth in the 1960s. This was a result not 
only of the changing economy, which demanded more professionals and scientists, 
but also the coming of age of the largest ever birth cohort, the ‘baby boomers’ (those 
born in the post-WWII era, approximately 1945-1964). Technical education colleges 
had expanded following the war, when returned service men and women were 
retrained, but continued even after federal funding declined from 1948. Between  
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1942 and 1962 the number of State universities increased to ten and overall 
enrolments increased from 11000 to 63000 (Jones, 1988). As a result the States’ 
resources were increasingly stretched and, with growing agitation among staff, two 
federal inquiries were instigated; Murray (1957) and Martin (1964) (Barcan, 1980).  
 
The Murray committee suggested increased federal funding and continued growth in 
higher education; however, within a few years its recommendations about size had 
been exceeded, producing more problems in both universities and technical colleges. 
The Martin report, which consisted of three volumes and took four years to complete, 
was generally considered confusing and included many conflicting recommendations 
(having been written by committee; Barcan, 1980). It did, however, advocate the 
establishment of two systems; one for the liberal professions and research 
(traditional universities) and another for vocational training (Colleges of Advanced 
Education; CAEs), again following the British reforms of the same period. After this 
the tertiary sector expanded rapidly; universities until the 1970s (Jones, 1988), then 
the CAEs, which incorporated many of the teachers’ colleges (Barcan, 1980). 
Vocational education and training was also undertaken at TAFE colleges (Technical 
and Further Education), which were State run and initially provided trade-based 
qualifications, in conjunction with employers.  
 
Tertiary education traditionally drew only a small proportion of the population 
(about 5% prior to WWII), and almost all were school-leavers whose fathers also had 
higher education; however, by the 1970s this had increased to around 20% (Jones, 
1988), and is now around 30%. Admittance to universities was always based on merit 
(and ability to pay), but entry requirements were relaxed to allow non-school leavers 
(‘mature-age’) to attend without high-school graduation, through the STAT (a general 
aptitude test), and later via previous qualifications (such as at TAFE certificates or 
diplomas) or affirmative action programmes (particularly aimed at Indigenous 
Australians, but also those with disabilities and women). For school leavers, entry is  
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based on a score received at the end of the final year of high school (Year 12), which is 
usually calculated from both school based assessment throughout the year and state-
wide exams at the end.18 Some specialty courses have other entry requirements, such 
as interviews and portfolios (e.g., medicine, fine arts, music) but generally there is 
little room for subjective judgement.     
 
In 1972, Whitlam’s ALP Government tried to increase access to higher education by 
abolishing university fees and providing means-tested income support payments (the 
TEAS; Tertiary Education Assistance Scheme). The latter particularly helped older 
citizens, as those who had worked for two years full-time automatically qualified for 
benefits (Jones, 1988). The abolition of fees may have been less helpful in getting 
disadvantaged children into universities, due to the smaller numbers from these 
groups completing secondary schooling (Barcan, 1980). The level of participation of 
women dramatically increased though, as more completed Year 12, as well as those 
who returned to education (today they outnumber men at undergraduate tertiary 
level). The increased participation of women in higher education was most likely 
attributable to the rise of the women’s movement, which really accelerated in the 
1970s (Mackay, 1993).19 While it was later claimed that free tertiary education did not 
help disadvantaged groups, there was no denying that women certainly benefited, 
e s p e c i a l l y  a s  t h i s  p e r i o d  c o i n c i d e d  w i t h  e n o r m o u s  c h a n g e s  i n  g e n d e r  r o l e s  
(Marginson, 1997). 
 
 
 
                                                           
18The name and method of calculation differ between states; in WA it is the Tertiary Entrance Rank; 
which provides a percentile rank relevant to all other students who sat the Tertiary Entrance Exams 
(TEE) that year. This system was introduced in 1999; the previous TEE score was out of 510. The rank 
out of 100 brought WA into line with other states, but does not represent an overall percentage mark.  
19The participation of non-school leaver women was most likely also bolstered by the introduction of 
no-fault divorce in 1974, when many women, after leaving unhappy marriages, wanted opportunities to 
‘better’ their employability or to experience personal growth, something which can still be seen in 
mature-age students today (see sections 7.3.3 and 8.3.3).   
  
  144
 
5.3.2 THE HECS SYSTEM 
 
The Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) was introduced by the Hawke 
Labor Government in 1989.20 It involved students contributing some of the costs of 
their degree, but payments were contingent on income level (generally not required 
to pay until after graduation). The abolition of free higher education was deemed 
necessary as demand had increased significantly and the Federal Government was 
not prepared to fully fund the expansion of the tertiary education system.21 There was 
also an argument that lower income earners were funding education for the rich (or, 
at the very least, those who would become high earners), therefore it was a regressive 
system (Chapman, 1997).22 Similar concerns were not raised, however, about the 
massive increases in Federal funding of private schools which occurred throughout 
the late 1970s and 1980s. There was also a belief that free tertiary education had not 
increased access for the disadvantaged (Chapman, 1997), however, some of the 
evidence on which this was based was less than objective (Marginson, 1997). These 
factors, combined with the ‘economic rationalist’ doctrine of the 1980s which aimed 
for a reduced public sector, led to the demand for a more ‘user-pays’ approach to 
higher education (Marginson, 1997). 
 
The HECS system prescribed charges for all undergraduate students, which could be 
paid during each year of enrolment (with a 15% discount initially and later 25%) or 
deferred until later (most students’ preferred option), such that a HECS debt was 
accumulated over the degree, with interest indexed to inflation. Once a person’s 
income reached a particular threshold (also linked to inflation), they began making 
                                                           
20 Two years earlier the HEAC (Higher Education Administration Charge) of $250 per student had 
been introduced, which helped to normalise the idea of ‘user-pays’ and set up the system that would 
allow universities to collect fees. 
21 The Commonwealth Tertiary Education Authority recommended this option in 1985 and was 
abolished within a year (Marginson, 1997). 
22 Although, it could be argued that those who earn more money pay more tax and therefore pay 
retroactively, as well as contributing to tax revenue generally (see Marginson, 1997, pp. 224-231).  
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repayments via the income taxation system at an increasing rate of gross income 
(voluntary repayments attracted a 15% discount). The cost of a degree was identical 
across universities and disciplines initially; banded charges were introduced in 1997, 
by the Howard Government, along with a doubling of charges, significantly decreased 
repayment thresholds and increased repayment rates (Marginson, 1997). The levels 
of fees seemed to be based more on the likely income of future graduates than the 
actual cost of teaching, with medicine, law (an inexpensive course) and veterinary 
science at the top, science in the middle and arts, education and nursing (expensive) 
degrees on the lowest tier (Chapman, 1997). The cost of each type of degree was still 
the same across all public universities.  
 
At the same time as HECS was launched, the option of charging full up-front fees for 
postgraduate and TAFE students was also introduced (with fees set by the specific 
institutions) and this has now become universal. Universities were also permitted to 
introduce up-front fees for domestic students, however, very few chose to do so (but 
this has changed recently, e.g., Murdoch University introduced up-front fee places in 
2004). Discrepancies between universitie s  i n  p o s t g r a d u a t e  f e e s  w e r e  l a r g e  
(Marginson, 1997), although the gap has narrowed more recently. The introduction of 
t he  Pos t g r ad u a te  Ed u ca t ion  L oa n  Sc he me  (PE L S) in  2 0 02  pr ov id e d  s om e  he l p to 
those wanting to pursue postgraduate study, by allowing them to pay via the HECS 
system, although loans were often quite large. Marginson (1997) reported that the 
deregulation of postgraduate fees may be related to the underrepresentation of 
women and those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds at this level, compared to 
undergraduates.  
 
The income-contingent HECS system was considered appropriate as it allowed for 
student contributions, but people only had to pay back their debt if they earned 
sufficient income, thereby hopefully not dissuading the economically disadvantaged 
from attending university. In a way the system protected low income earners by not  
  146
making them pay, and obviously the inflation-level interest was effectively zero. It 
generally takes women longer to repay their debt, due to lower income, fewer hours 
worked and more time out of the workplace, compared to men (Beer & Chapman, 
2004; Chapman, 1997). There is also likely an effect of discipline preference, with 
particular disciplines costing, and earning, far more than others (e.g., engineering 
and medicine versus. teaching and nursing).  
 
There will be striking changes to the HECS system in 2005, with the explicit 
separation of HECS-HELP (government-funded places, old HECS) and FEE-HELP 
(loans for up-front fee undergraduate places, similar to PELS). HECS fees have also 
increased, although the threshold for repayments has been raised (as have repayment 
levels at the higher income thresholds, up to 8%). Limits on the length of time taken 
to complete a degree have also been introduced, along with a limit of only one 
government-funded place (see DEST, 2004). These changes do not apply to any of 
the students in the current studies but would be likely to have significant effects on 
the higher education system.  
 
5.3.3 THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM TODAY 
 
The introduction of HECS was followed by further encouragement of reforms within 
the higher education sector. In 1988 the CAEs were upgraded to full universities, and 
a l l  u n i v e r s i t i e s  w e r e  r e q u i r e d  t o  o f f e r  a  w i d e  r a n g e  o f  c o u r s e s ,  a n d  t o  c o n d u c t  
research and provide doctorates. Many institutions amalgamated, with numbers 
reducing from seventy in 1987 (including CAEs; Marginson, 1997) to thirty-nine in 
2004. 23 All universities are funded in essentially the same way, for each place, but 
they are encouraged to attract as much private income as they can, clearly moving 
more towards liberal economic principles (Marginson). Outside sources of income 
include commercial applications of research, research or other partnerships with 
                                                           
23 There are also three private tertiary education institutions currently operating in Australia: Bond 
(NSW), Notre Dame (WA) and the Australian Catholic Universities (NSW, Victoria and Queensland).  
  147
private sector organisations (such as links to private educational institutions), 
establishment of businesses and consultancies, donations, endowments, investments, 
sales of university assets and, especially, domestic fee-paying students 
(undergraduates and postgraduates, particularly postgraduate courses offering 
qualification and skill upgrades) and international students (deregulation allowed 
universities to set their own fees). The older, more established universities (especially 
the ‘Group of 8’) 24 were obviously advantaged in this, having been subsidised by 
public money for much longer, thereby allowing them to build up their reputation 
(therefore higher demand, able to charge higher up-front fees, greater investments 
and endowments etc.).  
 
The economic rationalist pressures of decreased financial support from successive 
Federal Governments have “marketised” the higher education sector (Marginson, 
1997). Universities compete against each other for students and government funding, 
both for research (formerly general grants, now specific) and supported places 
(although the system is no where near as competitive as in the U.S., it does seem to be 
heading that way). As part of the drive to make universities more efficient it became 
necessary for them to keep more detailed information, in order to support their 
claims for funding, and to introduce more administrators, in order to ‘cut the fat’ in 
the academic departments. The irony is, in their attempts to keep the costs of 
universities down, the numbers of administrative and support staff have increased, 
particularly in the areas of marketing and other attempts to raise revenue from 
private sources (e.g., business liaisons, people who identify commercial possibilities 
from research, public relations). Academic staff members are being asked to carry out 
more administrative functions, at the same time as more layers of administration are 
put in place to assess how well academic staff do their job (and to tell them how to do 
it). Universities are also taking more financial risks, as they become increasing 
entrepreneurial; money lost through these activities (in themselves, and through staff 
                                                           
24 Australian National University, Monash University and the Universities of Sydney, New South 
Wales, Melbourne, Adelaide, Queensland and Western Australia.  
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and other resources devoted to them) is further income unavailable for teaching and 
research, the university’s supposed core functions. 25 
 
Another key change brought about by the corporatisation of universities has been the 
shift to a “consumer culture” attitude towards education (e.g., Snare, 1997). 
Universities, TAFEs and private post-secondary educational institutions are now 
known as “education service providers”.26 As a result of this, there has been an 
increasing emphasis on students’ evaluations of universities, courses and teachers (as 
witnessed in the Good Universities Guide, which has been published since 1991), 
(Marginson, 1997). Also, “graduate outcomes” has become a key phrase for 
universities, which includes generic skills a s  w e l l  a s  “ e m p l o y a b i l i t y ”  a n d  f u t u r e  
incomes.27 The GUG is an example of the way post-secondary education has become a 
market-based service (or product?), as it allows students to compare both universities 
and private institutions (not TAFEs, although the publication includes a section on 
Vocational Education and Training) on a number of criteria including traditional 
measures related to prestige, student demand, faculty qualifications and research 
activity, as well as student evaluations, access and equity information (e.g., 
alternative entry pathways, Indigenous student participation) and graduate outcomes 
(e.g., starting salary, percentage employed). 
 
However, the problem with this model, especially when increased course costs are 
considered (for full fee payers and government funded places) is that it leads students 
to feel that they are entitled to receive a specific product (a degree) at the end, on the 
basis that they paid for it, rather than that they earned it (Snare, 1997). Universities 
run the risk of increasingly becoming a place to get qualified (‘rubber-stamped’), 
rather than a place to learn, which obviously decreases the students’ levels of 
                                                           
25 For example, Murdoch cut Schools’ budgets following the collapse of a deal in which a Business 
‘feeder’ college was to be established the main campus.  
26 Referring to students as ‘clients’, as in the welfare system, cannot be far behind. 
27 One of the changes mooted by the Howard Government in 2004 was a linking of future funding to 
tests of graduate outcomes like generic skills. This proposal would clearly have had a far more negative 
impact on the less prestigious institutions, which do not attract the top tier of applicants.  
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engagement, and their opportunities for personal growth and for learning new skills, 
such as critical thinking, that have traditionally been the hallmark of the tertiary 
educated (Marginson, 1997). The value of degrees generally is also likely to be 
decreased, not just as a result of more of them (as in any mass education system) but 
also because people who have them will be less skilled and they will be seen as being 
‘purchased’ rather than earned. It may be that the nature of what the academy 
envisions as its aims have to change (clearly administrators already have). Perhaps it 
can be accepted that vocationalisation at the undergraduate level is necessary, that 
new degree holders will be less skilled than in the past, but the focus could be on 
separating the few who could go on to research and postgraduate study from the 
mass.  
 
Of course, these are not new problems for tertiary education; it was the “trend 
towards vocationalism in universities, the growing numbers seeking postsecondary 
education, and the uncertain standards of many students” which produced the 
“speculation regarding the future of universities” that led to the Martin enquiry in 
1961 (Barcan, 1980, p.336). A Professor Partridge complained in 1966 that many staff 
members felt student standards were too low and that “too many were only interested 
in securing a professional qualification as quickly as possible” (Barcan, p.377). 
 
5.3.3.a Income support for tertiary students 
As previously mentioned, student assistance payments were first introduced by the 
Whitlam Labor Government in 1972, as TEAS, while income support was also 
available to those training in education, through State government scholarships. The 
TEAS payments were means tested, but only excluded a small proportion of students. 
Over time, however, they became increasingly restrictive, such that while only 35.1% 
of full-time undergraduates did not receive benefits in 1974, by 1986 61.9% no longer 
qualified (Marginson, 1997). Also, the real value of payments declined, making it 
harder for students to study full-time.   
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The TEAS was later changed to Austudy. All full-time students over 16 were eligible 
for benefits, including those from secondary, TAFE, university and private 
institutions, provided they met the stringent means tests. However, students 
pursuing a second degree, even at postgraduate level were not eligible for benefits. 
Subsequent changes by the Howard Government in 1998 placed students up to the 
age of 25 and unemployed people to the age of 21 on a single payment, the Youth 
Allowance, which was substantially less than both Austudy and the New Start 
Allowance (the unemployment benefit). It also made access to both payments more 
restrictive by decreasing parental and personal income thresholds and increasing the 
period of time during which young adults were considered ‘dependent’ on their 
parents, regardless of whether they still resided at home (25 years for students or 21 
for the unemployed).28 Those under 18 years of age who had previously collected 
either of these payments (which used to begin at 16, after child support payments 
from the government to low income earners ended), were no longer eligible.29 
 
The Youth Allowance payment is less than half the minimum wage, even for those 
who live away from home, so most students also have to find other sources of income. 
They are able to earn a certain amount of income from work without it affecting their 
payments, but there is an intensive reporting system (every two weeks, unlike for 
family payments, where people report once a year). As low-income earners though, 
they pay low or no tax and receive a Health Care Card, which entitles them to 
discount doctors’ visits and medication, and other concessions. Students with 
children, whether partnered or single, also receive extra support through the social 
security system. Recent changes, aimed at single mothers, now require that those in 
                                                           
28 Students can be declared “independent” if they meet particular work and income requirements (e.g. 
one-year full-time employment, reach income threshold), have children or have lived with a partner for 
at least one year (must have proof, heterosexual only, payments reduced if partner earns a wage). 
29 Students of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander descent receive allowances from 16 years of age, 
with rates matching Youth Allowance between 18 and 20 years, then Austudy rates from 21. They also 
receive payments for postgraduate study. This is an attempt to equalise the drastic difference in 
outcomes for Indigenous Australians, who are vastly underrepresented in upper secondary and tertiary 
education.  
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receipt of benefits return to work or study after their youngest child enters school, 
which is likely to further increase demand for university study in the future. 
 
 
5.4 MURDOCH UNIVERSITY 
 
Murdoch University was Western Australia’s second university, opening in 1975 with 
672 students; it now has over 12000 students, across three campuses. The university 
aimed to be flexible in its approach to degrees and to encourage equality of access. 
While it offers a broad range of subject areas, as required of all Australian public 
universities, Murdoch probably has most in common with the small, liberal arts 
colleges of the U.S. than the large, State institutions. The University takes its name 
from Sir Walter Murdoch, an Australian academic, and its stated mission is “To 
extend knowledge, stimulate learning and promote understanding, for the benefit of 
the community” (Murdoch University, 2005a). The university claims its “themes” are 
equity and justice, sustainability, global responsibility and innovation, and 
entrepreneurship. As such, Murdoch has generally been considered more liberal/left-
wing than the other WA universities, with strong environmental science and 
sustainability programmes, although the Veterinary school, regarded as the top in the 
country, is by far the most prestigious (and well-funded) part of the university.  
 
Murdoch’s teaching standards have been regarded as excellent, with numerous 
academics winning national teaching awards, and it has received a five-star rating 
(top level) for graduate satisfaction from the Good Universities Guide for eight of the 
last nine years (Murdoch University, 2005b). It also has quite high research 
standards, being rated in the top 500 in the world, and in the top 100 in the Asia-
Pacific region, according to Shanghai Jiao Tong University’s Academic Rating of 
World Universities (2004). Universities’ ratings are based on weighted numbers of  
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prestigious awards, publications and citations by staff and alumni, relative to 
university size. Only thirteen other Australian universities were in the top 500, two of 
equal standing and the others above Murdoch. The university scored particularly 
high, in relation to others at the same level, on high numbers of citations of staff 
publications. 
 
The GUG (2004) described Murdoch overall as on par with Curtin among the WA 
universities, with UWA far ahead and Edith Cowan University (ECU) behind. 
Murdoch received mid-level ratings for prestige, private earnings, research grants, 
student-staff ratios and staff qualifications. The University was above average on 
research intensity, entry flexibility, difficulty of entry, and indigenous and 
international enrolments, and received five stars for overall graduate satisfaction and 
gender balance. However, Murdoch performed poorly on all graduate outcomes (e.g., 
getting a job, starting salary) and had low cultural diversity.30 These are the general 
ratings; individual courses tend to vary. Overall, Murdoch was praised for having 
high levels of academic and electronic support, strong equity and alternative entry 
programmes, support for interdisciplinarity and an obvious focus on undergraduate 
education (GUG, 2004). 
 
Murdoch’s desire to provide a flexible learning experience for students means that 
double majors and minors in almost any areas of study are available (e.g., marketing 
and biochemistry, women’s studies and biomedical science).31 Students also have the 
opportunity to study part- or full-time and some units are available externally or 
online, and most degrees do not have pre-requisite subjects. Entry via alternative 
means (non-school leaver) has been made easier, with students able to get ‘advanced 
standing’ (credit) for previous university units, TAFE certificates and diplomas, and 
                                                           
30 WA has a large overseas born population but they are mainly from the UK, New Zealand and 
Ireland; numbers of Asian and African immigrants are increasing though. 
31 There are some exceptions, where only students enrolled in a degree programme can take units (e.g. 
Veterinary science, Law, Education), and some units often have pre-requisites (although not in 1
st 
year), however, students could select at enrolment to combine these degrees with almost any other.   
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relevant life experience (only about 39% of Murdoch’s students are school leavers; 
GUG, 2004). Compared to other WA universities Murdoch has more flexibility in 
entry, and offers entry specifically for people from groups traditionally 
underrepresented in higher education, adding to its popularity among mature-aged 
students (33% over 25 years of age; GUG, 2004). Generally, school leaver entrance 
scores are similar to the other universities, except the more prestigious University of 
Western Australia (where they tend to be higher), although they vary dramatically 
between degrees (related to popularity; e.g., Veterinary science and Law at top, 
Community Development, Conservation Biology at bottom) and between campuses 
(main campus higher), (see Murdoch University, 2005c). The other two WA 
universities tend to have more vocational and applied orientations, with Curtin a 
former institute of technology and ECU a former teacher’s college. They tend to be 
much more applied in their teaching and research, with Curtin’s business school 
especially, rivalling UWA’s for student demand within the State. 
 
Murdoch University also offers several affirmative action-type programs, through the 
Equity office, which also provides ongoing support to students from groups 
traditionally underrepresented at universities (e.g., disabled and Aboriginal 
students). Further educational support for all students can be accessed through the 
Teaching and Learning Centre, which particularly aids mature-age students and 
those from non-English speaking backgrounds to develop studying and essay-writing 
skills. The UniAccess programme is a four-week pre-semester course for “people who 
can demonstrate educational disruption due to family, financial, social, physical or 
medical reasons” particularly people of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander descent 
and those with disabilities, but also people from remote and rural regions, the 
economically disadvantaged, women wanting to study in non-traditional areas (e.g., 
Engineering), refugees and those from non-English speaking backgrounds, all of 
whom are currently underrepresented in higher education (Murdoch University, 
2005d). There are also specific places set aside in Vet and Law for Indigenous  
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Australians, and the Kulbardi Centre has also been established to provide ongoing 
culturally-appropriate support on campus, in conjunction with the Equity Office 
(Kulbardi Aboriginal Centre, 2004).  
 
Besides the main campus in Murdoch (the South St. campus; about 15kms south of 
Perth CBD), there are also the Rockingham (in Rockingham, ~75kms south CBD) and 
Peel campuses (in Mandurah, ~150kms south), which offer a restricted range of 
courses. Students who miss out on their first choice of degree at the main campus 
often enrol in a General Arts degree (which has the lowest cut-off score) at the 
Rockingham campus, with the aim of transferring into their preferred course, based 
on their advanced standing. The Rockingham and Peel campuses are also connected 
to the local TAFE colleges, and they work in concert to allow students to upgrade 
from TAFE to the university. Both these campuses are in lower socioeconomic areas, 
with high levels of unemployment and single-parent families, which harmonises with 
Murdoch’s aim of increasing access to tertiary education for the socially, physically 
and economically disadvantaged.   
 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Overall, it can be seen that the Australian political and education systems have some 
unique features which influence people’s situations, but that they also share many 
aspects with corresponding systems in other post-industrialist Western nations. 
Australian basically has a two-party political system, although some of its unique 
features, like compulsory preferential voting, have allowed minor parties to achieve 
success both electorally and via influence. Political cleavages have broken down 
somewhat, but dealignment of voters appears less than in other nations and seems to 
have stabilised (most likely the influence of compulsory voting). The Australian  
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electorate seems fairly similar to others in the level of constraint and ideological 
organisation, although it tends to lean slightly more right in its views at present than 
in the past, possibly influenced by the agenda set by the current Federal Government, 
which has won the last four elections.  
 
The Australian higher education system is more similar to the British than American 
model, with virtually all institutions publicly funded. However, neoliberal reforms in 
the 1980s and 1990s have changed universities, attuning them to free market 
principles. Students are required to pay some of the costs for their education, but 
these repayments are contingent on future income levels. Students also receive 
income support and other benefits from the social security system; however, these 
are becoming increasingly restricted. Modifications of the university sector due to 
take effect in 2005 seem to be aimed at reducing the costs for government but may 
also increase divisiveness (perpetuating class differences in future generations). The 
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  m o r e  u p - f r o n t  f e e  p l a c e s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  m a y  l e a d  t o  o t h e r  c h a n g e s  
which academic staff may not welcome (although this is by no means universal), 
however, faculty have been making the same kinds of complaints about poor quality 
students and increased vocationalisation since the 1940s. It may be the case that 
things will not be as bad as expected, or that changes will happen over time so people 
will adjust. Or perhaps faculty may have to resign themselves to the changing nature 
and functions of universities, which may never have met the high-brow, utopian 
standards of teaching people to think and conducting pure research that the myths 
have suggested.    
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6. STUDY 1 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There are a number of implications of the preceding literature review. Firstly, attending 
university seems to bring about change in the more socially liberal, greater tolerance 
direction. This change, however, seems likely to occur differently between different 
academic disciplines, with those in the social sciences relatively more left/liberal than 
those from others disciplines, especially commerce and engineering. This may help 
explain some of the inconsistent results that have been found for the impact of education 
on attitudes and values among community samples. Secondly, the causal attributions 
people favour when explaining social phenomena such as poverty and wealth are linked 
to other aspects of their worldview, such as political ideology, policy preferences and 
attitudes toward particular groups within society. Thirdly, those with university 
education have been found to be more politically sophisticated than people with lower 
levels of education. They tend to display greater consistency and constraint in their belief 
systems. Also, it seems likely that attitudes towards social and economic issues can be 
organised along separate, but related, dimensions, roughly corresponding to liberal-
conservative and left-right continuums, respectively. 
 
When looking at which disciplines tend to be the most left/liberal, results have 
consistently suggested that the social sciences are the most extreme, while those in the 
more applied disciplines, such as commerce, are relatively less left/liberal. Given these 
discipline differences, it has been suggested that students may be self-selecting into a 
discipline which matches their pre-existing beliefs and attitudes, or they may be 
socialised into the worldview of the discipline, during their studies. Of course, it is also  
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possible that both processes work in tandem, which would lead to accentuation of pre-
existing differences between students in different academic disciplines.  
 
There is also reason to expect that those with university-level education have more 
sophisticated understandings of the world, display abstract thinking and show evidence 
of greater constraint within their belief systems. It would be reasonable to expect that 
this was partly due to their greater intellectual capacity and their early life, as much as to 
the experience of education itself. A belief system, or worldview, encompasses many 
aspects, including political, social and economic beliefs, policy preferences, attitudes 
toward different social groups and ways of explaining social phenomena. While these are 
the components of worldview which are examined here, in order to get a broad sense of 
the differences between the disciplines, they are by no means exhaustive. It would be 
expected, from the point of view of constraint within belief systems, that all of these 
would be interrelated, although previous research has suggested that this would be the 
case for some more than others. 
 
6.1.1 AIMS 
 
The main aim of this first study was to assess the utility of the questionnaire, which had 
been specifically designed, based on previous research. Firstly, it had to be determined 
whether the wording was clear and unambiguous and whether the scales were reliable 
and valid. Secondly, the attribution scales had to be assessed to discover if they fitted 
their a priori classifications of individualistic, systemic and fatalistic explanations for 
wealth and poverty. The political ideology scales of left, right, liberal and conservative 
also had to be tested to see if they were unitary or independent. The affect ratings of the 
social groups also had to be examined in order to see if they could be used to create a 
consistent and coherent measure. Lastly, particular hypotheses were tested in order to  
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see whether differences existed between students in different disciplines and at different 
stages of their degrees.  
 
6.1.2 HYPOTHESES 
 
It was predicted that there would be two coherent and consistent sets of sociopolitical 
attitudes across the various domains, such that systemic attributions, left and liberal 
ideological values and ratings of a priori classified ‘liberal’ social groups would be 
positively interrelated; individualistic attributions, right and conservative values and 
ratings of ‘conservative’ social groups would also be positively interrelated. It was not 
known if the relationships between these two sets of variables would be independent or 
negative. 
 
It was expected that social science students would favour systemic explanations for 
wealth and poverty, left and liberal ideological values and certain liberal social groups 
more than commerce students did. It was also predicted that social science majors would 
endorse systemic explanations more than individualistic ones, favour left and liberal over 
right and conservative ideological values and prefer certain liberal social groups over 
conservative groups.  
 
In contrast, it was predicted that commerce students would favour individualistic 
explanations for affluence and poverty, endorse right and conservative ideological values 
and favour certain conservative social groups more than social science students did. It 
was also expected that those in commerce would endorse individualistic explanations 
more than systemic ones, favour right and conservative over left and liberal ideological 
values and prefer certain conservative social groups over liberal groups.  
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It was also expected that while first-year students would exhibit few significant 
differences between disciplines, such differences would be found between disciplines at 
third-year and above. First-year students were also predicted to show less consistency 
and coherence in their attitudes across the different measures compared to students in 
third year and above. 
 
Labor Party identifiers were expected to endorse systemic explanations for wealth and 
poverty, left and liberal ideologies and liberal social groups more than Liberal Party 
identifiers. Conversely, Liberal Party identifiers would endorse individualistic 
explanations for wealth and poverty, favour right wing and conservative ideologies and 
conservative social groups more than Labor Party identifiers.   
 
 
6.2 METHOD 
 
Participants: There were 223 participants (144 females and 79 males) ranging in age 
from 17-59 (Mean= 26.46, Mdn= 22). Table 6.1 shows the breakdown by year group and 
discipline, with one social science student not indicating year of degree. The social 
science students’ majors included sociology, history, community development, 
economics and politics, while the ‘other’ students included those from the humanities, 
communications, cultural studies, media, science, law and education (plus 26 students 
with majors or minors in more than one of the main disciplines). Most psychology 
students received credit hours for participating; other students received a chocolate frog 
for taking the questionnaire, regardless of whether or not it was returned. The  
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assessment of test-retest reliability included only psychology students (n=26; 19 female; 
mean age= 25.31, Mdn=23; 3 1st-years, 6 2nd-years, 14 3rd-years and 3 4th-years).1  
 
TABLE 6.1: Participants by discipline and year of degree  
 1
st years  2
nd years  3
rd/4
th years  Postgraduates  TOTALS 
Psychology 19  9  24  7  59 
Social science  14  11  16  7  48* 
Commerce 11  14  34  0  59 
Others 11  12  31  2  55 
TOTALS 55 46  105  16  222* 
*One social science student did not indicate year of degree 
 
Measures: The questionnaire was created based on previous research and consisted of 
five main sections (see Appendix I). The first section covered demographics and other 
variables that could possibly affect sociopolitical attitudes and social worldview. It asked 
for sex, age, degree, any changes to degree, occupation, parental and romantic partners’ 
levels of education and occupations, participants’ party identifications, parental and 
romantic partners’ party identifications, subjective perception of current and future 
financial situation and whether they were currently receiving or had previously received 
social security benefits.2 
 
The second section asked for participants’ ‘level of agreement’ with fifteen possible 
explanations for wealth, which were rated on a six-point scale (from 1= strongly disagree, 
to 6= strongly agree). The third section again asked for level of agreement, this time with 
nineteen possible explanations for poverty. The explanations offered for both wealth and 
poverty corresponded to the individualistic, structural and fatalistic factors, first 
                                                 
1 The need for test-retest reliability assessments, for which psychology students were easiest to attain, as 
well as the offer of one hour credit, led to a large number of psychology majors, even though no 
psychology lectures were specifically targeted. They were treated as a separate group, partly because they 
were a both a social science (with a particular individualistic focus) and an applied area of study (like 
commerce). As such they were a convenient mid-point between the other two disciplines.   
2 Other questions were included but their results will not be discussed here.  
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reported by Feagin (1972). The political ideology section was next, with eighteen items, 
also measured on the same six-point scale. There were five right wing, five left wing, four 
liberal and four conservative items. The final section consisted of a ten-point affective 
scale asking how positively participants regarded each of sixteen social groups (from 1= 
very negative to 10= very positive). This was an adaptation of the ‘feeling thermometer’ 
commonly used in political research, but with ten, instead of 100 points. 
 
Procedure: All data was collected over two months from the start of the second semester 
of the university year, hence most students had been attending for at least six months, 
although there are large mid-year enrolments, particularly in psychology and the social 
sciences. Participants were primarily recruited from lectures, except for the majority of 
psychology respondents, who were recruited through the Murdoch University School of 
Psychology’s subject pool. The investigator arrived at the start of a lecture, explained 
what the study was about, what was required of the students, how they could return the 
questionnaire and asked for any questions. The questionnaires and chocolate frogs were 
then distributed. Participants took the questionnaires home and completed them in their 
own time. The investigator collected them at the following week’s lecture and, if 
necessary, the subsequent lecture as well.  
 
Psychology students signed up for the study at the School of Psychology’s online subject 
pool, where they had read a brief description of the research. The researcher contacted 
the students via e-mail to arrange for them to attend a group testing session. Numbers in 
these sessions ranged from one to seven people and completion of the questionnaire took 
15 to 40 minutes. All received one hour of credit. Those who returned to participate a 
second time, to allow test-retest reliability to be assessed, received a further half-hour 
credit. The time between these two sessions ranged from seven to thirty-eight days, with 
a median time difference of two weeks (mean=15.5 days).   
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Occupations were classified according to the nine ‘supergroups’ in the Australian 
Standard Classifications of Occupations (DEIR, 1987), and the extra categories of home 
duties, retired and student. The nine supergroups are: Managerial; Professional; Artistic, 
Literary or Sports; Clerical, Sales or Service; Primary Production; Manufacturing or 
Construction; Transport or Materials Handling; Basic Manual; and Occupations Not 
Classified Elsewhere. This simple classification system allowed comparisons between 
disciplines in terms of parents’ and partners’ type of employment. 
 
 
6.3 RESULTS 
 
6.3.1 BACKGROUND VARIABLE COMPARISONS 
 
The breakdown of demographic information by discipline can be seen in Appendix II. 
Overall, the demographics of the sample were similar to those of all students in the 
specific disciplines examined at Murdoch University (Office of Policy and Planning, 
2002). Significant differences by discipline were found for sex (more males in commerce, 
fewer in psychology) and age (older participants in the social sciences compared to all 
other groups). No differences were found based on parents’ levels of education or 
occupational prestige, although there were some small differences based on mothers’ and 
partners’ occupational categories and on partner’s education level. There were also quite 
large differences in party identification, with commerce students much more likely to 
favour the Liberals and less likely to favour Labor or the Greens, compared to those in 
psychology and the social sciences. There were no differences between disciplines in 
participants’ subjective rating of their current financial situation. However, social science  
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students had significantly lower expectations of where they would be in ten years, 
compared to all other groups, although the gap was widest with commerce majors.  
 
For the test-retest reliability analyses see Appendix III. All background items showed 
high correlations (>0.9). Reliability was more variable for some of the various individual 
scale items, with some items having to be excluded from subsequent analyses (see 
Appendix IV). However, most of the sociopolitical scales showed outstanding test-retest 
reliability (see below). 
 
6.3.2 SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES SCALES 
6.3.2.a Structure 
Principal components analysis (PCA) was conducted on the attributional and ideological 
attitudes scales using SPSS, in order to create scales which would be the basis for testing 
for differences between the disciplines.3 Direct oblimin rotation was used for all as, even 
though past research indicated independence, the factors were clearly conceptually 
linked, so allowing them to correlate would not force an unnatural independence on 
them. Pairwise deletion of missing data was used in all correlation matrices, to provide a 
broader sample and remove the effects of the small amount of missing data (Fleishman, 
1988).  
 
The sets of wealth and poverty items yielded two components each, corresponding to 
internal and external explanations (Individualistic Wealth [IW], Systemic Wealth [SW], 
Individualistic Poverty [IP] and Systemic Poverty [SP]). All of the left items loaded on 
one component (Left Scale [LS]), but the right-wing items failed to produce a consistent 
                                                 
3 PCA produces components, instead of factors, although the terms are used interchangeably here. In PCA 
all variance is analysed whereas only shared variance is analysed in FA (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Due 
to expected systematic difference in subgroups (e.g., expected greater shared variance among higher level 
students, as their belief systems should be more consistent) PCA was chosen to provide a more accurate 
understanding of the structure of responses.  
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scale and were not included in subsequent analyses. All the liberal and conservative 
items loaded on the same factor (the former negatively), which became the Conservative 
Scale (CS). Most of the social group ratings also loaded on the same component, 
(‘conservative’ groups negatively) so a single Social Groups Scale (SG) was constructed, 
which included six liberal and six conservative groups. Table 6.2 shows the descriptive 
statistics for each of the seven scales created (mean of scale items, scale may range from 
1 to 6, except SG which was from 1 to 10, items not weighted).4 Details of each PCA are 
provided in Appendix IV.  
 
TABLE 6.2: Descriptive statistics for the sociopolitical attitudes scales 
 n  # 
items 
Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Skew 
 
Kurtosis Cronbach’s 
α 
Test-
retest
5
IW 220  6  3.77  3.71  0.74  -0.19  -0.44  0.779  0.81 
SW 221  8  4.01 4.00  0.65  -0.22  0.09  0.699  0.76 
IP 222  6  2.79  2.83 0.87  0.23  -0.36 0.782  0.81 
SP 217  10  4.08  4.11  0.73  -0.12  -0.02  0.736  0.74 
LS 220  5  3.64  3.60  0.88  0.25  -0.02  0.627  0.85 
CS 222  8  3.36  3.50  0.84  -0.18  -0.32  0.697  0.89 
SG 220  12  5.86  5.75  1.28  0.34  -0.25  0.850  0.90 
 
 
Pearson’s r correlation coefficients indicated that there were significant relationships 
between the scale variables, but these were generally only of moderate intensity (see 
Table 6.3). Correlations were in the directions expected, with the systemic scales 
positively related to each other and to the left and liberal (SG) measures. The 
individualistic measures were also positively related to each other and to the 
conservative scale. SG showed the strongest relationships with other variables, 
particularly for the ideological measures. 
                                                 
4 In cases with missing data only one was allowed for the smaller scales (LS, IW and IP) and up to three for 
the larger scales (SW, SP, CS and SG). A univariate outlier was identified on SW only and deleted. There 
was only one multivariate outlier, with a Mahalanobis distance score of 22.65, when the critical value was 
22.46. This case was not deleted, given the large sample size.  
5Test-retest calculations based on smaller sample of 26 Psychology students. 
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TABLE 6.3: Correlations between sociopolitical attitudes scales 
 SW  IP  SP  LS  CS  SG 
IW 0.19**  0.46***  -0.01  -0.19**  0.26***  -0.32*** 
SW    -0.10  0.50*** 0.49*** -0.26***  0.35*** 
IP      -0.23*** -0.37*** 0.47***  -0.60*** 
SP     0.45***  -0.31***  0.40*** 
LS      -0.36***  0.54*** 
CS       -0.64*** 
***Significant at p<0.001 
 **Significant at p<0.01 
  *Significant at p<0.05 
 
 
6.3.2.b Discipline and year of degree analysis 
A two-way (4 x 4) MANOVA was conducted to assess differences between the disciplines 
(psychology, social science, commerce and others) and/or year groups (first, second, 
third/fourth and postgraduate) on each of the seven created sociopolitical scales. The 
assumption of equality of covariances was not violated (Box’s M= 354.41, F (280, 
11655.41) = 0.974, p>0.05). Pillai’s Trace indicated that there was a significant main 
effect for discipline (V = 0.32, F (21, 564) =3.21, p<0.001), but not for year group (V = 
0.14, F (21, 564) = 1.33, p>0.05) or the interaction (V = 0.26, F (56, 1344) =0.935, 
p>0.05).  
 
One-way ANOVAs revealed that there were significant discipline differences on all 
factors except SW (see Table 6.4). Bonferroni post-hoc tests indicated that those in the 
social sciences scored significantly lower than commerce students on IW, IP and CS, but 
significantly higher on SP, LS and SG. Social science students also supported SG more 
and IP and CS less, than students from ‘other’ disciplines. Psychology students favoured 
SP, LS and SG more, and IP and CS less, than commerce majors. They also scored higher 
on IW than those in the social sciences. Commerce students were also significantly 
different from all others on SG (also see Appendix V for all MANOVA results).  
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TABLE 6.4: Mean scores on sociopolitical attitudes scales by 
discipline 
 
 Psychology 
(1) Social  sciences 
(2)  Commerce 
(3)  Others 
(4) 
IW 3.88 
2 3.40 
13 4.00 
2 3.71 
SW  4.15 4.09  3.90 3.90 
IP 2.69 
3 2.28 
34 3.21
12  2.91 
2 
SP 4.32 
34  4.21 
3 3.80
12 3.99 
1 
LS 3.87 
3 3.88 
3 3.29
12 3.54 
CS 3.14 
3   2.98 
34 3.74
12 3.51 
2 
SG 6.31 
3 6.53 
34 4.88
124 5.84 
23 
1= Significantly different from psychology sample 
2= Significantly different from social sciences sample 
3= Significantly different from commerce sample 
4=Significantly different from others sample  
 
To determine differences within the disciplines in terms of their relative endorsement of 
different variables, repeated measures t-tests were used. Both psychology and social 
science students endorsed systemic over individualistic explanations for both poverty (t 
(56) = 9.89, p<0.001; t (48) = 13.02, p<0.001, respectively) and wealth (t (56) = 2.23, 
p<0.05; t (46) = 4.79, p<0.001, respectively) and preferred liberal social groups (mean 
SG scores above 5.50). They also both endorsed LS more than CS (t (57) = 3.87, p<0.001; 
t (48) = 4.19, p<0.001, respectively). Commerce students endorsed CS over LS (t (58) = 
3.48, p<0.001), as expected, and scored below 5.5 on the SG. However, they were not 
more likely to endorse individualistic explanations over systemic ones, with no 
significant difference for the wealth scales (t (58) = 1.19, p>0.05), and being significantly 
more likely to support systemic explanations for poverty over individualistic ones (t (55) 
= -4.14, p<0.001). 
 
6.3.2.c Internal consistency of scales by discipline and year group 
To assess if scales were more cohesive among students at higher levels of their degree, 
t h e  v a r i a n c e  o f  e a c h  s c o r e ,  w h e n  b r o k e n  d o w n  b y  d i s c i p l i n e  a n d  y e a r  g r o u p ,  w a s  
considered. However, no clear patterns emerged, with variance highly inconsistent  
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across and within disciplines on each scale. This indicated that responses to the 
sociopolitical scales did not become more cohesive among those who had been studying 
their discipline longer. Further examination of internal reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) 
for each scale, broken down by year of degree and discipline also showed no consistent 
relationships. Psychology students generally showed the greatest level of internal 
reliability over different levels, while commerce students tended to have the lowest. 
However, many of the cell sizes were quite small, so it was easy for the results to be 
affected by minor variations (see Appendix VI for variances and reliability coefficients). 
 
Participants were asked to indicate whether or not they had changed their programme of 
study. Twenty-nine students had changed between the four discipline categories used.6 
While the small numbers involved prevented statistical analyses, an examination of the 
means showed some patterns. The most notable of these was that those who changed 
into commerce were more extreme in their responses that those who had always been 
there (i.e., higher on IP and CS, lower on SW, SP and LS). Those who changed out 
seemed to go in the opposite direction but the difference was not as pronounced. For 
psychology, those who changed out had lower scores across all scales (possibly a 
‘disagreement’ bias), while there seemed to be little difference for those who changed in. 
There did not seem to be a clear pattern for social science students, although those who 
changed out seemed to endorse both types of systemic explanations and left beliefs more 
than those who were still there (see Appendix VII). 
 
6.3.2.d Party identification comparisons 
As there was a significant difference between the disciplines in terms of their party 
identification distributions, and that the dependent variables would be expected to be 
                                                 
6 More students indicated that they had changed, but often this involved changing majors within the same 
discipline category, e.g., from sociology to history, or finance to marketing, or that they had added a second 
major   
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related to party identification, another MANOVA was conducted to test for main effects 
for both. The two-way (4 x 5) MANOVA did not violate the assumption of equality of 
covariances (Box’s M= 459.11, F (308, 9363.22) = 1.05, p>0.05). Pillai’s Trace indicated 
significant main effects for both party identification (V = 0.31, F (28, 636) = 1.89, 
p<0.01) and discipline (V = 0.28, F (21, 474) = 2.28, p<0.001) but no interaction (V = 
0.33, F (84, 1134) = 0.67, p>0.05).  
 
Univariate analyses indicated that party identification produced significant differences 
on five of the seven dependent variables (not IW or IP). The results for discipline were 
similar to before, except that there was no longer a significant difference on LS. Post-hoc 
comparisons revealed significant party differences between Labor and Greens identifiers 
and Liberal voters on all five scales (see Figure 6.1, SG not included due to different 
scale, and see Appendix V for post-hoc results). These results fit with the previously 
found discipline differences (given that there were differences in the party identification 
distributions) and the findings of numerous others on differences between those who 
identify with different political parties.  
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FIGURE 6.1: Mean scores on sociopolitical attitudes scales for Labor, 
Liberal and Greens voters 
 
6.3.2.e Relationships with other variables 
Considering the differences in age and sex between disciplines, another MANOVA was 
conducted to determine whether either of these variables could account for the 
differences found, independently of discipline. The three-way (4x2x5) MANOVA 
compared the four levels of discipline, two of sex and five of age (17-20, 21-25, 26-35, 36-
45 and 46+ years). Box’s M was only slightly significant (M= 539.61, F (336, 9495.08) = 
1.14, p<0.05).7 There was a significant main effect only for discipline (V= 0.22, F (14, 
344) = 3.04, p<0.001; not for sex (V = 0.05, F (7, 171) = 1.42, p>0.05) or age (V = 0.19, F 
(28, 696) = 1.26, p>0.05).8 None of the four interactions were significant (discipline x 
sex: V = 0.06, F (14, 344) = 0.82, p>0.05; discipline x age: V = 0.32, F (56, 1239) = 1.05, 
                                                 
7 Box’s M is “notoriously sensitive” and only significance at p<0.001 is problematic (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
1996, p.382). 
8 A two-way (2x5) MANOVA for sex and age was significant for sex only (V = 0.91, F (7, 188) = 2.70, 
p<0.05); not for age (V = 0.15, F (28, 764) = 1.07, p>0.05) or the interaction (V = 0.16, F (28, 764) = 1.15, 
p>0.05). Box’s M was not significant (M= 224.94, F (196, 8993.62) = 0.92, p>0.05). However, univariate 
analyses revealed significant between groups differences only on IP (F (1) = 10.28, p<0.01) and SG (F (1) 
= 4.64, p<0.05). Males scored higher on the IP (x = 2.99 vs. 2.68), while females scored higher on the SG 
(x = 6.00 vs. 5.61). Given the 4x2x5 MANOVA results, this was probably an effect of discipline.   
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p>0.05; sex x age: V = 0.16, F (28, 696) = 1.07, p>0.05; discipline x sex x age: V = 0.18, F 
(35, 875) = 0.92, p>0.05). The one-way ANOVA results demonstrated significant 
between-groups differences for discipline on IP, SP, LS, CS and SG (see Appendix V). 
The assumption of equality of variances was violated for CS and SG. Post-hoc tests were 
not conducted as the direction of differences between disciplines had already been 
established. 
 
The relationships between the sociopolitical attitudes scales and the subjective financial 
variables were also assessed using Pearson’s r correlations (see Table 6.5). Most of the 
relationships, even when significant, were weak, however, it seems that future 
expectations have greater relevance than current ones. Those with the highest financial 
expectations seem to favour individualistic explanations more, and left values and liberal 
social groups less, than those with lower expectations.  
 
TABLE 6.5: Pearson’s r correlation coefficients for subjective 
financial expectations and sociopolitical attitudes scales 
 
 IW  SW  IP  SP  LS  CS  SG 
Current    0.19**  -0.09 0.17* -0.04 -0.07 0.23***  -0.15* 
Future 0.23***  -0.13  0.24***  -0.13  -0.21** 0.19** -0.29*** 
 
 
Given the differences between disciplines on future financial expectations (see Appendix 
II), a one-way MANCOVA was used to assess whether the significant discipline 
differences on the sociopolitical attitudes scales were still evident when subjective future 
financial situation was controlled. Box’s M was not significant (M = 113.26, F (84, 
89689.51) = 1.26, p>0.05) but the multivariate test for discipline was (V= 0.33, F (21, 
591) = 3.48, p<0.001). One-way ANOVAs revealed significant differences on all scales 
except SW (see Appendix V). These results suggested that, while future financial  
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expectations were related to the sociopolitical attitudes, they did not affect the significant 
differences found between disciplines.  
 
The effect of having received social security benefits was assessed via a one-way 
MANOVA with two levels of the IV (have vs. have not ever received benefits). Box’s M 
was not significant (M= 28.23, F (28, 146843.2) = 0.97, p>0.05), but Pillai’s Trace was 
(V = 0.08, F (7, 200) = 2.47, p<0.05). Univariate analyses indicated significant 
differences for all scales except IW (see Appendix V). Those who had received social 
security were more likely to endorse SW, SP, LS and SG, and less likely to support IP or 
CS compared to those who had not received payments (see Figure 6.2, SG not included 
due to scale difference). This finding fitted with previous research about the actor-
observer effect. Even when discipline was included in a two-way (4x2) MANOVA, there 
was still a significant main effect for having/not received social security, although the 
univariate test for IP was no longer significant (see Appendix V). 
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FIGURE 6.2: Mean scores on sociopolitical attitudes scales for those 
who have versus have never received social security benefits 
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6.4 DISCUSSION 
 
The results indicated that there were significant differences between students in different 
academic disciplines but no differences across year-levels within disciplines. There was 
also no evidence of an interaction, which would have suggested an accentuation effect, 
whereby differences evident at first year level were greater at higher year levels. This 
suggested that, for this sample, the self-selection hypothesis was the best explanation for 
the differences seen between those who major in different academic disciplines.  
 
The aims of the study were fulfilled. Ambiguous and less relevant items were identified 
and either excluded or altered for the questionnaire to be used in Study 2. Test-retest 
reliabilities were generally significant and in the moderate to high range, particularly for 
the main sociopolitical measures. Internal reliabilities for the scales were generally 
excellent. Convergent and divergent validity were seen in the relationships between 
variables and the outcomes of the discipline and party identification comparisons.  
 
6.4.1 SUPPORT FOR HYPOTHESES 
6.4.1.a Structure of sociopolitical attitudes 
The attribution scales were found to fit the classifications of individualistic and systemic 
explanations for social phenomena. However, no fatalistic factors emerged; fatalistic 
items were either rejected or subsumed within the systemic factors (an internal/external 
distinction). The left and right scales emerged as independent, although this was 
probably influenced by the poorer quality of the right items, which did not factor well 
and had poor internal reliability. The liberal and conservative scales, however, were 
found to be unitary, and the single factor was a highly efficient measure for  
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distinguishing between sub-groups in the sample. The affect ratings of the social groups 
were used to create a reliable scale, which also distinguished significantly between 
groups within the sample, as well as having the strongest relationship with the other 
sociopolitical value measures. This finding fits with previous work regarding the use of 
social group ratings in structuring belief systems (e.g., Brady & Sniderman, 1985; Zinni 
et al., 1997ab; also see section 4.2.2a).  
  
Significant positive and negative relationships were found between the different 
attributional, social groups and ideological measures, in line with expectations. These 
results supported the interconnectedness of these sociopolitical attitudes. However, 
while significant, most of the correlations were moderate in magnitude. The results failed 
to demonstrate significant negative relationships between individualistic explanations 
for wealth and systemic explanations for either wealth (actually a positive correlation) or 
poverty. Individualistic explanations for poverty were also not significantly related to 
systemic explanations for wealth. These findings, however, do fit with previous research 
which had suggested that attributions to these different causes were independent (e.g., 
Guimond et al., 1989a). This may have been due to some participants recognising that 
there were likely to be multiple necessary causes involved in the social phenomena 
considered. 
 
6.4.1.b Discipline differences 
As predicted, social science students did find systemic explanations for poverty to be 
more important than commerce students did. Social science majors also found 
individualistic explanations for poverty and affluence less important than commerce 
students did. However, they did not favour s y s t e m i c  w e a l t h  e x p l a n a t i o n s  m o r e  t h a n  
commerce students. Overall, they endorsed both types of systemic attributions more 
than both types of individualistic explanations. Social science participants endorsed left  
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values and liberal groups more than most other students. Those in the social sciences 
also endorsed conservative values significantly less than other types of students, except 
psychology majors.  
 
Psychology students generally exhibited a similar pattern of differences from commerce 
students as those in the social sciences, scoring higher on systemic explanations for 
poverty, left values and ratings of liberal social groups, but lower on individualistic 
explanations for poverty and conservative values. However, those in psychology were 
more likely to endorse individualistic explanations for wealth, compared to social science 
majors.  
 
Commerce students did find individualistic explanations for both poverty and wealth 
more important than social science students did, and systemic explanations for poverty 
less important. They also favoured conservative values and social groups significantly 
more than social science students. Overall, commerce participants preferred 
conservative groups to liberal ones and left to conservative values. However, commerce 
students did not favour individualistic explanations for poverty and affluence 
significantly more than systemic explanations. There was no difference in overall support 
for individualistic and systemic explanations for wealth and they actually endorsed 
systemic attributions for poverty significantly more than individualistic attributions. 
While commerce students did not endorse systemic explanations more than social 
science students, they did not necessarily favour individualistic over systemic 
explanations overall.  
 
Contrary to expectations there was no evidence of a socialisation effect; students did not 
exhibit larger differences between disciplines at higher year-levels. There was also no 
evidence that the participants’ sociopolitical attitudes, as measured, were more coherent  
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and cohesive with greater socialisation within their discipline. This was surprising, given 
that greater abstract thinking would presumably have developed during their time within 
the degree, which should have allowed students to develop more unified belief systems 
(although only a longitudinal study could confirm this). However, only an aggregate 
measure of consistency was used, not an individual one, and no inferential statistics were 
used to test this. Overall though, these findings suggested that the differences evident 
between disciplines were most likely attributable to self-selection by students. 
 
6.4.1.c Differences based on other variables 
Labor Party (and Greens) identifiers did endorse systemic explanations for both 
affluence and poverty more than Liberal identifiers. Labor and Green voters were 
significantly more left-wing than Liberal voters, who endorsed individualistic 
explanations for poverty and conservative values significantly more than Labor and 
Greens voters. Those who identified with the Greens favoured liberal social groups 
significantly more than all other groups of voters, except Labor supporters, who favoured 
liberal social groups significantly more than Liberal voters only. These results were 
mostly consistent with expectations, including the finding of such a large group of 
Greens supporters, given the tendency of university students to be more relatively more 
left-wing than the general population and the fact that the Greens are the most left-wing 
mainstream political party (see Chapter 5). 
 
Students’ future financial expectations did have significant relationships with some of 
their sociopolitical attitudes scores, particularly on the ideological and social groups 
measures. However, when expectations were controlled, significant differences on seven 
of the eight scales remained. Few significant relationships were found for subjective 
rating of current financial situation. It is likely that desire for greater financial success in 
the future was a key determinant in selecting discipline and in the decision to attend  
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u n i v e r s i t y  a n d  i t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  b o t h  h a v e  c o m m o n  c a u s e s  w i t h i n  p e o p l e ’ s  w o r l d v i e w s  
generally, including their value systems and other background factors. Present financial 
situation may be seen as less important because participants are currently working to 
improve it, through furthering their education. 
 
Not unexpectedly, those who had received benefits were more inclined towards systemic 
explanations for both poverty and wealth, and more rejecting of individualistic 
explanations for poverty, compared to those who had not received benefits. They also 
preferred left values and liberal groups more, and conservative values less, than those 
who had never received welfare payments. This difference was significant, even when 
discipline was considered, however, this could be linked to the age of the participants, 
with older people both more likely to have received benefits and to be from the social 
sciences (although no significant age differences were found on the sociopolitical 
attitudes scales). 
 
Generally though, the findings for non/welfare recipients supported the actor-observer 
effect (Jones & Nisbett, 1972), whereby those who had experienced economic hardship 
were relatively more likely to assign blame to systemic rather than individualistic factors, 
compared to those who (presumably) had not  (also see Chapter 3). Perhaps the 
experience of financial difficulties was instrumental in the choice of discipline, not in the 
direction of making money but aimed at helping others. Alternatively, they may place 
less importance on money generally, because they know that they can live without a lot of 
it (lower expectations). This last point was particularly likely to apply to those students 
who were returning to study after some years in the ‘real world’.   
 
There were also clear differences between the disciplines in the types of students they 
attracted, most notably the sex and age discrepancies (although these variables did not  
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have any significant effects on the sociopolitical attitudes scores). The preponderance of 
‘mature age’ female students in the social sciences and psychology most likely has a 
social and economic basis. The women who come to university from this age group are 
likely to be either coming back to education after having children and/or after getting 
divorced. Both groups are looking for new challenges/stimulation, but the latter group 
also tends to be career focused. Both these sets of women tend to gravitate towards the 
‘helping’ professions, most likely because that fits with society’s expectations and their 
experience of caring for their families. It would be necessary to focus on what drives 
people both to attend university and to choose their specific discipline in order to 
examine this further.  
 
 
6.4.2 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
 
There were noteworthy problems with the sample. Firstly, the uneven distributions of 
students in different year groups among the disciplines most likely affected the results. 
This may be why no differences were found between year-levels. Secondly, students were 
tested three-quarters of the way through the year. It was possible that significant 
socialisation had already taken place within the first year of tertiary education (as 
reported by Guimond & Palmer, 1990; 1996).  
 
The other problem with the sample was response bias. About 50-70% of people in 
lectures requested questionnaires, but the return rate was much lower (between 30-
50%), although this differed between disciplines (much lower in the commerce units 
than the social sciences). Clearly, the dat a  w e r e  c o l l e c t e d  f r o m  s t u d e n t s  w h o  w e r e  
interested in the topic, more altruistic or felt greater guilt after receiving the initial 
reward (chocolate frog). In other words, they were ‘nicer’ (see Rosenthal & Rosnow,  
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1975). There was no way of knowing whether such pronounced differences would occur 
with full return rates. Perhaps the more right wing, conservative social science students 
would then emerge. The biases produced by sub-optimal response rates are a continual 
problem for survey research, with no obvious remedy. 
 
Other major problems were with the questionnaire itself. The right wing items were 
inadequate and need to be rewritten for future testing; however, there is no guarantee 
that face validity is enough. Secondly, the participants seemed to approach the 
attributional items as “do you agree with this statement?”, rather than “do you agree with 
this statement as an important explanation for wealth/poverty?”. Consequently, the scale 
and instructions for these sections will be rewritten for future use as ‘Not at all 
important’, ‘A little important’, ‘Somewhat important’, ‘Quite important’ and ‘Very 
important’. A ‘Don’t understand/know’ response will also be added, to prevent people 
just choosing the middle response. Items that were commonly missed or commented on 
by participants were altered to improve their ‘understandability’ (see Appendix VIII, for 
full details of changes). The test-retest data was also a little suspect because the sample 
was small. Study 2 will also include a larger test-retest sample to improve the reliability 
of this data.  
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The most noteworthy finding of this study was the endorsement of the self-selection over 
the socialisation hypothesis, as well as the reliability and validity results for the 
sociopolitical scales used. The results for the party identification comparisons also 
indicated that it has a significant relationship with ideological beliefs. However, at this 
stage the relationship could not be considered a causal one, as implied by Campbell and  
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colleagues (1960); most likely both ideological beliefs and party identification are part of 
a larger system of interdependent beliefs (‘worldview’). Most past research has supported 
relationships between party identification and ideological values with attributional 
patterns, although not necessarily this strongly and consistently. This may have been due 
to greater than average political sophistication and abstract thinking among the 
participants, compared to community samples (with varying levels of education). Other 
research has found strong links between party identification and ideology only among 
elites. Tertiary students could be considered a step between elites and the mass public, as 
the process of higher education is focused on ‘tomorrow’s leaders’. As such, greater 
ideological consistency would be expected from postgraduates, compared to 
undergraduates.     
 
The next study will also look at why students come to university and why they choose 
their particular discipline, through open-ended questions. This could help shed light on 
one possible explanation for self-selection differences; perhaps students are coming to 
university for different reasons, with certain disciplines more suitable to meeting their 
goals than others. Study 2 will also be larger, and will aim for even numbers of students 
across disciplines and year groups.    
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7. STUDY 2 
  
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The results of Study 1, which was chiefly exploratory, supported some expectations 
but not others. Primarily, the socialisation hypothesis was not supported, nor was 
there evidence of accentuation (the socialisation and self-selection hypotheses 
working in tandem). Some components of worldview which were tested showed 
interrelationships, but others did not, for example liberal and conservative social 
beliefs were negatively related, but individualistic and systemic explanations of 
wealth were not. There were significant differences between disciplines though, 
which supported the self-selection hypothesis. These were, as predicted, consistently 
in the direction of social science students being more left/liberal than those in 
commerce, although this was relative, not absolute (which was consistent with past 
research findings that those with tertiary education are generally more liberal than 
those with lower levels of education). Study 2 aimed to explore all of these issues 
further, using an improved questionnaire and larger sample size.  
 
7.1.1 AIMS 
 
The aim of the second study was to further test whether self-selection or socialisation 
was the better explanation for the consistent differences in sociopolitical attitudes 
found between people from different academic disciplines. A larger sample and an 
improved questionnaire were used, compared to the first study. Students were also 
asked why they came to university and why they chose their particular course of 
study, in the hope that this would illuminate some possible explanations for the self-
selection effect that was so strongly evident in the first study.   
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7.1.2 HYPOTHESES  
 
These were similar to the first study. Social science students were expected to endorse 
systemic explanations for poverty and wealth more, and individualistic explanations 
less, than commerce students. Social science majors were also predicted to favour left 
and liberal ideological values and liberal groups more than those from commerce. In 
turn, commerce students were expected to favour right and conservative ideological 
values and conservative groups more than those from the social sciences. Psychology 
and other students were predicted to fall in between these two groups in their 
responses to the sociopolitical attitudes, with psychology participants closer to social 
science students in their responses.  
 
S t u d e n t s  w e r e  a l s o  e x p e c t e d  t o  s h o w  l e s s  v a r i a n c e  ( m o r e  c o h e s i v e n e s s )  i n  t h e i r  
responses to on the sociopolitical value scales after they had been in their course for 
longer. Postgraduate students were expected to be especially cohesive. Participants 
with the highest economic expectations for their future were predicted to show 
greater endorsement of individualistic explanations for poverty and wealth, and right 
and conservative values and social groups, compared to those with lower 
expectations. However, it was also anticipated that they would demonstrate less 
support for systemic explanations, and left and liberal values and social groups, 
compared to those with lower expectations.  
 
Differences were also expected between participants who identified with different 
political parties. Labor and Green voters were predicted to score higher on the 
systemic explanation variables, left and liberal values, and support for liberal social 
groups (but lower on individualistic explanations, right and conservatives values and 
support for conservative groups) compared to Liberal Party identifiers.   
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It was also anticipated that there would be relationships between people’s subjective 
ratings of their current and future financial situations and the sociopolitical attitudes. 
It was predicted that as ratings of current and future situations increased, 
participants would become less supportive of systemic explanations, left and liberal 
values and liberal social groups, and more supportive of individualistic explanations, 
right and conservative values and conservative social groups. It was also expected 
that those who had never received social security benefits would favour 
individualistic explanations for wealth and poverty, favour right-wing and 
conservative ideologies and conservative social groups more than those who had 
received benefits. In contrast, those who had received benefits were expected to 
endorse systemic explanations for wealth and poverty, left and liberal ideologies and 
liberal social groups more. 
 
It was also predicted that social science and commerce students would have different 
motivations for attending university and in choosing their academic disciplines. 
Social science participants were expected to report more intrinsic reasons for both 
attending university and choosing their discipline. However, commerce students 
were expected to describe more extrinsic, instrumental reasons as being most 
important in choosing to attend university and in choosing their degree. 
 
 
7.2 METHOD 
 
Participants: There were 531 participants (380 female and 151 male), all Murdoch 
University students. They ranged in age from 17-70, with a mean age of 27.18 years 
(mdn= 22.00). Table 7.1 shows the numbers of participants by discipline and year 
group. The social sciences included majors such as sociology, history, politics, 
community development, sustainable development and legal studies, while ‘other’  
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students included majors such as communications, cultural studies, media and other 
humanities, law, biological sciences and education, and twenty-two people with 
majors or minors in more than one area.1 Psychology students received credit hours 
for participating; other students received a chocolate frog for taking the questionnaire 
and another one when it was returned.2 The assessment of test-retest reliability 
included only psychology students (n=50; 42 female; mean age= 25.94, Mdn=22; 6 
1st-years, 20 2nd-years, 22 3rd-years and 2 4th-years).  
 
TABLE 7.1: Participants by discipline and year of degree 
 1
st years  2
nd years  3
rd/4
th years  Postgraduates  TOTALS 
Psychology 56  34  31  12  133 
Social science  76  37  20  17  150 
Commerce 45  55  62  15  177 
Others 29  16  18  8  71 
TOTALS 206  142 131  52  531 
 
 
Measures: The questionnaire was created based on previous research and results 
from the first study (the changes to the questionnaire based on Study 1 are detailed in 
Appendix VIII). It consisted of five main sections (see Appendix IX).3 The 
demographic section requested participants’ sex, age, country of birth, degree 
enrolled in, type of enrolment, year-level and whether they had changed from 
another degree. The background information sought included participants’ 
occupations, parents’ and partners’ levels of education and occupations,4 the party 
identifications of participants, their parents and partners, and whether they had 
                                                 
11st-year (Part I) students tend to be concentrated in a few large classes within each programme of 
study (e.g., Introduction to… Psychology, Sociology, Accounting). 2
nd- and 3
rd-year students are both 
classified Part II and enrol in many of the same units, but tend to be scattered across a larger number of 
units, hence it was comparatively easier to access the 1
st-years. 4
th-year students were not specifically 
targeted but some are enrolled in Part II units.  
2 Using two chocolate frogs did not increase the response rate much more than the single frog, and 
there were still large discrepancies between disciplines. 
3 Two counterbalanced versions of the questionnaire were used, one starting with the demographics and 
the other with the scales. There was only a slight difference in the number of each type returned; 198 
vs. 182; however, there were no significant differences in the kind of respondents who returned each 
version.  
4 Occupations were again classified according to the Australian Standard Classifications of 
Occupations (DEIR, 1987) ‘supergroups’.  
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received social security payments now or in the past. There were also several 
subjective variables, asking about current and expected financial situation (in 10 
years time; both 5-point scales), the expected likelihood of gaining “employment in 
your chosen field” after graduation (4-point scale) and socioeconomic class self-
placement (7-point scale). A forced choice simple attributional item asked what the 
participants thought the outcomes of people’s lives were “mostly due to…”, with 
individualistic, systemic/fatalistic and “even mix” options. Feagin’s (1972) three 
possible poverty solutions were included (guaranteed-jobs, guaranteed-income and 
equal-income plans) and participants rated them on a five-point scale from strongly 
oppose (1) to strongly favour (5), with a neutral mid-point. Finally, students were 
asked the main reason that they came to university and why they chose their 
particular degree. About half a page was provided for these open-ended responses. 
 
The fifteen wealth and fifteen poverty explanations were rated, this time in terms of 
“how generally important you believe each of the following factors is in explaining 
wealth (poverty) in Australia” (emphasis included). The five-point scale ranged from 
not at all important (1) to very important (5), with a neutral point and a ‘don’t 
understand/know’ option. The ideological scales again included five left, five right, 
four liberal and four conservative items. These items were also rated on a five point 
scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree) with a neutral point and a ‘don’t 
understand’ option. Feelings toward eighteen social groups were rated on a scale 
from 0 (very negative) to 10 (very positive).  
 
Procedure: Data collection ran over five months from the start of the academic year 
(March, 2003). Undergraduates, particularly first years were collected in the first 
month, with later data obtained from postgraduates and some upper year students 
who were underrepresented in the distribution of disciplines.  
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Participants were primarily recruited from lectures, except for the majority of the 
second-year and above psychology respondents (who were recruited through the 
Murdoch University School of Psychology’s subject pool) and non-MBA postgraduate 
students (recruited through email requests). The investigator arrived at the start of a 
lecture, explained what the study was about, what was required of the students, how 
they could return the questionnaire and asked for any questions. The questionnaires, 
with chocolate frogs attached, were then distributed. The investigator returned to 
collect the questionnaires at the following week’s lecture and, if necessary, the 
subsequent lecture as well. When students returned a questionnaire they received 
another chocolate frog. 
 
Psychology students signed up for the study at the School of Psychology’s online 
subject pool, where they had read a brief description of the research.5 The researcher 
contacted the students via e-mail to arrange for them to attend a group testing 
session. Numbers in these sessions ranged from one to five people and completion of 
the questionnaire took 15 to 40 minutes. All received one hour of credit. Those who 
returned to participate a second time, for the test-retest reliability assessment, 
received a further half hour credit. The time between these two sessions ranged from 
seven to fifty-eight days, with 74% of retests within one to three weeks (mode= 14 
days, mean=19.9 days).  
 
MBA students were recruited through lectures, as per undergraduate students. PhD 
students were recruited through an ‘email-out’ which contained a request for help, a 
brief description of the research and the investigator’s contact details. Emails were 
sent via the research student administrative officer in the appropriate divisions. 
Postgraduate participants were also recruited through personal requests from the 
researcher.   
                                                 
5 1
st year psychology students were recruited through lectures as they were unlikely to sign up for 
research at the beginning of their first year, mostly due to lack of awareness of the subject pool. They 
were able to receive credit by signing up later, as well as the chocolate frogs.   
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7.3 RESULTS 
 
7.3.1 BACKGROUND VARIABLE COMPARISONS 
 
Background variable comparisons can be found in Appendix X. Again there were 
significant sex and age differences between disciplines, with psychology having more 
females and commerce more males, and social science students being significantly 
older than the students in the other disciplines. There were still uneven cell sizes, 
with more first year social science students and more upper-year commerce majors. 
There were also more significant differences based on parental education levels, with 
‘other’ students reporting higher levels of education for both parents, while social 
science students’ parents had lower levels (most likely related to age). No discipline 
differences were found for partner’s education. There were some differences in 
fathers’ occupational classification between the groups but only one for mothers’.  
 
No differences were found for current financial situation, but commerce students had 
significantly higher expectations for the future. Those in commerce also rated their 
ease of finding employment significantly higher than those from the social sciences, 
while social science students rated their socioeconomic status lower than all other 
discipline groups. There were significant differences in party identification between 
disciplines, in line with Study 1 (more Greens and Labor voters and fewer Liberals, 
among social science students, reverse for commerce). Social science and psychology 
participants were also more likely to have received social security during their 
lifetimes compared to both commerce and others.  
 
Test-retest reliability analyses were carried out for all variables. Again, almost all the 
demographic items had perfect correlations, while some of the sociopolitical scale 
items performed poorly (see Appendix XI). The test-retest reliabilities of the  
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sociopolitical value measures were still good, although not as impressive as in the 
previous study (especially for IW, SW and RS), most likely due to missing data. Some 
missing data were non-responses, while others were due to the exclusion of ‘don’t 
know/understand’ responses. While this was problematic, it does increase confidence 
in the accuracy of the remaining data. Poor test-retest reliability and missing data led 
to some items being excluded from the PCAs for the sociopolitical scales (see below). 
 
7.3.2 SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES SCALES 
 
7.3.2.a Structure 
Principal components analysis (PCA) was conducted on the attributional and 
ideological beliefs scales using SPSS, in order to (re)create the sociopolitical attitudes 
scales. Direct oblimin rotation was used for all, as Study 1 had indicated significant 
correlations between the scales in most cases. The number of factors specified for 
each analysis was based on the solutions from Study 1 (see Appendix XII). 
 
The results were highly similar, although this time there was a right factor (Right 
Scale [RS]). The wealth and poverty explanation PCAs each yielded two components, 
one internal and one external (Individualistic Wealth [IW], Systemic Wealth [SW], 
Individualistic Poverty [IP] and Systemic Poverty [SP]). The left items all loaded 
together (Left Scale [LS]) independently of the right-wing items (RS). Two liberal 
items failed to load on the single conservative factor, although the remaining two 
loaded negatively (Conservative Scale [CS]). The Social Groups Scale (SG) was again 
unitary, this time it contained seven ‘liberal’ and seven ‘conservative’ groups. Table 
7.2 indicates the descriptive statistics for each of the eight scales created (mean of 
scale items, minimum of 1, maximum of 5, items not weighted).6  
                                                 
6In cases with missing data only one was allowed for the smallest scales (LS, RS), two for the six-item 
scales (IW, IP, SP and CS) and up to three for the largest, fourteen-item, scale (SG). In each individual 
case in which these limits were exceeded, scale score was not calculated. No substitutions for missing 
data were made; scale scores were calculated using available data. Four univariate outlier scores were  
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TABLE 7.2: Descriptive statistics for the sociopolitical attitudes 
scales 
 n  # 
items 
Mean Median Standard 
deviation
Skew Kurtosis Cronbach’s 
α 
Test-
retest
7
IW  523  6  3.26  3.33 0.88  -0.32  -0.50 0.82  0.61 
SW 517 8  3.57  3.63  0.70  -0.46 -0.21  0.79  0.51 
IP  520  6  2.91  2.83 0.80  -0.02  -0.43 0.76  0.82 
SP  512  6  3.39  3.50 0.85  -0.27  -0.41 0.74  0.73 
LS  522  5  3.40  3.40 0.70  -0.19  -0.22 0.62  0.70 
RS  509  4  2.76  2.75 0.76  -0.01  -0.44 0.59  0.54 
CS  524  6  2.93  3.00 0.79  -0.14  -0.51 0.70  0.84 
SG 510 14  5.51  5.36  1.26  0.27  0.15  0.84  0.86 
 
Pearson’s r coefficients indicated that there were significant relationships between 
almost all the scale variables but these were generally only of low to moderate 
intensity (see Table 7.3). Correlations were in the expected directions, with the 
systemic scales positively related to each other and to the left and liberal group 
measures. The individualistic scales were positively related to each other and the 
right and conservative value scales, but were not significantly related to the systemic 
scales. Again, the social groups scale had the strongest relationships with other 
variables, particularly the ideological measures.  
TABLE 7.3: Correlations between sociopolitical attitudes scales 
 SW  IP  SP LS  RS  CS SG 
IW 0.08  0.52***  -0.10* -0.27***  0.31***  0.25***  -0.36*** 
SW   0.16***  0.59*** 0.47***  -0.20***  -0.17***  0.23*** 
IP     0.01  -0.14***  0.34***  0.39***  -0.34*** 
SP       0.57***  -0.29***  -0.22***  0.44*** 
LS         -0.25***  -0.17***  0.45*** 
RS           0.50***  -0.54*** 
CS         -0.60*** 
***Significant at p<0.001 
 **Significant at p<0.01 
  *Significant at p<0.05 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
removed (3 SG, 1 SW) and no multivariate outliers were found, as assessed by Mahalanobis distance 
(critical value 26.12, chi-square significant at p<0.001, with 8 df).   
7 Test-retest calculations based on smaller sample of 50 Psychology students.  
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7.3.2.b Discipline and year of degree analysis 
A two-way (4 x 4) MANOVA was initially used to assess whether responses to the 
eight sociopolitical value scales differed by discipline (psychology, social science, 
commerce and others) and/or year of degree (1st, 2nd and 3rd/4th  years and 
postgraduates). Unfortunately, Box’s M test was highly significant, indicating 
violation of the assumption of homoscedasticity (M= 730.76, F (504, 334470.32) = 
1.23, p<0.001). Thus, a two-way (4 x 3) MANOVA was conducted, with postgraduate 
students excluded.8 Box’s M was still significant but less so (M= 534.98, F (396, 
40208.62) = 1.181, p<0.01)9, so Pillai’s Trace (V) was used as the test for multivariate 
effect (it is the most robust in instances of heteroscedasticity and non-normality; 
Olson, 1976; 1979). A significant main effect was found for discipline (V = 0.25, F (24, 
1200) = 4.46, p<0.001) but not for year-level (V = 0.03, F (16, 798) = 0.76, p>0.01) 
or their interaction (V = 0.16, F (48, 2418) = 1.35, p>0.01), consistent with previous 
results.10 
 
One-way ANOVAs indicated significant discipline differences on all sociopolitical 
attitudes except SW (see Appendix XIII for all MANOVA results). The assumption of 
equality of variances was violated for SG (which possibly accounted for the extreme 
Box’s M),11 so Tamhane’s T2 post-hoc comparisons were used. The results indicated 
that commerce students scored higher than social science students on IW, higher 
than both social science and psychology students on IP, and significantly higher than 
all three other discipline groups on RS and CS (see Table 7.4). Commerce participants 
were significantly lower than social science majors on SP, lower than social science 
                                                 
8 There were far fewer postgraduate students (n= 52) compared to other year-groups and therefore they 
tended to have more variance on the scales. Conceptually, they were also distinctive, in that 
postgraduate study does not necessarily flow on directly from the preceding categorisations, unlike the 
way that 2
nd –year follows 1
st. 
9 Box’s M is “notoriously sensitive” and only significance at p<0.001 is problematic (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 1996, p.382). 
10 Separate two-way (4x4) MANOVAs were conducted for 17-24 year-olds (n=260) and over 25 years 
(n=201), to see if there was a socialisation effect among ‘school leavers’. However, no main effects for 
year-level were found (see Appendix VIII). Results were quite similar, but fewer differences were 
found on the attribution scales when the smaller samples were used.  
11 However, another MANOVA, including four levels of degree but excluding SG as a DV, also 
violated the assumption of equality of covariances (M = 568.36, F (392, 34696.51) = 1.26, p<0.001).  
 
 
190
and psychology students on LS, and lower than all discipline groups on SG. Those 
from the social sciences also favoured SG more, and RS less, than psychology 
students did. There were no differences between other students and either 
psychology or social science participants (possibly due to this group’s small size).  
 
TABLE 7.4: Mean scores on sociopolitical attitudes scales by 
discipline 
 
 Psychology 
(1)  Social sciences 
(2)  Commerce 
(3)  Others 
(4) 
IW 3.28  3.05 
3 3.46 
2 3.20 
SW  3.58  3.72   3.47   3.51  
IP 2.81
3  2.73 
3  3.15 
12 2.86   
SP 3.42
   3.64 
3 3.20 
2 3.29   
LS 3.47 
3 3.60 
3 3.19 
12 3.34   
RS 2.69 
23 2.41
 13 3.09 
124 2.79 
3 
CS 2.83 
3 2.65 
3 3.30 
124 2.81 
3 
SG 5.65 
23 6.18 
13 4.76 
124 5.60 
3 
1= Significantly different from psychology sample 
2= Significantly different from social sciences sample 
3= Significantly different from commerce sample 
4=Significantly different from others sample  
 
 
Although it was not possible to compare all four levels of degree across all scales, the 
means of postgraduates compared to undergraduates show a consistent pattern (see 
Figure 7.1). A one-way MANOVA, just comparing undergraduates and postgraduates, 
indicated that there were significant differences between them (V = 0.10, F (8, 456) = 
6.30, p<0.001).12 Box’s M was not significant (M= 51.07, F (36, 22713.37) = 1.33, 
p>0.05). Univariate analyses revealed significant differences on IP, RS, CS and SG. 
Undergraduates scored significantly higher on IP, RS and CS, and lower on SG, 
compared to undergraduates (see Appendix XIII). While discipline differences held, 
it was clear that postgraduates were generally less right-wing and conservative and 
less likely to blame the individual for their poverty, relative to undergraduates. 
 
                                                 
12 It was not possible to do a 4 x 2 MANOVA with discipline, due to an extreme violation of the 
assumption of equality of covariances (M = 362.51, F (216, 10173.99) = 1.42, p<0.001) or a 3 x 2 
(others excluded) MANOVA (M = 310.02, F (180, 7586.47) = 1.43, p<0.001).  
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FIGURE 7.1: Mean scores on sociopolitical value scales by 
discipline for undergraduates and postgraduates 
 
 
The consistency of scale values was considered, broken down by discipline and year 
group, in order to see if students at more senior levels displayed greater consistency 
in their beliefs (see Appendix XIV). Again, no clear patterns emerged, not even 
among postgraduates, except that psychology postgraduates had less variance on 
most scales than psychology undergraduates. Internal reliability assessments were 
also conducted for each year group within disciplines (see Appendix XIV). The 
consistency of the attributional scales was quite similar across year groups within 
disciplines. The other scales, however, showed greater cohesiveness among 
postgraduates, except for those in the social sciences, who often showed poorer 
internal reliability (however, this group was much more mixed in terms of major than 
the other two). None of the discipline groups showed evidence of accentuation effects 
(whereby attitudes became more cohesive as students progressed through their 
undergraduate years).  
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7.3.2.c Party identification comparisons 
Another MANOVA was conducted to determine if there were differences in 
sociopolitical attitudes between different party identifiers.13 The 5-level one-way 
MANOVA was highly significant (V= 0.47, F (32, 1672) = 6.90, p<0.001), and Box’s 
M indicated that the assumption of equality of covariances was not violated (M= 
165.07, F (144, 152585.01) = 1.092, p>0.05). One-way ANOVAs indicated significant 
differences on all eight factors. The assumption of equality of variance was violated 
for IP, RS and SG; therefore Tamhane’s T2 was used for post-hoc testing (see 
Appendix XIII).  
 
Post-hoc comparisons demonstrated that Liberal voters scored significantly higher 
than Greens on IW, RS and CS and significantly higher than Labor voters on IP, RS 
and CS. Liberal Party supporters were significantly lower than all other groups on SP 
and SG, and lower than all except ‘others’ on LS. Green identifiers were significantly 
higher than all other groups on SG and lower on RS and CS. Labor and Greens 
supporters were both significantly different from Liberals and others on LS (see 
Figure 7.2, SG excluded due to different scale). A highly consistent, and expected, 
pattern emerged from the results, with Green and Labor supporters the most 
left/liberal and Liberal voters the most right/conservative. 
 
7.3.2.d Relationships with other variables 
In order to determine whether sex or age were affecting responses to the scales a two-
way MANOVA was conducted, with two levels of sex and five levels of age (17-20, 21-
24, 25-34, 35-44, 45+ years).14 Box’s M was not significant (M= 342.86, F (324, 
29725.87) = 0.94, p>0.05), although Levene’s F was significant for IW (F (9, 451) = 
                                                 
13 It was not possible to conduct a two-way MANOVA with discipline due to a considerable violation 
of the assumption of equality of covariance (M = 945.58, F (612, 24089.54) = 1.22, p<0.001). 
14 It was not possible to perform a 3-way (2x5x4) MANOVA with discipline due a substantial violation 
of the assumption of equality of covariances (M= 1013.01, F (648, 3267.51) = 1.25, p<0.001).  
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2.06, p<0.05). Pillai’s Trace was only slightly significant for age (V= 0.11, F (32, 1788) 
= 1.58, p<0.05) and not at all for sex (V = 0.03, F (8, 444) = 1.682, p>0.05) or their 
interaction (V = 0.07, F (32, 1788) = 1.02, p>0.05). The univariate level analyses 
indicated significant age differences on LS (F (4) = 2.72, p<0.05), RS (F (4) = 3.44, 
p<0.01) and SG (F (4) = 4.82, p<0.001). However, Tamhane’s T2 post-hoc 
comparisons found only that those in the 45 plus age-group were significantly higher 
on SG, compared to both the 17-20 and 21-24 groups (both differences at the p<0.05 
level). Clearly, the impact of sex and age was minimal, and certainly does not account 
for the discipline differences observed.15 
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FIGURE 7.2: Mean scores on sociopolitical attitudes scales for 
Labor, Liberal and Greens voters 
 
 
The relationships between the sociopolitical factors and the subjective variables were 
also assessed; Pearson’s r correlation coefficients are reported in Table 7.5. While 
there were many significant relationships, in the expected directions, most were 
                                                 
15 A 1-way MANCOVA, with age as a covariate, could not be performed due to the strong positive 
skew (1.27) of the participants’ ages.  
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small in magnitude. It does seem, though, as if those who expected to be wealthy in 
the future or reported higher socioeconomic status, were more inclined to favour 
individualistic explanations, right-wing values and conservative groups, and to 
endorse systemic explanations and left-wing values less. Subjective ratings of current 
financial situation and likelihood of finding employment in “chosen field” had only 
minimal relationships with the sociopolitical attitudes scales.16 Unfortunately, the 
relationship between future financial expectations and discipline on the sociopolitical 
attitudes could not be assessed as both a one-way MANCOVA and two-way MANOVA 
severely violated the assumption of equality of covariances.17 
 
Table 7.5: Pearson’s r correlation coefficients for subjective 
variables and sociopolitical attitudes scales 
 
  Current financial  Future financial  Ease of 
employment 
Subjective 
Class 
IW 0.06  0.17***  0.04  0.15** 
SW -0.11*  -0.09*  -0.08  -0.21*** 
IP -0.14**  0.21***  0.08  0.11* 
SP  -0.15***  -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.25*** 
LS -0.15***  -0.17***  -0.11*  -0.25*** 
RS 0.18***  0.18***  0.12**  0.20*** 
CS 0.11*  0.19***  0.07  0.06 
SG -0.10*  -0.27***  -0.14**  -0.20*** 
 
 
 
Those who had and had not ever received social security were also compared for 
differences on the sociopolitical attitudes. The one-way MANOVA, with two levels 
(yes and no) was highly significant (V = 0.05, F (8, 451) = 3.27, p<0.001) and the 
assumption of equality of covariances was not violated (M = 33.55, F (36, 616744.8) = 
0.91, p>0.05). However, one-way ANOVAs showed differences only on LS, CS and SG 
(see Appendix XIII). Those who had never received social security payments scored 
much higher on RS, but significantly lower on LS and SG, compared to those who had 
                                                 
16 The difference between current and future expectations showed very weak relationships (<0.13) with 
the sociopolitical attitudes scales, but they were significant for IW (r (520) = 0.09, p<0.05), IP (r (517) 
= 0.12, p<0.01), and SG (r (507) = -0.13, p<0.01).  
17 A 1-way MANCOVA, with the subjective variables as covariates could not be conducted due to a 
large, and highly significant Box’s M test result (M = 171.59, F (108, 212686.7) = 1.53, p<0.001).  
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received benefits, either currently or in the past (see Figure 7.3). Surprisingly though, 
unlike the first study, there were no significant differences on the attribution scales. 
However, when a two-way (4x2) MANOVA was conducted with discipline as an IV, 
there was no main effect for having/not received welfare payments. This again 
suggested that discipline subsumed differences based on other variables, (see 
Appendix XIII). This may have been due to students with differing socioeconomic 
status levels being differentially attracted to different fields of study, as significant 
differences were found for self-reported class between those who had/not received 
benefits (t (457) = 6.65, p<0.001) and between disciplines (F (3, 456) = 4.85, 
p<0.01). 
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FIGURE 7.3: Mean scores on left and right scales for those who 
have versus have never received social security payments 
 
 
7.3.3 OPEN-ENDED RESPONSE ANALYSIS 
 
The details of the classifications used and the relationships between the different 
reasons for both attending university and choosing a discipline are detailed in 
Appendix XV. Overall, thirteen types of responses were given for reason for attending  
 
 
196
university and nine for choosing degree. Up to three categorisations were made for 
university reason and two for degree reason (the vast majority provided fewer 
reasons and only a very small number offered more). Most participants indicated that 
they had attended university for employment purposes, followed by a desire for 
“further education”, then money, “wanting to learn”, and for personal growth or a 
personal dream to attend university. The three most popular responses were clearly 
instrumental reasons, focusing on the extrinsic rewards of having a university degree. 
The fourth and fifth most favoured reasons were clearly more intrinsic, “learning for 
learning’s sake”, or for the more intangible personal fulfilment.    
 
Of the nine classifications for degree reasons, by far the most popular was “interest”, 
followed by desire for a specific occupation to which the degree was directly relevant, 
then “opportunities” (usually to do with career) and wanting to help others. While it 
cannot be known for sure why the participants were interested in their particular 
discipline (i.e., for intrinsic or extrinsic reasons) for most it seemed to be about 
genuine fascination with the subject area. However, people’s interests were likely to 
be shaped by their worldview, just as their reasons for attending university would be.  
 
7.3.3.a Differences between those choosing different reasons for 
attending university 
There were demographic differences between those who favoured specific 
explanations (see Appendix XVI). Clear age differences were visible, with older 
participants favouring changing the world, making lifestyle changes or looking for 
personal growth, while younger participants were more likely to be attending due to 
expectations, for further education or to avoid the negative consequences of not 
having a tertiary education. There were also differences in parents’ education levels: 
those who cited expectations came from families with higher levels of education, 
compared to those who wanted to avoid negative consequences from not having 
tertiary education. There were also some sex differences in first reason for choosing  
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degree; however, these were most likely linked to age (with more older women than 
men).  
 
As expected there were numerous differences in the type of explanations favoured by 
each academic discipline group. Looking at reasons for attending university, 
commerce students were more likely overall to name both employment and money as 
reasons, compared to those in the social sciences and, to a lesser extent for money, 
psychology majors (see 7.6). Commerce students were less likely to describe 
attending university as a personal dream or a means of “growth”, compared to the 
other disciplines. Social science participants expressed a desire to learn more than 
either psychology or commerce students did. They were also more likely to want to 
change the world through their study and to be a role model for their children, 
compared to the other two disciplines. However, psychology students favoured 
lifestyle change explanations slightly more than those in the social sciences and much 
more than those from commerce. The percentages seeking further education or job-
specific education were similar across fields of study. 
 
TABLE 7.6: Overall support for university reason categories by 
discipline 
 
%*  Total sample   Psychology   Social science   Commerce 
Employment 25.9  23.3  22.7  30.0 
Further education  12.1  10.2  11.4  13.8 
Money 11.0  12.1  5.2  15.5 
To learn  10.7  9.3  15.6  8.6 
Job specific  10.0  8.8  9.0  9.7 
Personal 
growth/dream 
8.0 9.3  10.9 5.5 
Lifestyle change  5.6  8.8  6.6  3.4 
Better life  5.1  8.4  3.8  4.1 
Avoid negative 
effects 
3.8 4.6  1.4  4.1 
Obligation/expected 3.6  1.9  3.8  4.1 
Change world  2.7  2.8  6.2  0.0 
Role model for kids  1.0  0.5  2.4  0.3 
Murdoch specific  0.6  0.0  0.9  0.7 
 *% totals not exactly equal to 100 due to rounding 
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In order to compare the preference for different reasons statistically dummy variables 
were created, specifying whether participants had cited a particular reason (either 1st 
or 2nd), and then goodness of fit chi-squares were used to compare the distribution of 
disciplines for those who had versus had not included each reason.18 Those who cited 
employment as either their first or second reason for attending university were more 
likely to be from commerce, and less likely to be from the social sciences (
2 X (3) = 
17.94, p<0.001). Comparisons for money as a reason for attending university also 
indicated a significant difference (
2 X (3) = 16.96, p<0.001), again between 
commerce and social science students, with the former far more likely to cite money. 
There was also a significant difference, though smaller, in discipline distribution 
between those who did and did not give learning as a reason for attending university 
(
2 X (3) = 8.53, p<0.05). More social science students and fewer commerce and 
psychology students indicated a desire to learn as their first or second reason. 
 
The only other significant differences were on lifestyle change and desire for a better 
life (see Appendix XVI). Psychology students were far more likely to want a “better 
life” (all other discipline groups less likely to), or to indicate lifestyle change as their 
motivation, compared to commerce majors only. The failure to find more significant 
differences may have been due to the large differences between the size of expected 
and observed attitudes. When discipline groups were compared directly, commerce 
participants were found to provide personal growth/dream reasons significantly less 
than both social science (
2 X (1) = 9.03, p<0.01) and psychology students (
2 X (1) = 
8.78, p<0.01).  
 
 
 
                                                 
18 The third reason was excluded from university reasons because so few participants provided that 
many (only 12.5% overall). All four discipline types were compared, but others showed no noticeable 
differences across reasons, and given what a mixed groups they were, their results were not reported.  
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7.3.3.b Differences between those providing different reasons for 
choosing degree 
When examining the reasons given for choosing their degree, differences were also 
quite pronounced between the academic disciplines studied (see Table 7.7). 
Commerce students were far more likely to cite opportunities, job specific, money 
and travel opportunities as reasons for choosing their degree, compared to those 
from the social sciences and psychology. Psychology majors were far more likely to 
cite a desire to help others as the reason for their degree, compared to both social 
science and commerce students. Those in the social sciences had slightly higher levels 
o f  i n t e r e s t  a n d  w e r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  using their degree as a stepping stone to 
transfer to another degree.19  
 
TABLE 7.7: Overall support for degree reason categories by 
discipline 
 
%*  Total sample   Psychology   Social science   Commerce  
Interested 44.0  47.0  51.1  37.6 
Job related  18.7  14.0  15.6  22.4 
Opportunities 17.2  10.4  10.6  28.8 
Help others  10.0  22.0  10.6  0.0 
Suits skills/abilities  4.0  4.3  4.3  2.9 
Money 1.9  0.6  1.4  4.1 
Travel 1.5  0.0  0.7 2.9 
Change the world  1.5  1.8  2.8  0.0 
Entry-point 1.3  0.0  2.8  1.2 
*% totals not exactly equal to 100 due to rounding 
 
Chi-square analyses showed that interest was cited significantly differently across 
disciplines (
2 X (3) = 18.29, p<0.001); those in the social science and psychology 
provided this reason more than commerce students. However, the reverse was found 
for opportunities (
2 X (3) = 41.68, p<0.001) and job related reasons (
2 X (3) = 12.16, 
p<0.01). There was no difference among those who chose their degree because it 
suited their own abilities (
2 X (3) = 0.86, p>0.05). Commerce students could not be 
                                                 
19 This result is probably inflated by the number of general arts students classified as social science but 
also represents the lower admission standards for many social science (and the general arts) degrees.  
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included in the comparison for helping others as none provided this reason; however, 
there was still a significant difference among the three remaining discipline groups 
(
2 X (3) = 24.44, p<0.001), with psychology participants much more likely to cite 
helping, in comparison to social science and other students. Other reasons could not 
be analysed, due to low numbers of endorsements.  
 
Chi-squares were also used to determine if there were any differences in year group 
distributions among those who did versus did not cite a particular reason. Significant 
differences were found for some university reasons; desire to learn (
2 X (3) = 34.00, 
p<0.001), lifestyle changes (
2 X (3) = 12.11, p<0.01), further education (
2 X (3) = 
8.24, p<0.05) and wanting to change the world (
2 X (3) = 8.98, p<0.05). Not 
surprisingly, postgraduate students were more l i k e l y  t o  c i t e  d e s i r e  t o  l e a r n ,  w h i l e  
first- and second-years were less likely to give this reason. First-years were also more 
likely to mention lifestyle change (second-years less likely), while both first-years and 
postgraduates were more likely to want to change the world, compared to the middle 
year-groups. Third- and fourth-years were more likely to cite further education, with 
first-years and postgraduates mentioning it less. No significant differences in year- 
group distributions were found for any of the reasons for choosing degree (see 
Appendix XVI).  
 
Overall, a number of things can be gleaned from these results. Firstly, students were 
generally motivated by extrinsic reasons for attending university, like securing 
employment and money, and qualifications to help them attain these. However, when 
it came to choosing their specific degree, most students had intrinsic motivations, 
based on interest, although many were aiming for a specific occupation, which would 
presumably fulfil their reasons for attending university in the first place. There was a 
difference between students in different academic disciplines though, with commerce 
majors comparatively more focused on extrinsic motivations, both for attending  
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university and choosing their degrees. Those in the social sciences and psychology 
were more likely to cite intrinsic reasons, compared to commerce students.  
 
 
7.4 DISCUSSION 
 
The results of this second study clearly reinforced those from Study 1. While 
unambiguous differences existed between students in different academic disciplines, 
no evidence was found to support the socialisation effect, or even accentuation of 
existing attitudes or increased cohesiveness among undergraduate students at 
different levels of their degree. Differences were also found generally as expected on 
other variables, in terms of support for the different sociopolitical value scales.  
 
7.4.1 SUPPORT FOR HYPOTHESES 
 
7.4.1.a Discipline differences 
Social science students again favoured systemic explanations for poverty more, and 
individualistic explanations for both poverty and wealth less, than commerce 
students. Those in the social sciences also supported left-wing values and liberal 
social groups significantly more than most other participants, including commerce 
students. In contrast, commerce participants supported individualistic explanations 
for poverty and wealth, right-wing and conservative values, and conservative social 
groups significantly more than those in most other disciplines, especially the social 
sciences.  
 
Psychology majors scored significantly lower on individualistic explanations for 
poverty, and right-wing and conservative values compared to commerce students, but 
lower on systemic explanations for poverty, and support for liberal social groups than  
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the social science participants. Students in other disciplines were significantly lower 
than commerce participants on right-wing and conservative values, and favoured 
liberal social groups more. Again, there were no differences found for systemic 
explanations for wealth, which had fairly high levels of support overall. 
 
Crucially for the socialisation hypothesis, no significant differences were found based 
on participants’ current years of degree. There was also no real evidence of greater 
support for the sociopolitical attitudes measured or greater cohesiveness within value 
scales, when students had spent longer in the university system. While in line with 
past research, these results were still somewhat surprising. There was some evidence 
of significant differences between undergraduates and postgraduates, as well as a 
trend towards greater internal reliability within the sociopolitical scales for 
postgraduates. These findings, however, indicated decreased support for 
individualistic explanations for poverty, and right-wing and conservative attitudes, 
across the three main discipline groups. So while it would have been expected that 
commerce postgraduates would show greater accentuation of undergraduate 
attitudes, they actually moved in the opposite direction.  
 
This may have been due to the type of students who selected Murdoch University for 
their MBA, as it is perceived as more liberal than the other WA universities and has 
more flexible entry pathways and curriculum. It may also possibly have been because 
the postgraduates were older, and therefore had more experience of the ‘real world’ 
than the comparable undergraduate sample, however, no significant age effects were 
found overall on the sociopolitical value scales. The failure to find greater coherence 
between the sociopolitical value measures could again be due to methodology. 
However, Newcomb (1943/1957) also found little evidence of decreased dispersion of 
scores as students progressed through their degree, concluding that a consequence of 
“college experience cannot be said to be (that) of increasing homogeneity in attitude” 
(p. 33).  
 
 
203
 
7.4.1.b Party identification 
Significant differences in support for the sociopolitical attitudes were found between 
participants who identified with different political parties, in line with expectations 
and past findings. Green and Labor voters favoured systemic explanations for poverty 
and wealth, left-wing values and liberal groups more than Liberal supporters did. 
They also generally supported individualistic explanations, and right-wing and 
conservative values less than Liberal identifiers did (the only exception was 
individualistic wealth, where Labor and Liberal supporters were not significantly 
different). Those who described themselves as swinging voters showed a leftist tilt, 
endorsing right-wing  and conservative values less, and systemic explanations for 
poverty, left-wing  values and liberal social groups more, than Liberal voters. 
However, they also showed differences in the opposite directions on these scales 
when compared to the Greens supporters, so this may simply have been reflective of 
the sample overall.  
 
7.4.1.c Relationships with other variables 
Significant relationships were found between the subjective variables and the 
sociopolitical attitudes, although these were generally weak. The most consistent and 
significant relationships were seen for future financial expectations and self-reported 
socioeconomic status. Both these variables also showed strong relationships with 
discipline, especially future financial expectations, however, the effects of these 
relationships could not be statistically removed from the effect of discipline on the 
sociopolitical attitudes. It seems likely that the desire for a better economic future 
impacted on choice of field of study, but also that a particular conjunction of attitudes 
would lead to higher future expectations. As such, these variables were severely 
confounded. Current subjective financial situation again had little effect, as in Study 
1. It may be that university students see their present situation as only temporary, 
with higher education the key to improving it.   
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There were again differences between those who had received social security benefits 
and those who had not, most notably on the ideological measures. This may have 
been a function of socioeconomic status, with significant differences on self-reported 
class between those who had/not received benefits and between disciplines. 
However, there was no support for the actor-observer effect, in contrast to Study 1, 
with no significant differences on the attributional measures.  
 
7.4.1.d Reasons for attending university and choosing discipline 
When it came to the reasons offered by the students for why they attended university 
and why they chose their particular degree, findings were mixed. Instrumental, 
practical reasons were the most favoured overall as explanations for why the 
participants chose to attend university, although one specific intrinsic explanation 
“interest” was by far the most popular for choosing discipline. Commerce students 
w e r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  c i t e  g a i n i n g  e m p l o y m e n t  a n d  m o n e y  a s  t h e i r  r e a s o n s  f o r  
attending university, compared to those in the social sciences, who, in turn, were 
more likely to mention the intrinsic “wanting to learn” than commerce participants. 
Some small differences were also found between year groups, most notably first-years 
and postgraduates were more likely to express idealistic notions about wanting to 
change the world, and postgraduates were more likely than those early in their 
degrees to cite a desire to learn.20  
 
Overall, however, the basic ordering of reasons from most to least cited was identical 
across disciplines, with the main point of difference being desire to learn ranking 
above money for social science and psychology students. It was, though, impossible 
to know exactly what the participants were thinking about their specific reasons, 
especially in the case of the second most popular response, “further education”, 
                                                 
20Not surprising given that most were PhDs and, therefore, working on increasing their knowledge 
about a very specific area, presumably of interest to them.   
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which could have several meanings (e.g., conferring status, pathway to employment, 
improving one’s self through learning).  
 
When it came to reason for choosing their degree there were also some significant 
discipline differences, and more ordering differences among reasons, although 
interest was on top for all. No year-level differences were found. Commerce students 
were more likely to cite opportunities, job-specific issues and money reasons for their 
degree choice, compared to those from the social sciences and psychology. The latter 
two disciplines mentioned interest significantly more often than commerce majors. 
Psychology students were also much more likely to name a desire to help others as 
important in selecting their degree, compared to all other discipline groups, which 
does fit with the perception of psychology in the wider community and its major 
occupational outcomes. Again, it is difficult to tell exactly what the participants 
meant when they gave these particular reasons, although commerce students did 
seem to favour instrumental reasons comparatively more than those from the other 
academic disciplines.  
 
7.4.2 ISSUES ARISING FROM RESULTS 
 
The continuing failure to find that commerce participants prefer individualistic 
explanations over systemic ones has a number of possible explanations. Firstly, it fits 
with Feather’s (1974) research suggesting that Australians generally prefer systemic 
to individualistic explanations for poverty. Most of the other research in the area of 
casual explanations for social phenomena has used American participants (see 
Chapter 3). Secondly, those who attend university would presumably be more 
politically sophisticated, given that education level and knowledge have often been 
used to operationalise political sophistication in research. Gomez and Wilson (2001, 
2003) reported that the highly politically sophisticated made more distal and 
multiple attributions when explaining economic events, as such, if university  
 
 
206
students are more politically sophisticated, then it would be expected that they would 
assign responsibility for people’s economic situations, either poverty or wealth, to 
more diverse causes (i.e., the multiple systemic causes, rather than the more singular 
individualistic ones).   
 
7.4.3 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
 
There were some problems with this study. While the sample size was much larger 
than the original study, the cell sizes were still not even for the discipline by year-level 
comparisons. This was particularly an issue with the postgraduates, who may have 
demonstrated more significant differences from undergraduates had there been more 
of them. Also, there were problems with the data itself. The inclusion of the “don’t 
know” response led to a considerable amount of missing data, although forcing 
participants to choose a position would have decreased the accuracy of their scores. 
However, it was also partly responsible for the poorer test-retest and internal 
reliabilities for the sociopolitical scales in this study, compared to Study 1. There were 
also considerable differences in variance between groups within the study, which led 
to violation of several equality assumptions. It was likely, however, that these 
represented true differences between the groups and were related to cell sizes overall.  
 
The most obvious shortcoming was the fact that the study was cross-sectional, rather 
than longitudinal. While it is possible to report that adherence to the sociopolitical 
measures was not greater at higher year-levels, it is not possible to say that there was 
no increase. It was also not possible to rule out cohort or historical effects. The 
socialisation, self-selection and accentuation hypotheses would obviously be best 
tested using a longitudinal study. The time limit imposed by a research degree 
prevented a full three-year study but, in hindsight, follow-up studies at least one year 
later would have been valuable.  
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7.5 CONCLUSION 
 
The results of Study 2 have helped to reinforce the findings from Study 1. There was 
some evidence that university students were liberal/left leaning generally, although 
those in the social sciences were relatively more so than those in commerce. The 
results also provided further support for the idea of group-based structuring of 
ideological belief systems, with the Social Groups scale again demonstrating the most 
distinctions between discipline and other sub-groups.  
  
Both of the studies so far have suggested that self-selection, and not socialisation or 
accentuation, is responsible for the differences found between students from different 
academic disciplines. This finding has some serious implications for the tertiary 
education system, which has generally been assumed to be shaping the value systems 
of society’s future leaders. If university attendance is having no impact on students’ 
sociopolitical attitudes, then it would seem that childhood or adolescent socialisation 
is the key to explaining people’s sociopolitical worldviews. It is also possible that 
further socialisation or accentuation takes place once people enter the workforce, 
although self-selection would be likely to continue to play an important role.  
 
As such, the next logical step would be to examine the beliefs of adolescents, both 
those who desire to and those who actually will attend university, to see whether their 
attitudes match those exhibited by the students already within the disciplines they 
are attempting to enter. Unfortunately, out of the fifteen local high schools contacted 
about this research (selected due to the high numbers of current Murdoch University 
students who had attended them) only one agreed to participate. As this would not 
have offered a large enough sample size, taking into account that not all final year 
students planned to attend university or would match the specific disciplines 
examined here as their first choice, this study had to be abandoned. However, a study 
was carried out which assessed the sociopolitical attitudes of recent graduates, in  
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order to determine whether the robust differences found among undergraduates 
persisted after leaving university. This was clearly a key issue, in terms of discovering 
whether the early findings actually had any real life implications.   
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8. STUDY 3 
 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The results of both previous studies were generally consistent in terms of indicating 
that there were significant and predictable differences in the sociopolitical attitudes 
of students in different academic disciplines, as expected. These differences were 
generally found to be consistent with the self-selection hypothesis though (rather 
than socialisation or accentuation), due to the lack of differences across year-levels 
within disciplines in strength of endorsement of attitudes. There were also no 
differences the internal consistency of the sociopolitical attitudes measured at 
different levels of undergraduate study. There were significant differences between 
postgraduates and undergraduates, however, the former were a highly selective 
group, who would differ from most undergraduates in numerous ways, including 
levels of critical abstract thinking and occupational and educational goals.  
 
While these results were highly congruent, they would be of little value if these 
differences did not persist in the ‘real world’ outside of universities. The adjustment 
from education to the workplace would involve significant socialisation into the new 
environment; as such graduates pre-existing beliefs and values may be overridden, or 
at least altered, by the experience. While research has mostly suggested that those 
with higher education tend to be more liberal than the general population, there have 
been some inconsistencies. People spend much longer in their occupations than at 
universities, and they tend to be much more central to people’s lives, which may 
explain these inconsistent results between education level and beliefs and values 
(although discipline still seems a likely culprit). However, it is most likely that pre-
existing attitudes are responsible for both the choice of discipline and occupation; 
people self-select into social environments in which their worldviews are supported.    
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8.1.1 AIMS 
 
The main aim of this study was to examine whether the strong and consistent 
differences in sociopolitical attitudes found among university students were 
maintained among recent graduates. This was essential to the ‘real world’ relevance 
of the research programme’s findings. It also provided an opportunity to discover 
whether participants felt that their values and beliefs had been changed by the 
experience of attending university. Students may have been changing in important 
ways that were not being assessed by the measures employed here. Some 
occupational socialisation may have taken place since completion of university study, 
so comparisons were also made based on the occupational classifications of 
managerial or professional. A questionnaire was again used, based on the previous 
two studies, but this time it was administered electronically, rather than in a paper-
based format, as participants were contacted via email instead of in person or via 
conventional mail.  
 
8.1.2 HYPOTHESES 
 
These were essentially the same as in previous studies. Social science graduates were 
expected to endorse systemic explanations for wealth and poverty, left-wing values 
and liberal groups more than graduates with other degrees. Commerce graduates 
were expected to support individualistic explanations for wealth and poverty, right-
wing and conservative values and conservative social groups more than other alumni. 
Social science and psychology students were expected to support Labor and the 
Greens more, and the Liberal Party less, than commerce students, for whom the 
reverse was predicted. Graduates were also expected to show greater internal 
cohesiveness in their scale scores, due to increased sophistication and maturity, 
compared to undergraduates. It was also predicted that there would be differences in  
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endorsement of the sociopolitical attitudes based on current type of occupation, 
particularly managerial versus professional occupations. 
 
Participants from different disciplines were expected to report different reasons for 
choosing to attend university and for choosing their degree, with commerce 
graduates reporting more extrinsic motivation, and less intrinsic, than their social 
science counterparts. The different discipline groups were also predicted to indicate 
different types of changes to their values and beliefs; although no change or 
accentuation of pre-existing beliefs were expected to be the most common responses.  
 
 
 
 
 
8.2 METHOD 
 
 
Participants:  There were 143 participants (97 females, 46 males), all Murdoch 
University Alumni. They ranged in age from 21-65 years, with a mean age of 34.1 
(median= 28.0). All the participants had previously supplied their email addresses to 
the University’s Alumni office and had graduated with a degree in the social sciences 
(politics, history and/or sociology; 36.4%), commerce (41.3%) or psychology (18.2%) 
between 1998 and 2003 (the previous five years). A further 4.2% had majors in more 
than one area of study (see Table 8.1). The mean time since graduation was 2.62 
years, with 52.6% graduating within two years.1 The sex distribution was similar to 
the previous undergraduate studies, with slightly more males but the age distribution 
was, as expected, older. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1A one-way ANOVA indicated commerce respondents had been graduated significantly longer than 
psychology participants (F (3, 133) = 3.15, p<0.05).  
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TABLE 8.1: Participants by discipline 
  N  Mean time since graduation 
Psychology 26  2.04 
Social science  52  2.27 
Commerce 59  3.20 
Others 6  2.80 
TOTAL 143  2.62 
 
Measures: The questionnaire was based on those used in the previous studies (see 
Appendix XVII). To make it easier to complete electronically boxes were provided for 
all responses. Only ten items each were used for the wealth and poverty scales, based 
on the five questions for each scale (SW, IW, SP and IP) which performed best in 
Study 2. The ideology scales had only slight wording changes from those used in 
Study 2.2 All explanation and ideological scales were rated on a six-point scale from 
‘strongly disagree’ (1) to ‘strongly agree’ (6), as in Study 1. Fourteen social groups 
were included; the twelve used in SG for Study 2 and the ALP and unions. The groups 
were again rated on an eleven point scale (0 to 10, with 5 as neutral).  
 
The scales were followed by the background and demographics section. Participants 
were asked to indicate their sex, age, the degree completed at Murdoch and years 
they attended, any other qualifications, whether they were currently employed, and if 
not were they looking for work or studying, and their current job3 or course title. The 
next set of questions dealt with education levels of parents and partner (if applicable) 
and own, parents’ and partners’ party identification. There were several subjective 
scales indicating current and expected (10 years time) financial situations (both 5-
point scales), how easy attaining employment was after graduation (4-point scale and 
“did not look” option) and self-placement socioeconomic class scale, with working, 
                                                 
2 “The government should leave market forces…” became “…allow market forces…”; “’User-pays’ is 
the best system for education and health” became “People should pay for their own education and 
health care” and “The government should privatise most assets and only run essential services…” 
became “The government should use private companies, which are more efficient, to run services (like 
welfare, employment, prisons)”. 
3 Occupations were again classified according to the Australian Standard Classifications of 
Occupations (DEIR, 1987) ‘supergroups’. 
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middle and upper class indicated on it (11-point scale). Finally, there were two open-
ended questions; the first was the same as in Study 2 (reasons for attending 
university and choosing degree). The second question asked whether they thought 
that “going to university changed your beliefs and values? In what way/s?”. Boxes 
were provided to enter answers into which expanded as participants typed, so they 
were no limited in their responses by space. 
 
Procedure: All participants were contacted via email, using the addresses they had 
supplied to the Murdoch University Alumni office. The email contained a brief 
description of the study and asked that they email the researcher to receive an 
electronic copy of the questionnaire. Once they received the questionnaire, 
participants completed it and sent it back to the researcher. The questionnaires were 
then printed, with no identifying information on them, and stored as hard copies. 
Each participant received an email to acknowledge the questionnaire’s receipt and to 
thank them for their help. Both the original and questionnaire-attached emails were 
only stored electronically until after all data were collected, except for those who had 
requested feedback. Their original emails were kept until feedback was sent at the 
conclusion of the analysis.  
 
There were two rounds of requests to participants. The first was sent in July, 2004. 
Four weeks later, another email was sent (with those who had participated in the first 
phase excluded) which was slightly shorter and indicated that there had been a poor 
response to the first ‘email-out’ and that the researcher needed participants from all 
disciplines but especially “commerce, psychology, politics and history”. After nearly 
two weeks a reminder email was sent to all those who had requested a questionnaire 
but had not yet returned it (n=30). All completed questionnaires were received in 
July or August, 2004.  
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In the first round 1095 emails were sent. It is not known how many were undelivered, 
as this email-out was performed by an administrative staff member; however, based 
on the second email-out it was probably around 15% (n~164). Seventy-one 
participants sent requests for questionnaires, with a total of fifty-six returned. Two 
people indicated that they did not want to participate after receiving the 
questionnaire. The approximate response rate was about 6%.  
 
The remaining graduates were included in the second email-out, four weeks later, 
which included 1024 emails. Of these 139 ‘bounced’ (were undeliverable), meaning 
885 presumably reached their destinations. A total of 102 replies were received, 
leading to the receipt of 87 completed questionnaires. Two respondents requested 
that they not be contacted again while thirteen received the questionnaire but did not 
return it, even after a further reminder. This gives an effective response rate of about 
10%.4 The response rates were slightly different across discipline groups (see 
Appendix XVIII).  
 
 
8.3 RESULTS 
 
8.3.1 BACKGROUND COMPARISONS 
 
Overall, there were slightly more men in the alumni sample than in the previous 
sample (32.2% vs. 28.4%). However, similar differences were seen between discipline 
groups (see Appendix XVIII). Goodness of fit chi-squares indicated that the sex 
distributions were again significantly different (more males in commerce, more 
females in psychology and the social sciences). Social science graduates tended to be 
                                                 
4 The response rates indicated are only tentative due to the many unknowns, like the accuracy of the 
email addresses and how often they were accessed by participants. Some responses came from email 
addresses not included in original send-out (most likely due to forwarding from old addresses). Many 
people reported not receiving the first request to participate, so presumably the reverse was also true.  
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older than those from the other fields of study, as found previously. There were no 
differences between disciplines in terms of whether family members had tertiary (or 
non-tertiary) levels of education. There were some differences in current employment 
situations, with commerce participants more likely to be employed full-time and less 
likely to be studying, compared to social science graduates. Commerce graduates 
were also more likely to be in managerial or administrative occupations compared to 
those from the social sciences and psychology, while the latter disciplines were more 
likely to be involved in professional or other occupations, or continuing to study. 
 
Similar differences in subjective variables were also found. While there was again no 
divergence in current financial situation ratings, social science graduates rated their 
future economic situations significantly lower than other participants. There were no 
differences in reported ease of finding employment after graduation or in self-
reported socioeconomic class. However, there were significant differences in party 
identification, in line with expectations. Commerce graduates were much more likely 
to be Liberal party supporters, and much less likely to be Labor, Greens or swinging 
voters compared to social science and psychology alumni. 
 
8.3.2 SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES SCALES 
 
8.3.2.a Structure 
The sociopolitical scales were generated based on the relevant a priori items and 
confirmed through internal reliability assessment, which led to the exclusion of some 
items.5 One item had to be excluded from each of the attributional scales 
(Individualistic Wealth [IW], Systemic Wealth [SW] and Systemic Poverty [SP]), 
                                                 
5 The sample size was too small for further PCAs and previous work led to the assumption of few 
changes. Aside from “take risks” on the IW scale, those items excluded were also the lowest loading 
items on each of their respective scales in Study 2.  
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except Individualistic Poverty (IP), to improve internal reliability.6 One of each type 
of left and right item also failed to show internal consistency for their respective 
scales (Left Scale [LS] and Right Scale [RS]) and one conservative and two liberal 
items were excluded from the Conservative Scale (CS; liberal items reverse coded).7 
Of the fourteen social groups rated, eleven were included in the Social Groups scale 
(SG); seven liberal and four conservative.8 Table 8.2 indicates the descriptive 
statistics for each scale.9 Skew and kurtosis scores indicated normal distributions for 
all scales.10  
 
TABLE 8.2: Descriptive statistics for the sociopolitical attitudes 
scales 
 
 n  # 
items 
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Skew Kurtosis  Cronbach’s 
α 
IW 143  4  3.56  3.75 0.97  -0.13  -0.01 0.74 
SW 143  4  4.57 4.75  0.91  -0.64  -0.03  0.73 
IP 143  5  2.95  3.00  0.87  0.28  0.01 0.72 
SP 141  4  4.06 4.00 1.01  -0.25  -0.20 0.73 
LS 143  4  4.04  4.00 0.99  -0.01  -0.33 0.76 
RS 143  4  3.03 3.00 1.05  -0.00  -0.65 0.76 
CS 142  5  3.14 3.20 1.06  0.14 -0.48 0.75 
SG 136  11 6.01 5.95  1.34  0.13 -0.32  0.82 
  
 
The sociopolitical value scales again showed consistent interrelationships in the 
expected directions (see Table 8.3). While some were only weak, many correlations 
were larger than those found previously, particularly among the political ideology 
variables. This showed that the university graduates in this sample had greater 
                                                 
6 These were: “wealthy people take risks” (IW), “wealthy people are in the ‘right place at the right 
time’” (SW) and “the capitalist economic system means that some people have to be on the bottom and 
others on the top” (SP). 
7 The exclusions from the ideological scales were: “The government should provide a job for everyone 
who wants one” (LS) and “Status and income inequality in society encourage individual effort” (RS), 
“The law should always be obeyed, without exception”, “Adults should be able to watch or read what 
they want, without government censorship” and “It’s every woman’s right to choose an abortion” (CS).  
8 Excluded were: Aborigines (liberal) and self-made millionaires and the military (conservative). 
9Those with more than one missing item on each scale did not receive a score for that scale, which 
created uneven sample sizes for each scale. Where one item was missing, scale score was calculated 
without it (each scale score represents mean of relevant items).  
10 Z-scores indicated only two possible outlier scores, one on IP and SP, but both were only a little over 
3 so they were not excluded (on IP: z= 3.051 and SP: z= 3.037)). No multivariate outliers were found 
(based on critical value of 26.12 for Mahalanobis distance, with 8 df).  
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interconnections between their beliefs compared to the undergraduates in the 
previous studies, as would be suggested by both maturity and socialisation theories. 
However, when the sample was split at 30 years of age, correlation coefficients 
remained very similar, which suggested socialisation, rather than maturation, may 
have been the difference (see Appendix XIX). 
 
TABLE 8.3: Correlations between sociopolitical attitudes scales 
 SW  IP  SP  LS  RS  CS  SG 
IW  0.07 0.37*** -0.17* -0.17* 0.30*** 0.23**  -0.26** 
SW    -0.03  0.49*** 0.61*** -0.30*** -0.41***  0.44*** 
IP      -0.15 -0.09 0.38***  0.46*** -0.56*** 
SP       0.61*** -0.34*** -0.52***  0.52*** 
LS        -0.42***  -0.46***  0.62*** 
RS          0.60***  -0.61*** 
CS            -0.74*** 
 
 
 
8.3.2.b Discipline analysis 
A one-way MANOVA was used to determine the effects of discipline (3 levels: 
psychology, social science and commerce) on the eight dependent variables.11 Box’s M 
indicated that the assumption of equality of covariances was not violated (M= 87.19, 
F (72, 21213.00) = 1.084, p>0.05). Pillai’s Trace demonstrated a significant 
multivariate effect on scale scores (V= 0.47, F (16, 236) = 4.48, p<0.001). Levene’s F 
test showed that the equality of variances assumption was violated for SW; therefore 
Tamhane’s T2 tests were used for all post-hoc comparisons (see Appendix XX). One-
way ANOVAs showed significant discipline differences on all scales except IW. This 
was similar to previous studies, except that among the undergraduate samples SW 
was the only scale which had failed to show significant discipline differences. 
 
Table 8.4 demonstrates that the differences between discipline groups were in the 
same directions as previously found, with the social sciences and commerce being 
                                                 
11 For this MANOVA n = 127, due to exclusion of ‘mixed’ degree holders and list-wise deletions.  
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significantly different on all seven scales for which post-hoc tests were performed. 
Commerce graduates scored significantly higher on IP and RS, and lower on SG, 
compared to those from both social science and psychology, and lower on SP and LS 
compared to social science only. Social science participants were significantly higher 
on SW, and lower on RS and CS, compared to both other discipline groups. There 
were no significant differences between psychology graduates and those from 
commerce on SW, SP, LS or CS, or the social sciences on IP, SP, LS or SG. The lack of 
significant differences for psychology alumni may have been due to their smaller 
numbers.  
 
 
TABLE 8.4: Mean scores on sociopolitical attitudes scales by 
discipline 
 
 Psychology 
(1)  Social sciences 
(2)  Commerce 
(3) 
IW 3.65  3.35 3.73 
SW 4.38
2 4.86
13 4.33
2 
IP 2.71
3 2.71
3 3.30
12 
SP 4.06  4.47
3 3.67
2 
LS 3.98  4.42
3 3.66
2 
RS 3.01
23 2.48
13 3.62
12 
CS 3.34
2 2.48
13 3.75
2 
SG 6.22
3 6.67
3 5.13
12 
1= Significantly different from psychology sample 
2= Significantly different from social sciences sample 
3= Significantly different from commerce sample 
 
 
The variances for each of the sociopolitical attitudes scales were compared to 
determine if there were differences between disciplines, and between students and 
graduates (see Appendix XXI). The results indicated few differences, except that 
psychology participants again showed generally lower variances. Alumni participants 
showed similar levels of internal reliability within scales compared to the 
undergraduate students from Study 2 (see Table 8.5).12 There were some large 
differences, mostly with psychology, but also commerce, with some poorer and some 
better internal reliabilities for the graduate, compared to undergraduate samples. The 
small sample sizes, particularly for psychology, may explain this variability.  
                                                 
12 Scales from Study 2 not identical, most Study 3 scales have at least one less item.  
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TABLE 8.5: Reliability coefficients for sociopolitical attitudes 
scales by discipline for undergraduate and alumni participants 
  
 Psychology  Social  sciences  Commerce 
  UG (Study 2)  Alumni  UG (Study 2)  Alumni  UG (Study 2)  Alumni 
IW  0.80 0.64 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.71 
SW  0.73 0.20 0.81 0.83 0.79 0.70 
IP  0.65 0.79 0.75 0.70 0.69 0.68 
SP  0.79 0.73 0.69 0.73 0.77 0.66 
LS  0.54 0.67 0.64 0.79 0.56 0.68 
RS  0.49 0.62 0.52 0.74 0.42 0.65 
CS  0.71 0.51 0.65 0.66 0.55 0.67 
SG  0.77 0.82 0.83 0.85 0.68 0.73 
 
 
8.3.2.c Party identification comparisons 
Those with certain party identifications would be expected to show clear differences 
on the sociopolitical attitudes; however, party support showed evidence of strong 
discipline differences, hence a two-way MANOVA was conducted. The two-way (3x5) 
MANOVA showed significant main effects for both discipline (V= 0.34, F (16, 192) = 
2.42, p<0.01) and party identification (V= 0.62, F (32, 392) = 2.25, p<0.001), but not 
for their interaction (V= 0.71, F (64, 816) = 1.24, p>0.05). Box’s test for equality of 
covariances was not significant (M= 308.94, F (216, 6863.70) = 0.98, p>0.05). 
Levene’s test for equality of variances indicated only marginal significance for IP (F 
(14, 102) = 1.81, p<0.05), so Tamhane’s T2 post-hoc tests were used.  
 
Univariate comparisons specified significant differences for party identification on 
SW, IP, SP, LS, CS and SG. There were significant differences on only IP, LS, RS, CS 
and SG for discipline. Labor supporters scored significantly higher than Liberal 
voters on SW and LS (and lower on IP) and higher than Liberal, swinging and other 
voters on SG (see Appendix XX). Liberal identifiers scored significantly higher on CS, 
and lower on SP, compared to all voters except those who supported other parties. 
They were also significantly lower than all the other voter groups on SG. Greens 
voters were significantly different from Liberal voters, in the expected direction on 
SP, LS, CS and SG. Post-hoc tests for discipline were not conducted, as the direction  
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of the differences had already been established. However, it seemed as though 
differences based on party identification were far larger than those based on 
discipline, although the two variables were clearly not independent. Figure 8.1 
indicates the mean score on the sociopolitical attitudes scales for the main political 
groupings (SG not included due to different scale).  
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FIGURE 8.1: Mean scores on sociopolitical attitudes scales for 
Labor, Liberal and Greens voters 
 
 
8.3.2.d Relationships with other variables 
A two-way (2x4) MANOVA was conducted to determine if there were any significant 
sex or age (four levels: 21-24, 25-34, 35-44 and 45+ years) differences on the 
sociopolitical attitudes scales. There was a significant multivariate main effect for age 
(V = 1.75, F (24, 360) = 1.75, p<0.05) but not sex (V= 0.11, F (8, 118) = 1.81, p>0.05) 
or their interaction (V = 0.25, F (24, 360) = 1.36, p>0.05). The assumption of 
equality of covariances was not violated (M = 177.36, F (144, 8473.96) =0.99, 
p>0.05). One-way ANOVAs showed significant differences on SP, LS, RS, CS and SG, 
with a split between the two younger and two older age groups. The older participants  
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were significantly more left, liberal and systemic and the younger participants more 
right and conservative (see Appendix XX).  
 
Unlike in previous studies, age was normally distributed in this sample; therefore it 
was possible to conduct a MANCOVA, assessing the effect of discipline on the 
sociopolitical scales with the effect of age controlled. Discipline had a highly 
significant multivariate effect (V = 0.41, F (16, 234) = 3.78, p<0.001). The 
assumption of equality of covariances was not violated (M = 87.19, F (72, 21213.00) = 
1.08). One-way ANOVAs indicated significant differences on all scales except SW (see 
Appendix XX). This finding was not consistent with the one-way discipline 
MANOVA, which found significant effects on all scales except IW, but was in line with 
the results of Study 1 and 2. 
 
Another two-way (3x3) MANOVA was also performed, with discipline and 
occupational classification (managerial/administrative, professional/other or 
student) as independent variables. Pillai’s Trace indicated no significant multivariate 
differences between occupational classifications (V= 0.16, F (16, 216) = 1.20, p>0.05) 
or for the discipline/occupation interaction (V = 0.32, F (32, 440) = 1.20, p>0.05), 
but was significant for discipline (V = 0.27, F (16, 216) = 2.90, p<0.01). The 
assumption of equality of covariances was not violated (M = 280.60, F (180, 6511.09) 
= 1.14, p>0.05).13 Univariate effects for discipline were the same as previously found. 
 
The relationship between the subjective variables and the sociopolitical attitudes was 
assessed via Pearson’s r correlation coefficients (see Table 8.6). Overall results were 
similar to past research, but correlations were of greater magnitude. Participants’ 
current financial situations and reported ease of finding employment showed only 
weak relationships with the sociopolitical variables. Participants’ self-reported 
socioeconomic status was significantly, though weakly, positively correlated with LS, 
                                                 
13 A one-way MANOVA also showed no significant difference (V = 0.19, F (16, 238) = 1.56, p>0.05).   
 
 
222
and to a lesser extent, SW and SG. Expected financial situation, however, was 
significantly positively correlated with all eight scales.  
 
TABLE 8.6: Pearson’s r correlation coefficients for subjective 
variables and sociopolitical attitudes scales 
 
 Current 
financial 
Future 
financial 
Change in 
situation 
Ease of 
employment 
Subjective 
Class 
IW 0.061 0.242**  0.218*  0.059  -0.120 
SW -0.091  -0.347***  -0.275***  -0.005  -0.216* 
IP 0.086 0.183*  0.134 -0.012  -0.017 
SP -0.203*  -0.293***  -0.144 -0.190*  -0.157 
LS -0.040 -0.373***  -0.335***  -0.027  -0.278*** 
RS -0.001 0.266***  0.274***  -0.037  0.087 
CS 0.127  0.399***  0.308***  0.017  0.052 
SG -0.093 -0.339***  -0.271**  0.018  -0.194* 
 
 
Of particular interest was the finding that, unlike in Studies 1 and 2, there were 
significant relationships between the size of the gap between perceived current and 
expected future financial situations, and all the sociopolitical attitudes, except IP and 
SP. This was not an effect of a larger gap in the alumni sample, which was actually 
significantly smaller than in both other studies (F (2, 889) = 11.85, p<0.001; Study 1 
and 2 were not significantly different from each other).14 The alumni would most 
likely have experienced an improvement in their economic situation since 
graduating; those with more modest expectations may have already had them met 
(particularly among the older participants, with those over 45 years showing the 
lowest mean gap in current and future situations).  
 
Given the strong discipline differences in financial expectations, a one-way 
MANCOVA was conducted to determine the effects of discipline on the sociopolitical 
attitudes scales with future economic situation controlled. The assumption of equality 
of covariances was not violated (M = 85.68, F (72, 21259.72) = 1.06). A significant 
multivariate effect was found for discipline (V = 0.36, F (16, 230) = 3.20, p<0.001). 
                                                 
14 The smaller gap was due to significantly higher ratings of current situation among alumni compared 
to both student samples (F (2, 892) = 7.18, p<0.001), but no difference in future expectations (F (2, 
889) = 2.09, p>0.05).  
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One-way ANOVAs demonstrated significant differences all scales except IW and SW. 
Levene’s F was significant for SW. This further suggested that, even when the effect of 
future financial expectations was removed, there were significant differences between 
disciplines in their endorsement of the sociopolitical attitudes measured (see 
Appendix XX).   
 
8.3.3 REASONS FOR ATTENDING UNIVERSITY AND CHOOSING 
DEGREE 
 
Open-ended questions had been included in Study 2 and 3 in order to determine 
what students’ reasons were for attending university and why they chose their 
particular programme of study. Particular attention was paid to possible discipline 
differences in responses, but demographic effects were also considered (see Section 
7.3.3). The responses to the open-ended questions of “what was the main reason you 
went to university” and “why did you choose your particular degree” were coded 
according to the categories developed in Study 2 (Appendix XV). Only twelve of the 
university reason categories (there were no Murdoch-specific responses) and six of 
the degree reasons were needed (there were no travel, entry-point or change the 
world responses). One extra category was added to the degree reasons: “others told 
me to” (e.g., “because my Father is a Psychologist and he recommended it” [F, 27, 
Bpsych], “advice from parents/school” [M, 22, Bpsych]). For details of the ordering of 
reasons and the relationships between them see Appendix XXII.  
 
Generally, the results were similar to those found previously. The most favoured 
reasons for attending university were employment opportunities, which accounted 
for 30.2% of categorised responses overall. The two next most often cited reasons 
were further education and learning (16.7% each), followed by personal 
growth/dream (10.9%). Money was rated much lower than previously (3.1%). 
Compared to the undergraduate sample, the alumni were even more likely to cite  
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interest as the reason for choosing their degree (60.6% of all categorised reasons), 
although support for all other categories dropped. The next most cited degree reason 
was opportunities (13.6%), followed by job-related reasons (12.1%). The new 
category, others’ idea, accounted for 5.3% of reasons overall.  
 
8.3.3.a Differences between those choosing different reasons for 
attending university 
There were some demographic differences in support for specific explanations, which 
were generally consistent with previous findings (see Appendix XXII). Those who 
cited personal growth and lifestyle change were older, while those who mentioned 
expectations and money were younger. Higher levels of tertiary education were found 
among the family members of those who reported that they were expected to attend 
university, while those who wanted to avoid negative effects had low levels of 
education in their families (as in Study 2).  
 
There were significant discipline differen c e s  i n  r e a s o n  f a v o u r e d  f o r  a t t e n d i n g  
university (see Table 8.7). More of those from the social sciences favoured learning as 
their most important reason of attending university (
2 X (2) = 9.90, p<0.01), 
compared to both commerce and psychology graduates. Social science participants 
named employment less often than both other discipline groups did (
2 X (2) = 15.59, 
p<0.001). No other chi-squares could be conducted due to small cell sizes; either 
comparing discipline distributions or comparing those who cited versus did not cite a 
particular reason between disciplines. However, social science graduates seemed to 
also cite personal growth and lifestyle change more, and further education, 
expectations and money less than commerce and psychology participants. Psychology 
students also cited expectations and avoiding negative effects comparatively more.  
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TABLE 8.7: Overall support for university reason categories by 
discipline 
 
%*  Total sample   Psychology  Social science   Commerce 
Employment 30.2 41.7  19.7  31.7 
Further education  16.7  19.4  12.1  18.3 
To learn  16.7  8.3  27.3  12.2 
Personal growth  10.9  0.0  19.7  9.8 
Better life  7.3  0.0  9.1  9.8 
Obligation/expected 6.8  16.7  1.5  6.1 
Money 3.1  5.6  0.0  4.9 
Avoid negative effects  2.6  5.6  0.0  3.7 
Job specific  2.6  2.8  4.5  1.2 
Lifestyle change  2.1  0.0  4.5  1.2 
Change world  0.5  0.0  1.5  0.0 
Role model for kids  0.5  0.0  0.0  1.2 
 *% totals not exactly equal to 100 due to rounding 
 
8.3.3.b Differences between those choosing different reasons for 
choosing degree 
Differences could also be seen between disciplines in the specific degree reasons cited 
(see Table 8.8), however, with the vast majority of participants favouring interest, 
statistical comparisons were difficult (due to the small cell sizes). While interest was 
by far the most important reason, social science graduates seemed to cite it a lot more 
often than those from the other discipline groups, although not significantly (
2 X (2) 
= 2.32, p>0.05). No other chi-square comparisons were possible; but, psychology 
participants seemed to favour opportunities and others’ recommendations more than 
those from the social sciences and commerce. Commerce graduates cited job-specific 
and skill matches more often than both other groups, and opportunities more than 
those from the social sciences, as their degree reasons.  
 
TABLE 8.8: Overall support for degree reason categories by 
discipline 
 
%*  Total sample   Psychology   Social science   Commerce  
Interested 60.6  56.0  74.4  54.5 
Opportunities 13.6  20.0  4.7  12.7 
Job related  12.1  0.0  9.3  21.8 
Others’ idea  5.3  12.0  4.7  1.8 
Help others  3.8  8.0  7.0  0.0 
Suits skills/abilities  3.0  0.0  0.0  7.3 
Money 1.5  4.0  0.0  1.8 
*% totals not exactly equal to 100 due to rounding  
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These relationships were similar to those found in the Study 2, although the 
psychology graduates seemed to be closer to the commerce than social science 
participants in their responses (whereas the reverse was true among 
undergraduates). This may have been a bias in the sample, with all participants 
probably ‘nicer’ than those in the previous study, due to their willingness to take part 
with no real incentive for them. This could also explain the higher ratings of learning, 
as a reason for attending university, and interest, as a degree reason; those most 
interested in learning and knowledge would probably be the most willing to be 
involved in someone else’s research.  
 
8.3.4 CHANGES AS A RESULT OF UNIVERSITY EXPERIENCE 
 
Another open-ended question was added for Study 3, which directly asked 
participants whether they thought that university had changed their beliefs and 
values, and in what ways. Ninety-three participants offered a yes or no response 
initially, 69.9% of them yeses. Broken down by discipline, 50.0% of social science, 
45.8% of commerce and 38.5% of psychology graduates said yes, with about one-
third of each subgroup not providing a direct yes or no. The open-ended responses 
were categorised into twelve types of responses. All participants provided a response, 
but three could not be categorised.15 Up to three categorisations were allowed from 
the responses provided, 97.9% had at least one, 35.0% gave two and only 4.9% 
supplied three. Details of the categories used and the overall order of importance are 
detailed in Appendix XXIII. 
 
Most participants seemed to interpret this question as changes to themselves 
generally, discussing changes to beliefs and values indirectly. Overall, the most cited 
                                                 
15 One was “I don’t know”, another indicated that they were “more changeable” after university and the 
other said that her values evolved with her degree.  
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type of change was increased open-mindedness, which involved being willing to 
question the beliefs and assumptions of others, and engaging in critical and analytical 
thinking. Second was increased tolerance, which was distinct from open-mindedness 
in its focus on how education allowed the participant to be more accepting and 
respectful of the values and beliefs of others. The third most cited change was 
expanded knowledge of the world, followed by the strengthening (accentuation) of 
existing beliefs and values, through further education. The fifth most favoured 
response was “no”, as in, there had not been any belief or value change (although this 
was followed on with other types of changes on two occasions). The other types of 
change mentioned had less than 5% support each overall.  
 
8.3.4.a Differences in support for types of change 
There were some demographic differences in support for particular types of changes 
as a result of attending university (see Appendix XXIII). Female respondents seemed 
more likely to indicate that they had changed, showing higher levels of support for 
the most favoured responses. Older participants were also more likely to cite changes 
matching the most frequent responses. Not surprisingly, those saying they became 
more independent through university were younger (none over 30 years) while those 
who said they were mature-aged, and therefore did not change, were older. Those 
giving yes or no answers only were also younger. The only noticeable difference in the 
education levels of family members was that those who claimed university had 
expanded their knowledge reported higher levels of education, while those who cited 
independence had partners with higher levels of education, who they possibly met at 
university.  
 
Chi-square comparisons (which could only be conducted for the top five responses) 
indicated that there were significant sex differences on tolerance and knowledge only, 
with females more likely to endorse the former, and less likely to report the latter, 
compared to males. There were several significant age discrepancies, with more  
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participants aged 30 or above endorsing open-mindedness, expanded knowledge and 
strengthening of existing beliefs. The last finding in particular fits with expectations. 
However, these differences may have been an artefact of differing response rates, 
with 73.9% of males and 68.8% of under 30 year-olds offering only one response, 
compared to 57.7% of females and 56.1% of over 30 year-olds. These differences, 
though, corresponded to discipline differences. 
 
The differences in changes reported by participants from different disciplines were 
pronounced (see Table 8.9). Social science graduates reported that they became more 
open-minded, that their values were strengthened and that their knowledge 
expanded, compared to both commerce and psychology participants. Those in 
commerce and psychology reported that their tolerance of others increased and that 
they became independent more than social science graduates, as well as no change. 
Psychology participants seemed more likely to report that they valued education 
more, while those from commerce were more likely to mention PWE beliefs, 
compared to both other groups.  
 
TABLE 8.9: Overall support for categories of reported change due 
to university study by discipline 
 
 Overall 
(n=140) 
Psychology 
(n=26) 
Social science 
(n=50) 
Commerce 
(n=58) 
Open-minded 28.4  22.2  32.5  26.3 
Increased tolerance  15.2  19.4  13.0  17.1 
Expanded knowledge  14.7  11.1  22.1  10.5 
Strengthened values  13.2  8.3  20.8  5.3 
No 8.6  19.4  0.0  13.2 
Independence 3.6  5.6  0.0  6.6 
PWE 3.6  2.8  0.0  7.9 
Yes 2.5  2.8  1.3  2.6 
No, mature aged  2.5  0.0  3.9  2.6 
Became activist  2.0  0.0  2.6  1.3 
Value education more  2.0  5.6  1.3  1.3 
Lost religion  2.0  2.8  2.6  1.3 
No, not values related  1.5  0.0  0.0  2.6 
 
Chi-square comparisons indicated significant differences in discipline distributions 
on open-mindedness (
2 X (2) = 6.40, p<0.05), knowledge (
2 X (2) = 9.13, p<0.01)  
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and strengthening of pre-existing beliefs (
2 X (2) = 13.35, p<0.001), with social 
science graduates significantly more likely to mention each type of change compared 
to commerce participants, (only different on open-mindedness from psychology). No 
differences were found for tolerance (
2 X (2) = 1.23, p>0.05) or for “no” (
2 X (2) = 
1.48, p>0.05), although only psychology and commerce were included in the latter 
comparison, as no social science participants provided that response. The larger 
numbers of responses by social science participants overall was due to them being 
more likely to cite more than one type of change, with only 51.9% of those from the 
social sciences giving only one response, compared to 71.2 and 65.4% giving only one 
type of response, for commerce and psychology participants, respectively.16 
 
 
8.4 DISCUSSION 
 
The results from this study supported the previous findings of Study 1 and 2. Clear, 
strong differences between those from different academic disciplines were evident 
among recent graduates, in the expected directions. The pattern of results was 
generally the same; the failure of some comparisons to reach significance seemed 
most likely due to a much smaller sample size, compared to both previous studies.  
 
8.4.1 SUPPORT FOR HYPOTHESES 
 
8.4.1.a Sociopolitical attitude differences 
Social science graduates were more supportive of systemic explanations for poverty 
and wealth, and less supportive of individualistic explanations for poverty, than were 
commerce participants. Those from the social sciences also favoured left-wing values 
and liberal social groups more than commerce participants, and right-wing and 
                                                 
16 This difference, however, was not significantly different (F (2, 134) = 1.34, p>0.05).  
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conservative values less than both other discipline groups. Commerce graduates also 
scored significantly higher than those from psychology on individualistic 
explanations for poverty and right-wing values. Psychology graduates were 
significantly lower on systemic explanations for wealth compared to those from the 
social sciences, and more supportive of liberal social groups, compared to commerce 
participants.  
 
The only surprising finding was that there was no longer a difference between the 
discipline groups on individualistic explanations for wealth, but that there was now a 
difference on systemic explanations for wealth. Support for SW was larger across all 
discipline groups in the alumni study, while support for IW fell (see Appendix XXIV). 
Support for all other scales, except SW, fell in the alumni study, possibly suggesting 
less extreme responses than were found among the student samples. However, once 
age was controlled for (which was not possible in Study 2) the difference on SW 
disappeared and the difference for IW became significant. It seems that older people 
were more likely to endorse systemic explanations for wealth, which may be due to 
their greater life experience.  
 
There was again no evidence of increased cohesiveness within the sociopolitical value 
scales, with internal reliabilities generally higher, though similar to those found 
previously. There were stronger correlational relationships between scales though, 
which suggested that the sociopolitical attitudes were more interconnected among 
the graduates than the students. This finding was consistent between those under and 
over 30 years of age, which suggested that it was not related to maturation. Also, the 
lack of differences between participants from different occupation types indicated 
that occupational socialisation had not had any effects over and above discipline of 
degree. However, there were significant differences in occupational classification 
based on discipline, which may have subsumed occupation differentiation, as well as  
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all participants being recent graduates, and therefore not having spent very long in 
their post-degree occupations.   
 
8.4.1.b Party identification comparisons 
The results also supported earlier findings of significant discipline differences in 
party identification, with more social science and psychology participants supporting 
Labor and the Greens, and fewer supporting the Liberal or other parties, compared to 
commerce graduates. However, there was still a surprisingly large number of Labor 
identifiers among the commerce graduates, given the differences in occupation and 
economic expectations between the groups. Even with discipline included, party 
identification had a highly significant effect on the sociopolitical scales, particularly 
the ideological measures of left-wing and conservative values, and support for liberal 
social groups. Liberal voters scored significantly higher on conservative values 
compared to Labor, Green and swinging voters. They also scored significantly lower 
than all four other voter groups on the social groups and left-wing values measures 
and lower than Labor supporters only on systemic explanations for wealth and 
poverty. Labor voters were significantly higher than Liberal supporters only on 
individualistic explanations for poverty. Both Green and Labor identifiers were also 
lower than ‘others’ on conservative values, but preferred liberal social groups more.  
 
8.4.1.c Relationships with other variables 
The sociopolitical attitudes scales were shown to have similar relationships to other 
variables as had been found previously. There were no significant sex differences, 
however, older people (35 years and over) were more likely to prefer systemic 
explanations for poverty, left-wing values and liberal social groups, compared to 
younger alumni (who endorsed right-wing and conservative values significantly 
more). Yet, when age was controlled, significant differences were still found on all 
scales except IW, which suggested that age was not responsible for the differences 
found on the sociopolitical attitudes scales.   
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Future financial expectations were again found to be significantly correlated, in the 
expected direction, with all of the sociopolitical attitudes scales. Interestingly, the gap 
between current and future subjective financial position was significantly related to 
several of the sociopolitical attitudes, such that those who predicted the bigger 
changes in their position endorsed conservative and right-wing values more, and 
favoured systemic explanations for wealth, left-wing values and liberal social groups 
less. However, when these future financial expectations were controlled, there were 
still significant differences on the scales, suggesting that, while these two variables 
were closely related, subjective financial position alone was not responsible for the 
robust discipline differences found.   
 
8.4.1.d Open-ended response differences 
Similar patterns to Study 2 also emerged among the open-ended responses to reasons 
for attending university and choosing discipline. There were big differences between 
social science and commerce participants, with the most frequently named reason for 
attending university differing between the two groups (wanting to learn versus 
employment). Those from the social sciences clearly favoured more intrinsic 
explanations, while those from commerce (and psychology) preferred extrinsic 
reasons for attending university. Psychology graduates were generally closer to 
commerce than social science participants w h e n  i t  c a m e  t o  u n i v e r s i t y  r e a s o n s .  
However, all discipline subgroups clearly favoured interest as the explanation for why 
they chose their particular degree, even more so than the student sample. There were 
some minor differences between the other reasons, with commerce and psychology 
graduates comparatively more inclined towards the opportunities offered by a degree. 
Psychology and social science participants were more likely to want to help people, 
with none of those in commerce citing this reason (again). Both commerce and social 
science respondents were more likely to choose their degree for job specific reasons,  
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compared to psychology (where none provided this reason), but there was no way of 
knowing what sort of motivation was behind wanting a particular occupation.  
 
When it came to detailing changes to their values and beliefs as a result of university, 
most participants described broad changes, such as increased tolerance and open-
m i n d e d n e s s ,  w h i c h  w e r e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  a r c h e t y p a l  c h a n g e  d e t a i l e d  b y  p a s t  
researchers; ‘liberalisation’ (e.g., Astin, 1979; Feldman & Newcomb, 1969; Pascarella 
& Terenzini, 1991). Commerce participants were much more likely to simply answer 
no, or provide only one example of change to themselves, while social science 
graduates were much more effusive. The development of critical thinking, which was 
included within the open-minded response, has been thought to be a key benefit of 
university education. The reported expansion of knowledge was also unsurprising, 
given that this has long been the key aim of all types of education, or at least the main 
outcome measured.  
 
The strengthening, or accentuation, of existing values was something which previous 
research had suggested, although there was little evidence of that in Studies 1 and 2, 
which were, admittedly, cross-sectional. Participants who provided this response 
tended to be slightly older, however, it was much more popular among the social 
science graduates. Yet again, it is difficult to tease out age rather than discipline 
differences, although there is clearly a strong relationship between the two. 
 
8.4.2 ISSUES ARISING FROM RESULTS 
 
It may simply be the case that social science topics were more clearly related to 
beliefs and values, and therefore participants were more aware of the explicit linkage 
between their experiences within higher education and their pre-existing beliefs and 
values. The content of social science degrees would often have involved looking at the 
way social forces shape people’s lives (particularly sociology) so this invited students  
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to look at the way their external environment shaped their own lives. Commerce also 
looks at large forces, primarily economic, and how these shape situations for 
organisations; however, the solutions considered often involve an individual, or an 
individual organisation, instituting change. While the social sciences often study 
issues so that their solution can be known by all and widely used, business is far more 
competitive, where solutions may be jealously guarded, for the advantage they may 
bring to the specific organisation. General psychology is also often very individually 
focused (e.g., clinical, personality and cognitive psychology), minimising students’ 
exposure to information about the larger social environment and the way this 
structures their experience of the world (except in social and critical psychology 
where these factors are the most important).  
 
The reported increase in Protestant Work Ethic beliefs as a result of attending 
university, among commerce participants particularly, but also among those from 
psychology, suggested that the individualistic natures of these disciplines were 
affecting the way their graduates felt about the world. Although this was only a small 
group, their proffering of “those who work hard are rewarded” type statements 
suggested not only increased self-reliance, but also its negative flip-side; that those 
w h o  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  r e w a r d e d  m u s t  n o t  h a v e  w o r k e d  h a r d ,  a n d  a l l  t h e  s o c i a l  a n d  
economic policy implications of that. Support for the PWE has been found to be 
linked to more conservative ideological beliefs and to Just World Beliefs (e.g., Rubin 
& Peplau, 1975; see also section 4.1.2).  
 
The failure to find any evidence of greater adherence to the sociopolitical attitudes 
measured among those who had spent more time in their respective disciplines in 
Studies 1 and 2 was clearly in conflict with the types of changes reported by the 
participants in Study 3. Firstly, the cross-sectional nature of the design is 
problematic, as change itself was not directly assessed. Secondly, the measures used 
may not be sensitive enough to detect the types of differences which actually exist,  
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hence the benefit of asking people directly what changes they felt they had 
experienced. However, for the most part, the kinds of changes reported were broad, 
and, if they were to fit with any measure, it should be social liberalism (as measured, 
by lower scores on the Conservatism Scale). The other issue is that relative, rather 
than absolute, discipline differences were addressed, with all groups scoring lower on 
the individualistic than systemic scales and lower on the right and conservative than 
the left-wing scales (except for commerce where left and conservative score were very 
close). As such, it may be that all university students were/became more liberal, or at 
least all the people ‘nice’ enough to the study were more liberal, than the average 
person.  
 
8.4.3 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
 
The main problem with this study was that the sample may not be very representative 
o f  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  f r o m  w h i c h  i t  w a s  d r a w n .  O f  p a r t i c u l a r  n o t e  w a s  t h a t  a g e  w a s  
normally distributed in this sample, but heavily positively skewed in the others, 
suggesting that younger graduates were underrepresented. Perhaps older people felt 
more of an obligation to participate; most surveys report response bias towards older 
(and more educated) respondents. 
 
While many efforts were made there were a number of issues with the data collection. 
The email lists held by the alumni office obviously only included those who chose to 
provide their details to the university after graduation. The next issue was the 
accuracy of the addresses. It was likely that many were no longer being used or not 
being used frequently enough for participants to receive the message. People change 
email addresses more often than home addresses, often needing to discard an 
address when it becomes too widely known to direct marketers (‘spammers’). Also, if 
an address becomes ‘too full’ (i.e., capacity for holding messages is exceeded) the 
email will ‘bounce’ (be returned to the sender as undeliverable). People may also have  
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deleted the email without reading it, believing it was spam, or maybe intended to 
respond but forgot (hence the follow-up). As the participants were required to both 
respond to the initial email and then complete and return the questionnaire, this 
introduced extra obstacles to getting all respondents to become participants. In all 
only about 10% of those who were on the lists participated in the research. 
 
However, in the case of this research, the email-out was still the best method for 
contacting participants. While mail addresses would generally be considered more 
accurate, this may not have been the case here as the home addresses were generally 
those last known for the graduate (i.e., the address they had at the time they were last 
enrolled), unless they had specifically updated the alumni office of any changes (as 
they had to do in order for their email addresses to be on file). The likelihood of new 
graduates moving would be extremely high, whether for work, travel, further study or 
out of share-housing and into their first mortgage. This would have been less likely 
among the older graduates but would still have been problematic, especially given 
that traditional mail-outs already have a relatively low response rate (around 30%). 
The bias among the alumni participants, in terms of being those most willing to help 
out, would also have been reflected among the undergraduate samples, as was the 
low response rates, compared to the total population of undergraduates. As such, it 
was still believed that comparisons between the study participants were appropriate.  
 
 
8.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Overall, the results of this third study complemented those of Studies 1 and 2. It can 
be seen that differences which existed between students persisted among recent 
graduates. Discipline was a stronger predictor of differences in sociopolitical attitudes 
than was occupation, although occupational socialisation may become more  
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important after longer periods of time. However, while there was still no evidence of 
increased cohesiveness within the sociopolitical attitudes examined, there was 
greater constraint between attitudes, as would be expected with increased maturity 
and ideological sophistication (resulting from enhanced abstract thinking abilities). 
There were still large discipline differences in reasons for attending university and 
choosing their degrees; however, many of these were not significant due to the 
smaller sample size.  
 
The new item about whether the participants felt that their values and beliefs had 
been changed by attending university yielded some interesting results. Generally, the 
traditional liberalisation measures of increased open-mindedness and tolerance 
garnered most support, across discipline groups. Social science graduates though 
were more likely to report that their values had been strengthened by their university 
experience, compared to those from the other academic disciplines studied. Those 
from commerce and psychology were more likely to report no changes or to provide 
examples of change in a more individualistic direction, such as supporting PWE 
beliefs more or becoming more independent.  
 
While the sample was small, and not necessarily reflective of the entire population 
from which it was drawn, it was analogous to the samples used in the earlier studies. 
As such, it is likely that these results reflect real and persistent differences between 
people who have studied in different academic disciplines. These results have 
significant implications for the future of society. While attending university 
reportedly increased open-mindedness and tolerance of others, it was not influencing 
students’ value systems, although there was some evidence of accentuation of beliefs.  
 
Participants seemed to be arriving for higher education with their cohesive attitudes 
and beliefs and were somehow selecting into the discipline which most supported 
these. Perhaps they were able to recognise this value fit through the expected content  
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of the discipline or through the occupations which it was most likely to lead to. In 
order to determine how students were ensuring this match, it was decided to 
interview those who had switched degrees, between the key disciplines considered in 
the previous studies, to see why they had done so.  
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9. STUDY 4 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The results of all three previous studies, which all used the same methodology, have 
generally been consistent, both in finding differences between disciplines and in 
supporting the self-selection over the socialisation hypothesis. In contrast, many 
graduates in Study 3 felt that they had been changed by attending university, mostly 
in the traditional social liberalism direction of greater tolerance for diversity and 
more openness towards the ideas of others. This was consistent with much past 
research in the area. The graduates in Study 3 showed continued differences based on 
the discipline of their degree, which suggested continued self-selection into 
occupation after university, adding further support to the self-selection hypothesis 
generally (although occupation itself may play a larger role in determining attitudes 
over time; all the participants had graduated in the last five years).  
 
All the studies so far have suggested that students in different academic disciplines 
differ in their support for different sociopolitical attitudes and political parties, have 
different financial aspirations, and have different reasons for choosing both to attend 
university and in selecting their specific discipline. All of these seemed to suggest that 
different academic disciplines were consistent with particular ways of seeing the 
world, which led to different attitudes and goals, not only towards education and the 
world of work, but all aspects of their lives. As such, those students who changed 
between academic disciplines would be of particular interest as they had made a 
‘mistake’ in their first selection of a discipline. The reasons for this could be varied, 
including a change in worldview or the failure of a discipline to meet the expectations 
of those entering it. These issues are explored in this study.  
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9.1.1 AIMS 
 
The main aim of the final study was to determine if students recognised a particular 
ideological slant within their discipline, primarily by examining students’ reasons for 
changing disciplines. If it was the case that students were (implicitly or explicitly) 
selecting disciplines which matched their pre-existing sociopolitical attitudes, then 
those who changed from one programme of study to another may have been trying to 
seek a discipline with a better fit for them, than the one they had originally chosen. It 
was hoped that this would provide further insight into whether the ideological nature 
of the fields of study considered (social sciences, psychology and commerce) was a 
factor in students’ experiences within them. As richer, more detailed data was 
required, to elicit whether there was any sense of disciplines’ having particular values, 
and whether participants felt that they had not “fitted” in the former discipline, but 
did in the new one, interviews, rather than surveys, were used.  
 
9.1.2 HYPOTHESES 
 
It was expected that qualitative analysis of the content of semi-directed interviews 
with students who had changed between the main three disciplines considered within 
Studies 1 to 3 (psychology, social sciences and commerce) would yield some evidence 
of what motivated their change, and whether this was related to ideological fit within 
the fields of study. While primarily exploratory in nature, it was expected that 
students would indicate that they felt more comfortable within their new area of 
study, and that this would possibly be related to ideological fit. Alternatively, there 
may be evidence which suggesting that instrumental goals are more crucial to some 
participants (most likely those changing from the social sciences; or less important in 
the case of the reverse). The same kinds of responses for choosing discipline as were  
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cited in open-ended questions within the previous studies were also expected, in 
relation to second discipline especially (e.g. “interest).  
 
Most of the individual participants’ responses to the questionnaire (same as Study 2) 
were predicted to be closer to the sample from their new discipline, rather than their 
former field of study (based on results from Study 2). In particular, it was expected 
that participants’ scores on the sociopolitical scales would be closer to those from 
their new discipline, rather than to students within their old discipline (compared to 
data from Study 2).  
 
 
9.2 METHOD 
 
Participants: Nine Murdoch University students were interviewed by the researcher 
in her office on campus. There were six females and three males, aged between 21 and 
4 7  y e a r s  ( m e a n =  3 0 . 1 1 ,  M d n =  2 9 . 0 ) .  I n i t i a l l y ,  f o u r  w e r e  s t u d y i n g  i n  t h e  s o c i a l  
sciences (all sociology), three in psychology and two in commerce. Five participants 
were now enrolled in psychology, two in the social sciences (sustainable development 
and political science), and one in commerce (see Table 9.1).  
 
TABLE 9.1: Participant characteristics  
 CHANGE  SEX  AGE 
1 Psy  → SS  M  43 
2 SS  → Psy  F  22 
3 Psy  → Com  M  21 
4 Psy  → SS  F  29 
5 SS  → Psy  F  21 
6 SS  → Psy  F  47 
7 SS  → Psy  F  27 
8 Com  → Psy  F  30 
9 Com  → SS  M  31 
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Participants were recruited via a selective email-out (via university administration) to 
students who were currently enrolled and had changed between the three disciplines 
specified (n=48). The email indicated that the research was investigating the reasons 
that people changed between disciplines, and would involve a questionnaire and an 
interview, predicted to take around 30 minutes in total, for which they would receive 
$10.00.1 They were invited to contact the researcher via email if they wanted to 
participate. All those who responded were interviewed.2 The difficulties of email 
recruiting were noted in the method section of Study 3. The low response rate here 
was also influenced by significant delays in administration’s forwarding of the email 
(hence it arrived during a busy period of semester, instead of in the first two weeks, 
as was planned).3 It was also not possible to send a follow-up email.  
 
Materials: The questionnaire was the same as Study 2 (see section 7.2 and Appendix 
XIII). An analogue Dictaphone was used to record the interviews.  
 
Procedure: All data was collected during August and September, 2004. Participants 
were informed that they would be asked to complete a questionnaire and that the 
interview, to discuss their reasons for changing degrees, would be tape recorded. 
After they had finished the questionnaire, participants were invited to “tell me why 
you changed degrees”. Other focus questions (which were not mentioned in all 
interviews) asked about why participants chose their original degree, whether the 
participants considered job opportunities when enrolling in their original degree, 
whether they thought that the students within the former and current degrees were 
different from each other and whether they felt that they fitted better within their 
new degree. The researcher prompted participants at some points when they 
                                                 
1Most were surprised when the reward was offered and only two indicated remembering about it; it 
seemed to create goodwill towards the researcher, rather than act as an incentive to participate. Most 
indicated an interest in the research itself, hence the discussions after the interviews. 
2 Two participants, both from psychology, were known to the researcher, who had previously taught 
them within the School.   
3 The administration was initially very busy instituting new procedures after the Howard Government’s 
changes to the education system, primarily involving more mechanisms for data gathering, and were 
under a lot of pressure at the time.   
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mentioned elements of fit, or other interesting aspects of their reason for changing, 
usually by repeating or summarising what the participant had previously said or by 
using non-verbal encouragement (e.g. “mm hm”, smiling), but tried not to be too 
directive (see Appendix XXV for full transcripts). Interviews had no time limit and 
w e r e  e n d e d  w h e n  t h e y  s e e m e d  t o  c o m e  t o  a  n a t u r a l  c o n c l u s i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  
participants and researcher often continued talking after the tape had ended; 
generally debriefing about the research. Students received their reward of $10.00 
before leaving.  
Analysis: Quantitative analysis of the questionnaire data proceeded as in previous 
sections. Qualitative analysis of interviews was guided by the approach of 
interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). Generally, IPA is concerned with 
understanding how individuals understand their lived experience and how they make 
sense of it, while acknowledging the dynamic nature of the research process, in that 
the interests and concerns of the investigator influence the analysis (e.g., Jarman, 
Smith & Walsh, 1997; Smith, Osborn & Flowers, 1997). Each transcript was read 
through repeatedly and sections relevant to students’ reasons for choosing their 
initial discipline and changing to another were noted. Other interesting issues raised, 
or clearly common themes, were also identified. Statements indicative of each of the 
major themes are presented (in Section 9.3.2) to illustrate these.  
 
 
9.3 ANALYSIS 
 
Participants represented a small sample of what was, admittedly, a small group 
within the university. The sample was predominately female, but covered a wide age 
range. Three participants were essentially school-leavers (P2, P3 and P5). P4, P6 and 
P9 all had children. P1, P4 and P6 were not seeking careers as a result of their 
university study, although the others were.   
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Most had not spent much time in their rejected discipline before they had changed. 
P3 and P6 withdrew very early in their first semester, while P2, P4 and P9 only 
completed one semester. P5 and P7 had only enrolled in their first degree (both 
sociology) because they missed the cut-off for the degree they wanted (both 
psychology). Both P6 and P9 had big gaps between when they started their first 
degree and when they began the subsequent one. P1 and P8 were much further into 
their respective degrees (with P8 completing a commerce degree) before they 
changed. Participants generally indicated that they did not enjoy their original 
degree, but were much more interested and enthusiastic about their current 
discipline. Some felt that their original degree was not what they had expected (P1 
and P2), while others felt that there was no future in it (P4) or had ended up there by 
accident rather than choice (P3, P5, P6, P7 and P9). 
 
As expected, participants did indicate that they felt more comfortable in their new 
discipline, primarily as it met their “interests”. However, there was no specific 
acknowledgement of lack of ideological fit. This may have been because the notion of 
interests was partly a representation of implicit ideological beliefs (certainly the two 
would be expected to be related), or because students simply did not recognise 
ideological content, explicitly or implicitly, within the disciplines. However, there 
were some mentions of ‘worldview’ style mismatches, between the way the 
participants saw the world and the way disciplines constructed it, which obviously 
would link to values and beliefs (which are integral parts of the way people construct 
their own worlds).  
 
Some participants did indicate that their former discipline did not provide the 
employment opportunities they desired, however, the valuing of instrumental over 
intrinsic goals would itself be an aspect of people’s worldviews. Those whose primary 
aim was employment may simply not be a good ideological fit with some social  
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science disciplines, such as sociology, while those whose occupational focus includes 
high financial rewards would not fit with psychology, where the aim is often on 
helping people. The two participants who cited having a tertiary education itself as a 
personal goal in the written section on why they came to university had both 
transferred into the social sciences from psychology, suggesting more intrinsic aims.  
 
Much of the participants’ responses echoed earlier findings with regard to why people 
attended university and why they chose their degree. Again, interest and employment 
opportunities, as already indicated, were crucial. Other explanations for which 
further evidence was found included acting as a role model for one’s children and 
avoiding the negative consequences (status, economic etc.) of not having attained a 
university degree.   
 
Overall, there was some evidence of individual participants being closer to their 
current, rather than former, discipline on the sociopolitical attitudes considered. 
Results tended to be more consistent on the ideological variables than the wealth and 
poverty explanations, as had been found in the previous studies. The only commerce 
student was much more negative towards alleviating poverty than the other 
participants, rejecting all three plans. With regard to the future financial expectations 
item, those who left psychology were found to have the highest aspirations, while 
those who changed into it had the lowest. This suggested that those focused on 
financial goals found a lack of fit with psychology, while those who flourished had 
other aims; primarily (based on this and other evidence) to help people. This also 
s e e m e d  t o  b e  l i n k e d  t o  c u r r e n t  s u b j e c t i v e  s o c i a l  c l a s s ;  t h o s e  w h o  l e f t  p s y c h o l o g y  
tended to rate themselves lower than those who transferred in.  
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9.3.1 QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS  
 
9.3.1.a Sociopolitical attitudes scales 
Overall, as Table 9.2 demonstrates, the mean values on each of the sociopolitical 
attitudes were relatively close to the sample from Study 2 (see Section 7.3.2.a, for 
details of scales). Obviously, there were issues of normality with such a small sample, 
but skew was reasonable in most cases; although half the measures had large kurtosis 
scores (see Appendix XXVI). The largest difference was on individualistic wealth, 
which may be explained by the higher numbers of psychology students in this 
sample; they tended to score higher on IW in comparison to social science students in 
previous studies (although not significantly in Study 2).   
 
TABLE 9.2: Mean scores on sociopolitical attitudes scales 
compared to Study 2 
 
STUDY 4 
MEAN 
STUDY 2    
 MEAN  Psychology Social  Science  Commerce
IW 3.63  3.26  3.28  3.05 3.46 
SW 3.80  3.57  3.58  3.72  3.47 
IP 2.94  2.91  2.81  2.73  3.15 
SP 3.30  3.39  3.42  3.64 3.20 
LS 3.37  3.40  3.47  3.60 3.19 
RS 2.61  2.76  2.69  2.41 3.09 
CS 2.86  2.93  2.83  2.65 3.30 
SG 5.78  5.51  5.65  6.18 4.76 
 
Breaking down the scores by disciplines changed to and from (keeping in mind the 
very small samples), some interesting findings can be seen. Those who changed from 
sociology to psychology (P2, P5, P6 and P7) generally showed greater preference for 
individualistic explanations, and were more right-wing and conservative, than both 
the social science and psychology samples from Study 2 (see Table 9.3). They were 
also more favourably disposed towards conservative than liberal social groups. This 
clearly indicated a lack of fit with the attitudes of most social science students. The  
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results for those who moved in the opposite direction though were more mixed; with 
P1 showing more extreme scores in the liberal/left direction (except on the wealth 
scales; generally the most extreme in the sample), which also suggested that he had 
made the right decision. The other participant (P4) showed less consistency, scoring 
low on most scales, except the wealth explanations, which were both quite high.  
 
The other three participants were the only examples of their particular change 
between disciplines. The student who moved from psychology to commerce (P3) also 
showed more extreme scores (conservative/right direction) on most measures, which 
was particularly noticeable on the ideological scales and systemic explanations for 
poverty. The student who changed from commerce to psychology (P8) showed more 
positive responses to almost all scales, which indicated a likely “agreeability” bias. 
The results for the student who changed from commerce to the social sciences (P9) 
were more mixed; however, there was more extremity in the left/liberal direction on 
the ideological measures, including social group ratings.  
 
TABLE 9.3: Individual and mean sociopolitical attitudes scores by 
change of discipline 
 
S→ P  P→ S  P→ C C→ P  C→ S   
2 5  6  7  Mean  1 4  3  8  9 
MEAN 
IW 3.0  3.5  2.8 4.2  3.38 3.3 4.0  4.0 4.3 3.5  3.63 
SW 3.9  3.6  4.0  3.2  3.80 4.2 4.2  3.2 4.1 3.1  3.80 
IP 3.8  3.3  3.8  3.2  3.54 1.8 2.5  2.5 3.8 1.7  2.94 
SP 3.7  2.3  3.3  2.8  3.04 5.0 2.2  2.8 4.2 3.3  3.30 
LS 3.4  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.10 4.6 3.6  2.8 3.2 3.7  3.37 
RS 2.2  3.7  1.2  4.0  2.81 1.7 2.5  3.2 3.0 1.7  2.61 
CS 2.8  3.8  3.0 2.0  2.92 2.3 2.8  3.5 3.0 2.4  2.86 
SG 5.1  3.6  5.7  6.7  5.30 8.0 5.4  4.6 *  7.0  5.78 
*Not enough responses 
 
 
9.3.1.b Other quantitative variables 
Some of the other variables from the questionnaire were also examined for evidence 
that participants were more like those from one particular discipline than the other 
(see Appendix XXVII for scores). The party identification distribution for the  
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participants was quite different from that seen amongst the earlier sample; four LP, 
two ALP, one GP and two from other parties (P2 and P8; not Australian citizens). 
Interestingly, both the Labor supporters (P1 and P9) had changed into the social 
sciences, while three of the Liberals had changed into disciplines which seemed 
further to the right (two from social science to psychology; P5 and P6, and one from 
psychology to commerce; P3). The other Liberal voter (P4) changed from psychology 
to social science, but did report that both parents were Labor identifiers. She was the 
only participant whose voting preference did not match her mother’s, but she was 
also the oldest, hence furthest from parental influence. Only five participants had 
partners, but all were reported as having matching party identifications.  
 
The subjective economic situation items indicated no clear patterns based on 
discipline.  Four participants indicated that they were currently “scraping by”, three 
were “comfortable” and two were “well-off”.4 Most rated their future highly, with only 
two expecting to be comfortable (P6 and P8, both women), and the rest well-off (P2, 
P3, P4, P5, P9) or wealthy (P1 and P7). Looking at current degree only, those in the 
social sciences (n=3) gave the highest rating of both current and expected situations, 
and ease of employment. One of those who changed out of commerce (into 
psychology; P8) indicated lower financial and employment expectations relative to 
other participants, but there was little difference for the other (P9), who had changed 
into social science. Those currently in psychology (n=5) had the lowest future 
financial and “ease of employment” ratings. In contrast, those who began in 
psychology (P1, P3 and P4) had the highest expectations for the future. This seemed 
to suggest a possible perception of psychology degrees as not helpful for future 
economic or occupational success.  
 
                                                 
4 All four Liberal Party voters (P3, P4, P5 and P6) rated their current financial situations as “scraping 
by”; while the two Labor supporters (P1 and P9) both indicated that they were “well-off”. This may 
indicate different aspirations between the two groups, as to what constitutes a good position financially.  
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With regards to the subjective class scale, participants who were now in psychology 
(P2, P5, P6, P7 and P8) had a comparatively higher mean rating than those from the 
other disciplines (middle-class versus mid-lower class), however, those who began in 
psychology had lower ratings. Overall, the mean status score (3.44) was a little lower 
than previous studies, although participants were also older (age and class had 
previously been found to be negatively related). 
 
Results for the poverty plans were similar to those found previously; guaranteed-
income was most popular, closely followed by guaranteed-jobs, with equal-income a 
distant third (definitely on the opposed side). Four participants were opposed to the 
equal-income plan; the sole commerce student (P3) and three from psychology (P6, 
P 7  a n d  P 8 ) ,  w h i l e  t w o  w e r e  i n  f a v o u r  ( P 1  a n d  P 2 ;  w h o  c o n s i s t e n t l y  f a v o u r e d  o r  
strongly favoured all three plans). The others were undecided (P4, P5 and P9). The 
only participant who opposed all three plans was from commerce (P3), although one 
social science student (P4) was undecided about all (both were previously in 
psychology).  
 
9.3.1.c Open-ended responses 
All of the participants provided a response to the open-ended question of why they 
attended university and why they chose their degree. Both participants who had 
changed from psychology to social science (P1 and P4) indicated that they wanted to 
set an example for their children by attending university (“role model”), and also that 
they wanted to prove to themselves that they could do it (“personal growth/dream”). 
Two participants also disclosed a desire to learn (P6 and P8), accompanied by 
particular interest in their (new) field. Both had changed into psychology, one each 
from commerce and social science.  
 
One other student, who had changed from social science to psychology, only 
mentioned a desire to help people (P7). Another participant (P2) also chose  
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psychology because of a desire to help people (having changed from social science), 
but indicated that she had come to university for financial security (so that she did 
not “have to worry that much about money and be able to give my [unborn] kids 
everything”). P3, P5 and P9 cited employment as their first reason for attending 
university (each had began in, and changed into, a different discipline). P3 also 
mentioned a desire to learn and to be financially secure, as subsequent reasons for 
attending university (changed from psychology to commerce). The other two both 
indicated interest (“passion”) in their new disciplines, with one also wanting to help 
others (not surprisingly, now in psychology). Two other participants (P4 and P7) 
cited “opportunities” as their reasons for choosing their disciplines (both social 
science), which was a departure from previous findings. 
 
9.3.2 INTERVIEW DATA5  
 
9.3.2.a The notion of interest 
The idea of “interest” as the primary motivation for choosing a degree was borne out 
in the interview data, as clearly as in the open-ended responses in Study 2 and 3. 
Having made the decision to attend university, often for employment reasons or 
because of a desire to learn and be educated, the subsequent choice of degree tended 
to be based on what participants found most interesting; what they had a passion for. 
Participants often did not elaborate on what it was about the degree that they found 
more interesting but it did seem to suggest an issue of ‘fit’ between people’s attitudes 
and values, and the content and processes of the discipline they were engaged in. It is 
most likely that both are linked to other aspects of background and worldview; 
however, more specific interviews, following up on these points would be required to 
establish this.6  
 
                                                 
5 In all extracts pauses are noted with -, while … means at least three words have been removed. 
6 These were only meant to be exploratory interviews; in hindsight following up on what interest meant 
seems like a very good idea.  
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P3 changed out of psychology within a few weeks of starting and returned the 
following year to do a commerce degree. He never really planned to do psychology, 
choosing it because his partner at the time was also doing it, and they withdrew 
together. He chose commerce because: 
 
  “I think that’s the way my mind is geared, um, is towards business.  
And it’s a lot of where I’m interested, a lot of my interests lie. But  
having said that I, I do, I really like the psychological aspect. I’m  
doing marketing management so when it comes to things like  
advertising and promotions and things like that and why people,  
the intention and motivations behind why people buy or why they  
act in a certain manner, um, it really interests me. So I’ve done like  
consumer behaviour units and stuff like that, so, I still do have an  
interest in psychology, and I think you can’t look at, you can’t do  
marketing without that” (P3, P→ C) 
 
His response was indicative of a choice which reflected his worldview, and that this 
corresponded to his interests. It also conveyed the close link between commerce and 
psychology (also seen in the popularity of these two as double majors). P3 clearly 
showed, at several points during the interview, how much he enjoyed commerce, 
particularly his specialty of marketing, even pointing out that he had considered 
doing a minor in marketing when first enrolled in psychology.  
 
P5 also indicated the role of interest in relation to background. Her younger sister has 
Down’s Syndrome and being around psychologists and other specialists from an early 
age had encouraged her to choose psychology (it was always her first choice but her 
marks were not high enough for entry initially).  
 
  “I’ve seen a lot of work that, not just from psychs, but from speechies  
and physiotherapies and all that, that have come through our house  
and our lives since she was born. And she’s five years younger than    
me, so I already had, I was five years old, so I was starting to get clued     
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into stuff when I was five, you know about stuff that was going on…And, 
y’know, all the different testing, and then hearing about these things from 
Mum in the background and all that. So I started to get interested, and  
then, when I was coming towards the end of high school, and y’know,  
picking your subjects and all that ‘hoo hah’, I was actually starting to get 
interested in my sister  and her behaviour at home…” (P5, S→P) 
 
These experiences, combined with knowledge from her degree, also influenced where 
P5 (a fourth year student) wanted to work in the future. While originally planning on 
developmental or school psychology, she was about to begin a full-time position at an 
agency which specialised in helping the disabled to acquire and maintain 
employment. While she had never intended to remain in sociology anyway, P5 found 
the discipline quite alienated from the way she thought about the goal of education 
particularly (reflecting the greater focus on occupational aims among younger 
students especially). 
 
  “This is just one step I have to take to get where I want to get to. 
I can’t get certain jobs unless I’ve got this degree, that’s how I kind 
of look at it. Whereas I think a lot of people were there, in the  
classes that I was in, because they just wanted to discuss the world 
and the nature of life and all this other ‘hoo hah’. And I was just  
sitting there going, “okay, I can’t see where the practical side of this  
is, for me, y’know”.” (P5, S→P) 
 
 
P6, who enrolled in a sociology degree, but dropped out before starting, felt that a lot 
of things in her life had contributed to her ending up in a psychology degree. She had 
spent twenty years as a nurse, before and after her children were born, and then, after 
abandoning sociology, she trained and worked as a teacher’s assistant, but implied 
that she felt herself drawn back to psychology. The fact that her contact with ‘mental 
illness’ led to a desire to find out more about it, rather than just assuming that it was 
a common part of life, suggested that there may have been an implicit link to her 
values and worldview.   
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  “…I had always had an interest in psychology, um, in that sort of  
area. I had a mother who was very depressed and had some  
problems when I was growing up. Um, and I think, y’know, I felt I had  
a fairly good understanding of depression…And um, along with that  
I had a neighbour who, um had bipolar disorder and I knew her very  
well and I’ve seen her over the years, sort of have, y’know acute 
episodes…there was a lot of things maintained that interest that I had.  
I also had a sister that did her psychiatric training. Um, and I worked  
as a secretary on a part-time basis for a psychiatrist…” (P6, S→P) 
 
Other participants also cited enjoyment of their current discipline. P8 indicated 
“psychology now is basically an interest, a passion”. P9, who found commerce boring 
and returned to university later, said that “It can be a lot of fun if you’re studying 
something you enjoy and politics is a passion so- No there was no thought of coming 
back and finishing commerce”. P1 changed from psychology, which he was 
dissatisfied with, to history: “I’ve just loved it and I’ve sort of swapped over almost 
straight away”.  
 
Clearly, the finding that interest was a key reason in determining people’s choice of 
degree, and their satisfaction with that choice, reaffirmed the results from the 
previous studies. In some cases there was evidence which linked this to worldviews 
and life events; however, this was generally not explicitly identified by the 
participants. It was likely that the totality of people’s values and beliefs, both created 
and reinforced by their life experiences, led to particular choices regarding degrees, 
which match the way that the specific discipline selected explained and engaged with 
the world. As such, it would seem that in order to be successful within a discipline, to 
persist, people must choose one within which they fit, rather than adapting to an 
ideologically foreign environment. Hence, this conclusion supports the self-selection 
rather than socialisation hypotheses.   
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9.3.2.b Failure of discipline to meet expectations 
Several participants described how the first discipline they enrolled in failed to meet 
their expectations, usually in terms of content. Generally, it would be expected that 
this would be the main reason why students leave a degree. It was probably also 
related in interest, in so far as they thought that their interests would be met by the 
discipline, but once they started they discovered it was not what they had expected. 
Clearly, this is a major issue for universities, not only in terms of loss of enrolled 
students but also the loss of students whose interests would have been fulfilled by 
that discipline, if they had known more about its true nature. As such, it seems 
critical for universities to address this issue, particularly within psychology, which 
seems to frequently have a problem of being misrepresented in the ‘real world’. 
 
P1 switched from psychology to history after becoming dissatisfied with the nature of 
study within the discipline. He was interested in the “human” side of psychology, 
such as counselling, and disliked the research-based, “scientific” side, primarily the 
statistics. Like many students who come into psychology, he assumed it would be 
about therapy. P1 indicated that he felt that much of the promotional material for 
psychology generally was misleading, in terms of not mentioning the statistical 
aspects of the degree.  
 
  “Well, what I thought- the perception of what I thought psychology  
was to the reality of what Murdoch psychology is was completely 
different. I wanted to do, and I would still like to do the counselling  
type of psychology.” (P1, P→ S) 
 
  “…it wasn’t really explained to me properly when I, when you get  
the book and read the book…I looked at the psychology and it  
looked good; the social psych, the cultural psych, um, and this  
sort of stuff. And that sort of introduced, interested me. But, there  
wasn’t enough emphasis on the fact that there is a lot of, a LOT  
of maths in there, y’know. And uh, not being a math person I   
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found it really hard to find help.” (P1, P→ S) 
 
He also talks further about the difficulties he had with statistical aspects of 
psychology and how this did not match his expectations of what psychology would be. 
He had envisaged psychology as more of a humanities type discipline than a science. 
He goes on to talk about attending other universities to do counselling-based 
psychology, and while these would be less likely to involve statistics at the post-
graduate level, all undergraduate courses require proficiency in statistics to graduate. 
 
  “Um, I like psychology. However, uhhh, I find doing research  
psychology is not what I want to do psychology for. I want to do  
counselling psychology. And I find that Murdoch University is a very  
much research-based psychology. There’s so much statistics. Um,  
and I’m not a math person, I don’t like maths at all…Um, and I failed  
a stats- just number two twice, um, and after that I just gave up, I just  
didn’t like it at all. Um, although I really enjoy the psychology, like the  
cultural psychology and um, the counselling course I thought was  
really good, I enjoyed that. But, it wasn’t going the way I wanted it to  
go... And to do the counselling course I’ve got to go to Edith Cowan  
and it’s just, just too far away. But I thought Cutin sorry, it’s too far  
away. So, um, I sort of made a choice. I was given a, I was actually  
going to give up- um, and just pull out, but I thought “give History a  
go”, and that was my second option…” (P1, P→ S) 
 
“Um, so, I’ve sort of thought about, um, oh, Notre Dame does psych,  
but they don’t do any stats psych. And so I’m sort of thinking about  
heading down that way, just to finish off the degree, ‘cause I only had 
four subjects to go to finish off the degree.” (P1, P→ S) 
 
I t  s e e m s  a s  t h o u g h  P 1 ’ s  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a b o u t  w h a t  p s y c h o l o g y  i n v o l v e d  w e r e  
unrealistic. It may be that psychology as a  d i s c i p l i n e  n e e d s  t o  w o r k  h a r d e r  t o  
represent itself more as “research” than “therapy” based to potential students, in 
order to resolve issues of dissatisfaction and drop-out.  
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P2 found the experience of learning sociology did not match her expectations. She 
suspected that she actually confused sociology with social psychology, which she had 
done at high school, in Sweden. Once she began taking psychology units she found 
them to be much more “fun”, and therefore a better fit with her interests.  
 
  “Well, I enrolled in sociology. But when I started it was totally different 
  from what I expected. It was a lot about the history, to start with, and 
  like all the theories and not so much about, um, I thought it would be 
  more like psychology. More about people in society and how it works.  
And, ah, second of all, the language was really, really hard…So then,  
yeah, since you, like, sociology and psychology is quite close, I was  
doing a couple of psychology units and they were, like, much more fun. 
So, yeah, I decided that it would suit me better and I would enjoy it,  
instead of being, like, struggling with everything…” (P2, S→ P)  
 
When asked to elaborate on what it was that attracted her to psychology over 
sociology, P2 offered explanations relating to the focus of the disciplines. Psychology 
was seen as less broad and more about individuals (with prompting from the 
interviewer), although P2 indicated that she preferred social psychology, for its 
recognition of both the individual and society.  
 
“‘Cause I wanted more about people and, and, how can you say, like  
learn more about people in….”  
(Interviewer) “More, kind of, individual, rather than looking at…” 
“…At the whole picture, yeah. So, I guess, that’s why, and, yeah, I  
just- But I think the combination of, like, like, social psychology, 
that’s really good. That’s so much fun…So that’s what I like more, 
the social psychology. But yes, I wouldn’t be able to do, like, just  
one. Like, both in the mixture, that’s really good and it makes sense” 
(P2, S→ P) 
 
When asked about “the mixture” she referred to, P2 indicated that this meant the 
relationship between the individual and society, rather than just focusing on social 
forces, as sociology tended to. She also again mentioned how much more she enjoyed  
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psychology, particularly social psychology (which was described as “fun” four times 
during the interview). This also provided further evidence of the importance of 
interest, which would presumably be linked to enjoyment of the subject matter.  
 
  “Like, talking about the person as an individual and in society. And  
as, like you work as, the way you work. In groups or, you know, in  
with the workplace. In different situations. And I think that’s more 
what I expected, to have more of that. Of course it, it wouldn’t be 
like, as much but, yeah. And I find that more fun.” (P2, S→ P)  
 
P8 was an unusual case among the participants as she had already completed her first 
degree and had returned to do another because she was not satisfied with the career 
she had attained (accountant). While she cited “passion” as her reason for choosing 
psychology, P8 chose her first degree to please her family (she is Singaporean) and 
provide financial security, but she found that this left her unsatisfied.  
 
  “Okay, um, my first degree is basically an avenue for me to earn  
  enough and to make sure that my family is comfortable. So that’s  
really something I select on practical reasons. You know, and I  
guess at that point in time I wasn’t sure what I like and y’know,  
just get something basic…I think I have a little bit of an intention to  
do something to help people, but the intention is not strong enough 
and the passion is not there yet. I was just floating along trying to find  
something that I liked to do and stuff like that and the idea of being 
able to help others, actually strengthened as I grow older and  
experience more things I guess.” (P8, C→P) 
 
 
It was surprising that more evidence was not found in support of a mismatch between 
content of discipline and students’ expectations. This was most likely because most of 
the participants did not spend very long within their new discipline before they 
changed, or they planned to change all along. The following section elaborates further 
on some of the threads visible here, whereby participants who found sociology too  
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broad or “big-picture” focused, or too discussion (not ‘fact’) based, found psychology 
worked much better for them. Unfortunately there were no participants who changed 
in the reverse direction but they would have been interesting to consider, in terms of 
whether they found psychology too narrow, and not attentive enough to large scale 
social forces.    
 
9.3.2.c Differences between sociology and psychology  
Apart from the differences in perceived occupational opportunities (discussed in the 
next section), several participants besides P2 discussed what made the two 
disciplines different, and why students seemed to be differentially attracted to the 
two.7 Generally, participants believed that understanding sociology required more life 
experience, hence its attraction for older students. It also tended to be more 
discussion and idea based, rather than ‘fact’-based, as psychology was. School-leavers 
m a y  h a v e  s t r u g g l e d  w i t h  t h i s  b e c a u s e  t h e y  h a d  b e e n  s o  s o c i a l i s e d  t o  t h e  “ d o  n o t  
question” style of education that they had received for so long, while older students 
would have experienced a much longer gap between secondary and tertiary education 
(although the education system would have changed significantly over the years).  
 
P5 had enrolled in sociology only after missing out on a place in psychology, with the 
intention of transferring at the first opportunity. While she had never really wanted 
to do sociology anyway, she found that the discipline really did not match her way of 
thinking. She also felt that other sociology students were more focused on learning 
about the world or discussing it, while she was more attuned to attending university 
in order to attain employment.  
 
  “I mean the sociology was just not me anyway, it wasn’t, I learnt  
some stuff in it, but I can’t say I enjoyed it…I really hated the, it was  
really, um what’s the word, it’s like I was pondering my navel all 
                                                 
7 The majority of participants had moved in and out of psychology, hence there were more findings 
related to it than to the other disciplines.  
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the time and trying to, I just felt like I was, I dunno- it was…” 
(Interviewer) “It’s more abstract?” 
“Yeah, It was something that I’d come fresh out of high school, I 
wouldn’t know anything about the world, I was not at that level 
yet, y’know. And I’m still not at that level. It would take a good  
five years of me out there in the wide world learning about life 
before I could come back and actually sit down and pay attention 
in class…” (P5, S→P) 
 
P7 was in the same situation as P5. She explicitly discussed differences between 
psychology and sociology, in terms of both students and content, but also in their 
conceptualisation of the world. The second extract below was P7’s response to what 
exactly the differences were between the disciplines, following almost directly on 
from the first extract. The third extract follows on from that (also see Appendix XXV).   
  
“Yeah, they were more mature-aged students in Sociology. Um,  
people were a lot more flexible, um, they were nice. Not that  
Psychology people aren’t nice, but, um, they were definitely different.  
Yeah, um, I’m not sure why. I guess it’s just like; it’s a different way  
of thinking.” (P7, S→ P) 
 
“Um, well it’s just a different discipline. I mean, I suppose the  
assignments are different, the way that the, like the lectures are  
different. Um- it’s a lot broader. Well, actually no it’s not, take that  
back…I suppose just because they’re different disciplines, then  
you’ve got to treat, like they’re treated in different ways. Um, one’s  
not better over the other, it’s just that that’s the way that one was  
teached, taught, because, um- Like Psychology is more disciplined,  
I guess, you’ve got to do things a certain way, whereas Sociology  
you don’t.” (P7, S→ P) 
 
“Okay, in Psychology, the content, I find you’ve got to, you can’t  
really express your own opinion it’s more you’ve got to find the  
research to back up what you want to say, whereas you can’t find 
anything new. Um, sociology, you do have your own opinions and 
you just need, um, you have to back up what you say, but it’s, you  
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still, you have your own opinions. Yeah.” (P7, S→ P) 
 
    
Two participants cited particular language difficulties with sociology. They felt that 
understanding the concepts was beyond them, when they did not even know what the 
words meant. Again this may have been due to age, although it is difficult to know. 
 
  “Sociology was just a huge battle for me to try and understand, 
  like all the [post?] modernist thought and, uh, I dunno, I can’t 
  even remember it y’know. That’s me, and I just used to sit there 
  going “uuuhhh” like in class…Psych just seemed more, a little 
  more scientific, a little bit more, y’know, “here’s some facts”.”  
(P5, S→ P) 
 
“…the language it was really, really hard. It’s like the text, 
everything, it’s so difficult to understand, and since my English 
was really not that good back then, when I tried to read the 
text, it would take me forever and I just felt that it wasn’t  
something I was enjoying while I was doing it.” (P2, S→ P) 
 
The responses of these three participants in particular (P2, P5 and P7) seem to 
convey the sense of sociology as more ‘idea-based’, while psychology tended to be 
more ‘fact-based’. All three found that difficult to cope with and were much happier 
with psychology (which two had aimed for anyway). They were also younger than 
most of the other participants and were perhaps still reflecting the socialisation into 
education they had received at primary and secondary school, where something is 
either right or wrong (‘facts’). Sociology as a discipline seemed to represent a more 
flexible (post-modernist even) approach that focused more on discussion and 
informed opinion. Psychology, especially at the undergraduate level, mostly 
concentrated on “evidence”, which for those not predisposed to, or encouraged to 
engage in, critical thinking probably seemed like “facts”; hence this discipline would 
be more compatible with the experiences of recent school leavers.  
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9.3.2.d Issues of employability and opportunities 
Participants criticised both sociology and psychology in terms of the job 
opportunities they envisaged arising from these degrees. The people who offered such 
critiques may have chosen the discipline initially for other reasons, and may not have 
considered the employment implications at first. In most cases this issue seemed to 
be the key to why these specific participants had changed degrees.  
 
Both P5 and P7 had only enrolled in sociology as a means of transferring into 
psychology, after they each failed to gain entry. While they had always intended to 
leave, and therefore, their positions may not reflect the way other students who 
initially wanted to do sociology may feel, P7’s comment in particular succinctly 
indicated a criticism that others also levelled at sociology. P5 also showed evidence of 
the tendency to regard a degree’s value in terms of the instrumental function of 
opening up employment opportunities.  
 
  “I felt as though sociology, you could be an academic or you could  
  be a researcher, but there wasn’t really an opportunity in the same 
  way…I just didn’t see it as though it was leading anywhere, like that  
I could get a job in” (P7, S→ P) 
 
“I just couldn’t see where sociology fit in with any job. Like I couldn’t, 
I, I was at Uni for a job, not just to learn stuff and enrich my brain or 
whatever other people come here to do. I’m here because I’m trying 
this is one step towards my career, y’know. I’m, it’s a very systematic 
sort of thing, how I’m looking at it. This is just one step I have to take 
to get to where I want to get to” (P5, S→ P) 
 
While P5 and P7 saw psychology as providing employment opportunities which 
sociology did not, P4 and P3 felt that psychology could not give them the chances that 
they wanted. P4 had no immediate plans for employment, as she currently had two  
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“ m i d - p r i m a r y  s c h o o l  a g e ”  c h i l d r e n  w h o m  s h e  f e l t  s h o u l d  h a v e  t e r t i a r y  e d u c a t e d  
parents. P3 was most interested in getting himself “established” (a house, family, 
f i n a n c i a l  s e c u r i t y  e t c . ),  s o  t h e  t i m e  r e q u i r e d  t o  a t t a i n  a  c a r e e r  i n  p s y c h o l o g y  ( t h e  
necessity of a post-graduate degree) was an issue for him.  
 
 “ It’s just that, um, to tell you the truth, there’s not- I did- I couldn’t  
see, like, a huge range of jobs for me if I completed a psychology  
degree.” (P4, P→S) 
 
“…now that I come to think of it, the ah, the fact that I was looking  
at six to eight years before I was practising, um, in Psychology, as  
well. And um, I just wanted to, also, get out and set a foundation  
early in my life, so I can start having a house and everything like that,  
and just, getting ready for a family early. Um, and just, ah, yeah, that  
was a big priority of mine…” (P3, P→C) 
 
These findings again reinforce those found earlier, in terms of the value some 
students place on instrumental goals, such as employment, and others on intrinsic 
ones, such as a desire to expand one’s knowledge and learn new things. While not 
explicitly linked to ideological beliefs, the goals people value would clearly be integral 
to their worldviews, and as such, the differences between those who chose different 
disciplines may reflect ideological fit. The following section notes further confirming 
evidence for some other common explanations found in response to the open-ended 
questions about university attendance and degree selection from Study 2 and 3.  
 
9.3.2.e Other explanations corresponding to previous studies 
Several participants also echoed previous findings with their identification of helping 
people as a key component in choosing psychology. While this reason could 
presumably apply to other social sciences, it seems particularly popular among those 
who want to be psychologists. This is most likely because the relationship between 
helping and the (perceived) nature of psychology are very explicit and direct, whereas  
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for most other social sciences helping others is mediated through changing the 
external (social, political, environmental) aspects of their world in some way.  
 
All four of the extracts below were in response to questioning about what those in 
psychology wanted to do with their degrees. Interestingly, P4, who changed out of 
psychology, did not mention wanting to help people when explaining why she 
originally chose her degree. P1, who also left psychology, talked about how he wanted 
to focus more on the “human” side, in terms of counselling, but he did not indicate 
why he was interested in counselling itself (although presumably it was a desire to 
help others, reinforced by his current plans to become a secondary History teacher). 
 
  “Well I always, until now, I always wanted to work with people in  
the future, working them. But, er, helping them, not working them 
(LAUGHTER) But then, I still haven’t decided. I just, when I started, 
I just wanted to end my degree. I knew that I wanted to do something 
that would help someone. So, I’m not sure what, but, yeah, I just, it 
could be anything.” (P2, S→P) 
 
  “But I think with Psychology, y’know, it does have um, a broad 
  application, um, but I, I suppose an underlying theme is that 
y’know, you’re generally helping people.” (P6, S→P) 
 
“Um, I like to do community service and I like to work in hospital, 
um, dealing with emotions and those things. Yeah, and eventually 
I hope to set up a home for the homeless. Yeah, so I think 
Psychology helps a lot” (P8, C→P) 
 
“Um, I originally wanted to do it to help people. Um, yeah like I 
just thought I had something to offer to people. So that’s why 
I wanted- And psych is the obvious choice for like- “ (P7, S→P) 
 
 
Both P4 and P3 also drew on explanations for their degrees which were found in 
previous studies in response to the open-ended questions about attending university.  
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As noted earlier, even on the questionnaire P4 identified the importance of being a 
role model for her children, in terms of attaining a university education.  
 
  “Um, mainly, well one of the reasons was to finish your degree,  
because we couldn’t see telling our sons “You need to finish your 
degree”, because in, by the time they’re at, sort of um you know, 
work age they’re going to need to have qualifications. We couldn’t 
see, it seemed hypocritical to say, “You have to do a degree” and  
not have one myself, and me, my husband’s completed his, but 
we couldn’t, it seemed hypocritical, we couldn’t do that so- “  
(P4, P→ S) 
 
P3 draws most explicitly on the instrumental value of a degree, in that it provided 
access to a higher level of the job market, and therefore bestowed greater financial 
security (rewards). However, he also made use of the “avoiding negative effects” 
argument. The reason P3 so strongly desired security seemed to be his own 
problematic family life, to which he alluded several times. When discussing why he 
dropped out initially he indicated: 
 
“And um, yeah, probably a combination of thirteen years straight  
of education, a few family problems, um, and just not knowing  
exactly what I wanted to do. I thought, “I’ll just take a year out”,  
and, ah yeah, just, sort of, re-establish exactly where I want to be  
and, um yeah, when I came back, I had a much better idea about  
what would be more suitable for me.” (P3, P→C) 
 
Also, following on from the earlier extract, when he talked about leaving psychology 
because he did not want to spend too long in education:  
  
“I’ll probably be doing masters within the next couple of years. Um,  
so I definitely do want to study but I just wanted to set that foundation  
early. Um, just, relating back to my family, it hasn’t been done. I’ve  
just seen some downfalls and I want to overcome that and not make  
the same mistakes, or, go the same path.” (P3, P→C)  
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9.3.3 WHY DO PEOPLE CHOOSE THEIR DISCIPLINE? 
 
The evidence in this section seemed to further confirm the findings from previous 
studies about why people chose to attend university and why they chose their specific 
degrees. Employability and job opportunities were key themes within the interviews, 
along with interest, just as they were in Studies 2 and 3. While these factors explain 
the way students see tertiary education itself, they do not necessarily help elucidate 
why they change disciplines. Generally, it seemed that if they cannot see how their 
priorities (interest, employment opportunities etc.) were being met by their specific 
degree then they will change. The issue of interest may best be met by first, 
investigating what this means to students, but even without this step, disciplines 
should try to portray an accurate representation of themselves to the public, to avoid 
clashes of expectations. With regard to employment, disciplines may need to work to 
make explicitly clear to students what their future careers might be, and what they 
need to do to attain them.  
 
Alternatively, it may be the case that for a discipline like sociology employment is 
simply not a focus, and those students who are geared towards such instrumental 
goals, rather than a desire to learn, would not be appropriate for that area of study; it 
would not interest them anyway. However, psychology and commerce, both of which 
have much larger enrolments, also tend to be more applied and instrumental in focus, 
so naturally they attract students whose interests are consistent with these positions. 
The key difference between the two, based on the kinds of explanations participants 
provided in Study 2, 3 and 4, was that those in psychology have a desire to help 
people, and to understand them, within their occupation, whereas commerce  
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students were only interested in understanding people in so far as it would allow 
them to profit from such knowledge (e.g., sell them more).8  
 
9.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The interview data presented here clearly has limitations. It did not cover the full 
range of change-types between the three disciplines, it was limited to only those 
disciplines and important issues (in hindsight) arising from the interviews were not 
followed up on within that context. However, the interviews were meant to be 
exploratory in nature and they did serve to confirm many of the findings from 
previous studies, as well as allowing for elaboration of some of the reasoning behind 
these explanations. Ultimately, the interview data contained numerous echoes of 
previous findings, which adds to their validity. Most valuable was the explication of 
differences between the disciplines in terms of the types of explanations people 
favoured; such patterns, already evident, became clearer and more intricate, to the 
point where they allow for conclusions about what it is in the nature of the disciplines 
themselves which may be attracting people with different worldviews, as well as 
acting to reinforce and perpetuate students’ constructions of their world.   
 
While little direct evidence was found in support of the notion of a lack of ideological 
fit, it may be necessary to position ideological values within an overarching worldview 
which also determines such things as interests and goals (which would clearly also 
feed back into each other). Determining causality here, as with much of human 
thought and behaviour, is virtually impossible (despite the views of some) because it 
is all embedded within such as intricate social context. Ultimately the question 
becomes what determines people’s “worldviews”, when that is understood as people’s 
overarching construction of the world. Clearly, socialising agents (the family, peers, 
                                                 
8 Clearly these are gross generalizations, but the focus is on determining whether there are consistent 
differences in worldview between students in different academic disciplines.  
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institutions, society as a whole) need to be considered in order to really understand 
why people choose to do what they do, both generally and within the context of 
tertiary education.   
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10. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
10.1 OVERVIEW 
 
10.1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Previous research has suggested that people who attend university are likely to 
become more socially liberal (open-minded, tolerant) compared to when they started 
(e.g., Astin, 1979, Feldman & Newcomb, 1969, Newcomb, 1943/1957; Pascarella & 
T e r e n z i n i,  19 9 1 ) .  H o w e v e r ,  s o m e  pa s t  f i ndings did not support these conclusions, 
leading to the possibility that tertiary education may differentially affect those in 
different academic disciplines (e.g., Baer & Lambert, 1982; 1990; Guimond and 
colleagues 1990; 1996). Disciplines are obviously attuned to divergent issues and 
topics, and use contrasting methods of learning and research; they convey different 
worldviews. Two main mechanisms have been proposed to explain how these 
differences among students develop: self-selection, whereby students chose the 
discipline whose ideological orientation matches their pre-existing beliefs (e.g., Ladd 
& Lipset, 1972); or socialisation, whereby students develop attitudes in line with 
those espoused by the discipline they chose (e.g. Guimond and colleagues 1990; 
1996). A third possibility would be accentuation, whereby initial differences are 
intensified by students’ experiences within their academic discipline. The latter 
interactional effect logically seems the most likely explanation, because it recognises 
that students’ pre-existing worldviews influence their initial choice, but that they 
could also be altered by what was learnt during higher education.  
 
Findings in the area of belief systems, particularly their structure and constraint, also 
suggested differences among students, but this time at different levels of their degree,  
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r a t h e r  t h a n  i n  d i f f e r e n t  a r e a s  o f  s t u d y. Among community samples, those who 
demonstrated more consistent and coherent belief systems often had higher levels of 
education and were more politically sophisticated. This was primarily believed to be 
due to education’s effect on abstract and critical thinking skills. As such, greater 
consistency of beliefs and values was expected among those who had been studying at 
university for longer. A belief system, or worldview, encompasses many aspects, 
including political, social and economic attitudes, policy preferences, attitudes 
toward different social groups, and ways of explaining social phenomena. In order to 
examine systemic change in belief systems related to university study, measures of all 
these elements of worldview were considered. However, these variables were by no 
means an exhaustive measure of all aspects of worldview. 
 
It was generally expected that there would be significant differences in the kinds of 
values, explanations for social phenomena and favourability ratings of different social 
groups provided by students in different academic disciplines. The primary discipline 
groups compared were commerce and the social sciences, as past research had 
indicated that they showed the greatest differences in beliefs and values. It was 
expected that social science students would be more liberal and left-wing, like ‘liberal’ 
social groups more, and favour systemic explanations for poverty and wealth, 
compared to those from other academic disciplines. In contrast, it was predicted that 
commerce students would prefer right-wing and conservative values, favour 
‘conservative’ groups, and endorse individualistic explanations for poverty and 
wealth, more than those from other disciplines.  
 
A number of possibilities were tested to determine how these expected differences 
between academic disciplines could have come about. The socialisation hypothesis 
predicted that those at higher levels of their undergraduate degree (i.e., 3rd-years) 
would show greater endorsement of the relative sociopolitical attitudes than those 
who had just begun their degree (i.e., 1st-years). The self-selection hypothesis led to  
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the expectation that the value differences found between disciplines would be equally 
evident at all years of degree. The accentuation hypothesis predicted an interactional 
effect, such that there would be differences among 1st-year students in different 
academic disciplines but that these would be greater among those who had been in 
the discipline longer.   
 
10.1.2 METHOD 
 
A variety of attitudes and beliefs were measured, although similar measures had 
previously found differences between academic disciplines and between those with 
d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  o f  e d u c a t i o n .  T h e  m a i n  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e s ,  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  t h e  
sociopolitical attitudes, included separate system and person-blame measures for 
explaining both poverty and wealth, both social (liberal-conservative) and econ0mic 
(left-right) political ideology measures and ‘feeling thermometer’-style ratings of 
social groups (including both ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ groups). As well as 
determining discipline and year of current university degree, numerous other 
variables (background variables, such as parents’ levels of education, demographic 
variables, such as sex and age, and subjective variables, such as expectations about 
future financial situation) were also assessed to ascertain their impact on discipline, 
and the sociopolitical attitudes and other variables.  
 
Four correlational studies were conducted, based around essentially the same format. 
Study 1 was primarily exploratory and provided an assessment of the questionnaire, 
as well as investigating the main hypotheses. Study 2 was designed to overcome some 
of the shortcomings of Study 1, especially issues with the questionnaire and the 
sample size, as well as addressing the primary hypotheses. Following on from the 
previous studies, Study 3 investigated support for the sociopolitical attitudes among 
recent graduates. Finally, Study 4 involved students who had switched between the 
three main discipline areas investigated by the previous studies (social sciences,  
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psychology and commerce), in order to elucidate differences between the disciplines, 
primarily in terms of why students were attracted to one initially but then switched to 
another.  
 
All four studies were cross-sectional and used (slightly altered versions of) the same 
questionnaire, with the fourth study also involving interviews. Analysis was primarily 
quantitative in the first three studies, with some qualitative (content/thematic) 
analyses on open-ended responses to the questionnaires. The fourth study comprised 
primarily interviews, which were also thematically analysed (partly based on previous 
findings), with some examination of quantitative variables.  
 
10.1.3 RESULTS 
 
The results were remarkably similar across each study, and were generally in line 
with predictions. The major finding was that the self-selection hypothesis was clearly 
supported, at the expense of both the socialisation and accentuation hypotheses. 
Significant differences were consistently found across most of the sociopolitical 
attitudes between the most dissonant discipline groups at all undergraduate levels 
(social sciences and commerce), with generally similar patterns for the remaining 
groups too (psychology and ‘others’). No differences were found between year-groups 
within disciplines, in terms of support for specific attitudes or in their internal 
consistency or variability. These differences between disciplines were relative though, 
with most leaning towards left-wing and liberal values, and especially, endorsing 
systemic over individualistic explanations for poverty and wealth.  
 
Other findings, consistent with significant differences in worldview between 
disciplines (and supporting the convergent and divergent validity of the sociopolitical 
attitudes measures), were also revealed. There were, for example, differences based 
on party identification (with Green and Labor voters being more left-wing/liberal),  
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whether participants had received social security (those who had were more left-
wing/liberal) and for participants’ future financial expectations (although 
surprisingly not on explanations for wealth and poverty). These differences were 
closely linked to discipline in expected ways, and none had greater main effects than 
discipline.     
 
There were also discipline differences in terms of students’ reasons for choosing to 
attend university, and for choosing their particular degree. Generally, commerce 
s t u d e n t s  w e r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  c i t e  e x t r i n s i c  r e a s o n s  ( “ e m p l o y m e n t ” ,  “ m o n e y ” )  f o r  
attending university, compared to social science students, who were more likely to 
give intrinsic reasons (“desire to learn”, “personal growth”). These differences were 
relative, however, with the pattern of most to least favoured very similar across 
disciplines. The most favoured reason for choosing their particular degree was clearly 
“interest”, followed by “job-specific” degree (obviously also connected to interest) and 
“opportunities”. The main difference between disciplines was more commerce 
students citing the latter two reasons, and fewer giving the former, compared to both 
social science and psychology majors. However, this was again relative; the only 
major difference in order of reasons for each discipline was the much greater citation 
of “wanting to help others” among psychology students compared to both other major 
discipline groups. However, none of the psychology alumni named this reason 
retrospectively. There were some differences between year groups, which suggested 
that more intrinsic reasons were named early on, with those who had been at 
university for some time more likely to report the more generic “further education” 
response.    
 
Study 3 also included a question asking the alumni participants whether they felt that 
university had changed their beliefs and values. Answers were diverse, although a 
relatively similar pattern was again seen across discipline groups. All cited increased 
“open-mindedness” most often, although social science graduates were more likely to  
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indicate that their “knowledge expanded”, and less likely to cite no change, compared 
to both other groups. Interestingly for the accentuation hypothesis, some 
participants, predominately from the social sciences, indicated that they felt that their 
university experience had served to strengthen their existing values and beliefs. 
While support for this had not been uncovered in the other (admittedly cross-
sectional) studies, this suggested that participants themselves may recognise that 
what they had learnt reinforced their existing belief systems. Clearly, this still 
supported an initial self-selection into discipline, however, the measures and 
methodology used may not have been able to recognise this accentuation effect. 
 
With regard to the measures used, findings were consistent with previous research in 
these areas. Clear distinctions were made between systemic and individualistic 
explanations for both poverty and wealth, with systemic explanations by far the most 
endorsed overall, consistent with Feather (1974). Also, economic and social issues 
were found to form separate, though significantly correlated, scales.1 While the social 
issues loaded on one scale (conservatism), the economic issues separated into two 
scales (left and right). Although they were negatively related, the left and right items 
used did not create a unidimensional factor.  
 
The social groups factor, which consisted of favourability ratings of different groups, 
was the most reliable and consistent in distinguishing between different groups 
within the sample of all the scales. The performance of the social groups measure 
suggested that the majority of the participants may match Campbell and colleagues 
(1960) ‘group-interests’ level of political sophistication. At this level, people consider 
political, social and economic issues in terms of the groups which are most associated 
with that issue, rather than explicitly in terms of their overarching ideological belief-
systems (as those at the top level of ideologue do; Converse, 1964). However, little 
                                                 
1A PCA with all 18 ideological items yielded the same three factors as the two separate PCAs in Study 
1 and 2, although the right-wing factor was much weaker in Study 1.   
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evidence was found to indicate that constraint was greater among those at higher 
levels of their degree, expect possibly postgraduates. Only slightly more consistency 
was found between alumni, which failed to support previous findings. It may be the 
case, however, that the participants were still significantly more sophisticated than 
the general population, as no direct comparison was made.  
 
 
10.2 REASONS FOR NOT FINDING CHANGES 
 
One possible reason for the lack of evidence for differences between students at 
different stages of their undergraduate degrees could be the inadequacy of the 
measures used. However, the measures did effectively distinguish between those in 
different disciplines, even after graduation. There was evidence among the recent 
graduate sample that participants felt that they had become more open-minded and 
tolerant as a result of attending university, although the social conservatism scale was 
really the only one to tap that kind of value explicitly. The other issue was the use of 
cross-sectional design, so that differences, not changes per se, were examined.2 As 
such, it was possible that significant changes may occur over the period of the degree, 
but that these were simply not able to be discovered without a longitudinal study. 
Even if this were the case though, there were still large initial differences, which were 
found at all levels of the undergraduate degree, suggesting that self-selection was 
crucial. If socialisation does take place, it seems likely that it would correspond to the 
accentuation hypothesis, whereby initial beliefs and values are reinforced.  
 
This leads to the issue of why these results are inconsistent with those found 
previously with regard to socialisation (Guimond and colleagues, 1990, 1996). Firstly, 
                                                 
2 It was not possible to track students over a three-year degree, given the recently introduced much 
stricter time limits on PhD research, although in hindsight one-year follow-ups would have been 
valuable.  
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it may be a cultural issue. No research of this kind based on Australian university 
students was uncovered. The comparability of these findings with those from North 
America seems clear; however, there may be key differences in the development of 
sociopolitical attitudes, as a result of social, educational and political differences 
between the societies. Feather (1974) reported that Australians favoured systemic 
explanations for poverty over individualistic ones, in contrast to Feagin’s (1972) 
results with an American sample. However, Feather’s research was conducted over 
30 years ago, before most of the current research participants were born. It may have 
been that Australian society was more socially liberal (and certainly more 
economically left at the time than U.S. society), and this may still be the case today. 
For example, one of the major differences between the U.S. and Australia (and much 
of the rest of the Western world) is the role of religion in society; non-American 
nations tend to be much more secular, with Australians generally believing religion to 
be a personal, private matter, not something to be proclaimed openly.   
 
The tendency to find evidence of change over year groups in the past may have been a 
generational or cohort effect. Much of the research which supported this finding (of 
increased liberalism, tolerance etc) was conducted at a time when these values were 
changing in the wider community as well (1930s: Newcomb, 1943/1957; 1960s-70s: 
e.g., Astin, 1970; Feldman & Newcomb, 1969; Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991). The 
American samples would have been more homogenous than the current ones, given 
the time period. Even though these data were gathered from one university, there was 
likely to be more variety among the students, in terms of socioeconomic status, age 
and ethnicity, than comparable past research samples.  
 
There are also vast differences between the Australian and U.S. higher education 
systems, and even larger ones when compared to the 1960s (and the 1930s, in the 
case of the Bennington studies). While there is some stratification of universities in 
Australia, it is much less than in the U.S., and the vast majority of universities are  
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publicly owned. Tertiary education in Australia still largely draws on the middle- and 
upper-class; nevertheless, more children from lower income families have access, due 
to income support payments and a deferred fees system (rather than relying on loans 
or scholarships to pay up-front fees, as in the U.S.). There are also more non-school 
leaver students, who would be more likely to attend two-year community colleges, 
rather than four-year universities, in the U.S. This diversity in age and background 
among Australian students may mean less socialisation pressure to develop 
homogenous beliefs and values as a result of university attendance.  
 
The heterogeneity of the student population would be particularly accentuated by the 
difference in living arrangements of students in Australia. Most Australian students, 
even school-leavers, chose universities close to their homes, with few heading to 
other states (except for particular courses), due to all tertiary education institutions 
being roughly equal and offering most of the same courses. As a result, there is less of 
a need for on-campus student accommodation, except for international and some 
regional and rural students. However, many students who begin in on-campus 
housing subsequently move into the private rental market, although often residing 
with other students. This is in contrast to American universities where students are 
predominately school-leavers who reside on or close to campus, particularly in 
‘university-towns’, which are also common in the U.K. In these environments there is 
more opportunity to interact with other students outside of classes and to be 
socialised into a student culture; therefore the development of more homogenous 
belief systems seems more likely (although this does not necessarily account for the 
difference between disciplines).   
 
Also, Murdoch University pays special attention to providing access to non-school 
leavers, who would have been rare among undergraduate samples in previous 
research about ‘the effects of college’. Older students would obviously be more likely 
to have firmly established their sociopolitical attitudes before attending university,  
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and may also be more likely to recognise which academic disciplines were most 
consistent with their pre-existing value and beliefs. They would also be more likely to 
choose disciplines consistent with their current occupations, as indicated by those 
participants who wanted to ‘get qualified’ through higher education, compounding 
the initial occupational self-selection (or conversely, they may use higher education to 
get away from a current occupation which did not match their worldview). The 
presence of older students in the sample may have obscured differences; however, 
analysis of those aged under versus over 25 years in Study 2 found no year-group 
differences, only discipline main effects.     
 
There may also be issues to do with university culture, with students not only self-
selecting into a discipline but also a particular university. Cheung and Kwok (1998) 
failed to find evidence of decreased authoritarianism, nationalism or traditional sex-
role beliefs among college students in China and Hong Kong, where the culture 
supported these beliefs. The culture of Murdoch University is regarded as relatively 
‘liberal’, with explicit emphasis on issues o f  s o c i a l  j u s t i c e .  W h i l e  m e a s u r e s  o f  t h e  
c a u s e s  o f  p o v e r t y  a n d  w e a l t h  t a p  t h i s  issue to a certain extent, perhaps other 
measures of inequality and differential attitudes towards different social groups may 
have yielded greater evidence of socialisation, for instance measures of 
ethnocentrism, tolerance, racism or sexism. Certainly greater open-mindedness and 
tolerance were key self-reported changes, retrospectively, by Murdoch University 
graduates in Study 3.  
 
It is also the case that students may have the opportunity to develop more elaborate 
and integrated belief systems now, prior to attending university. While universities 
have always attracted the most literate members of society, people now are likely to 
be more knowledgeable generally than in the past. Since the 1960s, when most of the 
college student belief system studies were performed, high school curricula have 
advanced, aided by increased technology, leading to students with wider, and also  
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more applied, knowledge. Advanced technology, particularly the ‘information super-
highway’ (World Wide Web) means students can have access to information from all 
over the world, in far less time than it would have taken to access it in the past. The 
media also provides access to far more information than past generations were 
exposed to, allowing students to have knowledge of national and international 
political, social and economic issues and events with little effort. Television-viewing 
has been found to affect political knowledge (Bourdon, 1992), and those who grew up 
in the Western world in the 1980s and 1990s have had virtually universal access to 
t h i s  m e d i u m .  C o m p a r e d  t o  p r e v i o u s  g e n e r a t i o n s ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  c r o p  o f  u n i v e r s i t y  
students may just be far more politically sophisticated and have already developed 
cohesive worldviews, which give rise to their sociopolitical attitudes, and also 
determine their interests and motivations.  
 
Students may also be less open to change generally. This could be because they have 
already developed a coherent worldview, but it may also be a change in attitude 
toward tertiary education and the world of work. Newcomb (1943/1957) reported that 
those students least invested in the college community, due to greater personal 
involvement with family or other outside interests, were the least likely to exhibit 
changes in social attitudes. Students now are much more likely to have 
responsibilities outside study, particularly work. Many report at least one extrinsic 
reason for attending university, mostly employment. A university degree has come to 
b e  s e e n  a s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  u p w a r d  m o b i l i t y ,  w i t h  p a r e n t s  i n  a l l  i n c o m e  g r o u p s  
(particularly lower-middle and above) pushing young people to obtain professions 
rather than trades. This has partly been a result of the significant job losses sustained 
following the 1987 stock market crash and the subsequent early 1990s recession. The 
increased vocationalisation of higher education can be seen in the loss of many 
programmes, particularly in the humanities (such as the classics and languages), 
which were not perceived as leading to work. There has also been a subsequent 
greater focus on applied disciplines (such as commerce) and on making study in  
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other areas more applied, with recognisable ‘graduate outcomes’. All of this means 
that students may be less open to expanding their knowledge and learning about 
those who are different from them, and more focused on gaining a ‘higher education’ 
which will lead to employment and a middle-class lifestyle. Of course, academics have 
been complaining since the expansion of higher education began post-WWII about 
the vocationalistic attitudes of students, so this may have always been an issue (e.g., 
Halsey & Trow, 1971; Marginson, 1997).  
 
 
10.3 THEORETICAL AND REAL-LIFE IMPLICATIONS 
 
There are some theoretical implications of these findings. The predominance of the 
self-selection hypothesis, should it be confirmed by further longitudinal  research, 
may suggest that young people, or at least those who attend university, develop more 
sophisticated belief systems at earlier ages than in the past. Researchers in this area, 
and developmental theorists, may need to adjust their ideas about the period in 
which young people’s beliefs are susceptible to greatest influence (the 
‘impressionable years’ hypothesis). Of course, it may be that those who are more 
intelligent have crystallised worldviews sooner than those who are not destined for 
university. In either case, this is an issue which needs to be examined further.  
 
The need to investigate the nature of the belief systems of the mass public in greater 
depth is also clear. The nature of the construct of ideological beliefs is still 
ambiguous, with social and economic beliefs loading on separate factors, but only 
liberal-conservative values being unidimensional (although all were related to each 
other in expected ways). Further and more precise investigation of political 
sophistication among the public and university students should also be considered.  
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The results of these studies have implications at the individual, institutional and 
societal level. For individuals, it seems that university will not lead to the 
development of a ‘philosophy of life’; it will build on their pre-existing values and 
beliefs, provided they make the right discipl in e  c hoice  (w hic h m os t s ee m  t o hav e  
done). However, differences between disciplines were relative, rather than absolute, 
such that most favoured left-wing/liberal values and groups, and especially, systemic 
explanations more than individualistic ones.  
 
This may reflect Australian values and beliefs generally, or it may be a feature of only 
those with (or destined for) higher education. It may be that the people most likely to 
attend university are also most inclined towards post-materialist values, such as 
open-mindedness and tolerance, and this is reflected in the responses to the 
sociopolitical attitudes measures. Egerton (2002) found that young people who went 
on to complete a university degree were significantly more engaged within organised 
community activities, most notably civic groups, compared to those who did not. This 
added further support to the idea that distinctions in value systems, and behaviours, 
are evident between those who pursue tertiary education and those who do not. There 
certainly seems to be no need to fear that students will be ‘brainwashed’ by either 
radical lecturers or militant fellow students, unless they already agree with the values 
these others espouse. 
 
The idea that people self-select into situations which support their existing 
worldviews has long been recognised; Newcomb and colleagues (1967) cited the 
social environment of graduates as key in whether they still held the same 
sociopolitical beliefs as when they graduated from Bennington College. Given this, at 
the institutional level, universities need to ensure that they are attracting the kind of 
students whose values match those of the institution. Even more critical, students 
who match the values of the specific disciplines need to be focussed on when 
recruiting. As such, it is necessary for different disciplines to present an accurate  
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picture of what they represent to potential recruits, to ensure they do not miss those 
who would do well or, correspondingly, end up with those whose worldviews conflict 
with those of the discipline. However, it seems that the intangible notion of ‘interest’ 
functions relatively well in ensuring students find the right discipline for their 
worldview, especially as it would clearly be related to other elements of their belief 
systems, such as values and attitudes.  
 
The idea that students’ worldviews are not significantly altered by attending 
university would most likely sit uncomfortably with many academics who feel that 
their job involves opening people’s minds to new knowledge and experiences. These 
would be expected to affect the way the students understand the world. If it is simply 
the case that students are not open to these appeals, it may be disheartening and feel 
pointless. In any case, it seems somewhat unlikely that people could be exposed to an 
environment for at least three years, yet experience no change. It seems most likely 
that academics are ‘preaching to the converted’; providing students with knowledge 
that strengthens their existing beliefs. 
 
Finally, at the societal level, these results suggest that more consideration should be 
given to people’s disciplinary choices; the way attention is currently paid to 
occupation, in helping to understand their likely worldview. However, given that the 
two are inextricably linked (and the support for the self-selection hypothesis further 
confirms this is likely) this is probably already well recognised. In truth, the general 
slightly left/liberal lean from even the commerce students seems to be a positive 
finding, particularly in light of the many alumni who reported greater open-
mindedness and tolerance as a result of attending university. If this greater 
acceptance of others who are different from themselves persists after graduation and 
into working life, then the more people who attend university, the more harmonious 
society should (in theory) become. The development of greater open-mindedness and 
tolerance (social liberalism) has, of course, been the major finding with regard to  
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change among higher education students since Newcomb’s first Bennington study in 
the 1930s.  
 
 
10.4 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 
The most obvious starting point for future research would be a longitudinal study 
involving university students from different academic disciplines. This would allow 
researchers to identify whether individual students’ sociopolitical attitudes were in 
fact changed by their university experience. Ideally, there would be several testing 
points, in order to see whether any changes that did occur were steady or occurred at 
particular points, and postgraduate students would also be included (although 
analysed as a distinct group). Also, other sociopolitical attitudes could also be 
assessed, such as tolerance, ethnocentrism or sex-role beliefs, to see if changes 
occurred in these areas, as the results of Study 3 suggested. Research should also 
attempt to assess attitudes relevant to the specific university culture, to determine if 
the broader, institutional level values were impacting on students. For example, at 
Murdoch University measures of adherence to principles of social justice would be 
appropriate, given the emphasis on this issue within the university.   
 
The main difficulty with such a study would be tracking students over their degrees, 
which would have privacy implications and would be time-consuming, at least four 
years, probably longer (with double-majors, honours, degree-switching, part-time 
study, suspensions etc.). The other advantage of a longitudinal study would also be in 
examining students who changed degrees and those who dropped out altogether as 
well (although they would be harder to track). Cross-institutional testing should also 
be conducted, to determine if the results were anomalous as students from only one  
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university were included. Given the findings regarding discipline, self-selection into 
particular universities is also likely to be occurring.    
 
Alternatively, the reasons why students chose to attend university and how they 
chose their degrees could also be further examined. This might best be explored 
through semi-structured interviews, aimed at assessing the notion of worldview as 
the determinant of choices, both within education and with regards to lifestyle (e.g. 
the valuing of money). Such an intangible concept as ‘worldview’ may be better 
assessed through idiosyncratic talk, rather than via questionnaires. There would also 
be important implications of assessing what attracted students to particular academic 
disciplines and whether their expectations were fulfilled.  
 
Other research could focus on senior high school students, examining whether there 
were pre-existing differences between those who chose different majors, and also 
between those who did versus did not go to university (by choice or through missing 
out). This would ideally also be a longitudinal study, in order to see whether those 
who did not go to university changed as they entered adulthood (especially as they 
would be expected to gain independence from their parents earlier than those who 
continued studying). It would also allow for the tracking of those who entered 
university through alternative means a few years later (via TAFE qualifications or the 
STAT tests), either because they had planned to all along or because they decided to 
go later.  
 
High school students’ reasons for choosing to attend university and for selecting their 
degree could also be examined, again with regard to the role of worldview, but also in 
order to see whether disciplines are portraying themselves accurately to potential 
students. Such findings could be critical to reducing drop-out rates and in helping 
disciplines to develop messages that speak to the kinds of people who would be most  
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suited to the particular field of study. This would be advantageous for universities, 
disciplines and students.   
 
At a broader level, it may be necessary for developmental researchers, and those 
generally interested in socialisation issues, to start at the secondary, rather than 
tertiary, level. If sociopolitical orientations are already formed by the time students 
reach university, then the development of these attitudes must be occurring at an 
earlier point, which further research should be able to uncover. There may also be 
differences in development of values and beliefs between those who do compared to 
those who do not attend university, such that the belief systems of non-tertiary bound 
young people may not be as crystallised as their higher achieving counterparts. Such 
a finding would be consistent with theories of political sophistication, but would 
obviously need to be investigated in detail first.  
 
Another alternative avenue for research would be to examine the sociopolitical 
attitudes of academics within the different disciplines. This would provide evidence 
of whether such differences exist, as well as the opportunity to ask faculty whether 
they were aware of ideological differences and how they felt these may affect the 
students within their field of study. Logically, academics would be expected to show 
more extreme versions of the attitudes of undergraduates, as they would be the group 
most clearly integrated into the discipline (Ladd & Lipset, 1972). However, 
counterintuitive results were obtained for commerce postgraduates, in that they were 
closer to the undergraduates of other disciplines than those in their own (more left/ 
liberal/ systemic, less right/ conservative/ individualistic). Students and staff from 
different universities would need to be compared, in case this was an anomaly related 
to the types of people who chose to study (and teach) at Murdoch University.  
 
Another option for future research would be the use of community samples to further 
investigate these issues. This would have the advantage of including people from a  
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broad range of educational levels and areas (although highly educated people would 
be likely to be over sampled, which would not be a disadvantage in this case). This 
would also allow for the examination of the role of occupation, in terms of whether it 
was more influential than discipline after longer periods in the workplace (although 
remaining in a single occupation throughout one’s career has become less common 
than in the past).  
 
A community sample would also allow for the investigation of the structure of 
sociopolitical attitudes in the community, to determine whether there are differences 
between those with differing levels of education. It would also allow for an 
examination of both the wealth and poverty explanations and ideological scales 
specifically, in order to determine the level of support each had within the general 
community. This would allow for greater certainty about the role of culture generally 
in the attitudes and values measured. Both the organisation and content of these 
beliefs would be expected to differ between the student and community samples. 
When addressing the beliefs of those with university level education, the effect of 
financial and social status expectancies (sense of deservingness; Baer & Lambert, 
1990) could also be examined, in terms of how this affects both their sociopolitical 
attitudes and the value they place on higher education itself.  
 
 
 
10.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Overall, the results of this research programme supported the self-selection 
hypothesis, with substantial differences in worldviews between students in different 
academic disciplines from their first weeks of study. There was no direct evidence for 
an accentuation of these differences between disciplines; however, some participants  
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reported that their pre-existing values had been strengthened by their university 
experience. In order to definitively determine whether this was the case a 
longitudinal study, tracking students for at least four years, in the style of Newcomb’s 
original Bennington study, would be necessary. The research did also show support 
for the notion that those with higher education were generally more socially liberal 
and tolerant, with a general left/liberal tilt, particularly in the endorsement of 
systemic over individualistic explanations for poverty and wealth. While some 
students reported becoming more tolerant, the quantitative results suggested that 
they may have been this way from the start of their degree.  
 
There are many issues raised by this research which require further investigation 
before definitive answers can be attained, however, the belief systems of university 
students, and the general public, have received less attention in Australia than other 
nations, particularly the U.S. It is important that the nature of people’s worldviews is 
understood because of the clear influence they have on the way that people think and 
behave. Understanding the reasons why people make certain decisions about all 
aspects of their lives can provide us with avenues to ensure they make decisions 
which do not harm others, which has long been a key motive of social psychology as a 
discipline.    
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APPENDIX I: STUDY 1 QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
 
 
Please complete the following questionnaire. You should be able to 
answer all questions in the space provided. There are no right or 
wrong answers, so just respond truthfully. If you cannot answer a 
question you can write “don’t know”. There is a blank piece of paper 
attached to the back of the questionnaire. Please use this to write any 
comments you have about the questionnaire, including any problems 
you had in completing it and any questions you found ambiguous or 
unpleasant.   
 
Thankyou for your participation in this study. Your help is greatly 
appreciated. 
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PLEASE COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING SECTION. QUESTIONS REQUIRE TICKING 
A BOX OR A WRITTEN RESPONSE. THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS 
AND YOU CAN ANSWER “DON’T KNOW”. 
 
1 .   S e x :         F e m a l e    [     ]    
       M a l e    [     ]  
 
2.  Age  in  years:      ......................................................... 
 
3.  Country  of  birth:      ......................................................... 
 
4.  Ethnicity       …………………………………….. 
 
5. Title of degree currently enrolled in     ......................................................... 
(including double majors and minors):     
       ......................................................... 
  
6. Type of enrolment:         Full-time  [  ]   
       P a r t - t i m e   [     ]  
 
7. Current year of degree:        First       [  ] 
       Second          [    ] 
       T h i r d           [     ]  
       F o u r t h    [     ]  
 
 
8. If this was not your first choice      ......................................................... 
degree, what was?     
       ......................................................... 
 
9. If you have changed degrees since first    ……………………………………. 
enrolling at a university, what was your 
original  degree?      …………………………………….. 
 
10. Father’s highest level of education:    ....................................................….. 
 
11.  Father’s  main  occupation:     ......................................................... 
 
12. Mother’s highest level of education:    ......................................................... 
 
13. Mother’s main occupation:      ......................................................... 
 
14. (If applicable) Romantic partner’s highest  
level  of  education      ......................................................…. 
 
15. Romantic partner’s main occupation    ......................................................... 
  
16. Secondary school you attended:      .........................................................  
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17. Which political party do you usually vote for (or, if you have never voted, are most 
likely to vote for)? 
International students: please use the “other” option 
 
Australian  Labor  Party      [    ] 
Liberal  Party  of  Australia       [    ] 
National  Party  of  Australia       [    ] 
Australian  Democrats        [    ] 
G r e e n s           [     ]  
O n e   N a t i o n          [     ]  
I t   c h a n g e s          [     ]  
Ineligible  to  vote        [    ] 
 
Other:................................................................................................................................ 
 
 
18. Which of the above parties/options do you think the following people usually vote (or 
voted, if deceased) for? 
 
Father..............................................................................................................................….. 
 
Mother............................................................................................................................…… 
 
(If applicable) Romantic partner............................................................................................ 
 
 
19. Do you currently reside with:     
P a r e n t / s /   G u a r d i a n         [     ]  
O t h e r   f a m i l y          [     ]  
Partner (married/ de facto) and/or  children     [    ] 
On campus                 [  ]        
Shared  housing       [    ] 
A l o n e           [     ]  
      
Other:............................................................................................................................... 
 
 
20. Do you spend most of your free time with: 
 
High  school  or  old  friends       [    ] 
W o r k   c o l l e a g u e s         [     ]    
Students from the same course          [  ] 
Students from different c o u r s e s       [     ]  
Your  partner  and/or  children       [    ] 
Other  family  members      [    ] 
A l o n e           [     ]  
 
Other:……………………………………………………………………………………….  
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21 Would your current financial situation be best described as: 
 
P o o r           [     ]  
Scraping  by         [    ] 
C o m f o r t a b l e          [     ]  
W e l l - o f f          [     ]  
V e r y   w e a l t h y          [     ]  
 
22 In ten years time would you expect your financial situation to be best described as: 
 
P o o r           [     ]  
Scraping  by         [    ] 
C o m f o r t a b l e          [     ]  
W e l l - o f f          [     ]  
V e r y   w e a l t h y          [     ]  
 
23. Are you currently in : 
 
Full-time  employment          [    ] 
Part-time  employment          [    ] 
Casual  employment          [    ] 
Not  in  employment          [    ] 
 
If employed, what is your occupation:................................................................................... 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………... 
    
 
23. Are you currently receiving any social security payments?         Yes  [  ]   
         N o   [     ]  
 
 
24. Have you received any social security payments in the past?  Yes  [  ]     
         N o   [     ]  
 
 
26.What was the main reason you came to university? 
     Why did you choose your particular degree/ programme of study? 
 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
 
..........................................................................................................................................  
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27. At what level of weekly net income (after tax) would you consider someone poor if 
they were: 
 
Single?:       $…………………………………… 
 
Supporting a partner and two children?:    $……………………………………. 
 
 
28. At what level of weekly net income (after tax) would you consider someone wealthy 
if they were: 
 
Single?:       $…………………………………… 
 
Supporting a partner and two children?:    $……………………………………. 
 
 
29. In your understanding of the concepts of left- and right-wing, which academic 
disciplines do you think would hold the most: 
 
Right-wing  views?:      ……………………………………… 
 
Left-wing  views?:      ……………………………………… 
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PLEASE INDICATE YOUR LEVEL OF AGREEMENT WITH THE FOLLOWING 
STATEMENTS AS EXPLANATIONS FOR WEALTH: 
 
Strongly disagree      Disagree   Slightly disagree        Slightly agree         Agree      Strongly agree 
      1                      2                               3                             4                         5                           6 
 
 
1. Wealthy people work harder             1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
2. Wealthy people take risks                        1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
3. Wealthy people are naturally more intelligent         1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
4.  Wealth  is  inherited             1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
5. Wealthy people are just lucky            1       2       3       4      5      6   
 
6. Wealthy people use their particular skills         1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
7. Wealthy people have good role models and ‘contacts’      1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
8. Wealthy people are better at managing their money  
(e.g..  saving,  investing)             1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
9. Wealthy people are in the ‘right place at the right time’     1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
10. Wealthy people have drive and perseverance        1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
11. The economic system supports individual entrepreneurs     1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
12. Better education is available to the wealthy         1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
13. Wealthy people are ruthless and determined         1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
14. Government policies make it easier for the wealthy to  
become  wealthier             1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
15. Worldwide economic conditions favour the wealthy       1       2       3       4      5      6 
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PLEASE INDICATE YOUR LEVEL OF AGREEMENT WITH THE FOLLOWING 
STATEMENTS AS EXPLANATIONS FOR POVERTY:  
 
 
Strongly disagree      Disagree   Slightly disagree        Slightly agree         Agree      Strongly agree 
      1                      2                               3                             4                         5                           6 
 
 
1.The  poor  are  lazy             1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
2. The minimum wage is too low           1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
3. The poor lack ability               1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
4. Exploitation of the poor by the rich           1       2       3       4      5      6 
  
5. Unemployment and underemployment among the poor                1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
6. The poor cannot manage their money          1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
7. The poor live in areas with low employment prospects and   
little  infrastructure             1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
8. Worldwide economic problems                                    1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
9. Low levels of education and qualifications among the poor     1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
10. The policies of the present government          1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
11. The policies of previous governments         1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
12. Sickness and physical handicaps among the poor       1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
13. People would rather stay on social security than work     1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
14. The capitalist economic system means that there  
have to be some people who are on the bottom                    1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
15. The poor are unable to sustain employment         1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
16. Poor role models within the family (cycle of poverty)       1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
17. The social security system is inadequate         1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
18. Limited educational opportunities for the poor       1       2       3       4      5      6 
 
19. The poor are unlucky                        1       2       3       4      5      6  
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PLEASE INDICATE THE STRENGTH OF YOUR AGREEMENT WITH EACH OF THE 
FOLLOWING STATEMENTS: 
 
Strongly disagree      Disagree   Slightly disagree        Slightly agree         Agree      Strongly agree 
      1                      2                               3                             4                         5                           6 
 
1. There is one law for the rich and another for the poor         1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
2. Individuals should take care of themselves and          1      2      3     4      5        6 
not rely on the government                     
 
3. The government should redistribute income from rich to poor       1      2      3     4      5        6 
             
4. The government should not act to control the economy                  1      2      3     4      5        6  
 
5. Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers                 1      2      3     4      5        6  
    
6. The government should private ownership of all 
businesses and industries                1      2      3     4      5        6                    
                   
7. Some people will never succeed even when they are given 
opportunities                  1      2      3     4      5        6 
                      
8. Competition brings out the worst in people           1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
9.The most important thing is for all people to be equal                    1      2      3     4      5        6           
 
10. The most important thing is for all people to be free to 
pursue the lives they want                                             1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
11. Everybody should be allowed to stage protests  
and  demonstrations                        1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
12. People have become too dependent on the welfare state               1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
13. Even extremist groups are entitled to freedom of expression        1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
14. The law should always be obeyed, without exception        1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
15. Any censorship of film, magazines or television is wrong            1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
16. Young people today do not show enough respect for authority     1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
17. The death penalty should never be reintroduced         1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
18. More attention needs to be paid to God in our society                   1      2      3     4      5        6 
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PLEASE INDICATE THE NATURE OF YOUR FEELINGS TOWARDS EACH OF THE 
FOLLOWING GROUPS: 
  
        Very Negative                  Neutral                   Very Positive 
                    
•  Socialists           1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
•   Refugees           1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
•  Labor Party          1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
       
•  Liberal Party           1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
•  Capitalists           1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
•  Unions            1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
•  Self-made millionaires         1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
•  Anti-globalisation protestors       1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
•  Multinational companies       1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
•  Military           1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
•  Aborigines           1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
•  Unemployed           1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
•  One Nation           1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9     10 
 
•   Anti-abortion protestors       1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
•  Creationists           1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9     10 
 
•  Homosexuals           1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
                                                          
 
THANKYOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY. YOUR HELP IS 
GREATLY APPRECIATED.  
IF YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER COMMENTS PLEASE USE THE ATTACHED 
SHEET OF PAPER.  
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APPENDIX II: CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDY 1 SAMPLE 
 
A large quantity of demographic information was collected in order to determine if any 
of these variables could have been influencing responses more than academic discipline. 
Table IIa compares results on numerous variables for the whole sample and the 
discipline subgroups. These data matched reasonably closely with the university 
enrolment statistics. Based on 2002 enrolments (Murdoch University Office of Policy 
and Planning, 2002), 59.4% of all undergraduate students were female, while 59.0% of 
students in the social sciences, 54.3% of those in business and 79.1% of psychology 
students were female.1 Age group percentages were also fairly close to enrolment details. 
Overall, 76.5% of undergraduate students were enrolled fulltime.2 However, the 
percentage of full-time students is less (68.0%) among the social science undergraduates 
and about the same among psychology (74.6%) and commerce (77.9%) students. 
 
TABLE IIa: Comparison of overall demographics with discipline 
subgroups 
   Overall 
(n=223)
Psychology 
(n=59) 
Social 
Sciences 
(n=49) 
Commerce 
(n=59) 
Others 
(n=56) 
Sex   % Female  64.6  79.7  63.3  47.5  67.9 
% 17-20  32.0  40.7  27.7  25.4  33.3 
% 21-25  37.0  27.1  25.5  42.4  51.9 
% 26-35  13.7  18.6  10.6  16.9  7.4 
% 36-45  8.7  10.2  8.5  13.6  1.9 
Age  
%46+ 8.7  3.4  27.7 1.7 5.6 
Australia 55.9  74.6  56.3  57.6  33.9 
Other 
Western 
19.8 11.9  37.5  11.9  21.4 
South east 
Asia 
17.6 8.5  2.1  23.7  33.9 
Country of 
Birth  
Other 6.8  5.1  4.2  6.8 10.8 
Enrolment 
Type 
% Fulltime  83.0  83.1  71.4  83.1  92.9 
First 24.7  32.2  29.2  18.6  19.6 
Second 20.6  15.3  22.9  23.7  21.4 
Third/fourth 47.1  40.7  33.3  57.6  55.4 
Year of 
degree (%) 
Post-grad 7.2  11.9  14.6  0.0  3.6 
                                                 
1 Calculated based on numbers of females vs. males enrolled in BA major of History, Sociology or Politics 
and International studies or Bachelor of Economics (for social sciences), Bachelors of Commerce, 
International Business or Marketing and the Media (for business) and Bachelor of Psychology and BA in 
Psychology (for psychology). Does not include honours level or higher. 
2Based on number of students attending classes on campus; external students were excluded, as they were 
not included in the data collection. 
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Chi-square analyses indicated that the discipline distribution was significantly different 
between males and females, with more males in commerce and fewer in psychology, 
compared to females (see Table IIb). The distribution of disciplines was also significantly 
different when those under 25 years were compared to those aged 25 and above, with 
fewer “other” and more social science students among the older group. Results also 
indicated the same difference in distribution between full- and part-time students (part-
time students more likely to be in social sciences than other degrees), which was not 
surprising given that much research has indicated that older students are more likely to 
study part time (e.g., ABS, 2005a), and that the older students were more likely to be in 
the social sciences.3  
 
TABLE IIb: Chi-square comparisons between discipline sub-groups   
  Expected values  Observed values  Chi-value  df  n 
SEX Females  Males  23.738***  3  79 
AGE  17-24 years  25 years and over  25.388***  3  74 
LOAD Full-time  Part-time 10.632*  3  38 
COUNTRY OF 
BIRTH 
Australia All  others  96.458***  3  98 
 
It was only possible to perform one chi-square analysis on the country of birth data, 
comparing Australian-born students to all others, as the expected values in some cells 
were too small. However, the results indicated a significant difference in distribution 
across disciplines, with overseas born participants much more likely to be enrolled in 
other disciplines, and less likely to be enrolled in psychology, compared to those who 
were Australian born.4 A s i a n - b o r n  s t u d e n t s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  w e r e  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  t h e  
“other” category (mostly media students).   
 
The country of birth differences between disciplines were consistent with expectations. 
Some of the “other western” group were exchange students, only studying abroad for a 
year, however, the majority were born in the Commonwealth countries.5 The 2001 
national census found that 22% of Australia’s population was born overseas. Of these 
                                                 
3 A Chi-square comparing age (five categories) by enrolment type was also highly significant, (
2 X (4) = 
83.57, p<0.001), showing that more part-time enrolments appeared from 26-35 years category, increasing 
with age. This indicated that the differences in enrolment load between disciplines were most likely 
attributable to the age of the students within the disciplines. 
4 There was no question asking about citizenship so it is not known whether those born overseas are 
Australian citizens or permanent residents, although it is probably safe to assume that most of the 21 year+ 
sample were not just on student visas. 
5 Of the 44 other western students, 18 were from the UK, 5 Irish, 7 NZ, 7 South Africans, 4 Germans, 2 
Norwegians and 1 Austrian.  
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43% were born in the UK (1.1 million, 6% of total population), New Zealand (356000, 
2%), Italy (219000, 1%) or Vietnam (155000, 1%) (ABS, 2005b). Most of the older UK-
born immigrants have lived in Australia for a substantial period of time and would not be 
expected to differ much from native-born participants. Many of the South-east Asian 
born participants only came to Australia to undertake their degrees and will generally 
return home (based on student feedback). The majority of these participants were 
undertaking commerce or media/communications degrees. In 2002, Murdoch had 1395 
international students enrolled, from 62 different countries. However, 50% of these were 
from either Singapore (456) or Malaysia (241), which also made up the majority of 
Asian-born participants in the sample (Office of Policy and Planning, 2003).6 
 
Table IIc provides a breakdown of family members’ levels of education7 and mean 
occupational prestige ratings, by discipline (where “1” is the most prestigious and “7” is 
the least prestigious). The occupations of parents, partners and participants were all 
assigned prestige ratings based on Daniel (1983).8 Partners tended to have higher levels 
of education than parents, and parents generally had about the same level of education 
as each other. Fathers had more prestigious occupations than both mothers and 
partners, but this could be due to many partners being students, and therefore not yet 
into their careers. There were few differences across disciplines, with only a significant 
chi-square for partners’ education level, due to other students having more university-
educated partners (most likely other students).  
 
TABLE IIc: Discipline differences in background variables 
   Overall  Psychology  Social 
science 
Commerce Others 
Father (n=213)  34.3  39.7  40.4  32.7  24.5 
Mother (n=221)  41.6  44.1  53.1  39.7  30.9 
% Year 10 or 
less 
Partner 
(n=138) 
8.0 10.0  10.7  10.3  0.0 
Father (n=213)  30.5  24.1  25.5  30.9  41.5 
Mother (n=221)  29.9  23.7  28.6  32.8  34.5 
% university 
by discipline  
Partner 55.8  50.0 60.7  46.2  71.0 
                                                 
6 Of the 39 Asian students: 16 Malaysians, 13 Singaporeans, 4 Hong Kong, 3 Indonesians, 2 Indians and 1 
Chinese. 
7 Only 138 of the 223 participants indicated that they had a “romantic partner”, but of these 36.2% reported 
that their partner was a university student. In these cases level of education was categorised according to 
current level of study (i.e., “Bachelor degree” or “Post-graduate degree”, depending on the information 
provided) and no occupational prestige rating was assigned. 
8The age of this prestige scale probably reduced its usefulness but few alternatives were available. In cases 
where a woman received a lower rating in the same job as a man (e.g., waiter vs. waitress, male vs. female 
solicitor), the higher rating was assigned to both sexes to improve the equity.    
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(n=138) 
            
Father (n=187)  3.83  3.89  3.96  3.86  3.63 
Mother (n=209)  4.50  4.49  4.47  4.64  4.39 
Mean 
Occupational 
Prestige 
Rating 
Partner (n=79)  4.18  4.30  4.19  4.31  3.77 
            
% Participants Employed  57.1  78.0  51.0  50.8  57.1 
 
Analyses indicated no discipline differences in occupational prestige ratings9 and minor 
differences in occupational classifications. There was also a difference between 
disciplines when students who were employed were compared to those who were not in 
p a i d  e m p l o y m e n t .  P s y c h o l o g y  s t u d e n t s  w e r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t h a n  c o m m e r c e  a n d  s o c i a l  
science majors to be employed (see Table IId). 
 
TABLE IId: Chi-square results for discipline comparisons on background 
variables 
  Expected values  Observed values  Chi-value  df  n 
FATHER’S 
EDUCATION 
Non-university University  7.38  3  65 
MOTHER’S 
EDUCATION 
Non-university University  2.79  3  66 
PARTNER’S 
EDUCATION 
Non-university University  14.48**  3  77 
Professional 1.716  3  44  Managerial 
Manufacturing & 
construction 
6.407 3  33 
FATHER’S 
OCCUPATION
10  
Professional Manufacturing  & 
construction 
1.729 3  33 
Professional 1.731  3  55 
Clerical, sales & 
service 
6.610 3  50 
Home duties 
Managerial 11.727**  3  34 
Clerical, sales & 
service 
11.041* 3  50  Professional 
Managerial 12.686**  3  34 
MOTHER’S 
OCCUPATION 
Clerical, sales & 
service 
Managerial 3.244  3  34 
Managerial 4.352  3  27  PARTNER’S 
OCCUPATION 
Student 
Others 8.133*  3  45 
                                                 
9 One-way MANOVA with fathers’, mothers’ and partners’ occupational prestige ratings as DVs: V = 
0.216, F (9, 192) = 1.657, p>0.05 (Box’s M= 23.107, F (18, 10794.887) = 1.168, p>0.05). 
10 Occupation categories included in chi-squares depended on sufficient numbers of cases in cells, hence 
the different categories for each. Differences for mother’s occupational classification were due to more 
professional, and fewer managerial, mothers among the commerce and other participants. The participants 
whose partners were also students were more likely to be from other disciplines, while those whose 
partners had “other” types of occupations were less likely to be from other disciplines. Participants who 
were employed were far more likely to come from psychology, and less likely to come from commerce and 
the social sciences, compared to those who were not in paid employment. 
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PARTICIPANT’S 
OCCUPATION 
Employed Not  employed  17.504***  3  90 
Participants’ perceptions of their current financial situation and expected future 
situation indicated that 49.3% of respondents felt their current situation was 
“comfortable”, while 34.1% said they were “scraping by”. However, in ten years 45.2% 
expected to be comfortable and 51.3% either “well-off” or “very wealthy”. One-way 
ANOVAs indicated that there was a significant difference between disciplines only for 
students’ expected financial situation (F (3, 217) = 9.02, p<0.001) and not for current 
situation (F (3, 219) = 1.28, p>0.05). Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons (see Table IIe) 
indicated that social science students had significantly lower expectations of their 
financial future compared to all three other discipline sub-groups.  
 
TABLE IIe: Bonferroni Post-hoc test results for one-way ANOVA on 
future financial situation 
I  J  Mean difference (I-J) 
Social science  Psychology  0.45** 
 Commerce  -0.72*** 
 Others  -0.47** 
Psychology Commerce  -0.27 
 Others  -0.03 
Commerce Others  0.24 
 
Table IIf provides the results of a further three-way ANOVA of age, sex and discipline. A 
significant main effect was found for discipline only, although there was also an 
interaction of age x discipline. This was determined to be due to older students generally 
having lower expectations, except for those in other disciplines, where expectations were 
higher. Although there was no main effect for sex, Figure IIa indicates that the 
interaction effect may have been sex specific, but the small cell sizes may have prevented 
the three-way interaction from reaching significance.  
 
TABLE IIf: Three-way (2 x 2 x 4) ANOVA results (sex x age x 
discipline) 
 Levene’s  F    df  F-value 
1.566 Sex  1  0.121 
 Age  1  2.109 
 Discipline  3  1.215 
  Sex x age  1  0.061 
  Sex x discipline  3  0.273 
  Age x discipline  3  1.174 
Current 
situation  
(n= 219) 
  Sex x age x discipline  3  1.133 
1.635 Sex  1  0.226 
 Age  1  0.048 
 Discipline  3  8.338*** 
Future 
situation  
(n = 217) 
  Sex x age  1  0.138  
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  Sex x discipline  3  0.881 
  Age x discipline  3  2.828* 
  Sex x age x discipline  3  0.725 
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FIGURE IIa: Mean expected financial situation by age, sex and 
discipline 
 
Of the overall sample, 47.5% had never received social security benefits, now or in the 
past. But when only the Australian-born students were considered (n=124), the amount 
who had never received social security dropped to 35.5%. A chi-square for discipline 
differences was marginally significant (
2 X (3) = 8.92, p<0.05), with those who had not 
e v e r  r e c e i v e d  p a y m e n t s  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  o t h e r  s t u d e n t s ,  a n d  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  s o c i a l  
science or psychology students, compared to those who had received social security 
payments. This was most likely due to the greater number of international students in 
the other group and the higher age of the social science group. Further analyses revealed 
no difference for sex (
2 X (1) = 1.83, p>0.05) but a large difference for age (
2 X (4) = 
39.66, p<0.001), with increasing lifetime prevalence of payments with age, except in the 
oldest group (46+ years, where it dropped again). 
 
TABLE IIg: Differences in having received social security 
 Yes  (%)  n 
Overall   52.47  223 
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Females 50.00  144 
Males 56.96  79 
    
Psychology   57.63  59 
Social science  61.22  49 
Commerce 49.15  59 
Others 42.86  56 
    
17-20 years  40.00  70 
21-25 years  43.21  81 
26-35 years  86.67  30 
36-45 years  78.95  19 
46+ 52.63  19 
 
Table IIh provides information on the party identifications of the participants by 
discipline. Party identification was then classified into five categories: Labor, Liberal 
(including National), Greens, swinging voters and other voters (other Australian and 
international parties). Chi-squares using these categories confirmed the discipline 
differences found in the table; only psychology and the social sciences were not 
significantly different in their party identification distributions. The largest differences 
were between commerce and the other groups, due to the former’s much higher support 
for the Coalition and lower support for Labor and the Greens (see Table IIi).  
 
TABLE IIh: Party identification by discipline 
(%) Overall 
(n=204) 
Psychology 
(n=58) 
Social sciences 
(n=49) 
Commerce 
(n=55) 
Others 
(n=42) 
Labor Party  26.5  31.0  36.7  21.8  14.3 
Liberal Party  25.0  20.7  18.4  38.2  21.4 
Australian 
Democrats 
7.8 13.8  8.2  5.5 2.4 
Greens 15.7  17.2  14.3  1.8  33.3 
One Nation  0.5  0.0  0.0  1.8  0.0 
Swinging voters  11.3  12.1  16.3  7.3  9.5 
Other 9.3  1.7  6.1  12.7  19.0 
Don’t  know 3.9  3.4  0.0 10.9  0.0 
 
TABLE IIi: Chi-square comparisons for party identification 
Expected values  Observed values  Chi-value  df  n 
Psychology Social  science  1.557  4  49 
 Others  10.848*  4  42 
 Commerce  20.234***  4  49 
Social science  Others  19.333***  4  42 
 Commerce  27.429***  4  49 
Others Commerce  28.585***  4  49 
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The reported party identifications of participants’ family members can be seen in Tables 
IIj-IIm. Of the participants who reported a party identification matching the five 
categories used for comparison for both themselves and their father, 53.57% shared the 
same identification. A slightly higher percentage reported the same identification for 
themselves and their mothers (56.47%), and slightly more again reported the same 
preference for themselves and their partner (58.24%). For those cases where 
identifications matching the five categories were reported for both parents (n=166), 
75.90% had matching identifications. 
 
TABLE IIj: Reported party identifications for participant compared to 
father  
 PARTICIPANT 
FATHER Labor  Coalition Greens  Swinging Others  TOTAL 
Labor  35 9  11 6  7  68 
Coalition  10 37 11 8  8  74 
Greens  0 0 2 0 0 2 
Swinging  1 0 0 2 0 3 
Others  2 1 2 2 14  21 
TOTAL  48 47 26 18 29 168 
  
TABLE IIk: Reported party identifications for participant compared 
to mother  
 PARTICIPANT 
MOTHER Labor  Coalition  Greens  Swinging  Others  TOTAL 
Labor  34 9  11 6  4  64 
Coalition  8 36  7 7 8 66 
Greens  1 0 8 0 0 9 
Swinging  3 2 0 2 1 8 
Others  3 0 2 2 16  23 
TOTAL  49 47 28 17 29 170 
 
TABLE IIl: Reported party identifications for participant compared to 
partner  
 PARTICIPANT 
PARTNER Labor  Coalition  Greens  Swinging  Others  TOTAL 
Labor 16  4  2  0  2  24 
Coalition 5  22  3  5  4  39 
Greens 2  0  7  1  2  12 
Swinging 3  4  0  5  0  12 
Others 0  0  1  0  3  4 
TOTAL 26  30  13  11  11  91 
 
TABLE IIm: Reported party identifications for mother compared to 
father  
 FATHER  
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MOTHER Labor  Coalition  Greens  Swinging  Others  TOTAL 
Labor  49  13  0 0 0 62 
Coalition  8 54  0 0 2 64 
Greens  4 1 2 0 1 8 
Swinging  3 2 0 2 1 8 
Others  1 3 0 1 19  24 
TOTAL  65  73  2 3 23  166 
 
Chi-square comparisons were used to determine whether participants’ party 
identification distribution differed significantly from those of other family members (see 
T a b l e  I I n ) .  T h e  e x p e c t e d  v a l u e s  g e n e r a t e d  w e r e  d i f f e r e n t  i n  e a c h  c a s e ,  a s  o n l y  t h o s e  
whose family member also had an appropriate party identification were included. The 
results indicated significant differences for all comparisons, except participant and 
partner. This was largely due to much less minor party support and swing voting among 
parents, although mothers were reported as showing less support for the two major 
parties than fathers were (hence their significant difference). It’s likely that the older the 
students, the less the match between their party identification and those of their parents. 
Conversely, older students would be more likely to report the same identification as their 
partner. 
TABLE IIn: Chi-square results for party identification comparisons 
Expected values  Observed values  Chi-value  df  n 
Participant Father  59.788***  4  171 
 Mother  29.330***  4  170 
 Partner  7.476  4  91 
Mother  Father 9.695* 4  171 
 
Most of the significant differences in background variables were minor. This may have 
been a ceiling effect, in that the majority of university students are from middle- to 
upper-class backgrounds. Their families are most likely supportive of higher education 
and believe it is a means to improve their children’s socioeconomic status. The large 
numbers of mature age students would also have affected the impact of background 
variables. Many have moved away from their family of origin and would be more 
influenced by their own (and their partners’) positions in the socioeconomic structure. 
Most are probably reacting to their place in the social world when they chose to return to 
education. Murdoch University has one of the highest mature-aged (20+ years) intakes 
of the Perth universities. It is also one of the smallest and most flexible, making it 
particularly attractive to those with families and other commitments. 
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APPENDIX III: TEST-RETEST RELIABILITY IN STUDY 1 
 
Test-retest reliability was assessed initially at the item level with two-tailed Pearson’s 
correlations.11 Scores at time one and time two were compared for each attributional, 
ideological and social group item.12 While generally participants gave the same score or 
one point different when tested the second time, the small sample size meant a small 
number of participants who deviated dramatically affected the correlation. However, in 
some cases the inconsistency was more common and these items were removed in 
subsequent analyses.  
 
The ideological items generally showed higher levels of test-retest reliability, as might be 
expected given that values are supposed to be more stable (see Table IIIb). The affective 
ratings of the social groups produced the highest consistency of scores, although this 
may have been impacted by the larger scale used here; more margin for error (see Table 
IIIc). Almost all of the background variables delivered correlations close to perfect (see 
Table IIId). When they did not, it was normally a matter of one or two changing slightly. 
In the case of the party identifications, the switches occurred either to or from the 
“swinging” voter position, hence they were easily explained.  
 
TABLE IIIa: Test-retest reliability correlations for wealth and poverty 
explanations 
 Pearson’s  r 
Wealthy people work harder  0.698*** 
Wealthy people take risks  0.679*** 
Wealthy people are more intelligent  0.752*** 
Wealth is inherited  0.143 
Wealthy people are just lucky  0.476* 
Wealthy people use their particular skills  0.412* 
Wealthy people have good role models and contacts  0.530** 
Wealthy people are better at managing their money  0.548** 
Wealthy people are in the “right place at the right time”  0.647*** 
Wealthy people have drive and perseverance  0.708*** 
The economic system supports individual entrepreneurs  0.633** 
Better education is available to wealthy  0.504** 
Wealthy people are ruthless and determined  0.716*** 
Government policies make it easier for the wealthy to become 
wealthier 
0.778*** 
Worldwide economic conditions favour wealthy   0.563** 
                                                 
11 Caution must be exercised with these results, as, while in the total sample most items had satisfactory 
skew and kurtosis, in the much smaller test-retest sample this was not the case. The test-retest sample was 
all psychology students, which partly accounts for the skew. However, “eyeballing” of the data indicated 
only a few discrepancies.   
12 Test-retest reliabilities for the factors produced via PCA are in Table 6.3, section 6.3.2.  
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The poor are lazy  0.604** 
The minimum wage is too low  0.169 
The poor lack ability  0.441* 
Exploitation of the poor by rich  0.780*** 
Unemployment and underemployment among the poor  0.589** 
The poor cannot manage their money  0.628** 
The poor live in areas of with low employment prospects and little 
infrastructure  
0.290 
Worldwide economic problems  0.524** 
Low levels of education and qualifications among the poor  0.718*** 
The policies of the present government  0.809*** 
The policies of previous governments  0.447* 
Sickness and physical handicaps among the poor  0.484* 
People would rather stay on social security than work  0.600** 
The capitalist economic system means that there have to be 
some people who are on the bottom  
0.550** 
The poor are unable to sustain employment  0.700*** 
Poor role models within the family (cycle of poverty)  0.553** 
The social security system is inadequate  0.788*** 
Limited educational opportunities for the poor  0.547** 
The poor are unlucky  0.527** 
***Significant at p<0.001 
 **Significant at p<0.01 
  *Significant at p<0.05 
 
 
TABLE IIIb: Test-retest reliability correlations for ideological items  
 
 Pearson’s  r 
There is one law for rich and another for poor  0.794*** 
Individuals should take care of themselves and not rely on the 
government 
0.740*** 
Government should redistribute income from rich to poor  0.887*** 
Government should not act to control the economy   0.468* 
Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers  0.524** 
Full private ownership of all businesses and industries  0.637** 
Some people will never succeed even when given opportunities  0.328 
Competition brings out the worst in people  0.820*** 
Most important thing is for all people to be equal  0.742*** 
Most important thing is for all people to be free to pursue the lives 
they want 
0.684*** 
  
Everybody should be allowed to stage protests and 
demonstrations 
0.904*** 
People have become too dependent on the welfare state  0.325 
Even extremist groups are entitled to freedom of expression  0.313 
The law should always be obeyed, without exception  0.842*** 
Any censorship of film, magazines or television is wrong  0.803*** 
Young people today do not show enough respect for authority  0.906*** 
The death penalty should never be reintroduced  0.485* 
More attention needs to be paid to God in our society  0.907*** 
***Significant at p<0.001 
 **Significant at p<0.01 
  *Significant at p<0.05  
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TABLE IIc: Test-retest reliability correlations for Social groups items 
 
 Pearson’s  r 
Socialists 0.696*** 
Refugees 0.771*** 
Labor Party  0.747*** 
Liberal Party  0.905*** 
Capitalists 0.777*** 
Unions 0.480* 
Self-made millionaires  0.802*** 
Anti-globalisation protestors  0.606** 
Multinational companies  0.736*** 
Military 0.770*** 
Aborigines 0.729*** 
Unemployed 0.787*** 
One Nation  0.410* 
Anti-abortion protestors  0.651*** 
Creationists 0.855*** 
Homosexuals 0.749*** 
Socialists 0.696*** 
Refugees 0.771*** 
***Significant at p<0.001 
 **Significant at p<0.01 
  *Significant at p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
TABLE IIId: Test-retest correlations for background variables  
 
 N  r 
Party identification  26  0.935*** 
Father’s party identification  26  0.999*** 
Mother’s party identification  26  0.980*** 
Partner’s party identification  26  0.848*** 
Currently live with  26  0.951*** 
Current financial situation  26  0.917*** 
Expected future financial 
situation 
26 0.913*** 
Type of employment  26  0.959*** 
Current social security 
payments 
26 0.926*** 
Past social security payments  25  1.000*** 
***Significant at p<0.001 
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APPENDIX IV: PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS FOR 
SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES SCALES IN STUDY 1 
 
 
For the attribution items, a three-factor solution was initially specified, in line with past 
research, but a two-factor solution (one individualistic and the other systemic) was more 
appropriate for both wealth and poverty. PCA was also used on the ideological items, to 
determine whether left and right items, and liberal and conservative items, would be 
better treated as unitary or independent scales. For the left and right PCA only the left-
wing items could be combined to produce a reliable scale, although in the liberal and 
conservative PCA all items loaded onto one conservative factor, as liberal items loaded 
negatively. The social group ratings were also combined to create a single scale, with high 
scores indicating more positive ratings of liberal groups, and lower ratings of 
conservative groups.  
 
ATTRIBUTIONS FOR WEALTH ITEMS 
 
In the case of the attributions for wealth the fourteen item,13 two-factor solution 
accounted for 41.35% of the variance within the sample (see Table IVa). The first factor, 
individualistic wealth (IW) accounted for 23.91% of variance, and consisted of six items, 
with high internal (α = 0.79) and test-retest reliabilities (r (24) = 0.81, p<0.001). The 
second factor, systemic wealth (SW) accounted for 17.42% of total variance and consisted 
of eight items (including the two fatalistic ones). It had a slightly lower Cronbach’s alpha 
value (0.70) and correlation coefficient (r (24) = 0.76, p<0.001). The following table 
indicates the loadings within the structure matrix for each item under both the initial 
three-factor, and eventual two-factor, solution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 One item- “wealth is inherited” was excluded due to poor test-retest reliability.  
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TABLE IVa: Structure matrix loadings for PCA for wealth  
 F1  F2  F3    F1  F2 
%Variance Explained  23.911  17.424  9.458    23.91  17.42 
Cronbach’s alpha  0.7375  0.6993  0.7101    0.779  0.699 
            
Wealthy people work harder  0.802       0.710   
Wealthy people take risks  0.770       0.692   
Wealthy people are more intelligent  0.699       0.648   
Wealth is inherited- EXCLUDED            
Wealthy people are just lucky   0.393        0.349 
Wealthy people use their particular skills  0.413  -0.642    0.647   
Wealthy people have good role models 
and contacts 
   -0.638      0.499 
Wealthy people are better at managing 
their money 
   -0.785    0.608   
Wealthy people are in the “right place at 
the right time” 
 0.503        0.522 
Wealthy people have drive and 
perseverance 
0.575  -0.617    0.758   
Economic system supports individual 
entrepreneurs 
 0.474        0.480 
Better education is available to wealthy   0.561        0.576 
Wealthy people are ruthless and 
determined 
0.485 0.512        0.504 
Government policies make it easier for the 
wealthy to become wealthier 
 0.768        0.751 
Worldwide economic conditions favour 
wealthy  
 0.785        0.765 
-Loadings under 0.30 excluded 
 
 
ATTRIBUTIONS FOR POVERTY ITEMS 
 
For the poverty items, fifteen items were included in the two-factor solution, which 
accounted for 43.28% of the total variance (see Table IVb).14 The first factor, 
individualistic poverty (IP) accounted for 26.21% of the variance, and the second factor, 
systemic poverty, explained a further 17.08%. IP contained six items, five individualistic 
and one systemic which loaded negatively (“the social security system is inadequate”), 
and SP included the remaining nine. The test-retest reliabilities were higher for IP than 
SP (r (24) = 0.81, p<0.001; r (24) = 0.74, p<0.001, respectively), as were the internal 
reliabilities (α= 0.78 and 0.74). The following table indicates the loadings within the 
                                                 
14 Two items were excluded due to poor test-retest reliability- “the minimum wage is too low” and “the 
poor live in areas with low employment prospects and little infrastructure”; two other items (both fatalistic) 
were excluded after failing to load above 0.4 on either factor- “sickness and physical handicaps among the 
poor” and “the poor are unlucky”. Neither of the fatalistic items loaded on the third factor of the three-
factor solution either.  
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structure matrix for each item under both the initial three-factor, and eventual two-
factor, solution. 
 
TABLE IVb: Structure matrix loadings for PCA for poverty 
 F1  F2  F3    F1  F2 
%Variance Explained  23.731  15.835  7.333    26.21  17.08 
Cronbach’s alpha  0.760  0.670  0.770    0.782  0.736 
            
The poor are lazy  0.740        0.757   
The minimum wage is too low- 
EXCLUDED 
          
The poor lack ability  0.721        0.723   
Exploitation of the poor by rich    0.321  0.525      0.535 
Unemployment and underemployment 
among poor 
 0.613  0.319     0.580 
The poor cannot manage their money  0.678        0.680   
The poor live in areas of with low 
employment prospects and little 
infrastructure- EXCLUDED 
          
Worldwide economic problems    0.630  0.502      0.706 
Low levels of education and 
qualifications among the poor 
 0.654      0.480 
The policies of the present government      0.855    0.384^  0.612 
The policies of previous governments  -0.316    0.867    0.429^  0.609 
Sickness and physical handicaps 
among the poor 
   0.416^      
People would rather stay on social 
security than work 
0.738      0.677   
The capitalist economic system means 
that some people have to be on the 
bottom  
 0.442  0.422^     0.516 
The poor are unable to sustain 
employment 
0.632      0.591   
Poor role models within the family (cycle 
of poverty) 
 0.690     0.367^  0.503 
The social security system is 
inadequate 
-0.538    0.440  -0.511  0.454 
Limited educational opportunities for the 
poor 
-0.468 0.476  0.397   -0.380^  0.559 
The poor are unlucky    0.329  0.340^      
^Indicates excluded from scale due to impact on internal reliability 
-Loadings under 0.30 excluded 
 
 
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY ITEMS 
 
Left and Right 
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An exploratory PCA of nine left and right items was conducted,15 with a two-factor 
solution, explaining 45.66% of the variance, providing the best fit to the data (see Table 
IVc).16 The first factor comprised the five left items and explained 27.51% of the total 
variance; however, this left scale (LS) only had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.6311. The test-
retest reliability was high though (r (23) = 0.85, p<0.001). The second factor, however, 
only included three right wing items, and only had an internal reliability of 0.45. As such 
it was decided not to include this right factor in the subsequent analyses. The following 
table contains the structure matrix loadings under the two-factor solution and the 
component loadings under the unsuccessful single-factor solution. 
 
TABLE IVc: Structure matrix loadings for PCA for left and right items 
 F1  F2    F1 
% Variance explained  27.51  18.16    27.51 
Cronbach’s alpha  0.631  0.448    0.627 
        
There is one law for rich and another for poor  0.528      0.495 
Individuals should take care of themselves and 
not rely on the government 
-0.371 0.486    -0.466 
Government should redistribute income from rich 
to poor 
0.711     0.655 
Government should not act to control the 
economy  
 0.733     
Big business benefits owners at the expense of 
workers 
0.710     0.707 
Full private ownership of all businesses and 
industries 
 0.814     
Some people never succeed even when given 
opportunities- EXCLUDED 
      
Competition brings out the worst in people  0.651      0.653 
Most important thing is for all people to be equal  0.548      0.504 
Most important thing is for all people to be free to 
pursue the lives they want 
      
 Only factors loading greater than 0.3 included 
 
 
Liberal and Conservative 
 
A second exploratory PCA was used for the eight liberal and conservative items. An 
initial two-factor solution showed evidence of cross-loadings and internal reliabilities 
were poor, so a single-factor solution was used, which included all eight items, the liberal 
                                                 
15 One right item was excluded due to poor test-retest reliability- “some people will never succeed even 
when they are given opportunities”. 
16 A single factor solution was not appropriate; the right items did not load with the left items and internal 
reliability was poor when right items reverse-scored.  
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items loading negatively (see Table IVd). The single-factor solution only explained 
32.88% of the total variance but had good internal (α = 0.70) and strong test-retest 
reliabilities (r (23) = 0.89, p<0.001). The following table contains the structure matrix 
loadings under the initial two-factor solution and the component loadings under the final 
single-factor solution. 
 
TABLE IVd: Structure matrix loadings for PCA for liberal and 
conservative items 
 
 F1  F2    F1 
% Variance explained  32.88  15.30    32.88 
Cronbach’s alpha  0.688  0.579    0.697 
        
Everybody should be allowed to stage protests and 
demonstrations 
-0.491 0.712    -0.698 
People have become too dependent on the welfare 
state 
0.778     0.710 
Even extremist groups are entitled to freedom of 
expression 
 0.764    -0.424 
The law should always be obeyed, without exception  0.699      0.598 
Any censorship of film, magazines or television is 
wrong 
 0.702    -0.443 
Young people today do not show enough respect for 
authority 
0.627     0.528 
The death penalty should never be reintroduced  -0.650      -0.630 
More attention needs to be paid to God in our society  0.432  -0.320    0.479 
 
 
 
SOCIAL GROUP RATINGS 
 
The exploratory PCA for the social group ratings also yielded a single factor solution, 
with six liberal groups loading positively and six conservative groups loading negatively 
(see Table IVe). The remaining four groups did not load on the single-factor solution, 
possibly due to most participants giving neutral responses, some likely due to lack of 
understanding (e.g., creationists). It may have also been due to generally neutral or 
positive responses from almost all (e.g., Labor Party). This twelve item social groups 
scale (SG) had both strong internal (α = 0.85) and test-retest reliabilities (r (25) = 0.90, 
p<0.001). The following table contains the structure matrix loadings under the initial 
two-factor solution and the component loadings under the single-factor solution. 
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TABLE IVe: Structure matrix loadings for PCA for social group 
ratings 
 
 F1  F2    F1 
% Variance explained  30.43  10.56    38.00* 
Cronbach’s alpha  0.838  0.521    0.850 
        
Socialists 0.659      0.612 
Refugees 0.745      0.761 
Labor Party  0.332  0.449     
Liberal Party  -0.628      -0.629 
Capitalists -0.611      -0.610 
Unions 0.474  0.425     
Self-made millionaires  -0.479      -0.479 
Anti-globalisation 
protestors 
0.706     0.702 
Multinational companies  -0.696      -0.741 
Military -0.559      -0.597 
Aborigines 0.635      0.630 
Unemployed 0.583      0.592 
One Nation  -0.437  0.475    -0.511 
Anti-abortion protestors    0.655     
Creationists   0.551     
Homosexuals 0.401  -0.567    0.449 
*with the four non-loading items excluded  
If included, % variance explained=30.43. 
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APPENDIX V: RESULTS OF MANOVAS AND MANCOVAS FOR 
SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES SCALES IN STUDY 1 
 
TWO-WAY (4X3) MANOVA FOR DISCIPLINE BY YEAR 
LEVEL 
 
Univariate analysis 
  Levene’s F test  Mean square  Discipline F-value 
df 14,  192    3 
IW 0.742    1.732  3.413* 
SW 1.004  0.519 1.206 
IP 1.630  5.713  8.747*** 
SP 1.173  2.930  6.317*** 
LS 1.313  3.628  5.145** 
CS 0.744  3.429 5.578*** 
SG 0.964  22.291  19.168*** 
 
Bonferroni post-hoc tests 
  I  J  Mean difference (I-J) 
Social science  0.4953** 
Commerce -0.0851 
Psychology 
Others 0.1602 
Social science  Commerce  -0.5805*** 
 Others  -0.3351 
IW 
Commerce Others  0.2454 
Social science  0.3731 
Commerce -0.5308** 
Psychology 
Others -0.2348 
Social science  Commerce  -0.9038*** 
  Others -0.6078** 
IP 
Commerce Others  0.2960 
Social science  0.1323 
Commerce 0.5202*** 
Psychology 
Others 0.3768* 
Social science  Commerce  0.3879* 
 Others  0.2445 
SP 
Commerce Others  -0.1434 
Social science  0.0956 
Commerce 0.6027*** 
Psychology 
Others 0.3660 
Social science  Commerce  0.5072* 
 Others  0.2705 
LS 
Commerce Others  -0.2367 
Social science  0.1386 
Commerce -0.5588** 
Psychology 
Others -0.3485 
Social science  Commerce  -0.6974*** 
 Others  -0.4871* 
CS 
Commerce Others  0.2103 
Social science  -0.1465  SG  Psychology 
Commerce 1.4725***  
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Others 0.5439 
Social science  Commerce  1.16189*** 
 Others  0.6904* 
Commerce Others  -0.9285*** 
 
 
 
TWO-WAY (5X3) MANOVA FOR PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
AND DISCIPLINE ON SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES 
SCALES 
 
Univariate analysis 
  Levene’s F  Party identification F  Discipline F 
 19,  162  4  3 
IW 0.796  0.521  4.732** 
SW 1.208 5.495***  1.200 
IP 1.232  0.639  7.384*** 
SP 0.853  3.253*  2.710* 
LS 0.852  6.788***  1.669 
CS 1.077  6.174***  3.873** 
SG 1.297  7.562***  10.435*** 
 
Bonferroni post-hoc tests 
  I  J  Mean difference (I-J) 
Coalition 0.4424** 
Greens -0.0549 
Swinging 0.5025* 
Labor 
Other 0.1195 
Greens -0.4973** 
Swinging 0.0601 
Coalition 
Other -0.3229 
Swinging 0.5573*  Greens 
Other 0.1744 
SW 
Swinging Other  -0.3830 
Coalition 0.4356* 
Greens -0.1281 
Swinging 0.3591 
Labor  
Other 0.2112 
Greens -0.5646** 
Swinging -0.0774 
Coalition 
Other -0.2253 
Swinging 0.4872  Greens 
Other 0.3393 
SP 
Swinging Other  -0.1479 
Coalition 0.7171*** 
Greens -0.2760 
Swinging 0.4140 
Labor 
Other 0.1071 
Greens -0.9931*** 
Swinging -0.3031 
LS 
Coalition 
Other -0.6101**  
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Swinging 0.6900  Greens 
Other 0.3831 
Swinging Other  -0.3069 
Coalition -0.8365*** 
Greens 0.0885 
Swinging -0.3518 
Labor 
Other -0.3832 
Greens 0.9250*** 
Swinging 0.4848 
Coalition 
Other 0.4534 
Swinging -0.4402  Greens 
Other -0.4716 
CS 
Swinging   Other  -0.0314 
Coalition 1.2484*** 
Greens -0.4649 
Swinging 0.7146 
Labor 
Other 0.2949 
Greens -1.7133*** 
Swinging -0.5338 
Coalition 
Other -0.9536*** 
Swinging 1.1795**  Greens  
Other 0.7598* 
SG 
Swinging   Other  -0.4198 
 
 
THREE-WAY (4X2X5) MANOVA FOR DISCIPLINE, SEX 
AND AGE ON SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES SCALES 
 
Univariate analysis 
  Levene’s F  Discipline F 
df 34,  169  2 
IW 1.161  1.778 
SW 0.989  1.429 
IP 1.171  8.368*** 
SP 1.221  4.855** 
LS 1.511  7.752*** 
CS 1.646*  7.988*** 
SG 1.754*  18.755*** 
 
 
ONE-WAY MANCOVA FOR DISCIPLINE (WITH FUTURE 
FINANCIAL SITUATION AS A COVARIATE) ON 
SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES 
 
Univariate analysis 
  Levene’s F  Mean Square  Discipline F 
df 3,  202   3 
IW 0.637  2.157 4.276** 
SW 0.686  0.792  1.895 
IP 1.382  5.612 8.631***  
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SP 0.176  2.638  5.485*** 
LS 1.555  3.058 4.438** 
CS 0.521  4.418  6.996*** 
SG 2.409  22.657 19.320*** 
 
 
 
ONE-WAY MANOVA FOR EVER HAVING RECEIVED 
SOCIAL SECURITY  
 
 
Univariate analysis 
  Levene’s F test  Ever received social 
security 
df 1,  206  1 
IW 0.011  2.466 
SW 0.706  6.574* 
IP 0.506  5.982* 
SP 0.433  4.268* 
LS 2.137  6.145* 
CS 0.165  10.549*** 
SG 4.322*  11.305*** 
 
 
 
 
TWO-WAY (4x2) MANOVA FOR DISCIPLINE AND EVER 
HAVING RECEIVED SOCIAL SECURITY ON 
SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES SCALES 
 
 
Univariate analysis 
  Levene’s F  Discipline  Ever received social 
security 
df 7,  200  3  1 
IW 0.664 5.223**  2.954 
SW 0.449  1.617  5.418* 
IP 1.201 9.907***  4.784* 
SP 0.343  5.607***  2.902 
LS 0.668 4.891**  5.717* 
CS 1.391  7.708***  8.743** 
SG 1.802  22.097***  12.043*** 
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APPENDIX VI: VARIANCE AND INTERNAL RELIABILITY FOR EACH 
SCALE BY DISCIPLINE AND YEAR GROUP IN STUDY 1 
 
 
VARIANCE FOR EACH SCALE BY DISCIPLINE AND YEAR 
GROUP 
  
Individualistic Wealth (IW) 
 Psychology  Social  Science  Commerce  Others 
1
st  0.42 0.34 0.66 0.79 
2
nd  0.23 0.61 0.46 0.76 
3
rd/4
th    0.27 0.80 0.40 0.49 
Post-grad  0.59 1.06 n/a  0.16 
 
Systemic Wealth (SW) 
 Psychology  Social  Science  Commerce  Others 
1
st  0.50 0.63 0.21 0.74 
2
nd  0.45 0.49 0.45 0.60 
3
rd/4
th    0.33 0.61 0.26 0.37 
Post-grad  0.72 0.30   0.00 
 
Individualistic Poverty (IP) 
 Psychology  Social  Science  Commerce  Others 
1
st  0.82 0.54 0.77 0.43 
2
nd  0.51 0.39 0.57 1.03 
3
rd/4
th    0.43 0.54 0.80 0.90 
Post-grad  0.48 0.12   0.01 
 
Systemic Poverty (SP) 
 Psychology  Social  Science  Commerce  Others 
1
st  0.58 0.39 0.62 1.03 
2
nd  0.84 0.22 0.53 0.58 
3
rd/4
th    0.28 0.62 0.30 0.49 
Post-grad  0.42 0.84   .00 
 
Left scale (LS) 
 Psychology  Social  Science  Commerce  Others 
1
st  0.90 1.51 0.41 0.49 
2
nd  1.41 1.16 0.36 0.81 
3
rd/4
th    0.46 0.68 0.47 0.78 
Post-grad  1.25 0.66   0.18 
 
Conservative scale (CS) 
 Psychology  Social  Science  Commerce  Others 
1
st  0.67 0.74 0.55 0.59 
2
nd  0.63 0.56 0.79 0.87 
3
rd/4
th    0.59 0.62 0.35 0.66  
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Post-grad  0.55 1.06   0.20 
Social groups (SG) 
 Psychology  Social  Science  Commerce  Others 
1
st  1.02 1.71 1.00 2.66 
2
nd  1.11 1.85 0.54 1.38 
3
rd/4
th    1.05 1.37 0.73 1.33 
Post-grad  1.02 0.99   0.68 
 
 
 
INTERNAL RELIABILITY OF SCALES BY DISCIPLINE AND 
YEAR GROUP 
 
 
Overall Cronbach’s alpha for each scale by discipline 
(n)    Psychology   Social sciences  Commerce  Others 
IW  0.74 (56)  0.82 (46)  0.70 (55)  0.78 (56) 
SW  0.75 (53)  0.77 (46)  0.50 (55)  0.70 (53) 
IP  0.78 (52)  0.65 (47)  0.73 (57)  0.79 (51) 
SP  0.76 (46)  0.72 (44)  0.57 (48)  0.76 (48) 
LS  0.66 (57)  0.78 (45)  0.22 (55)  0.60 (53) 
CS  0.70 (57)  0.65 (45)  0.55 (53)  0.68 (53) 
SG  0.83 (56)  0.87 (48)  0.59 (53)  0.82 (51) 
  
 
IW 
  Psychology  n Social  Science  n Commerce n Others  n 
1
st 0.8302    18  0.4435  14 0.7795  10 0.8093  11
2
nd  0.2766  6 0.8538  9 0.6809  14 0.8093  12
3
rd/4
th   0.6810  23  0.8900  15 0.7050  31 0.7620  31
Post-grad  0.7688  7 0.9445  7 n/a  0 n/a  2 
 
 
SW 
  Psychology  n Social  Science  n Commerce n Others  n 
1
st 0.7522  17  0.7616  13 0.1483  10 0.7818  10
2
nd 0.5336  7  0.7149  11 0.6987  13 0.8492  11
3
rd/4
th   0.7776  22  0.8599  14 0.4488  32 0.5862  30
Post-grad  0.8560  7 0.5345  7 n/a  0 n/a  1 
 
 
IP 
  Psychology  n Social  Science  n Commerce n Others  n 
1
st 0.8318  15  0.7317  14 0.7711  11 0.4407  10
2
nd 0.7006  8  0.6592  11 0.6403  14 0.8051  11
3
rd/4
th   0.7749  23  0.6478  14 0.7506  32 0.8419  28
Post-grad  -0.2978^  6 -0.6759^^  7 n/a  0 n/a  2 
^the normally negatively loading “the social security system is inadequate” loaded positively here  
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^^one items loaded negatively: “the poor are unable to sustain employment” 
 
 
SP 
  Psychology  n Social  Science  n Commerce n Others  n 
1
st 0.7421  15 0.5527  11 0.7117  7  0.8833  10
2
nd 0.7343  6  0.3141  10 0.7233  12  0.7760  10
3
rd/4
th   0.6754  19 0.7598  15 0.3799  29  0.6596  27
Post-grad  0.8059  6 0.8769  7 n/a  0 n/a  1 
 
LS 
  Psychology  n Social  Science  n Commerce n Others  n 
1
st 0.6146  19 0.9095  12 0.4142  10  0.2015  10
2
nd 0.7136  8  0.8067  11 0.2505  14  0.6886  12
3
rd/4
th   0.5776  23 0.6685  14 0.1068  31  0.6549  29
Post-grad  0.8346  7 0.6250  7 n/a  0 n/a  2 
 
 
CS 
  Psychology  n Social  Science  n Commerce n Others  n 
1
st 0.6758  19 0.6969  14 0.4982  9  0.5520  10
2
nd 0.6184  8  0.4509  10 0.7465  13  0.7933  11
3
rd/4
th   0.7297  23 0.4458  13 0.3564  31  0.6845  30
Post-grad  0.6224  7 0.8641  7 n/a  0 n/a  2 
 
 
SG 
1
st 0.7659  19 0.9147  14 0.7448  9  0.8629  10
2
nd 0.8453  7  0.8518  11 0.4236  12  0.8236  10
3
rd/4
th   0.8393  23 0.8327  16 0.6262  32  0.7984  29
Post-grad  0.8565  7 0.8205  6 n/a  0 n/a  2 
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APPENDIX VII: COMPARISONS FOR THOSE WHO CHANGED 
DISCIPLINES IN STUDY 1 
 
 
FIGURE VIIa: Mean scores for students in Psychology (n= 59) and 
those who changed in (n=8) and out (n=3) 
 
 
FIGURE VIIb: Mean scores for students in Social sciences (n= 49) and 
those who changed in (n=13) and out (n=4) 
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FIGURE VIIc: Mean scores for students in Commerce (n= 59) and 
those who changed in (n=7) and out (n=9) 
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FIGURE VIId: Mean SG score by discipline and changers 
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APPENDIX VIII: CHANGES TO QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STUDY 2 
 
Test-retest information indicated that most of the background variables delivered 
consistent findings. Changes were necessary however, with the removal of several 
irrelevant items and the inclusion of others. The layout was also altered to use less space; 
a circling response system replaced boxes for ticks.  
  
The participants’ seemed to approach the attributional items as “do you agree with this 
statement?”, rather than “do you agree with this statement as an important explanation 
for wealth/poverty?” Consequently, the scale and instructions for these sections were 
rewritten as “not at all important” (1), “a little important” (2), “somewhat important” (3), 
“quite important” (4) and “very important” (5). A “don’t understand/know” response was 
also included and there was now a mid-point.17 In their feedback, students have 
expressed dissatisfaction about both of these not being in the first questionnaire. Items 
which were commonly missed in the first study were altered to improve their 
“understandability”. It was believed that the results would be robust to the change from a 
six to a seven point scale, given the consistency and significance of the findings in Study 
1. The scale for the political ideology items was also altered for consistency (five point, 
strongly disagree to strongly agree, with a neutral point and “don’t understand” option).  
 
The questions about ethnicity, company in spare time and the ideological orientations of 
different disciplines and the income estimates for poor and wealthy families and singles 
were all removed. New items included “any previous post-secondary qualifications” (to 
control for past degrees, diplomas etc.), perceived likelihood of finding employment in 
chosen field, a subjective class scale (including a “there is no such thing as class” 
option)18 and a single generalised attribution question. This item was based on the 
findings from the exploratory study and asked participants “do you think that the 
outcomes of people’s lives are mostly due to…” (emphasis included) with an internal, 
                                                 
17 The inclusion of the don’t know/understand response category dramatically increased the level of 
missing data, however, it can be assumed that the responses given are a more accurate reflection of 
people’s position on the items as they weren’t forced to choose a response when they didn’t know or 
understand. 
18 The scale was marked with seven vertical lines with three labelled: working class (1), middle class (4) 
and upper class (7). Participants can mark the scale anywhere and score is given to the nearest 0.5  
 
 
351
external or mixed option.19 The revised questionnaire also included a variation on 
Feagin’s (1972) poverty-alleviating options; guaranteed-jobs, guaranteed-income and 
equal-income plans. These plans, with brief phrase explanation, were rated on a five-
point scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly favour), with 3 as the neutral point. 
 
There was only one wealth explanation item with non-significant test-retest reliability 
(“wealth is inherited”) but it was considered important and remained in the 
questionnaire in a slightly altered format (“wealth is inherited from the family”). Two 
wealth explanations (“wealthy people are naturally more intelligent” and “wealthy people 
are just lucky”) were replaced in the revised questionnaire (“wealthy people are more 
ambitious” and “certain occupations have very high wages”). A corresponding motivation 
item was included in the poverty explanation scale, while the high wages item was 
adapted from Furnham (1983).  
 
Two poverty explanations items had unsatisfactory test-retest reliability: “the minimum 
w a g e  i s  t o o  l o w ”  a n d  “ t h e  p o o r  l i v e  i n  a r eas of low employment prospects and little 
infrastructure”. However, both were rated hig h l y  b y  p a r t i c i p a n t s  s o  t h e y  w e r e  a g a i n  
included. The following four items were dropped; “exploitation of poor by rich”, 
“worldwide economic problems”, “sickness and physical handicaps”, “the poor are 
unable to sustain employment” and “the poor are unlucky”. “The poor are lazy” became 
“the poor lack motivation” and “unemployment and underemployment” became “the 
poor are unemployed or casual workers”. One other item was added, “changing job 
market”, to reflect the impact of increasing mechanisation and the loss of unskilled 
manufacturing employment, which has led to higher unemployment and poverty in 
industrialised nations. Further reliability testing will occur in Study 2, which should 
determine the reliability over time of the new and revised items in both the wealth and 
poverty explanation scales. 
 
One right-wing item had poor test-retest reliability and responses to it differed in both 
directions (“some people will never succeed even when given opportunities”). As the 
right-wing items failed to load as a consistent scale two were altered (“there should be 
full private ownership of all businesses and industries”, “the government should not act 
to control the economy”) and two were replaced (“some people will never succeed…” and 
                                                 
19 It is a given that most will opt for the mixed option but there is likely to be a big difference between those 
who chose “their own ability, effort, motivation and perseverance” compared to those who chose “things 
outside themselves, like social or economic forces, or luck”.   
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“the most important thing is for all people to be free to pursue the lives they want”).20 
Two of the left-wing items were also altered. The item on the need to redistribute income 
elicited some confused responses and was altered to the more clichéd “the gap between 
the rich and the poor is too large”. “The most important thing is for all people to be 
equal” was changed to “The government should provide a job for everyone who wants 
one” because it was the weakest left-wing  item, and with the right-wing “most important 
thing…” item removed, it made less sense. 
 
All four liberal and one of the conservative items were altered to improve their 
comprehensibility. The words “…and demonstrations” were dropped from the “everyone 
should be allowed to stage protests…” item. “Any censorship of film, magazines or 
television is wrong” became “adults should be able to watch or read what they want, 
without government censorship” to allow for classification restricting under-18s access to 
certain materials.21 To make it more relevant, the freedom of expression item was 
changed from being about extremist groups to an extreme act (“flag-burning is a 
legitimate form of free speech”). This was not intended to refer specifically to the flag of 
people’s own countries but, due to subsequent historical events, it is likely that most 
participants interpreted it as such. Historical effects may confound the results from this 
and other liberal and conservative items.22  
 
The death penalty question was reworded, as the double negative was confusing, from 
“ t he  d ea t h pe n a lt y  s hou l d  ne ve r  be  r e in tr od uc e d ”  t o “ …shou l d  be  r ein t r od u ce d ”. T he  
weakest conservative scale item, “more attention needs to be paid to God in our society”, 
seemed to draw more on religious beliefs than the social traditionalism the conservative 
                                                 
20 These four items became, respectively, “the government should leave market forces to regulate the 
economy”, “the government should privatise most assets and only run essential services such as law and 
order and the military”, “’user-pays’ is the best system for education and health” and “status and income 
inequality in society encourage individual effort”.  
21 The most common comment about this item in both studies was that it was not acceptable to watch child 
pornography. 
22 There had been some instances of recent flag burning in the Middle East, particularly the American, but 
also the Australian, flag, which inspired the investigator to include the item. However, throughout February 
and March 2003 many protests were held throughout the world, including Australia, opposing the (then 
planned) invasion of Iraq. There was a rise in “demonstrations”, “disobeying the law” and “disrespecting 
authority”, especially among students. Flag-burnings occurred and were generally condemned, with one 
Perth schoolboy arrested and charged (The West Australian, 6.3.03, although the judge decided that there 
was insufficient evidence to support the “disorderly conduct by insulting behaviour” charge, The West 
Australian, 12.3.03, p.1).    
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scale was aimed at assessing.23 It was replaced with “it’s every woman’s right to have an 
abortion”, which ensured equal numbers of conservative and liberal items. 
 
All the social group ratings showed significant test-retest reliability, although this could 
have been an artefact of the larger scale used (ten rather than six points). It may also be 
the case that feelings are more accessible than cognitions. However, the following groups 
were excluded from the revised social groups section: the unemployed, anti-abortion 
protestors and creationists, due to their poor (or lack of) loading on the social groups 
factor. Also, most participants did not seem to understand who creationists were; not 
surprising, given that there has been no debate about creation versus evolution in 
Australia. Two more political parties were included, the Greens and the Australian 
Democrats, so that strength measure of party identification could be created (when 
combined with the directional measure from the background variables section). “Middle-
class people” and “working-class people” were also added, to correspond with class 
questions added to the demographics section. The new social groups measure consisted 
of eighteen groups, with a scale from “0” (very negative) to “10” (very positive).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23Although Australian society is based on Anglo-Christian values, the government is largely secular with 
very few explicit links with the Church. The Australian Prime Minister received widespread condemnation 
from many sectors when he named an Archbishop as the next Governor-General in June 2001 (the Queen’s 
representative in Australia who preforms ceremonial head-of-state duties in her stead and is always 
nominated by the PM).  
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APPENDIX IX: STUDY 2 QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
 
 
Please complete the following questionnaire. You should be able to 
answer all questions in the space provided. There are no right or 
wrong answers, so just respond truthfully. If you cannot answer a 
question you can write “don’t know”. Please feel free to add 
comments about the questionnaire as you go. 
 
Thankyou for your participation in this study. Your help is greatly 
appreciated. 
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PLEASE COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING SECTION. QUESTIONS REQUIRE 
CIRCLING A RESPONSE, TICKING A BOX OR A WRITTEN ANSWER. THERE ARE 
NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS AND YOU CAN ANSWER “DON’T KNOW”. 
 
1 .   S e x :         F e m a l e    M a l e     
 
2.  Age  in  years:      ...................................................... 
 
3.  Country  of  birth:      ...................................................... 
 
4. Title of degree currently enrolled in     ...................................................... 
(including double majors and minors):     
       ...................................................... 
 
5. Any previous post-secondary qualifications:         ………………………………….. 
        
       ………………………………….. 
 
6. Type of enrolment:     Full-time               Part-time   
 
7. Current year of degree:  First            Second            Third                 Fourth   
 
 
8. If this was not your first choice      ...................................................... 
degree, what was?     
       ...................................................... 
 
9. If you have changed degrees since first    ………………………………….. 
enrolling at a university, what was your 
original degree?                              ………………………………...... 
 
 
10. Father’s highest level of education:    ...................................................... 
 
11.  Father’s  main  occupation:     ...................................................... 
 
12. Mother’s highest level of education:    ...................................................... 
 
13. Mother’s main occupation:      ...................................................... 
 
14. (If applicable) Partner’s highest  
level  of  education      ...................................................... 
 
15. Partner’s main occupation                            ......................................................   
 
16. Secondary school you attended:      ...................................................... 
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17. Which political party do you usually vote for in the Federal Lower House (House of 
Representatives), or if you have never voted, are most likely to vote for? 
International students: please use the “other” option 
 
Australian  Labor  Party      [    ] 
Liberal  Party  of  Australia       [    ] 
National  Party  of  Australia       [    ] 
Australian  Democrats        [    ] 
G r e e n s           [     ]  
O n e   N a t i o n          [     ]  
I t   c h a n g e s          [     ]  
Ineligible  to  vote        [    ] 
 
Other:................................................................................................................................ 
 
 
18. Which of the above parties/options do you think the following people usually vote (or 
voted, if deceased) for? 
 
Father.............................................................................................................................. 
 
Mother............................................................................................................................. 
 
(If applicable) Partner..........................................................................................……… 
 
 
19. Do you currently reside with:     
P a r e n t / s /   G u a r d i a n         [     ]  
O t h e r   f a m i l y          [     ]  
Partner (married/ de facto) and/or  children     [    ] 
On campus                 [  ]        
Shared  housing       [    ] 
A l o n e           [     ]  
      
Other:............................................................................................................................... 
 
 
 
 
20. Would your current financial situation be best described as (please circle): 
 
Poor         Scraping by        Comfortable       Well-off         Very wealthy 
     
 
 
21. In ten years time would you expect your financial situation to be best described as: 
 
Poor         Scraping by        Comfortable       Well-off         Very wealthy  
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22. How difficult do you think it will be for you to find employment in your chosen field 
after you have graduated from university: 
 
Very difficult             Somewhat difficult    Fairly easy      Very easy 
     
 
 
23. Are you currently: 
 
Employed:         Full-time             Part-time             Casual                        Not employed 
         
 
If employed, what is your occupation:............................................................................. 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
   
 
 
23. Are you currently receiving any social security payments?         Yes              No   
 
 
24. Have you received any social security payments in the past?  Yes    No   
 
 
 
25. Please mark where do you consider yourself to be on the following scale: 
 
 
Working-class                                        Middle-class                                   Upper-class   
I-----------------I-----------------I-----------------I-----------------I----------------I-------------I 
       
OR         There is no such thing as class           
 
 
 
 
26. Do you think that the outcomes of people’s lives are mostly due to: 
 
Their own ability, effort, motivation and perseverance      [  ] 
Things outside of themselves, like social or economic forces, or luck  [  ] 
A n   e v e n   m i x t u r e            [     ]  
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27. Please indicate how favourably you feel about each of the following plans, which 
could be introduced as a means of reducing poverty in society:                                                            
                                                                            
 
                             Strongly    Oppose   Not sure    Favour   Strongly  
                                                                                       Oppose                                                     Favour 
A. Guaranteed-jobs plan  
(the government provides everyone with jobs)   SO          O        NS          F         SF 
 
B. Guaranteed-income plan  
(a minimum income for all people)                     SO          O        NS          F         SF 
 
C. Equal-income plan                                              
(equal income for all based on                             SO          O        NS          F         SF 
family size and needs) 
 
 
 
 
 
28. What was the main reason you came to university? 
       Why did you choose your particular degree/ programme of study? 
 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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PLEASE INDICATE HOW GENERALLY IMPORTANT YOU BELIEVE EACH OF 
THE FOLLOWING FACTORS IS IN EXPLAINING WEALTH IN AUSTRALIA: 
 
Not at all       A little important      Somewhat       Quite important       Very       Don’t understand/     
important                                          important                                       important          Don’t know        
     (1)                         (2)                          (3)                        (4)                       (5)                       (6) 
 
 
 
1. Wealthy people work harder   
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 
2. Wealthy people take risks   
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 
3. Wealthy people are more ambitious 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 
4. Wealth is inherited from the family 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 
5. Wealthy people use their particular skills 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 
6. Wealthy people have ‘contacts’ 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 
7. Wealthy people are better at managing their money  
(e.g. saving, investing)   
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 
8. Wealthy people are in the ‘right place at the right time’    
   
1 2 3 4 5  6 
9. Wealthy people have drive and perseverance 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 
10. The economic system favours individual entrepreneurs 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 
11. Better education is available to the wealthy 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 
12. Wealthy people are ruthless and determined 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 
13. Government policies make it easier for the wealthy to  
become wealthier 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 
14. Worldwide economic conditions favour the wealthy 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 
15. Certain occupations have very high wages   
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 
 
            
 
Any other reasons which you believe are important in explaining wealth:…………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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PLEASE INDICATE HOW GENERALLY IMPORTANT YOU BELIEVE EACH OF 
THE FOLLOWING FACTORS IS IN EXPLANING POVERTY IN AUSTRALIA:  
 
Not at all     A little important     Somewhat       Quite important        Very        Don’t  understand/          
important                                       important                                       important            Don’t know                                               
     (1)                      (2)                          (3)                        (4)                        (5)                          (6) 
 
 
1. The poor lack motivation       
  
1 2 3 4 5  6 
2. The minimum wage is too low     
            
1 2 3 4 5  6 
3. The poor lack ability         
            
1 2 3 4 5  6 
4. The poor are unemployed or casual workers        
  
1 2 3 4 5  6 
5. The poor cannot manage their money    
  
1 2 3 4 5  6 
6. The poor live in areas with low employment prospects and  
little infrastructure 
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 
7. The capitalist economic system means that some people 
have to be on the bottom and others on top     
                  
1 2 3 4 5  6 
8. Low levels of education and qualifications among the poor
  
1 2 3 4 5  6 
9. Government policies which maintain inequality  
            
1 2 3 4 5  6 
10. People would rather stay on social security than work
  
1 2 3 4 5  6 
11. Poor role models within the family (cycle of poverty) 
            
1 2 3 4 5  6 
12. The social security system is inadequate   
  
1 2 3 4 5  6 
13. Limited educational opportunities for the poor 
   
1 2 3 4 5  6 
14. Drug or alcohol addiction        
  
1 2 3 4 5  6 
15. Changing job market (e.g. movement away from 
manufacturing industries, fewer unskilled jobs)   
 
1 2 3 4 5  6 
 
  
 
Any other reasons that you think are important in explaining poverty:………………. 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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PLEASE INDICATE THE STRENGTH OF YOUR AGREEMENT WITH EACH OF 
THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS: 
 
Strongly disagree   Disagree   Neither agree nor disagree    Agree   Strongly Agree Don’t understand 
         (1)           (2)                          (3)                           (4)                (5)                           (6) 
 
 
1. There is one law for the rich and another for the poor       1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
2. Individuals should take care of themselves and        1      2      3     4      5        6 
not rely on the government                     
 
3. The gap between the rich and the poor is too large                  1      2      3     4      5        6 
             
4. The government should leave market forces to regulate                
the economy                                  1      2      3     4      5        6  
 
5. Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers               1      2      3     4      5        6  
    
6. The government should privatise most assets and only   
run essential services such as law and order and the military            1      2      3     4      5        6                    
                   
7. ‘User-pays’ is the best system for education and health     1      2      3     4      5        6 
                      
8. Competition brings out the worst in people         1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
9.The government should provide a job for everyone who  
wants one                                                  1      2      3     4      5        6           
 
10. Status and income inequality in society encourage  
individual effort                                     1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
11. Everybody should be allowed to stage protests       1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
12. People have become too dependent on the welfare state     1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
13. Flag-burning is a legitimate form of free speech                         1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
14. The law should always be obeyed, without exception      1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
15. Adults should be able to watch or read what they want,  
without government censorship                        1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
16. Young people today do not show enough respect for authority   1      2      3     4      5       6 
 
17. The death penalty should be reintroduced         1      2      3     4      5        6 
 
18. It’s every woman’s right to choose an abortion                           1      2      3     4      5        6 
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PLEASE INDICATE THE NATURE OF YOUR FEELINGS GENERALLY TOWARDS 
EACH OF THE FOLLOWING GROUPS IN AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY: 
  
                Very Negative                 Neutral              Very Positive 
                    
1. Labor Party                       0     1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
    
2. Liberal Party                                            0     1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
3. National Party                     0    1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
       
4. One Nation                                   0    1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9     10 
 
5. Australian Democrats                              0    1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9     10 
  
6. The Greens                                                0    1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9     10 
 
7. Socialists                                                  0    1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9     10 
   
8. Refugees                       0     1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
9. Capitalists            0    1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
10. Unions            0    1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
11. Self-made millionaires        0     1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
12. Anti-globalisation protestors       0     1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
13. Multinational corporations        0     1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
14. Middle-class people                    0     1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
15. Working-class people                            0     1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
16. Military           0     1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
17. Aborigines           0    1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
18. Homosexuals         0    1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9    10 
 
 
                   
 
 
THANKYOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY. YOUR HELP IS 
GREATLY APPRECIATED.  
IF YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER COMMENTS PLEASE USE THE BACK OF 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE.  
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APPENDIX X: CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDY 2 SAMPLE 
 
Chi-square analyses indicated that the discipline distribution was significantly different 
between males and females, with more males in commerce and fewer in psychology, 
compared to females (see Table Xb). The age comparison showed significant differences 
too, with students aged 25 and over significantly more likely to be in the social sciences, 
rather than commerce or other disciplines. Students in other disciplines and commerce 
were more likely to be full-time compared to those in the social sciences and psychology. 
There were also significant differences in year group distribution among disciplines. 
Commerce had significantly more 3rd/4th and 2nd years, compared to all the other 
disciplines, although the difference was largest with the social sciences. The social 
sciences also had more 1st years and fewer 3rd/4th and 2nd years in comparison to 
psychology and other disciplines. There was little evidence of difference in postgraduate 
numbers but this group was very small. Commerce was underrepresented.  
 
Table Xa: Discipline differences  
   Overall 
(n=223) 
Psychology 
(n=59) 
Social Sciences 
(n=49) 
Commerce 
(n=59) 
Others 
(n=56) 
Sex   % Female  71.3  80.5  72.7  63.3  73.2 
Age Mean  27.18  26.94 31.92  24.93  23.31 
% 17-20  36.4  33.1  25.7  37.1  63.4 
% 21-25  21.8  24.1  13.5  30.3  14.1 
% 26-35  18.2  19.5  22.3  17.7  8.5 
% 36-45  15.0  17.3  20.3  11.4  8.5 
 
%46+ 8.5  6.0  18.2  3.4 5.6 
% Australia  67.4  73.7  70.0  60.8  66.2 
% Other 
Western 
18.9 16.5  26.0  14.8  18.3 
% South east 
Asia 
10.2 6.8  2.7  19.3  9.9 
Country 
of Birth  
% Other  3.6  3.0  1.3  5.1  5.6 
Enrolment 
Type 
% Fulltime  81.4  78.2  75.3  84.2  93.0 
% First  38.8  42.1  50.7  25.4  40.8 
% Second  26.7  25.6  24.7  31.1  22.5 
% 
Third/fourth 
24.7 23.3  13.3  35.0  25.4 
Year of 
degree  
% Post-grad  9.8  9.0  11.3  8.5  11.3 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, the majority of respondents were Australian-born (67.4%) and the next 
largest group were born in other western nations, predominately the U.K. and New 
Zealand (18.9%). Goodness-of-fit chi-squares indicated significant differences between  
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the discipline groups. While there was no disicpline difference between Australian 
students and those from other western nations, Asian-born students were much more 
likely to be commerce majors. Asian-born participants were also less likely to be social 
science (especially compared to those born in other western nations) or psychology 
s t u d e n t s .  H o w e v e r ,  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  o n l y  a s k e d  f o r  b i r t h  p l a c e ,  n o t  c i t i z e n s h i p ,  s o  i t  i s  
possible that some of those born overseas consider themselves Australian (particularly 
likely in the case of those born in the U.K. or New Zealand, the two largest immigrant 
groups in Australia). On the other hand, the majority of international students at 
Murdoch University come from south-east Asian countries such as Singapore, Malaysia 
and Indonesia, and they enrol disproportionately in commerce and media units. 
 
TABLE Xb: Chi-square comparisons between discipline sub-group 
  Expected values  Observed values  Chi-value  df  n 
SEX Females  Males  16.113***  3  151 
AGE  17-24 years  25 years and over  79.46***  3  220 
LOAD Full-time  Part-time 13.766**  3  99 
Australia Other  western  4.737  3  100 
 Asian  30.789***  3  54 
COUNTRY OF 
BIRTH 
Other western  Asian  42.894***  3  54 
Commerce Social  sciences  61.178***  3  150 
 Psychology  21.119***  3  133 
 Others  10.859*  3  71 
Social sciences  Psychology  12.519**  3  133 
 Others  9.175*  3  71 
YEAR OR 
DEGREE 
Psychology Others  0.805  3  71 
 
 
Education level was initially measured at six levels- from primary or less to postgraduate 
degree. It was reclassified to three levels (low, medium and high) for some analyses. All 
those reported as currently undertaking education were classified at the level currently 
studied at (e.g., undergraduate student was level 5). While 9.4% of fathers had 
postgraduate degrees, only 2.8% of mothers did.24 There was a significant difference 
between parents’ levels of education (
2 X (2)= 18.15, p<0.001), with fathers more likely 
be reported as having mid-levels of education, and less likely to report low or high (see 
Table Xc). This was most likely due to trade qualifications being classified as mid-level, 
which few mothers were reported as having. Partners were generally better qualified 
                                                 
24 Interestingly, 17.8% of those with fathers at postgraduate level had mothers at the same level (71.1% 
degree or higher) while 61.5% of those with postgraduate educated mothers had fathers at the same and 
seven fathers level (69.2% university study).  
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than parents, with about half having university level education (8.8% postgraduates). 
There were differences in employment between the disciplines, with psychology students 
still having the highest percentage working, but this difference was no longer significant 
(
2 X (3)= 6.538).  
 
TABLE Xc: Discipline differences in background variables 
   Overall  Psychology  Social 
science 
Commerce Others 
Low 42.2  45.5  45.8  43.1  26.9 
Medium 28.9  31.4 27.1  28.8  28.3 
Father 
(n=213) 
High 28.9  23.1  27.1  28.1  44.8 
Low 47.6  44.2  54.0  51.2  31.3 
Medium 21.1  23.0 16.5  20.5  28.4 
Mother 
(n=221) 
High 31.4  32.8  29.5  28.3  40.3 
Low 15.4  15.9  16.4  14.3  13.6 
Medium 33.8  37.7 29.9  31.4  40.9 
Partner 
(n=79) 
High 50.9  46.4  53.7  54.3  45.5 
            
% Participants Employed  63.7  67.4  57.1  65.3  66.2 
 
 
Chi-square analyses indicated some differences in parents’ education levels between 
disciplines (see Table Xd). Those whose fathers had tertiary education were more likely 
t o  b e  e n r o l l e d  i n  o t h e r  d i s c i p l i n e s ,  a n d  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  i n  p s y c h o l o g y  o r  t h e  s o c i a l  
sciences, compared to those whose fathers’ had low and medium levels of education. 
Those participants whose mothers had low levels of education were more likely to be 
social science majors, and less likely to be from other disciplines, compared to those 
whose mothers had medium levels of education. Those whose mothers’ were tertiary 
e d u c a t e d  w e r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  i n  o t h e r  d i s c i p l i n e s ,  s l i g h t l y  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  i n  
psychology and less likely to be in social science or commerce. No significant differences 
were found in discipline distribution at different levels of partner’s education.  
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TABLE Xd: Chi-square results for discipline comparisons on 
background variables 
  Expected values  Observed values  Chi-value  df  n 
Low Medium  4.426  3  141 
 High  28.716***  3  141 
FATHER’S 
EDUCATION 
LEVEL  Medium High  9.022*  3  141 
Low Medium  14.319**  3  104 
 High  15.937***  3  155 
MOTHER’S 
EDUCATION 
LEVEL  High Medium  1.025  3  104 
High Medium  2.954  3  77 
 Low  0.376  3  35 
PARTNER’S 
EDUCATION 
LEVEL  Medium Low  0.748  3  35 
Social sciences  23.464***  5  142  Commerce 
Psychology 5.335 5  130 
 Others  12.483*  5  69 
Social sciences  Psychology  24.594***  5  130 
 Others  15.884**  5  69 
FATHER’S 
OCCUPATION  
Psychology Others  13.953*  5  69 
Social sciences  4.012  4  146 
Psychology 12.332*  4  129 
Commerce 
 
Others 5.126  4  71 
Psychology 8.645 4  129  Social sciences 
  Others 4.430  4  71 
MOTHER’S 
OCCUPATION 
Psychology Others  0.538 4  71 
Psychology 5.207 4  69  PARTNER’S 
OCCUPATION 
Commerce 
Social science  14.525**  4  66 
 Psychology  Social  science  30.321***  4  66 
 
In the case of occupation types, different combinations of the twelve possible 
categorisations (mentioned in section 6.2) were selected, depending on which were most 
relevant. A new category, “business owner” was also added. There were significant 
differences between the discipline groups in terms of fathers’ occupations.25 Other 
students were noticeable for having far more professional fathers than any of the other 
groups (and fewer “other” occupations). Social science students were less likely to have 
fathers in managerial occupations (or business owners), but more likely to have fathers 
in manufacturing, construction, transport or manual labour. Commerce students were 
more likely to have fathers who were managers, but less likely to have professional 
fathers. This probably reflects the age and socioeconomic differences between the social 
science students and those in the other groups.  
 
There was only one significant difference among mothers’ occupations, with commerce 
students more likely to report that their mothers’ occupation as “home duties”, and less 
                                                 
25Collapsed categories used were business owner, managerial, professional, clerical, sales or service, 
manufacturing, construction, transport or manual and others.  
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likely to report clerical, sales or service jobs for mothers compared to psychology 
majors.26 Social science students were less likely to report that their partners were 
managers/business owners or students, but w e r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
partners, compared to both commerce and psychology participants (numbers in cells for 
other disciplines too small).27 
 
It was also expected that there would be discipline differences in participants’ financial 
expectations for their futures, but not for their (subjective) current situation (see Figure 
Xa). Most felt that their current situation was comfortable (44.9%) or that they were just 
scraping by (37.7%), however, in the future 40.2% expected to be comfortable, while 
45.1% thought that they would be well-off. One-way ANOVAs confirmed previous 
findings, with a significant effect for future situation (F (3, 526) =13.05, p<0.001) but not 
for current one (F (3, 526) = 1.85, p>0.05). Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons indicated 
that commerce participants had higher expectations than both social science and 
psychology students, while other students had higher expectations than those in the 
social sciences only.  
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FIGURE Xa: Mean score for subjective financial situations by 
discipline 
 
 
                                                 
26Collapsed categories of: managerial/owner, professional, clerical, sales or service, home duties or others. 
27Collapsed categories of: managerial/owner, professional, clerical, sales or service, students or others.   
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Differences between disciplines were also examined for the two other subjective 
variables; expected ease of finding employment and the subjective class measure. 
Overall, slightly more students felt that they would gain employment in their area fairly 
to very easily (54.6%), with only 5.6% thinking it would be very difficult. The majority of 
respondents placed themselves in the very centre of the class measure (33.9%) or within 
one point either side (32.0%). One-way ANOVAs revealed significant between discipline 
differences for both ease of finding employment (F (3, 518) = 6.37, p<0.001) and 
subjective class (F (3, 456) = 4.85, p<0.01). Bonferroni post-hoc tests indicated that 
commerce students expected that they would find a job significantly more easily than 
both social science and other students. Social science students rated themselves 
significantly lower on the social class measure compared to those from both commerce 
and other disciplines. 
 
The four subjective scales were also tested for sex and age differences. A two-way (2 x 5) 
MANOVA, yielded a significant main effect for age (V = 0.12, F (16, 1776) = 3.56, 
p<0.001) but not for sex (U= 0.01, F (4, 441) = 1.38, p>0.05) or their interaction (V = 
0.02, F (16, 1776) = 0.51, p>0.05). Box’s M was not significant (M = 107.80, F (90, 
26857.34) = 1.12, p>0.05). One-way ANOVAs revealed significant differences for age on 
all measures, except ease of finding employment (see Table Xe).  
 
 
TABLE Xe: Univariate analyses for Age in two-way MANOVA for 
subjective scales 
  Levene’s F  df  Mean square  F-value 
Current situation  0.462  4  1.795  3.454** 
Future situation  1.331  4  3.018  7.867*** 
Ease of employment  1.229  4  0.620  1.140 
Class 2.268*  4  7.512  6.091*** 
 
 
Tamhane’s T2 post-hoc tests were used as the class measure violated the assumption of 
equality of covariances (F (9, 444) = 2.27, p<0.05). Post-hoc tests indicated that 17 to 20 
year-olds rated their current financial situation as significantly higher than those aged 
21-24 and 25-34 did (see Table Xf). For expected financial situation, those aged over 45 
years had significantly lower expectations than those in the three lowest age groups (17-
34 years). Those aged 17 to 20 also had significantly higher subjective class ratings, 
compared to all other age groups. These findings were most likely due to the youngest 
participants basing their current situation and class on that of their parents and having  
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inflated expectations about their future (due to inexperience). It was interesting to note 
the lack of gender differences in expectations; clearly the women in the sample did not 
believe they had fewer opportunities than the men, although no direct comparison was 
made.  
 
TABLE Xf: Tamhane’s T2 post-hoc comparisons 
  I  J  Mean difference (I-J) 
21-24 0.2863* 
25-34 0.3119* 
35-44 0.2438 
17-20 
45+ 0.2531 
25-34 0.0256 
35-44 -0.0425 
21-24 
45+ -0.0332 
35-44 -0.0681  25-34 
45+ -0.0589 
Current situation 
35-44 45+  0.0092 
21-24 -0.0142 
25-34 0.0407 
35-44 0.2493 
17-20 
45+   0.5514*** 
25-34 0.0549 
35-44 0.2635 
21-24 
45+ 0.5655*** 
35-44 0.2086  25-34 
45+ 0.5106*** 
Future situation 
35-44 45+  0.3020 
21-24 0.4303* 
25-34 0.5566** 
35-44 0.6770*** 
17-20  
45+ 0.5096* 
25-34 0.1263 
35-44 0.2467 
21-24 
45+ 0.0793 
35-44 0.1204  25-34 
45+ -0.0471 
Class 
35-44 45+  -0.1674 
 
  
SOCIAL SECURITY COMPARISONS 
 
Overall, 236 students (45%) had never received any social security payments. However, 
of those born in Australia (n=355), 61.1% had received social security benefits at some 
point, compared with 42.4% of those born outside of Australia (total n=170). Age was 
obviously important; with the older someone was the more likely they were to have 
accessed social security benefits, not just because of greater chance of need but also  
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greater eligibility (e.g., Austudy only applies to 25 and over, parenting payments etc.) 
( s e e  F i g u r e  X b ) .  O f  1 7  t o  2 0  y e a r - o l d s ,  3 6 . 3 %  h a d  r e c e i v e d  b e n e f i t s  a t  s o m e  p o i n t ,  
compared to 73.4% of 35-44 year-olds. The numbers having received benefits dropped in 
the 45+ group but was still over 50%. 
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FIGURE Xb: Percentage of those who have versus have not ever 
received social security payments by age 
 
 
 
There were also differences between the disciplines, with students in the social sciences 
the most likely to have received social security benefits. Even when age was considered 
though, differences could still be seen between disciplines (see Figure Xc). It seems that, 
regardless of age, social science and psychol o g y  s t u d e n t s  w e r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  
received social security benefits. A goodness of fit chi-square was used to assess whether 
discipline differences were occurring within age groups. As expected, in the under-25 
year-old group, those who had received benefits were significantly more likely to be 
social science and psychology students (
2 X (3)= 25.91, p<0.001), however, there was no 
significant difference among those aged 25 years and over (
2 X (3)= 6.38, p>0.05), 
although the trend was there. This result suggested that social science and psychology 
students come from more economically deprived backgrounds, hence their eligibility and 
reliance on social security benefits at an earlier stage than those in other disciplines. The 
more persistent effects for social science students were most likely related to the higher  
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numbers of older women in this area; more likely to have had children, and therefore 
more likely to have collected welfare payments relating to parenting.  
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FIGURE Xc: Percentage who had received social security benefits, by 
age and discipline 
 
 
GENERALISED ATTRIBUTION COMPARISON 
 
Discipline differences were also examined on the generalised attribution item, with three 
choices as to the most likely reason for people’s life outcomes. Distributions were very 
uneven, with the vast majority of participants selecting the compromise position. Chi-
squares indicated significant differences, with those who choose individualistic reasons 
m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  c o m e  f r o m  c o m m e r c e ,  a n d  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  b e  f r o m  t h e  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e s ,  
compared to those who selected even mix (
2 X (3)= 29.20, p<0.001). However, there was 
no difference between even mix and systemic/fatalistic groups, in terms of discipline 
distribution (
2 X (3) = 2.48, p>0.05). It was not possible to compare internal and 
external groups due to small cell numbers, however, Figure Xd clearly shows that the 
social science respondents were more likely to choose external reasons, and less likely to 
choose internal ones, while the reverse occurred for commerce students. However, those 
in the social sciences and psychology expressed the most ambivalence about supporting 
either the internal or external option. Overall though it seems that, even without context,  
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commerce students favour internal explanations and social science students favour 
external explanations for people’s life outcomes, when only these two were compared.28 
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FIGURE Xd: Generalised attribution item response by discipline 
 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION COMPARISONS 
Participants’ party identifications were compared between disciplines and to those of 
their parents and partners, to determine whether there were any patterns. Initially, there 
were 152 ALP (Australian Labor Party), 115 LP (Liberal Party), three NP (National Party), 
26 AD (Australian Democrats), 67 GP (Greens), six ON (One Nation), five Christian 
Democrats, 23 “other” (including international parties) and 84 swinging voters.29 With 
these last four groups excluded, the categories were collapsed to ALP, LP (including NP, 
due to their coalition), GP,30 “other” (including other minor parties and international) 
and swinging voters. The percentage distrib u t i o n  o f  s u p p o r t  f o r  e a c h  c a t e g o r y  b y  
discipline can be seen in Table Xg. The most obvious difference was clearly between the 
social sciences and commerce, in support for ALP and GP vs. LP. 
                                                 
28 Clearly, all disciplines favoured the compromise position of either of the other two. 
29 There were also four participants who chose not to vote, twenty-six who reported that they were 
ineligible to vote, fourteen who didn’t know who they voted for and seven who did not respond to the 
question 
30 Although the GP and AD have some policy similarities and both are seen as left-wing  alternative parties, 
there were some noticeable differences between them; AD supporters more female, parents had lower 
levels of education and subjective class rating higher than GP supporters    
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TABLE Xg: Percentage of party identification by discipline  
 Overall  Psychology  Social 
science 
Commerce Others  n 
ALP 31.7  31.0  45.4 25.6 17.5  152 
LP 24.6  21.6 9.2  40.6  23.8  118 
GP 14.0  15.5 19.1  5.6 20.6  67 
Other 
parties 
12.3 12.1  9.9  15.0  11.1 59 
Swinging 17.5  19.8  16.3  13.1  27.0  84 
TOTAL 100  100  100  100  100  480 
 
Goodness-of-fit chi-squares were used to confirm the differences in distribution of party 
identification between discipline groups. Highly significant differences were found on all 
comparisons except between psychology and others (see Table Xh). The social sciences 
had far more ALP and fewer LP supporters than psychology. Compared to both the social 
sciences and psychology, commerce students were less likely to be ALP, GP or swinging 
voters, and more likely to support LP or other parties. The other disciplines group had 
fewer ALP supporters than both psychology and social science. Other disciplines also had 
far more LP voters than the social sciences, but far fewer than commerce did.  
 
TABLE Xh: Chi-square results for party identification comparisons by 
discipline 
Expected values  Observed values  2 X   n 
Social science  105.082***  141 
Psychology 36.327***  116 
Commerce 
Others 41.112***  63 
Psychology 26.613***  116  Social science 
Others 29.932***  63 
Psychology Others  6.628  63 
 
Table Xi shows various demographic characteristics for each group of voters. Results 
w e r e  c a l c u l a t e d  b a s e d  o n  t h e  m o r e  l i m i t e d classifications mentioned above. Labor 
supporters were generally the oldest and had their parents had lower education levels. 
GP voters had the greatest number of mothers with tertiary education, and the second 
largest number of fathers. The subjective class scale comparison was generally as  
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expected, with ALP and GP voters more likely to describe themselves as working class 
and LP and swinging voters more likely to place themselves in the middle.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE Xi: Demographics of different party identification groups 
 ALP  LP  GP  Others  Swinging 
Sex   (% female)  67.1  68.6  65.7  78.0  81.0 
Mean  29.36 26.91 27.53 25.63  27.9  Age 
Median  25 22 22.5  22  23 
Australian  born  (%)  71.1 73.7 74.6 45.8  73.8 
Fathers  22.4 27.3 37.7 37.1  26.0 
Mothers  25.3 28.7 42.2 25.4  34.6 
Education 
(% tertiary) 
Partners  51.3 43.4 61.5 65.2  48.6 
Ever received 
social security 
(%  Yes)  63.8 49.6 64.2 47.5  61.4 
No such thing  12.8  7.0  7.6  15.5  12.0 
Working  23.5 11.4 24.2 15.5  10.8 
Middle  59.1 71.9 63.6 67.2  74.7 
Class category (%) 
Upper  4.7 9.6 4.5 1.7  2.4 
 
There was a slight significant difference between the distribution of party support for 
men and women (
2 X (4) = 10.33, p<0.05, n= 139), with men supporting ALP, LP and GP 
more than women, and other parties and swing voting less. There was also a significant 
difference in party preference distribution for those under 25 years compared to those 25 
years and over (
2 X (4) = 15.22, p<0.01, n= 213). The older group were far greater 
supporters of ALP, and less supportive of every other option, compared to those under 
25. A one-way ANOVA for subjective class (with “no such thing” excluded) was 
significant (F (4, 414) = 2.96, p<0.05), with Bonferroni’s post-hoc tests indicating only a 
significant difference between ALP and LP, with the latter scoring significantly higher.  
 
There were also differences for party identifiers on the subjective variables. While there 
was no difference for current financial situation (F (4, 475) = 1.27, p>0.05), there was for 
expected financial situation (F (4, 475) = 4.51, p< 0.001). LP identifiers rated their future 
economic situation more highly than GP supporters. There was also a significant 
difference for expected ease in finding employment (F (4, 468) = 5.80 p<0.001), with 
ALP voters rating their chances higher than GP and swinging voters. Goodness-of-fit chi-
squares were also used to determine if responses to the single-item generalised 
attributions variable were the same across party identification groups. Those who  
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favoured internal explanations for outcomes were more likely to be LP, and less likely to 
b e  G P  o r  A L P ,  s u p p o r t e r s ,  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h o s e  c h o o s i n g  e v e n  m i x  (
2 X (4) = 19.18, 
p<0.001, n=144). The group who favoured the external explanation had significantly 
more GP, and less LP, voters than those choosing the compromise option. No 
comparison of those who chose internal and external was possible, due to low cell sizes.  
 
Figures Xf and Xg demonstrate the reported identification of each family member, based 
on participants’ party preference. The match between participants’ and their family 
members’ party identifications were close but not exact; the closest was LP voters’ and 
their fathers, at 82.7%. In most instances, parents’ identifications were predominately 
ALP or LP, with only the exception of other voters, who included international students. 
Of those who deviated from the two-party preference, the majority of their partners 
matched their orientation (GP and swinging). Of the 417 cases where both parents had 
identifications recorded which matched the above categories, 77.7% of parents had the 
same identification. 
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FIGURE Xg: Distribution of Party identifications for family, based on 
participants’ identifications: Swinging and other voters. 
 
Goodness-of-fit chi-squares were used to compare the distribution of party support 
between family members.31 The results indicated that participants had significantly 
different party identification patterns from their fathers (
2 X (4) = 125.51, p<0.001, 
n=410) and mothers (
2 X (4) = 81.80, p<0.001, n= 419) but not their partners (
2 X (4) = 
8.61, p>0.05, n= 182). This was not surprising, given past research, and was primarily 
due the larger numbers of GP and swinging voters among the participants, compared to 
parents. Mothers’ and fathers’ party identifications were also significantly different 
(
2 X (4) = 11.36, p<0.05, n=417), with more mothers reported as GP or swinging voters 
than fathers. These results were in line with findings in Study 1. 
 
POVERTY PROPOSALS 
 
Students’ responses to Feagin’s (1972) poverty proposals were also compared. Overall, 
responses to these items demonstrated normality, with the guaranteed income plan 
being the most favoured (mean= 3.53), followed by the guaranteed jobs (mean= 3.36) 
and equal income plans (mean= 2.58). Discipline differences were evident only on the 
equal income plan (F (3, 521) = 4.94, p<0.001), with social science students considerably 
more supportive than either commerce or others. No differences were found for 
guaranteed jobs (F (3, 521) = 1.44, p>0.05) or income (F (3, 524) = 2.50, p>0.05). 
 
                                                 
31In each comparison cases were excluded if they did not have a score on both variables.    
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APPENDIX XI: TEST-RETEST RELIABILITY IN STUDY 2 
 
Test-retest reliability was assessed initially at the item level with two-tailed Pearson’s 
correlations.32 While generally participants gave the same score or one point different 
when tested the second time, the small sample size meant a small number of participants 
who deviated dramatically affected the correlation. Demographic variables such as sex, 
age and parents’ levels of education were not assessed. 
 
TABLE XIa: Test-retest reliability correlations for background 
variables 
   Pearson’s  r  n 
Participant 0.832***  50 
Father 0.819***  49 
Mother 0.887***  49 
Party 
identification 
Partner 0.965***  47 
Current financial 
situation 
0.891*** 50 
Future financial 
situation 
0.700*** 50 
Future employment  0.849***  49 
Subjective 
variables 
Class^ 0.913***  42 
Received social 
security 
Present 1.00***  50 
 Past^^  0.921***  50 
Outcomes of 
people’s lives^^^ 
 0.448***  50 
Guaranteed jobs  0.573***  50 
Guaranteed income  0.624***  50 
Poverty 
plans^^^^ 
Equal income  0.697***  50 
^Those who selected “no such thing” were excluded. With them included correlation drops to r 
(47) = 0.844, p<0.001 
^^Two people who initially reported not having received benefits in the past indicated that they 
had on the second testing occasion. Neither was currently receiving benefits 
^^^ Seven people switched from the internal to the mixed model and four others did the reverse. 
There were also comments from participants indicating that they did not believe that it was “an 
even mixture” of these forces even when they chose this alternative (despite the question asking 
what people’s outcomes were “mostly due to”; emphasis included). 
^^^^ There was s fair bit of movement in the responses to the different plans but it was generally 
only one step (most commonly from oppose or favour to neutral or vice versa). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 While in the total sample most items had satisfactory skew and kurtosis, in the much smaller test-retest 
sample this was not the case.   
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TABLE XIb: Test-retest reliability correlations for wealth and poverty 
explanation items  
   r-value 
(n=50) 
r-value (don’t know 
excluded) 
                                    n 
Work harder  0.480***  0.432**  48 
Take risks  0.433***  0.476***  48 
More ambitious  0.381**  0.380**  49 
Inherited 0.382**  0.382**  49 
Particular skills  0.230  0.368*  47 
Contacts 0.589***  0.589***  50 
Better money management  0.665***  0.646***  48 
Right place, right time  0.458***  0.451***  49 
Drive and perseverance  0.553***  0.507***  49 
System favours entrepreneurs  0.165  0.468**  31 
Better education  0.355**  0.439**  47 
Ruthless and determined  0.390**  0.420**  43 
Government policies  0.123  0.550***  41 
Worldwide economic conditions 0.526***  0.445**  48 
WEALTH 
High wage occupations  0.495***  0.495***  50 
Lack motivation  0.392**  0.600***  47 
Minimum wage too low  0.665***  0.648***  47 
Lack ability  0.543***  0.605***  46 
Unemployed or casual  0.402**  0.396**  49 
Cannot manage money  0.547***  0.562***  44 
Living areas  0.263  0.201  46 
Capitalist economic system  0.395**  0.466***  45 
Low level education  0.547***  0.547***  50 
Government policies  0.677***  0.751***  45 
Prefer social security  0.638***  0.745***  45 
Poor role models  0.258  0.406**  48 
Social security inadequate  0.595***  0.469***  45 
Limited educational 
opportunities 
0.656*** 0.691*** 48 
Drug or alcohol addiction  0.523***  0.608***  44 
POVERTY 
Changing job market  0.314*  0.477***  46 
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TABLE XIc: Test-retest reliability correlations for ideological items  
   r-value 
(n=50) 
r-value (don’t know 
excluded) 
                                  n 
Law for rich and poor  0.768***  0.802***  48 
Gap between rich and poor  0.587***  0.613***  49 
Big business benefits owners  0.426**  0.518***  45 
Competition bad  0.474***  0.474***  50 
LEFT 
Jobs for all  0.637***  0.637***  49 
Not rely on government  0.555***  0.555***  49 
Market forces should regulate  0.673***  0.661***  33 
Privatise most assets  0.179  0.324*  41 
User-pays best system 0.591***  0.552***  43 
RIGHT 
Status and income inequality  0.343*  0.336*  49 
Everybody should protest  0.644***  0.664***  49 
Flag burning legitimate  0.767***  0.767***  50 
Adults censorship free  0.783***  0.783***  50 
LIBERAL 
Pro-Abortion 0.903***  0.907***  49 
Too dependent on welfare  0.456***  0.456***  50 
Law should always be obeyed  0.555***  0.555***  50 
Young people no respect  0.660***  0.660***  50 
CONSERVATIVE 
Pro-Death penalty  0.823***  0.823***  50 
 
 
 
TABLE XId: Test-retest reliability correlations for social group items  
  r-value N 
Labor   0.646***  50 
Liberals 0.782***  50 
Nationals 0.587***  49 
One nation  0.794***  50 
Democrats 0.555***  50 
Greens 0.756***  50 
Socialists 0.665***  49 
Refugees 0.742***  50 
Capitalists 0.532***  50 
Unions 0.812***  49 
Self-made millionaires  0.835***  50 
Anti-globalisation protestors  0.704***  50 
Multinational corporations  0.695***  50 
Middle-class 0.761***  49 
Working-class 0.738***  50 
Military 0.784***  50 
Aborigines 0.787***  50 
Homosexuals 0.858***  50 
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APPENDIX XII: PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS FOR 
SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES SCALES IN STUDY 2 
 
WEALTH 
The two-factor solution was clearly adequate for the wealth explanation PCA, accounting 
for 47.29% of the total variance (see Table XIIa). One item was excluded due to a large 
amount of missing data (don’t know responses). The first factor was again 
individualistic, and initially consisted of eight items and explained 25.73% of the overall 
variance. However, two of these items loaded higher on the second factor and internal 
reliability analysis suggested their removal. The remaining six items had strong internal 
(Cronbach’s α= 0.82) but only moderate test-retest reliability (r (45) = 0.61, p<0.001). 
The second factor contained eight items, both systemic and fatalistic, as before. It 
explained 21.57% of the total variance and had reasonable internal (α= 0.79) and test-
retest reliability (r (41) = 0.51, p<0.001). The lower test-retest reliabilities were most 
likely due to the presence of missing data. 
  
TABLE XIIa: Structure matrix loadings for PCA for wealth   
 
 IW  SW 
Eigenvalue 3.602  3.019 
    
Ambitious 0.805   
Drive and perseverance  0.778   
Work harder  0.713   
Take risks  0.699   
Particular skills  0.649   
Money management  0.628   
Worldwide economic conditions    0.787 
Government policies    0.771 
Better education    0.615 
Inherited   0.594 
Contacts   0.584 
Right place, right time  0.368  0.534 
Ruthless and determined  0.428  0.528 
High wage occupations    0.473 
System favours entrepreneurs-
EXCLUDED 
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POVERTY 
A two-factor solution was also used for the poverty explanation items (see Table XIIb). 
One item was excluded due to poor test-retest reliability and two more were excluded 
after they loaded low on both components. This time the first factor was systemic, 
accounting for 23.35% of the total variance and consisting of six items. Cronbach’s alpha 
of this component was 0.76, while Pearson’s r was 0.82 (p<0.001, n=44). The second, 
individualistic component explained 21.85% of the total variance and also consisted of 
six items. It had well internal (α= 0.74) and test-retest reliability (r (40) = 0.73, 
p<0.001). 
  
 
TABLE XIIb: Structure matrix loadings for PCA for poverty 
 
 SP  IP 
Eigenvalue 3.129  2.702 
    
Government policies  0.793   
Social security inadequate  0.736   
Limited education opportunities  0.677   
Minimum wage too low   0.642   
Capitalism 0.611   
Changing job market  0.534   
Poor money management    0.716 
Lack motivation    0.713 
Lack ability    0.630 
Cycle of poverty    0.629 
Prefer social security to work    0.616 
Drugs/alcohol   0.588 
Live in areas with low prospects and 
infrastructure- EXCLUDED 
  
Unemployment- EXCLUDED     
Low level education- EXCLUDED     
 
LEFT AND RIGHT 
A two-factor solution was appropriate for the left and right ideological values PCA (see 
Table XIIc). One of the right items was excluded due to a large amount of missing data. 
The first component was clearly a left factor, including all five left-wing items and 
accounting for 27.40% of the overall variance. Two of the left items also loaded low and 
negatively on the right factor, however, this probably reflects the correlation between the 
factors. The left component had an internal reliability score of 0.62, similar to in the first 
study, and a good test-retest reliability (r (45) = 0.78, p<0.001). The right component  
 
 
382
included all four remaining right items but only had moderate internal (α= 0.59) and 
test-retest reliability (r (42) = 0.54, p<0.001). 
TABLE XIIc: Structure matrix loadings for PCA for left and right 
 
 LS  RS 
Eigenvalues 2.466  1.430 
    
Big business  0.706  -0.309 
Gap too large  0.645  -0.354 
Different laws  0.628    
Competition bad  0.605    
Jobs for all  0.561    
User-pays best     0.718 
Privatisation     0.675 
Care for self     0.663 
Inequality good     0.551 
Market forces should 
regulate- EXCLUDED 
  
 
 
LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE 
A single factor solution was again specified (see Table XIId). Two of the liberal items 
failed to load and were excluded.33 The single factor explained 40.41% of the overall 
variance and was conservative (liberal items loaded negatively). The internal reliability 
was reasonable (0.70) and test-retest reliability was very good (r (48) = 0.84, p<0.001). 
 
TABLE XIId: Component matrix loadings for PCA for conservative 
and liberal  
 
 CS 
Eigenvalue 2.42 
  
No respect  0.738 
Too dependent  0.682 
Flag-burning permissible  -0.654 
Pro-Death penalty  0.617 
Protests allowed  -0.564 
Obey law  0.536 
No government censorship-EXCLUDED   
Pro-abortion- EXCLUDED   
 
 
                                                 
33 A two-factor solution was examined but only the two liberal items loaded on it. This was most likely due 
to the generally high support for both items, 59.7% strongly/agreed with no censorship and 78.2% with 
abortion rights  
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SOCIAL GROUPS 
All eighteen items were entered into the initial PCA, which specified a single factor 
solution, as found previously (see Table XIIe).34 Four items did not load on the 
component so they were excluded. The fourteen item component (seven “liberal” and 
seven “conservative” groups) explained 31.93% of the total variance and had a strong 
internal (α = 0.84) and test-retest (r (48) = 0.86, p<0.001) reliability.  
 
TABLE XIIe: Component matrix loadings for PCA for Social groups  
 
 SG 
Eigenvalue 4.470 
  
Liberal party  -0.711 
Refugees 0.705 
Anti-globalisation protestors  0.670 
Multinational corporations  -0.598 
The Greens  0.591 
Aborigines 0.572 
Military -0.545 
National party  -0.519 
Socialists 0.518 
Capitalists -0.500 
Homosexuals 0.491 
Unions 0.484 
One Nation  -0.469 
Self-made millionaires  -0.452 
Labor Party- EXCLUDED   
Australian Democrats- EXCLUDED   
Middle-class- EXCLUDED   
Working class- EXCLUDED   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 A two-factor solution was also tested but many items cross loaded, with conservative and liberal groups 
loading positively and negatively on each  
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APPENDIX XIII: RESULTS OF MANOVAS FOR SOCIOPOLITICAL 
ATTITUDES SCALES IN STUDY 2 
 
 
TWO-WAY (4 X 3) MANOVA FOR DISCIPLINE BY YEAR OF 
DEGREE  
 
Univariate analysis 
  Levene’s F test  Mean square  Discipline F-value 
df 11,  405   3 
IW 0.974  3.451  5.176** 
SW 0.371  0.783  1.780 
IP 1.420  4.933  8.654*** 
SP 1.251  3.443  5.297*** 
LS 0.656  3.982  8.964*** 
RS 0.742  7.671  16.311*** 
CS 1.237  8.798  17.615*** 
SG 3.190***  38.862  31.918*** 
 
Tamhane’s T2 post-hoc tests 
  I  J  Mean difference (I-J) 
Social science  0.2903 
Commerce -0.1637 
Psychology 
Others 0.1060 
Social science  Commerce  -0.4540*** 
 Others  0.2696 
IW 
Commerce Others  0.2696 
Social science  0.0402 
Commerce -0.3467** 
Psychology 
Others -0.0199 
Social science  Commerce  -0.3869*** 
 Others  -0.0601 
IP 
Commerce Others  0.3268 
Social science  -0.3677** 
Commerce 0.1276 
Psychology 
Others -0.0647 
Social science  Commerce  0.4953*** 
 Others  0.3029 
SP 
Commerce Others  -0.1923 
Social science  -0.2125 
Commerce 0.2547* 
Psychology 
Others -0.0473 
Social science  Commerce  -0.4672*** 
 Others  0.2598 
LS 
Commerce Others  -0.2074 
Social science  0.2902* 
Commerce -0.3484*** 
Psychology 
Others 0.0476 
Social science  Commerce  -0.6386*** 
 Others  -0.2426 
RS 
Commerce Others  0.3960*** 
CS  Psychology  Social science  0.1846  
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Commerce -0.4038*** 
Others 0.1412 
Social science  Commerce  -0.5884*** 
 Others  -0.0434 
Commerce Others  0.5450*** 
Social science  -0.6213*** 
Commerce 0.7717*** 
Psychology 
Others -0.1901 
Social science  Commerce  1.3931*** 
 Others  0.4313 
SG 
Commerce Others  -0.9618*** 
 
 
TWO-WAY (4 X 4) MANOVAS FOR DISCIPLINE AND YEAR 
LEVEL BY AGE GROUP 
 
UNDER 25 YEARS 
Multivariate test 
 Box’s  M  V  F  df 
Discipline 0.21***  2.27  24,  723 
Year of degree  0.07  0.76  24, 723 
Discipline x year of degree 
600.32** 
0.26 1.18  56,  1715 
 
Univariate analysis 
  Levene’s F test  Mean square  Discipline F-value 
df 11,  244   3 
IW 1.282  3.211  5.032** 
SW 0.513  0.330  0.734 
IP 2.080*  1.243  2.431 
SP 1.530  1.680  2.542 
LS 0.654  1.863  4.235** 
RS 1.790*  3.308  6.474*** 
CS 1.339  5.029  10.426*** 
SG 1.676  18.849  15.684*** 
 
 
Tamhane’s T2 post-hoc tests 
  I  J  Mean difference (I-J) 
Social science  0.2969 
Commerce -0.2777 
Psychology 
Others 0.0417 
Social science  Commerce  -0.5746*** 
 Others  -0.2551 
IW 
Commerce Others  0.3195 
Social science  -0.1277 
Commerce 0.3507** 
LS  Psychology 
Others 0.0999  
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Social science  Commerce  0.4784*** 
 Others  0.2276 
Commerce Others  -0.2508 
Social science  0.1581 
Commerce -0.3770** 
Psychology 
Others 0.0101 
Social science  Commerce  -0.5351*** 
 Others  -0.1480 
RS 
Commerce Others  0.3871* 
Social science  0.1540 
Commerce -0.5194*** 
Psychology 
Others -0.0236 
Social science  Commerce  -0.6734*** 
  Others -0.1776 
CS 
Commerce Others  0.4959*** 
Social science  -0.4991 
Commerce 0.8818*** 
Psychology 
Others 0.0054 
Social science  Commerce  1.3809*** 
 Others  0.5045 
SG 
Commerce Others  -0.8764*** 
 
25 YEARS AND OVER 
Multivariate test 
 Box’s  M  V  F  df 
Discipline  0.31***  2.62  24, 540  
Year of degree  0.19  1.53  24, 540 
Discipline x year of degree 
568.46*** 
0.33 0.88  72,  1480 
 
Univariate analysis 
  Levene’s test  Mean square  Discipline F-value 
df 15,  185    3 
IW 1.194  1.556  2.068 
SW 0.566  0.492  1.044 
IP 1.713  2.410 3.842* 
SP 1.033  2.320  3.652* 
LS 1.065  1.325  2.842* 
RS 1.816*  6.637  15.013*** 
CS 1.674  4.931  9.562*** 
SG 2.435** 24.250 20.134*** 
 
Tamhane’s T2 post-hoc tests 
  I  J  Mean difference (I-J) 
Social science  0.2977 
Commerce -0.5308*** 
Psychology 
Others -0.1208 
Social science  Commerce  -0.8285*** 
 Others  -0.4185 
RS 
Commerce Others  0.4100  
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Social science  0.2282 
Commerce -0.4119* 
Psychology 
Others 0.3426 
Social science  Commerce  -0.6401*** 
 Others  0.1143 
CS 
Commerce Others  -0.7544* 
Social science  -0.6737** 
Commerce 0.8867*** 
Psychology 
Others -0.1699 
Social science  Commerce  1.5604*** 
 Others  0.5038 
SG 
Commerce Others  -1.0567* 
 
 
ONE-WAY MANOVA FOR UNDERGRADUATES VERSUS 
POSTGRADUATES ON SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES 
SCALES 
 
Univariate analysis 
  Levene’s F test  Mean square  Discipline F-value 
df 1,  463    1 
IW 0.940  1.967  2.741 
SW 2.358  0.248 0.546 
IP 2.284  17.071  28.580*** 
SP 0.243  2.258  3.221 
LS 0.068  0.594  1.249 
RS 3.126  9.231 16.679*** 
CS 0.505  18.755  32.517*** 
SG 2.065  35.509  22.547*** 
 
Mean scores 
 Undergraduates  Postgraduates 
IW 3.310  3.097 
SW 3.607  3.683 
IP 2.985  2.355 
SP 3.367  3.596 
LS 3.420  3.537 
RS 2.798  2.335 
CS 2.982  2.322 
SG 5.407  6.316 
 
 
ONE-WAY MANOVA RESULTS FOR PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION ON SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES 
SCALES 
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Univariate analyses 
 Levene’s  F 
test 
Mean Square  F-value 
df 4,  422    4 
IW 1.007  3.495  4.938*** 
SW 0.947  2.228  5.125*** 
IP 2.888*  2.701  4.447** 
SP 0.336  7.956  12.536*** 
LS 1.145  7.404  17.884*** 
RS 2.481*  7.622  14.787*** 
CS 2.168  11.668  22.524*** 
SG 4.247**  64.223  56.969*** 
  
Tamhane’s T2 post-hoc tests 
FACTORS  I  J  Mean Difference (I-J) 
Liberal -0.2682 
Greens 0.3312 
Others -0.0460 
Labor 
Swinging -0.0630 
Greens 0.5994*** 
Others 0.2222 
Liberal 
Swinging 0.2052 
Others -0.3772  Greens 
Swinging -0.3943 
IW 
Others Swinging  0.0170 
Liberal 0.3299*** 
Greens -0.0295 
Others 0.0505 
Labor 
Swinging 0.2080 
Greens -0.3594** 
Others -0.2794 
Liberal 
Swinging -0.1219 
Others 0.0800  Greens 
Swinging 0.2375 
SW 
Others Swinging  0.1574 
Liberal -0.3821*** 
Greens 0.0249 
Others -0.1486 
Labor 
Swinging -0.0952 
Greens  0.4070 
Others  0.2335 
Liberal 
Swinging  0.2869 
Others -0.1735  Greens 
Swinging -0.1202 
IP 
Others Swinging  0.0534 
Liberal 0.6509*** 
Greens -0.0532 
Others 0.1234 
Labor 
Swinging 0.1945 
Greens  -0.7041*** 
Others  -0.5275*** 
Liberal 
Swinging  -0.4563** 
SP 
Greens Others  0.1766  
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Swinging 0.2477 
Others Swinging  0.0711 
Liberal 0.5926*** 
Greens -0.1111 
Others 0.3847** 
Labor 
Swinging 0.1997 
Greens -0.7038*** 
Others -0.2079 
Liberal 
Swinging -0.3929*** 
Others 0.4958***  Greens 
Swinging 0.3108* 
LS 
Others Swinging  -0.1850 
Liberal -0.4084*** 
Greens 0.4612*** 
Others -0.0743 
Labor 
Swinging 0.0586 
Greens 0.8696*** 
Others 0.3341 
Liberal 
Swinging 0.4671*** 
Others -0.5355***  Greens 
Swinging -0.4026* 
RS 
Others Swinging  0.1329 
Liberal -0.5680*** 
Greens 0.4835*** 
Others -0.2212 
Labor 
Swinging 0.0017 
Greens 1.0515*** 
Others 0.3468* 
Liberal 
Swinging 0.5697*** 
Others -0.7047***  Greens 
Swinging -0.4818** 
CS 
Others Swinging  0.2230 
Liberal 1.5799*** 
Greens -0.7794*** 
Others 0.5684* 
Labor 
Swinging 0.5215*** 
Greens -2.3593*** 
Others -1.0115*** 
Liberal 
Swinging -1.0584*** 
Others 1.3478***  Greens 
Swinging 1.3010*** 
SG 
Others Swinging  -0.0468 
 
 
THREE-WAY (4X3X3) MANOVA FOR DISCIPLINE AND 
CURRENT AND FUTURE FINANCIAL SITUATIONS, ON 
SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES SCALES  
 
Univariate analysis  
  Levene’s F test  Discipline F-value Discipline by current situation 
F-value 
df 34,  429  3  6  
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IW 1.172  3.797**  2.321 
SW 1.260  0.635 0.378 
IP 1.184  2.422  1.768 
SP 1.172  2.455  0.679 
LS 1.698*  0.766  0.837 
RS 1.083  9.156***  1.896 
CS 1.574*  5.100**  0.750 
SG 1.244  9.413***  0.918 
 
ONE-WAY MANOVA FOR HAVING RECEIVED SOCIAL 
SECURITY ON SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES SCALES 
 
Univariate analysis  
  Levene’s F test  Mean square  Social security F-value 
df 1,  458    1 
IW 3.769  2.459  3.426 
SW 2.465  0.093  0.207 
IP 2.712  1.124  1.810 
SP 3.312  1.128  1.607 
LS 2.497  1.992  4.201* 
RS 0.004  11.490  20.926*** 
CS 0.210  1.589  2.609 
SG 2.843  10.235  6.312* 
 
TWO-WAY MANOVA FOR DISCIPLINE AND HAVING 
RECEIVED SOCIAL SECURITY ON SOCIOPOLITICAL 
ATTITUDES SCALES 
 
Univariate analysis  
  Levene’s F test  Mean square  Discipline F-value 
df 7,  452    3 
IW 0.872  4.576  6.604*** 
SW 0.690  1.855  4.233** 
IP 1.123  5.046  8.471*** 
SP 0.941  4.991  7.425*** 
LS 0.880  4.743  10.690*** 
RS 0.448  9.590  19.550*** 
CS 1.805  10.151  18.556*** 
SG 2.720  46.363  35.367*** 
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APPENDIX XIV: VARIANCES AND INTERNAL RELIABILITIES FOR 
EACH SCALE BY DISCIPLINE AND YEAR GROUP IN STUDY 2 
 
VARIANCES FOR ALL SCALES WITHIN DISCIPLINES AND 
YEAR GROUPS 
 
 
Individualistic Wealth (IW) 
 Psychology  Social  Science  Commerce  Others 
1
st  0.72 0.77 0.54 0.58 
2
nd  0.78 0.74 0.93 0.98 
3
rd/4
th    0.60 1.06 0.63 0.64 
Post-grad  1.36 0.72 0.83 0.58 
 
Systemic Wealth (SW) 
 Psychology  Social  Science  Commerce  Others 
1
st  0.39 0.54 0.57 0.48 
2
nd  0.59 0.37 0.57 0.56 
3
rd/4
th    0.32 0.47 0.40 0.45 
Post-grad  0.24 0.48 0.66 0.62 
 
Individualistic Poverty (IP) 
 Psychology  Social  Science  Commerce  Others 
1
st 0.42  0.57  0.74  0.55 
2
nd 0.35  0.95  0.62  0.95 
3
rd/4
th   0.55  0.59  0.47  0.55 
Post-grad 0.35  0.22  0.84  0.56 
 
Systemic Poverty (SP) 
 Psychology  Social  Science  Commerce  Others 
1
st 0.84  0.65  0.69  0.54 
2
nd 0.44  0.37  1.10  0.69 
3
rd/4
th   0.59  0.68  0.55  0.75 
Post-grad 0.52  0.46  0.74  0.85 
 
Left scale (LS) 
 Psychology  Social  Science  Commerce  Others 
1
st 0.42  0.57  0.54  0.55 
2
nd 0.42  0.34  0.49  0.37 
3
rd/4
th   0.25  0.40  0.47  0.40 
Post-grad 0.27  0.63  0.70  0.49 
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Right scale (RS) 
 Psychology  Social  Science  Commerce  Others 
1
st 0.40  0.49  0.33  0.58 
2
nd 0.47  0.51  0.48  0.41 
3
rd/4
th   0.50  0.67  0.55  0.33 
Post-grad 0.33  0.31  1.23  0.48 
 
Conservative scale (CS) 
 Psychology  Social  Science  Commerce  Others 
1
st 0.48  0.55  0.43  0.27 
2
nd 0.74  0.62  0.47  0.47 
3
rd/4
th   0.45  0.39  0.43  0.52 
Post-grad 0.46  0.37  0.78  0.71 
 
Social groups (SG) 
 Psychology  Social  Science  Commerce  Others 
1
st 1.00  1.44  1.00  1.93 
2
nd 1.18  1.94  1.03  1.50 
3
rd/4
th   1.28  0.68  0.72  0.85 
Post-grad 1.00  0.75  0.98  2.12 
 
INTERNAL RELIABILITIES FOR ALL SCALES WITHIN 
DISCIPLINES 
 
Overall Cronbach’s alpha for each scale by discipline 
(n)  Psychology   Social sciences  Commerce  Others 
IW  0.82 (123)  0.81 (139)  0.82 (165)  0.79 (63) 
SW  0.72 (113)  0.81 (127)  0.80 (149)  0.81 (51) 
IP  0.67 (122)  0.76 (133)  0.72 (161)  0.73 (65) 
SP  0.81 (106)  0.66 (128)   0.77 (145)  0.76 (63) 
LS  0.54 (125)  0.65 (143)  0.59 (165)  0.63 (63) 
RS  0.54 (112)  0.53 (125)  0.52 (159)  0.46 (58) 
CS  0.74 (127)  0.69 (142)  0.61 (166)  0.58 (62) 
SG  0.80 (124)  0.84 (143)  0.73 (160)  0.84 (67) 
  
IW 
  Psychology  n Social  Science  n Commerce n Others  n 
1
st  0.8144  52 0.8151  72 0.7178  44 0.7078 25 
2
nd  0.7990  30 0.7820  35 0.8647  51 0.8607 15 
3
rd/4
th    0.7015  29 0.8302  17 0.8040  56 0.8272 15 
Post-grad  0.9256  12 0.8252  15 0.8694  14 0.7989 8 
 
SW 
  Psychology  n Social  Science  n Commerce n Others  n 
1
st  0.7271  47 0.8525  62 0.8147  62 0.8056 19  
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2
nd 0.7714  27 0.7284  33 0.8153  33  0.7827 14
3
rd/4
th   0.6478  28 0.7450  17 0.7204  17  0.8718 10
Post-grad 0.5745  11 0.8283  15 0.8283  15  0.8052 8 
 
IP 
  Psychology  n Social  Science  n Commerce n Others n 
1
st 0.5081  51 0.6534  66 0.7894  40  0.6168 25
2
nd 0.5397  29 0.8637  36 0.6686  49  0.8682 15
3
rd/4
th   0.7626  30 0.7333  17 0.6181  58  0.6863 17
Post-grad 0.7362  12 0.3537  14 0.8305  14  0.5983 8 
 
SP 
  Psychology  n Social  Science  n Commerce n Others n 
1
st 0.7994  43 0.6923  62 0.7229  38  0.6542 24
2
nd 0.7184  23 0.5562  34 0.8839  41  0.7864 16
3
rd/4
th   0.7993  28 0.7147  18 0.6351  54  0.8788 15
Post-grad 0.7500  12 0.3787  14 0.6609  12  0.7554 8 
 
LS 
 Psychology  n  Social  Science n  Commerce  n  Others n 
1
st 0.5346  54 0.7007  74 0.5757  44  0.6439 27
2
nd 0.6286  32 0.4181  34 0.5467  50  0.5044 13
3
rd/4
th   0.3975  27 0.6834  20 0.5881  56  0.5198 15
Post-grad 0.4086  12 0.7074  15 0.7973  15  0.8825 8 
 
RS 
  Psychology  n Social  Science  n Commerce n Others n 
1
st 0.3858  47 0.4299  61 0.4174  39  0.4895 23
2
nd 0.4697  24 0.5607  32 0.5028  49  0.4144 13
3
rd/4
th   0.5239  29 0.7184  17 0.4758  56  0.2892 14
Post-grad 0.5152  12 0.3650  15 0.8859  15  0.7183 8 
 
CS 
  Psychology  n Social  Science  n Commerce n Others n 
1
st 0.6402  51 0.6462  70 0.5598  43  0.2933 25
2
nd 0.7984  34 0.6917  37 0.5306  51  0.2678 13
3
rd/4
th   0.6803  30 0.4648  20 0.5706  57  0.7180 16
Post-grad 0.6832  12 0.3904  15 0.7869  15  0.7409 8 
 
SG 
  Psychology  n Social  Science  n Commerce n Others n 
1
st 0.7018  49 0.8057  72 0.7638  40  0.8752  26
2
nd 0.7930  33 0.8977  37 0.7051  50  0.7884  15
3
rd/4
th   0.8013  31 0.6881  17 0.5679  56  0.6862  18
Post-grad 0.8392  11 0.7145  17 0.9164  14 0.9313  8 
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APPENDIX XV: DESCRIPTION OF QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
CATEGORIES OF REASONS FOR ATTENDING UNIVERSITY AND 
CHOOSING DEGREE, AND RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN REASONS, 
IN STUDY 2 
 
 
REASONS FOR ATTENDING UNIVERSITY 
 
Participants were given an open-ended question asking about the “main reason you came 
to university” and why they chose “your particular degree/ programme of study”. Most 
generally provided responses to both questions (78.7%), with only 2.1% not responding 
at all, 17.3% only to university reason and 1.9% only to degree reason. The main 
demographic difference between the groups was that those who only addressed the 
“university reason” had fewer females than the other groups (59.1%). Those who chose to 
respond to neither question were younger, more likely to be first-year students (n= 6 of 
11) and their parents were more highly educated than those who responded to one or 
more questions. Participants who only responded to the degree component were more 
l i k e l y  t o  b e  f e m a l e  a n d  m a j o r i n g  i n  p s y c h o l o g y  o r  t h e  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e s .  T h o s e  w h o  
responded to neither question were obviously excluded from the following analyses. 
 
Participants’ responses were coded according to categories which emerged from the data 
(see Table XVa). For university reason up to three categorisations were allowed (most 
did not exceed two), in order of mention. Only two categorisations were needed for 
degree reason in the vast majority of cases. With those who failed to respond at all 
excluded, the percentage of participants who provided a university reason which 
matched one of the 13 designated were 95.8%, 50.6% and 12.5%, respectively (for 1st, 2nd 
and  3rd reason). Reason for degree responses could be classified into one of the nine 
categories (including two already used in university reason) for 77.9% of participants for 
the first reason and only 24.0% for a second reason. 
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TABLE XVa: Overall and order of preference for reasons for attending 
university. 
 Overall   
(n= 826) 
% of all 
responses 
% of 1
st 
responses 
(n=520) 
% of 2
nd 
responses 
(n=520) 
% of 3
rd 
responses 
(n=520) 
Employment  214  25.9 22.3 17.7  1.2 
Further  education  100  12.1 16.9 1.7  0.6 
Money 91  11.0  4.4  8.3  4.8 
To  learn  88 10.7 11.9 3.7  1.3 
Job/Career specific  83  10.0  9.8  5.6  0.6 
Personal 
growth/dream 
66  8.0 7.3 4.2  1.2 
Lifestyle  change  46  5.6 7.9 0.8  0.2 
Better  life  42  5.1 5.6 2.3  0.2 
Avoid negative 
effects 
31  3.8 2.7 2.3  1.0 
Obligation/expected  30  3.6 4.4 1.2  0.2 
Change the world  22  2.7  1.5  1.9  0.8 
Role model for 
children 
8 1.0 0.0 1.0  0.6 
Murdoch  specific  5 0.6 1.0 0.0  0.0 
Missing and 
uncoded* 
734^   4.2  49.4  87.5 
*those who failed to respond excluded  
^not in n or % count 
 
 
Over all three response categories, the most popular reason for attending university was 
increased employment opportunities. This included comments such as “…need a degree 
to get a good job” (F, 20, BComm), “To get a job in the future” (M, 19, BComm), and 
“Improve job prospects” (F, 45, BA (sociology and community development)). It did not 
include attending university in order to get a specific job, which was the case for 10.0% of 
responses; fifth most popular overall (e.g., “Needed to do my masters in order to retain 
my casual job as a sessional lecturer [F, 38, M Human resources]; “To qualify as a 
veterinarian and work in rural areas” [F, 18, BVet]). 
 
The second most popular overall response was about getting “further education”. In most 
cases, this signalled increased job opportunities and higher pay (often the second and 
third responses). This included responses such as “Higher education” [M, 20, BA 
(history and politics)], “To educate myself” [F, 40, BA (history)], “To get a higher 
education” [M, 17, BSc], “Get a degree. Further higher education” [M, 23, BComm]. It 
also included those who mentioned a qualification generally (without linking to a specific 
occupation); “To get a better qualification” [F, 21, BEcon], “To gain qualification” [M, 20, 
BComm], and “To become qualified in some area” [F, 18, BSc (psychology and biology)].   
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The next most favoured category overall was “money” (although it was less often cited as 
a first response); “Make more money. Get more respect” [F, 25, BComm], “Money” [M, 
17, Law/Comm], “To get a well-paid respectable job” (in this case employment was coded 
as second reason) [F, 17, BPsych], “To make lots of money” [M, 22, BComm]. The fourth 
most favoured reason was wanting to learn, whether generally or in a specific area. 
Examples included: “To learn” [F, 21, BPsych; M, 49, BA (history); F, 29, BMarketing 
and the Media], “To learn more about business skills” [M, 21, BComm], “…to learn about 
society” [M, 29, BA (sociology)], “’To learn’. To further my knowledge in my chosen field” 
[F, 43, BA (history)].  
 
The sixth most common type of response was for personal growth or a personal dream of 
the participant to attend university. This included responses such as; “…I wanted to 
persue (sic) what was important to me and honour myself”[F, 43, BA (community 
development)], “Something I always wanted to do” [F, 42, BA (sociology)], “I came for 
the benefits I would gain personally- self-esteem, growth, knowledge, etc” [F, 45, 
BPsych], “I wanted to prove to myself that I could get into uni” [M, 25, BComm]. This 
was followed by lifestyle changes, either forced (e.g., redundancy) or chosen, and these 
two categories often occurred in combination. Responses included; “Because I wasn’t 
happy working in other jobs- I wasn’t satisfied” [F, 22, BPsych], “Change of life/ career 
direction” [M, 33, BComm], “My position…was made redundant, my marriage broke 
down. I was in a position to start life over” [F, 41, BPsych, BA (community 
development)]. 
 
Bettering one’s life, or having more opportunities, was the eighth most favoured. This 
category included responses like: “Build a better future” [F, 21, BComm], “…to give me a 
better life in the future” [F, 17, Law/Comm], “To better myself” [F, 36, BA (general arts)], 
“Better my opportunities” [F, 23, BA (politics and legal studies). In ninth position was 
avoiding the negative effects of not attending university, which seemed closely related, 
but was favoured by different types of participants than those aiming for a better life. 
Examples included; “…I do not want to be 40 years old and at home with three kids etc. I 
can’t see myself being happy if this was too (sic) happen” [F, 19, BPsych], “I didn’t want 
to be a full time check-out chick, ignorant, uneducated, uniformed and consequentially 
lower class and without respect” [F, 18, BA (politics and media studies)], “Do not want to 
get stuck in a job with no future!” [M, 25, BComm]. 
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The tenth most favoured reason overall was a sense of obligation/expectation of 
university attendance. This included: “My parents made me” [F, 19, BComm], “The next 
logical step in my life” [M, 19, BPolitics] and “I was never not going to university. My 
expectation as well as family expectation” [F, 18, BA (history), BEdu]. Coming in next 
was those who wanted to “change the world” in some way through their university 
study/degree, which was more common as a second than first response. For example: 
“…to begin a career that would make a difference to the world” [M, 47, PhD (Sustainable 
development)], “…I could see a myriad of political forces aligning with social engineers to 
create a society that was short on depth of character…I could have continued not caring 
but I have a responsibility to the next generation…” [M, 39, BA (sociology)]. This 
explanation tended to be favoured by older students in the social sciences ( x age= 42.5). 
 
The last two categories were being a role model for one’s children and a collection of 
Murdoch-specific responses. The former was only cited as a second or third reason while 
the latter only appeared as a first response and was the only response in four of the five 
cases where it occurred. Being a role model included statements such as “…To be a role 
model for my upcoming family…” [F, 52, BA (community development)], “…To give my 
son a solid moral standing and to be able to pass on to him a love of learning and 
knowledge” [F, 27, BA (history), BEdu], “…for better opportunities for my children” [F, 
36, BA (general arts)]. The Murdoch specific reasons included “The Tav” [F, 18, BA 
(mass communications)], “Proximity to where I lived” [F, 18, BA (history), BEdu] and 
“…good atmosphere on campus” [F, 24, BA (politics and history)]. 
 
 
Relationships between reasons for attending university 
Relationships between the different reasons for attending university were also examined 
to determine whether there was a pattern of responding. For the most popular first 
reason of “employment”, (named by 23.8% of those who provided 1st and 2nd reasons), 
43.5% subsequently named money. A further 12.9% each stated career-specific and 
learning goals as their second reasons. Of those who rated money first and provided a 
second reason, 86.7% named employment as their second reason. These two concepts 
were clearly linked for participants. Overall, of those who provided at least two reasons 
(n=260), employment was the first or second choice of 58.5% of participants, and made 
up 34.6% of all second choices (even when those who named it first were included).  
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Those who cited a desire to further their education as their first reason generally 
favoured employment when they provided a second reason (56.7%), with career-specific 
reasons (10.0%) the next most popular second choice. Of the twelve people who provided 
three reasons, with employment as the first, six cited money second and one cited it 
third. Of the 23 participants who named further education first, and named two 
subsequent reasons, 14 named employment then money (60.9%). Only three people 
within this group cited money without employment, two as a second reason (followed by 
learning) and one as a third reason, with being a role-model for children as the second 
reason.  
 
Only seven people cited desire to learn as their first reason for attending university (and 
two other reasons), with three naming employment as the second. Of these, two had 
personal growth/dream and one “money” as their third reasons. There were only two 
participants who had three reasons, with personal growth first. Both had employment 
second and one had money and one role-model as their third reasons. Three participants 
named avoiding negative effects first (and offered two other reasons), with two also 
naming employment then money and one citing a better life and then employment. Only 
two further participants gave three responses with the first being a desire for a better life, 
with both naming learning as the second reason. Employment and personal 
growth/dream were the third reasons. 
 
 
REASONS FOR CHOOSING DEGREE 
 
As previously mentioned, there were nine categories used in coding participants’ reasons 
for choosing their degree, with a maximum of two reasons coded (see Table XVb). Of all 
those who provided a response to the open-ended question 77.9% gave a first reason and 
24.0% gave a subsequent reason. The nine categories used were: interest, opportunities, 
j o b - r e l a t e d ,  w a n t  t o  h e l p  o t h e r s ,  s u i t e d  s k ills/abilities, travel, entry-point to other 
degrees, money and changing the world. The last two categories were also used for 
reasons for attending university. 
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TABLE XVb: Overall and order of preference for reasons for choosing 
degree 
 Overall   
(n= 530) 
% of all 
responses 
% of 1
st 
responses 
(n=520) 
% of 2
nd 
responses 
(n=520) 
Interested 233  43.96  40.58  4.23 
Job related  99  18.68  14.81  4.23 
Opportunities 91  17.17  10.00  7.50 
Help others  53  10.00  5.96  4.23 
Suits 
skills/abilities 
21 3.96  2.69  1.35 
Money 10  1.89  0.96  0.96 
Travel 8  1.51  0.58  0.96 
Change the 
world 
8 1.51  0.96  0.58 
Entry-point 7  1.32  1.35  0.00 
Missing and 
uncoded* 
510^ 22.12  75.96 
*those who failed to respond to either excluded 
^missing and uncoded not included in n or total % 
  
 
Overall, interest was by far the most popular explanation for degree choice. This was 
commonly expressed as “Interest” [F, 21, BPsych; F, 17, Law/Commerce], “…very 
interested in the subject” [F, 56, BA (history)]”, “My degree interests me…” [M, 25, BA 
(mass communications)] but also as a passion for the area: “I love those subjects with a 
passion…” [F, 19, BComm], “I chose biology because I’m passionate about nature…” [F, 
18, BSc (biology), BPsych]. The second most cited type of reason was related to a specific 
job, which the participant either wanted to get or they were already working in the area. 
For example: “Have ten years work experience in my chosen programme of study” [F, 31, 
BComm], “Relevant to my family’s business…” [M, 20, BComm] and “…I would like to 
become an overseas aid worker” [F, 18, BA (community development, women’s studies]. 
 
The opportunities category referred to both job and career options as well as having a lot 
of choices in what came after university. For example: “Wide/diverse range of 
occupations after graduating” [F, 42, Bpsych], “Have chosen tourism because there are 
many international opportunities, growth industry” [F, 20, BTourism], “Because 
opportunities are much broader than other fields of study” [F, 35, BComm]. The fourth 
most common response category was wanting to help others. This was particularly 
popular with those in psychology and the social sciences. Examples include: “…I like 
working with people and ‘trying’ to help them” [F, 44, Bpsych], “Due to life experiences I  
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want to try and help children” [F, 23, Bpsych], “Prefer to work with people in need” [F, 
47, BA (general arts)]. 
 
The fifth most common type of reason for choosing degree overall was because it suited 
the individual’s skills and abilities. This category included responses like: “I am business 
minded…” [F, 20, BComm], “Because I’m good at writing (or so I think…)” [M, 18, BA 
(mass communications)], “Consider myself to be a good communicator…” [F, 25, BA 
(sociology)], “I thought my abilities would be best utilised in this area” [F, 21, Bpsych]. 
The next most popular response overall was money. Again this category was pretty 
straightforward, and only two of the 10 participants citing it were not in commerce: 
“Money” [F, 20, BComm], “Business is the only way to make fast and easy money” [M, 
21, BComm], “To hopefully be financially secure. Not wealthy, just comfortable” [F, 29, 
BA (community development)].  
 
A degree that offered travel opportunities or a desire to change the world came in equal 
seventh overall. Travel included a job that would allow travel and a job that one could 
travel with; “…it’s a job I can travel with” [F, 17, Chiropractic], “I want to travel with my 
work!” [F, 25, BTourism], “To be able to travel and experience other cultures while I 
work” [F, 27, BEdu, BA (history)]. The “change the world” category was dominated by 
those in psychology and the social sciences. Examples included: “The aim is to intervene 
at an early age, proact (sic) and motivate people to reach their full potential” [M, 38, 
Bpsych], “…I want to change the way psych o l o g y  i s  d o n e … ”  [ F ,  2 3 ,  B p s y c h ,  B A  
(philosophy)], “…the best way to ‘change the world’ even if only in my immediate circle” 
[F, 44, PhD (communication and cultural studies)]. 
 
The final category only appeared as a first reason and was generally the only reason 
given; that the current degree was being used as an ‘entry-level’ position so the 
participants could transfer to another course that they really did want to take. This was 
mostly students at the Rockingham campus, which has lower entry requirements, who 
wanted to transfer to a specific major at the main Murdoch campus (almost all had 
previously been rejected for the degree they wanted). Examples included: “The degree 
I'm currently enrolled in is to allow me to gain entrance to my preferred degree based on 
academic record” [M, 18, BA (general arts)],  “…to achieve my goal of gaining entry to 
medicine” [F, 19, BSc (biomedical)], “…wanted to be in the system even though I didn’t 
get the course I wanted” [M, 17, BA (sociology)], “…easiest course to do for a year until I 
could transfer into molecular biology” [F, 17, BA (general arts)].                                                                                           
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Relationship between reasons for degree 
Of the 125 people who provided two reasons for choosing their degree 60.8% named 
interest as their first reason. Of these participants the most common second reasons 
cited were opportunities (39.5%), desire to help others (23.7%) and that the degree was 
job-related (21.1%). A further 14.4% of those who cited two reasons listed job-related 
responses first. Opportunities and interest were each cited as second reasons by 38.9% of 
those who listed job-specific reasons first, with a further 11.1% citing wanting to help 
people.  
 
Those who named opportunities as their first reason (10.4%) and provided a second 
reason, were most likely to cite interest (61.5%), with an additional 15.4% each citing 
travel and money as secondary reasons. Of those who provided two reasons, eight 
participants (6.4%) named a match between their skills/abilities and their degree as a 
first reason. Of this group, 62.5% cited interest second, with money, wanting to help 
others and opportunities each cited by one person. Overall, interest was cited by 233 
participants (out of 480 who provided a reason for choosing their degree), either as their 
first or second reason and the most popular combination of reasons was interest and 
opportunities which made up 30.4% of all two-reason responses (in either order). 
 
In total 384 participants cited at least one reason for both attending university and 
choosing a degree. Of the 23.2% who named employment as their first degree reason, 
52.8% named interest as their first degree reason, with 18.0% naming opportunities and 
16.9% saying it was job-related. Of those who cited further education as their first reason 
for attending university (18.2%), 55.7% named interest, 20.0% opportunities and 15.7% 
job-related as their first degree reasons. Of all the participants who cited at least one 
reason for both questions, 12.8% came to university for a specific career/job. 
Unsurprisingly, 53.1% of these participants also cited their degree as job-related and this 
was the only instance of interest not being the most popular degree reason. A further 
24.5% cited interest and 10.2% wanting to help others as first degree reasons. A total of 
9.6% of participants offered learning as their first university reason, and provided a 
reason for choosing their degree. Of these 70.3% cited interest as their first degree 
reason, with 18.9% naming job-related reasons.  
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APPENDIX XVI: DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THOSE 
REPORTING DIFFERENT UNIVERSITY AND DEGREE REASONS IN 
STUDY 2 
 
The demographic details of people choosing different responses, based only on their first 
reason for choosing their degree, were compared in Table XVIa. Clear age differences 
were visible, with the mean ages for those wanting to change the world, making lifestyle 
changes and following dream/personal growth all above 30 years. These ages were 
clearly higher than those attending due to expectations, for further education or to avoid 
negative consequences, all of which had mean ages in the low 20s. These findings were 
not surprising, given both the reality of the world and knowledge of the university 
attendance of different age groups. Also of note were the differences in future financial 
expectations, although these seemed to be closely related to age.  
 
With regards to the results for parents’ and partners’ education levels there was one 
particularly striking difference. Those who said they were expected to go to university 
came from families with higher levels of education and their partners were more likely to 
also have tertiary education (although many were likely to be students too). Clearly, 
these households had a greater norm for higher education, which was probably why 
these participants indicated that they gave little thought to why they attended university. 
Those who wanted to avoid the negative consequences of not having tertiary education 
had most likely seen them first-hand, given the low levels of education reported for their 
parents. This was particularly noticeable given the young age of this group; most of the 
other responses which showed low levels of familial education tended to have older 
respondents (e.g., lifestyle changers and personal growers/dreamers).  
 
There were also some sex differences in first reason for attending university; however, 
these were most likely linked to age (with more older women than men). Males were 
more likely to give Murdoch-specific, obligation, money and change the world 
explanations. Females displayed a greater tendency towards personal growth/dreams, a 
better life and lifestyle change as their first cited reason for attending university.  
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TABLE XVIa: Demographic differences by first reason for attending 
university 
Age Expected 
situation 
% tertiary educated   % 
Female 
Mean Mdn  Mean  Dad Mum  Partner
Employment (n= 116)  71.55  26.92 23.0  3.65  27.52  32.73  46.00 
Further education 
(n=88) 
72.73 22.69  21.0  3.62  35.44  27.50  53.85 
Money (n= 23)  65.22  24.22  20.0 3.87  30.00  14.29  50.00 
To learn (n=62)  66.13  31.10 25.0  3.48  33.33  37.93  51.72 
Job specific (n=51)  68.63  26.53 21.0  3.46  36.17  31.25  54.55 
Personal growth/ 
dream (n= 38) 
78.95 32.74  30.5  3.57  20.00  23.53  52.00 
Lifestyle change 
(n=41) 
73.17 35.22  35.0  3.52  18.92  13.51  54.55 
Better life (n=29)  75.86  24.03 23.0  3.71  25.93  33.33  38.46 
Avoid negative effects 
(N=14) 
71.43 22.93  20.0  3.61  21.43  28.57  40.00 
Obligation/expected 
(n=23) 
60.87 18.57  19.0  3.74  38.10  60.87  82.61 
Change world (n= 8)  62.50  42.50 39.5  3.25  0.00 37.50  33.33 
Role model for kids 
(n=0) 
0.00           
Murdoch specific (n=5)  60.00 19.40  18.0  4.00  40.00  80.00  0.00 
 
 
Demographic differences in reason for choosing discipline 
Demographic differences in the first reason given for choosing their discipline were also 
evident, although less pronounced than in reason for choosing university (see Table 
X V I b ) .  M a l e s  w e r e  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  w a n t  t o  c h a n g e  t h e  w o r l d ,  t o  c h o o s e  t h e i r  d e g r e e  
because of the opportunities it offered or because it was related to a specific occupation. 
Females were more likely to nominate money, travel possibilities and a match to their 
skills as their reasons for choosing their discipline. There were also noticeable age 
differences, with older participants favouring disciplines they thought would allow then 
to help others, change the world or pursue a specific career. Not surprisingly, those 
categories with the oldest respondents also showed the lower levels of parental and 
partner education, with those who wanted to help others showing the lowest levels.  
 
Those with the highest expectations about their financial future were more likely to give 
reasons related to travel, opportunities and a match in skills and abilities (this was 
probably related to age). Those who wanted to help others or change the world, were 
planning to change degrees or, ironically, choose their degree to make money, had the 
lowest expectations. This latter finding was in contrast to the differences found for  
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reason for attending university, and commonsense.35 Most likely it was the small sample 
size that bought about this anomaly.    
  
TABLE XVIb: Demographic differences by first reason for choosing 
discipline 
Age Expected 
situation 
% tertiary educated   % 
Female 
Mean Mdn  Mean  Dad  Mum Partner 
Interested (n=211)  78.67  26.16  22.0  3.55  29.90 36.36 48.31 
Job related (n=77)  68.83  27.48  23.0  3.55  24.64 27.14 55.00 
Opportunities (n=52)  63.46  23.17  21.0  3.90  32.65 36.73 55.56 
Help  others  (n=31)  74.19 33.48  32.0  3.35  10.71 10.71 35.00 
Suits skills/abilities (n= 
14) 
92.86 26.07  21.0  3.79  46.15 14.29 60.00 
Money (n=4)  100.00  22.50  20.5  3.50  50.00 50.00 N/A 
Travel (n=3)  100.00  21.00  21.0  4.00  66.67 66.67 N/A 
Change the world 
(n=5) 
60.00 30.40  29.0  3.50  40.00 40.00 50.00 
Entry-point  (n=7)  71.43 18.00  18.0  3.36  42.86 33.33 0.00 
 
 
GOODNESS OF FIT CHI-SQUARES COMPARING 
UNIVERSITY AND DEGREE REASONS BY DISCIPLINE 
 
TABLE XVIc: Goodness-of-fit chi-square comparisons for university 
reasons by academic discipline 
  Expected values  Observed values Chi-value  N 
Further education  No  Yes  2.153  97 
Job specific  No  Yes  7.205  80 
Personal growth/dream  No  Yes  6.437  60 
Lifestyle change  No  Yes  9.838*  45 
Better life  No  Yes  5.316  18 
Change the world  No  Yes  10.777*  41 
 
 
 
TABLE XVId: Goodness-of-fit chi-square comparisons for degree 
reasons by academic discipline 
  Expected values  Observed values Chi-value  N 
Interest Yes  No 18.285***  172 
Opportunities No  Yes  41.678***  91 
Job-related No  Yes  12.161**  99 
Suits skills/abilities  No  Yes  0.860  21 
                                                 
35 Three of these participants were commerce students and one a social science student. The latter 
participant and two of the former indicated they expected to be comfortable, while the other choose very 
wealthy.  
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Help Others  No  Yes  24.440***  53 
 
GOODNESS OF FIT CHI-SQUARES COMPARING 
UNIVERSITY AND DEGREE REASONS BY YEAR GROUPS 
 
  
TABLE XVIe: Goodness-of-fit chi-square comparisons for university 
reasons by year of study 
 
  Expected values  Observed values Chi-value  N 
Employment No  Yes  6.456  288 
Money No  Yes  4.606  66 
Job specific  No  Yes  2.003  80 
Personal growth/dream  No  Yes  4.278  60 
Better life  No  Yes  1.892  41 
 
 
 
TABLE XVIf: Goodness-of-fit chi-square comparisons for degree 
reasons by year of study 
 
  Expected values  Observed values Chi-value  N 
Interest Yes  No 3.227  172 
Opportunities No  Yes  6.222  91 
Job-related No  Yes  1.885  99 
Suits skills/abilities  No  Yes  5.869  21 
Help Others  No  Yes  3.051  53 
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APPENDIX XVII: STUDY 3 QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Project Title: Academic discipline and the sociopolitical values of 
university students. 
 
 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
Please complete the following questionnaire. You should be able to 
answer all questions in the space provided. There are no right or 
wrong answers, so just respond truthfully. If you cannot answer a 
question you can write “don’t know”. Please feel free to add 
comments about the questionnaire as you go. 
 
Thankyou for your participation in this study. Your help means a lot to me. 
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PLEASE INDICATE THE STRENGTH OF YOUR AGREEMENT WITH THE 
FOLLOWING STATEMENTS AS: 
  
Strongly disagree         Disagree     Slightly disagree         Slightly agree         Agree        Strongly agree    
             1     2    3          4       5    6 
 
EXPLANATIONS FOR WEALTH: 
 
1. Wealthy people work harder   
2. Wealthy people take risks   
3. Wealthy people are more ambitious   
4. Wealth is inherited from the family   
5. Wealthy people are better at managing their money (e.g. saving, investing)   
6. Wealthy people are in the ‘right place at the right time’   
7. Wealthy people have drive and perseverance   
8. Better education is available to the wealthy   
9. Government policies make it easier for the wealthy to become wealthier   
10. Worldwide economic conditions favour the wealthy   
 
EXPLANATIONS FOR POVERTY: 
 
1. The poor lack motivation   
2. The minimum wage is too low   
3. Government policies which maintain inequality   
4. The poor lack ability   
5. People would rather stay on social security than work   
6. Limited educational opportunities for the poor   
7. The social security system is inadequate   
8. The poor cannot manage their money   
9. Poor role models within the family (cycle of poverty)   
10. The capitalist economic system means that some people have to be on the bottom 
and others on top                      
 
 
 
Any other explanations for wealth or poverty which you feel are important: 
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PLEASE INDICATE THE STRENGTH OF YOUR AGREEMENT WITH EACH OF 
THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS: 
 
Strongly disagree       Disagree        Slightly disagree       Slightly agree       Agree        Strongly agree  
  (1)               (2)                        (3)                           (4)                       (5)                   (6) 
 
 
1. There is one law for the rich and another for the poor 
 
 
2. Individuals should take care of themselves and  not rely on the government 
 
 
3. The gap between the rich and the poor is too large 
 
 
4. The government should allow market forces to regulate the economy                      
 
 
5. Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers 
 
 
6. The government should use private companies, which are more efficient, 
 to run services (like welfare, employment, prisons)  
 
 
7. People should pay for their own education and health care 
 
 
8. Competition brings out the worst in people 
 
 
9.The government should provide a job for everyone who  
wants one                           
 
 
10. Status and income inequality in society encourage  
individual effort 
 
 
11. Everybody should be allowed to stage protests and demonstrations 
 
 
12. People have become too dependent on the welfare state 
 
 
13. Flag-burning is a legitimate form of free speech 
 
 
14. The law should always be obeyed, without exception 
 
 
15. Adults should be able to watch or read what they want,  
without government censorship 
 
 
16. Young people today do not show enough respect for authority 
 
 
17. The death penalty should be reintroduced 
 
 
18. It’s every woman’s right to choose an abortion 
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PLEASE INDICATE THE NATURE OF YOUR FEELINGS GENERALLY TOWARDS 
EACH OF THE FOLLOWING GROUPS IN AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY: 
  
 
Very Negative             Neutral                    Very Positive 
          0  1  2  3  4           5  6  7  8  9  10 
                                
  
1. Labor Party 
 
 
2. Liberal Party 
 
 
3. One Nation 
 
 
4. The Greens               
                                        
 
5. Socialists               
                                          
 
6. Refugees 
 
 
7. Capitalists 
 
 
8. Unions 
 
 
9. Self-made millionaires 
 
 
10. Anti-globalisation protestors 
 
 
11. Multinational corporations 
 
 
12. Military 
 
 
13. Aborigines 
 
 
14. Homosexuals 
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PLEASE COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING SECTION. QUESTIONS REQUIRE 
PLACING AN X NEXT TO A RESPONSE OR A WRITTEN ANSWER. THERE ARE NO 
RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS AND YOU CAN ANSWER “DON’T KNOW”. 
 
 
1. Sex 
 
Female   Male   
2. Age 
 
 
3. Title of degree you completed at Murdoch   
 
 
4. The years you spent at Murdoch University  
e.g. 1998-2001 
 
 
5. Any other qualifications (and year) attained          
Employed:  Full-time   Part-time   Casual/ 
Contract 
  6. Are you currently 
Not employed:  Looking  
for work 
 Not 
looking 
 Study   
7. Please indicate your current job title/ course 
 
 
8. Father’s highest level of education 
 
 
9. Mother’s highest level of education 
 
 
10. (If applicable) Partner’s highest  
level of education 
 
 
11. Which political party do you usually vote 
for?  
(if it changes please indicate) 
 
Mother  |  
Father    |  
12. Which political party do you think the 
following people vote for? 
(or voted if  deceased?; can indicate “don’t know”)  Partner  | 
 
 
 
13. Would your current financial situation be best described as: 
 
Poor   Scraping  by    Comfortable   Well-off   Very  wealthy   
 
14. In ten years time would you expect your financial situation to be best described as  
 
Poor   Scraping  by    Comfortable   Well-off   Very  wealthy    
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15. How difficult was it to find employment after you graduated from university 
 
Very 
difficult 
    Somewhat 
difficult       
  Fairly easy           Very easy    Did not look 
 
 
  
16. Please mark where you consider yourself to be on the following scale 
 
Working class-------------------------------Middle class------------------------------Upper class 
 
 
 
 
        
17. What was the main reason you went to university? 
       Why did you choose your particular degree? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you think going to university changed your beliefs and values? 
In what way/s? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANKYOU AGAIN FOR TAKING THE TIME TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS 
STUDY. YOUR HELP IS GREATLY APPRECIATED. PLEASE FEEL FREE TO 
ADD FURTHER COMMENTS. 
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APPENDIX XVIII: RESPONSE RATE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF 
STUDY 3 SAMPLE 
 
 
TABLE XVIIIa: Response rate related information overall 
 Graduates 
1998-2003 
Provided email 
addresses 
Appearing on 
more than one list
# completed 
1
st request 
Social 
Sciences 
551 250  62  25 
History 165 75  4  5 
Politics 172 79  30  10 
Sociology 214  96  28  18 
Psychology 235  149  27  16 
Commerce 1974  744  5  14 
 
   “# double or triple major” refers only to those who appeared on more than one of 
these lists but accounts for discrepancies in numbers (one triple major each in 
social sciences and psychology) 
   Totals are different due to those who had majors in more than one area, with 
sociology and politics being one of most common combinations although there 
were some cross category doubles counted twice  
   Double majors between three main categories placed in “mixed” group 
 
 
TABLE XVIIIb: Response related information second contact 
 Approximate 
delivered 2
nd 
time 
Completed 2
nd 
request 
Approximate 
response rate 
2
nd request only 
% total 
graduates 
included 
Social Sciences  121  27  22.31  10.66 
History  62 12 19.35   
Politics  59 11 18.64   
Sociology 61  8  13.11   
Psychology  92 10 10.87  11.16 
Commerce 669  45  6.73  3.00 
 
   Double majors not removed in individual social science response rate calculations 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND COMPARISONS 
 
As Table XVIIIa shows there were clear age (
2 X (2) = 74.27, p<0.001)36 and sex (
2 X (2) 
= 8.54, p<0.05) differences among the alumni participants, in the same direction as the 
previous studies (more female psychology participants, more male commerce, older 
                                                 
36 Those under and over 30 years were compared on their distribution over the three main disciplines. 
Mixed degree participants were excluded from all chi-squares due to their small numbers.    
 
 
413
social science). The number of years taken to complete degree differed between 
discipline groups (F (2, 54) = 4.15, p<0.05), with social science graduates taking 
significantly longer than those from commerce, but this was consistent with the age 
differences found37 and the tendency to have a greater number of majors in the social 
sciences. Time spent at Murdoch dropped slightly when those who completed post-
graduate study were excluded but the differences between disciplines remained the 
same. Those who had graduated more recently were more likely to take part in the study, 
which was most likely related to the accuracy of the email addresses used.      
 
 
TABLE XVIIIa: Descriptives by discipline 
   Overall 
(n=143) 
Psychology 
(n= 26) 
Social science 
(n= 52) 
Commerce 
(n=59) 
Sex   % Female  67.8  84.6  73.1  59.3 
Mean 31.4 31.8  40.8  29.2 
Mdn 28.0  26.5  45.0  27.0 
% 21-24  18.2  26.9  13.5  16.9 
% 25-34  44.1  42.3  21.2  69.5 
% 35-44  13.3  19.2  11.5  6.8 
Age  
% 45+  24.5  11.5  53.8  6.8 
Mean 1997  1998  1996  1997  Year began 
Mdn 1997  1997  1996  1998 
Mean 2001  2002  2002  2001  Year 
graduated  Mdn 2002  2002  2002  2001 
Mean 5.19 5.26  6.24  3.84  Years at 
Murdoch  Mdn 4.75  5.00  6.00  4.00 
Mean 4.91 5.15  6.07  3.72  Postgrads 
excluded  Mdn 4.00  5.00  6.00  4.00 
No 16.1  15.4  26.9  5.1 
F-T 60.8  53.8  40.4  84.7 
P-T 8.4  19.2  9.6  1.7 
% Employed 
Casual 14.7  11.5  23.1  8.5 
Employed 70.6  76.9  55.8  84.7 
Looking 2.1    0.0  1.9  1.7 
Not looking  0.7   0.0  1.9   0.0 
% Other 
employment 
situations 
Study 26.6 23.1  40.4  13.6 
 
 
O v e r a l l ,  8 3 . 9 %  o f  p a r t i c i p a n t s  w e r e  e m p l o y e d ,  m o s t  f u l l - t i m e .  T h e  v a s t  m a j o r i t y  o f  
respondents were employed only, with a further three looking for work, one not looking 
and 38 in further study (with 52.6% of those studying also employed, although only 
13.2% full-time). There were significant differences between disciplines, with those who 
were employed full-time more likely to be commerce graduates, while those employed 
                                                 
37 Mature-age students are more likely to be part-time and take time off during study, due to outside 
commitments (family, work etc.).   
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part-time or casual, or not employed, were more likely to be from the social sciences (see 
Table XVIIIb). Those participants who were in study were more likely to be from the 
social sciences, compared to those who were only employed, while commerce graduates 
were less likely to be studying. 
 
TABLE XVIIIb: Chi square comparisons  
  Expected Observed  df  Chi-value  n 
Part-time/casual 2 21.243*** 31  Full-time 
Not employed  2  22.132***  21 
Employment 
type 
Part-time/casual Not  employed  2  1.186  21 
Employed only 
vs. studying 
Employed only  Studying  2  16.726***  35 
 
Occupations were classified according to the ASCO supergroups, with the additional 
categories of student and self-employed, for the 137 participants who provided a job title 
(see Section 6.2 for classifications). The majority of participants held managerial 
occupations (46.0%), followed by professional (16.8%) and clerical, sales or service 
occupations (14.6%). Three participants had artistic, literary or sports occupations while 
one was in primary production and one was self-employed. A further 19.0% indicated 
t h a t  t h e y  w e r e  s t u d e n t s  o n l y  o r  o n l y  e m p l oyed at university (i.e., tutor or research 
assistant). When participants indicated another occupation first, they were classified 
according to this, rather than as a student.  
 
In order to compare the occupational classifications by discipline, the categories were 
collapsed into managerial and clerical/administrative occupations, professional and 
other occupations, and students. Only two chi-squares were possible as commerce 
participants only had low numbers of continuing students and professional/other 
occupations (n=5 for each). The results indicated significant differences in occupational 
distribution between the social science graduates and those from commerce (
2 X (2) = 
35.87, p<0.001), but not psychology (
2 X (2) = 2.97, p>0.05). Social science participants 
were underrepresented in the managerial/administrative categories, and 
overrepresented in the other two, compared to commerce graduates. It was likely that 
the difference between psychology and commerce graduates would also have been 
significant but small cell sizes meant this comparison was not possible. Overall, 38.5% of 
psychology and 27.1% of social science participants were professionals/others, compared 
to only 8.6% of those from commerce. The managerial/administrative percentages were 
46.2, 43.7 and 82.8%, for psychology, social science and commerce, respectively.  
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As Table XVIIIc indicates, parents’ and partners’ levels of education were similar to 
earlier studies, but with slightly higher proportions of university educated parents and 
partners than was found previously. Education was reclassified as low (Year 10 or less), 
medium (Year 12, TAFE or trade qualification or some university) or high (completed 
undergraduate or postgraduate degree). Looking at postgraduate study, 13.8% of 
partners had a higher degree, compared with only 8.0% of fathers and 3.5% of mothers. 
These results were similar to past findings, with slightly higher levels of eduction for 
partners than found previously, but this was most likely attributable to the alumni 
participants’ higher ages. Goodness of fit chi-squares indicated no significant differences 
in the distribution of the three academic disciplines between fathers (
2 X (2) = 3.01, 
p>0.05), mothers (
2 X (2) = 2.61, p>0.05) or partners (
2 X (2) = 3.07, p>0.05) who did 
verus did not have tertiary education levels. Parents’ levels of education were virtually 
identical (for non tertiary fathers: n= 92, mothers= 93; for tertiary fathers n= 45, 
mothers= 44). 
 
TABLE XVIIIc: Education levels of family members 
%   Overall 
(n=143) 
Psychology 
(n= 26) 
Social science 
(n= 52) 
Commerce 
(n=59) 
Low   42.8  38.5  52.0  40.4 
Medium 29.7  23.1  24.0  35.1 
Father’s 
education 
(n= 138)  High 27.5  38.5  24.0  24.6 
Low   52.8  50.0  55.8  55.2 
Medium 23.9  19.2  25.0  24.1 
Mother’s 
education 
(n= 142)  High 23.2  30.8  19.2  20.7 
Low   16.0  27.8  10.3  18.8 
Medium 24.5  33.3  30.8  12.5 
Partner’s 
education 
(n= 94)  High 59.6  38.9  59.0  68.8 
 
 
 
SUBJECTIVE VARIABLES 
 
For subjective financial situation, most participants rated their current situation as 
“comfortable” (69.7%), with the next most common category being “scraping by” 
(23.2%). However, participants were more confident about their future situations (“in 10 
years”), with 47.0% expecting to be comfortable, 42.5% expecting to be “well-off” and 
5.7% expecting to be “very wealthy”. Table XVIIId indicates the mean scores by 
discipline. One-way ANOVAs found no significant differences for current financial 
situation (F (2, 133) = 0.92, p>0.05), however, there was a large significant difference for  
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future situation (F (2, 132) = 12.33, p<0.001). This was again due to social science 
students rating their future situation significantly lower than both commerce (at 
p<0.001) and psychology (at p<0.05). Of the eight participants who expected to be very 
wealthy in the future, five were from commerce, whereas seven of the eight who expected 
to be less than comfortable were from the social sciences. There were slight sex 
differences in current financial situation, and age differences on future financial 
situation, with the latter inextricably linked to discipline and life-cycle issues.38 
 
TABLE XVIIId: Mean subjective measures scores by discipline 
 Overall 
(n=143) 
Psychology 
(n= 26) 
Social science 
(n= 52) 
Commerce 
(n=59) 
Current financial 
situation 
2.82 2.71  2.81  2.88 
Future financial 
situation 
3.47 3.54  3.12  3.75 
Ease of finding 
employment 
2.72 2.65  2.73  2.74 
Subjective class  4.92  4.87  4.70  5.17 
 
When it came to finding employment after graduation, 13.48% of participants did not 
look, with just over half going on to further study and others indicating that they already 
had jobs prior to graduating. The majority of the remaining participants found it “fairly” 
or “very easy” to obtain employment (61.5%), although 28.7% found it “somewhat 
difficult” and a further 9.8% “very difficult”. For all discipline groups a majority chose 
the easy categories, with a one-way ANOVA yielding a non-significant result (F (2, 132) = 
1.87, p>0.05). There were also no age or sex differences in ease of finding employment 
rating.39 
 
The final subjective variable was a continuous self-placement class scale. Participants 
could score between 0 and 10, with 0.5 intervals, but most described themselves as 
middle-class (5), with 47.1% scoring between 4.5 and 5.5 and 65.2% between 4 and 6. 
There were no significant differences between the disciplines in terms of their self-
                                                 
38A two-way (4x2) ANOVA indicated a marginally significant main effect for sex only (F (1) = 4.15, 
p<0.05) on current financial situation, with men rating their current situation more highly (x females= 
2.79; males= 3.00).A two-way (4x2) ANOVA for expected financial situation yielded a highly significant 
main effect for age only (F (3) = 6.07, p<0.001), with those aged 45 and over having significantly lower 
expectations of the future compared to all three younger age groups. Similar results had been found 
previously and were not surprising, given that 80% were women and many were in their 50s and 60s. 
39Two-way (4x2) ANOVA not significant for age (F (3) = 0.62, p>0.05), sex (F (1) = 0.68, p>0.05), or their 
interaction (F (3) = 2.15, p>0.05).  
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defined socioeconomic class (F (2, 129) = 1.38, p>0.05). The previous studies had found 
significant difference between students in the social sciences compared to commerce but 
perhaps this was attenuated by attaining qualifications. A two-way (2x4) ANOVA 
indicated a marginally significant main effect for age (F (3) = 3.19, p<0.05), but not for 
sex (F (1) = 0.75, p>0.05) on the subjective class measure. However, Bonferroni’s post-
hoc tests showed no significant differences.40  
 
There were several significant correlations among the subjective variables themselves, 
although these were somewhat lower than those found previously (most likely a sample 
size effect). Current and future financial situations showed the strongest, albeit still 
weak, relationship (r (140) = 0.36, p<0.001). Current financial situation had a relatively 
low, though significant correlation with subjective class (r (137) = 0.21, p<0.05), which 
suggested that other aspects of people’s lives, besides income, were being used to define 
class. The relationship between subjective class and expected financial situation was 
similar (r (136) = 0.21, p< 0.05). Ease of obtaining employment (with “not look” 
excluded) also showed small but significant relationships with the other subjective 
variables (current and future financial situations: r (120) = 0.22 and r (119) = 0.21, 
p<0.05, respectively; and class: r (117) = 0.32, p<0.001). 
 
 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
140 participants provided responses to the party identification question, with ninety-
three indicating that they usually voted for an Australian political party, twenty-five were 
swinging voters (including four who replied “don’t know), eight did not vote (presumably 
not Australian citizens but possibly abstainers) and fourteen named overseas political 
parties. Table XVIIIe gives the percentage breakdown of vote choice by discipline. There 
were far more ALP voters, percentage wise, and fewer LP and minor party supporters, 
compared to the undergraduate data.  
 
                                                 
40 This was most likely due to the small n and the presence of a significant interaction effect (F (3) = 3.13, 
p<0.05). The interaction effect was due to males showing consistently decreased class ratings with age, 
while female’s ratings remained almost the same. 
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For subsequent analyses of party identification the same five categories as previous were 
used (Labor, Liberals (and Nationals), Greens, others41 and swinging) with don’t vote 
responses eliminated. Only a limited number of chi-squares were able to be performed to 
examine discipline differences in party identification, due to the small cell sizes; very few 
c o m m e r c e  g r a d u a t e s  w e r e  G P  o r  s w i n g i n g  v o t e r s  a n d  v e r y  f e w  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  o r  
psychology participants voted LP or for other parties. These differences were significant 
for the comparisons made (see Table XVIIIf). The higher support for other parties 
among commerce students was most likely due to more international participants in this 
group. 
 
TABLE XVIIIe: Party identification by discipline 
(%) Overall 
(n=140) 
Psychology 
(n=26) 
Social sciences 
(n=51) 
Commerce 
(n=57) 
Others 
(n=6) 
Labor Party  32.1  38.5  39.2  22.8  33.3 
Liberal Party  16.4  15.4  5.9  28.1   0.0 
Australian 
Democrats 
5.0 3.8  7.8  1.8  16.7 
Greens 12.9  15.4  21.6  3.5  16.7 
Swinging voters  17.9  23.1  25.5  8.8  16.7 
Don’t vote  5.7  3.8   0.0  12.3   0.0 
Other  10.0   0.0   0.0  22.8  16.7 
 
TABLE XVIIIf: Chi-square comparisons for party identification 
Expected values  Observed values  Chi-value  df  n 
Liberals 17.649***  2  23 
Greens 3.128  2  17 
Swinging 1.035  2  24 
Labor 
Others 17.158***  2  19 
Swinging Liberals  33.931*** 2  23 
 
 
There were few demographic differences between supporters of different political 
parties, most likely due to the small sample size. There were no significant sex (
2 X (4) = 
5.68, p>0.05) or age differences (under vs. over 30 years: 
2 X (4) = 7.98, p>0.05). There 
were only small differences for partner’s (
2 X (4) = 3.58, p>0.05) and father’s (
2 X (4) = 
10.89, p<0.05) levels of education, however, there was a large difference based for 
mother’s education level (
2 X (4) = 19.67, p<0.001). Those whose mothers had tertiary 
level education, were much more likely to vote GP, and less likely to vote ALP or swing. 
One-way ANOVAs showed no significant differences on current financial situation (F (4, 
                                                 
41 Which included the Australian Democrats, One Nation and international parties  
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126) = 0.61, p>0.05). There was a marginally significant difference on expected financial 
situation (F (4, 125) = 2.73, p<0.05), however, Bonferroni post-hoc tests revealed no 
significant differences. Again, this was most likely due to the small sample size. 
 
 
TABLE XVIIIg: Demographics of different party identification groups 
 ALP  LP/NP  GP  Swinging  Others 
Sex   (% female)  71.1  60.9  61.1  80.0  57.1 
Mean 36.9  33.3  38.2  33.6  29.9  Age 
Median 37.0  29.0  31.0  27.0  28.0 
Fathers 31.1  43.5  44.4  16.0  47.6 
Mothers 24.4  39.1  61.1  24.0  38.1 
Education 
(% tertiary) 
Partners 47.7  43.5  33.3  32.0  42.9 
Working 25.0    0.0  22.2  12.0  10.5 
Middle 72.7  81.8  55.6  76.0  84.2 
Class category (%) 
Upper 2.3  18.2  22.2  12.0  5.3 
Current 2.76  2.95  2.83  2.86  2.90  Financial situation 
Future 3.25  3.73  3.17  3.56  3.57 
 
 
In order to test whether there was a significant difference in party identification based on 
self-described socioeconomic class, the measure was split into those who placed 
themselves above (n= 52) or below the midpoint (n=50), excluding all those who selected 
the mid-point. A chi-square indicated a significant difference (
2 X (4)= 13.04, p<0.05), 
consistent with the established political science wisdom that those who describe 
themselves as working class were more likely to be Labor supporters, while those above 
the middle were more likely to be Liberals (conservatives). 
 
Participants also reported their parents’ and significant others’ party identifications (see 
Table XVIIIh). Twenty-four participants reported that they did not know the party 
identification of either of their parents, which was higher than the previous studies and 
probably related to moving further from the family of origin. Looking at direct agreement 
between participants and their parents, 55.8% of participants reported the same 
identification as for their mother and 56.1% as their father. Forty-eight participants 
reported the same party identification for themselves and both parents. Within the five 
categories, 68.5% of participants reported the same party identification for themselves 
and their partner.  
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TABLE XVIIIh: Reported usual voting preference for participants, 
parents and partners 
% Participants  Mothers  Fathers  Partners 
ALP 34.1  37.5  36.7  43.2 
LP 17.4  41.3  42.9  29.7 
GP 13.6  2.9 4.1 8.1 
Swinging 18.9  3.8  2.0  8.1 
Others 15.9  14.4  14.3  10.8 
n 132  104  98  74 
 
Goodness of fit chi-squares indicated significant differences in party support between 
participants and mothers (
2 X (4) = 39.09, p<0.001) and fathers (
2 X (4) =42.07, 
p<0.001). These discrepancies matched previous findings, with significantly lower levels 
of support for the LP, and higher levels of GP and swing voting, among the participants 
compared to their parents. Partners were also reported as significantly more likely to be 
LP voters, and less likely to be swing voters, although the difference was not as large 
(
2 X (4) = 11.01, p<0.05). It was not possible to compare parents’ identifications, due to 
the low number of Greens and swinging voters, however, the distributions looked almost 
identical.  
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APPENDIX XIX: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SOCIOPOLITICAL 
VALUE SCALES FOR THOSE ALUMNI AGED UNDER AND OVER 30 
YEARS 
 
 
TABLE XIXa: Correlations between sociopolitical factors for those 
under 30 years of age  
 
N=77 SW  IP  SP  LS  RS  CS  SG 
IW 0.01 0.28*  -0.23* -0.13  0.27*  0.20  -0.28* 
SW -0.06  0.48***  0.61***  -0.30**  -0.36***  0.48*** 
IP -0.09  0.03  0.38***  0.44***  -0.43*** 
SP 0.60***  -0.37***  -0.50***  0.53*** 
LS -0.27*  -0.26*  0.54*** 
RS 0.57***  -0.63*** 
CS 
 
 
 
 
 
 -0.73*** 
 
 
 
TABLE XIXb: Correlations between sociopolitical factors for those 
aged 30 years and over 
 
N=66 SW  IP  SP  LS  RS  CS  SG 
IW  0.13  0.49***  -0.12 -0.24 0.35** 0.31*  -0.26* 
SW  -0.00  0.45*** 0.57*** -0.23  -0.35**  0.35** 
IP -0.23  -0.25*  0.41***  0.55***  -0.51*** 
SP 0.58***  -0.23  -0.48***  0.47*** 
LS -0.49***  -0.54***  0.65*** 
RS 0.58***  -0.56*** 
CS 
 
 
 
 
 
 -0.73*** 
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APPENDIX XX: RESULTS OF MANOVAS AND MANCOVAS FOR 
SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES SCALES IN STUDY 3 
 
 
ONE-WAY MANOVA FOR DISCIPLINE ON 
SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES 
 
Univariate Analysis  
  Levene’s F  Mean square  Univariate F 
df 2,  124    2 
IW 0.375 2.421  2.849 
SW 4.214* 3.653  4.474* 
IP   0.078  7.132  10.694*** 
SP 0.450  8.137  8.476*** 
LS 2.504 7.243  8.098*** 
RS 1.547  14.109  16.998*** 
CS 1.470  21.456  25.489*** 
SG 0.517  30.682  22.538*** 
 
 
Tamhane’s T2 post-hoc tests  
  I  J   Mean difference (I-J) 
Psychology Social  science  -0.4712* 
 Commerce  0.0249 
SW 
Social science  Commerce  -0.4961* 
Psychology  Social science  -0.0058 
 Commerce  -0.6923** 
IP 
Social science  Commerce  -0.6865*** 
Psychology Social  science  -0.4111 
 Commerce  0.3919 
SP 
Social science  Commerce  0.8029*** 
Psychology Social  science  -0.4375 
 Commerce  0.3175 
LS 
Social science  Commerce  0.7550*** 
Psychology Social  science  0.5288* 
 Commerce  -0.5286* 
RS 
Social science  Commerce  -1.0575*** 
Psychology Social  science  0.8683*** 
 Commerce  -0.4170 
CS 
Social science  Commerce  -1.2853*** 
Psychology  Social science  -0.4514 
 Commerce  1.0853*** 
SG 
Social science  Commerce  1.5367*** 
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TWO-WAY (3x5) MANOVA FOR DISCIPLINE AND PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION ON SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES 
SCALES 
 
Univariate Analysis   
  Levene’s F  Discipline  Party identification 
df   2  4 
    Mean square  Univariate F  Mean square  Univariate F 
IW  0.472  0.211 0.229  0.282 0.307 
SW  1.738  0.966 1.385  3.642 5.220*** 
IP    1.807* 1.998  3.262* 1.996  3.259* 
SP  1.282  2.733 2.911  3.133 3.337* 
LS  0.774  3.060 3.855*  4.046 5.098*** 
RS  1.560  5.342 6.218**  1.892 2.202 
CS  1.074  5.515 7.537***  4.679 6.394*** 
SG 1.259  4.916  5.683**  14.473  16.730*** 
 
 
Tamhane’s T2 post-hoc tests for party identification 
  I  J   Mean difference (I-J) 
Liberal 1.0536*** 
Greens 0.3407 
Swinging 0.3277 
Labor 
Others 0.4583 
Greens -0.7129 
Swinging -0.7259 
Liberal 
Others -0.5925 
Swinging -0.0130  Greens 
Others 0.1176 
SW 
Swinging Others  0.1307 
Liberal -0.6310* 
Greens -0.0102 
Swinging -0.2054 
Labor 
Others -0.3490 
Greens 0.6207 
Swinging 0.4255 
Liberal 
Others 0.2819 
Swinging -0.1952  Greens 
Others -0.3388 
IP 
Swinging Others  -0.1436 
Liberal 1.2768*** 
Greens 0.0860 
Swinging 0.2497 
Labor 
Others 0.4482 
Greens -1.1908** 
Swinging 1.0271* 
Liberal 
Others -0.8286 
Swinging 0.1638  Greens 
Others 0.3623 
SP 
Swinging Others  0.1985 
Liberal 1.3869*** 
Greens 0.2146 
LS  Labor 
Swinging 0.4031  
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Others 0.4440 
Greens -0.1723*** 
Swinging -0.9838** 
Liberal 
Others -0.9429* 
Swinging 0.1885  Greens 
Others 0.2294 
Swinging Others  0.0409 
Liberal -1.2762*** 
Greens 0.4528 
Swinging -0.2277 
Labor 
Others -0.7562* 
Greens 1.7020*** 
Swinging 1.0485*** 
Liberal 
Others 0.5200 
Swinging -0.6535  Greens 
Others -1.1820** 
CS 
Swinging Others  -0.5285 
Liberal 2.4630*** 
Greens -0.1561 
Swinging 0.7902* 
Labor 
Others 1.1652*** 
Greens -2.6190*** 
Swinging -1.6728*** 
Liberal 
Others -1.2978*** 
Swinging 0.9463*  Greens 
Others 1.3212*** 
SG 
Swinging Others  0.3749 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TWO-WAY (2X5) MANOVA FOR SEX AND AGE ON 
SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES 
 
 
Univariate analysis for age  
  Levene’s F  Mean square  Univariate F 
df     3 
IW 0.894  0.321  0.363 
SW 2.857**  2.179  2.596 
IP   0.604  1.136  1.597 
SP 1.086  3.573  3.670* 
LS 1.272  5.361  5.971*** 
RS 0.997  2.910  3.055* 
CS 1.911  6.560  6.352*** 
SG 0.874  7.884  4.786* 
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Tamhane’s T2 post-hoc tests for age 
  I  J  Mean difference (I-J) 
25-34 0.1977 
35-44 -0.5263 
21-24 
45+ -0.3419 
35-44 -0.7240*  25-34 
45+ -0.5396 
SP 
35-44 45+  0.1844 
25-34 -0.0205 
35-44 -0.8039* 
21-24 
45+ -0.6809* 
35-44 -0.7835*  25-34 
45+ -0.6604* 
LS 
35-44 45+  0.1231 
25-34 -0.2027 
35-44 0.3805 
21-24 
45+ 0.4715 
35-44 0.5833  25-34 
45+ 0.6742* 
RS 
35-44 45+  0.0909 
25-34 -0.0475 
35-44 0.9548* 
21-24 
45+ 0.7724* 
35-44 1.0023**  25-34 
45+ 0.8199** 
CS 
35-44 45+  -0.1824 
25-34 0.1616 
35-44 -0.7319 
21-24 
45+ -0.7421 
35-44 -0.8936  25-34 
45+ -0.9037** 
SG 
35-44 45+  -0.0101 
 
 
ONE-WAY MANCOVA RESULTS FOR DISCIPLINE (WITH 
AGE AS A COVARIATE) ON SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES 
SCALES 
 
Univariate analysis  
  Levene’s F  Mean square  Univariate F 
df 2,  124    3 
IW 0.754  3.651  4.373* 
SW 4.071*  1.988  2.437 
IP   0.506  8.849  13.755*** 
SP 0.344  5.719  5.925** 
LS 2.946  3.054  3.535* 
RS 1.600  11.751  14.047*** 
CS 1.246  14.250  17.010*** 
SG 0.628  23.499  17.179*** 
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ONE-WAY MANCOVA FOR DISCIPLINE (WITH 
SUBJECTIVE FUTURE FINANCIAL POSITION AS 
COVARIATE) ON SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES SCALES 
 
Univariate analysis  
  
  Levene’s F test  Mean Square  Discipline F 
df 2,  122    2 
IW 0.176  0.450  0.567 
SW 3.347*  0.917 1.274 
IP   0.085  4.497  6.773** 
SP 0.351  3.901  4.150* 
LS 0.952  2.579  3.276* 
RS 1.737  8.559  10.405*** 
CS 2.527  11.370  14.437*** 
SG 0.418  17.880  13.669*** 
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APPENDIX XXI: VARIANCE FOR SOCIOPOLITICAL ATTITUDES 
SCALES BY DISCIPLINE IN STUDY 3 
 
 Overall  Psychology  Social  sciences  Commerce 
IW 0.93  0.66  0.92  1.01 
SW 0.85  0.36  0.85  0.95 
IP   0.76  0.59  0.60  0.79 
SP 1.03  0.85  0.89  0.96 
LS 0.99  0.57  1.02  0.90 
RS 1.07  0.55  0.83  0.93 
CS 1.12  0.64  0.72  0.94 
SG 1.81  1.25  1.47  1.24 
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APPENDIX XXII: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF REASONS FOR 
ATTENDING UNIVERSITY AND CHOOSING DEGREE, AND 
DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THOSE REPORTING 
DIFFERENT REASONS, IN STUDY 3 
 
 
Overall, all participants provided at least one response; 79.7% answered both questions, 
17.5% provided only a university reason and 2.8% offered only a degree reason.42 Unlike 
Study 2, only two response categories were generally necessary for both university and 
degree reason. Ninety-three percent of participants provided a least one university 
reason which fitted the 12 categories, with 41.3% also providing a second reason. Overall, 
79.7% of participants offered at least one reason within the seven categorisations for 
choosing their particular degree, with only 13.3% listing two.  
 
REASON FOR ATTENDING UNIVERSITY 
 
Over both university reasons, the most popular explanation was again employment 
opportunities (see Table XXIIa). The two next most often cited reasons were further 
education and learning, although the former made up more first responses. Personal 
growth/dream was fourth, followed by wanting a better life and expectations/ 
obligations. The remaining responses were rarely reported. There were some differences 
in preferences compared to the undergraduate students. Money was cited far less often 
among the alumni, possibly due to their greater contact with the ‘real world’, especially 
as this reason was favoured most by younger participants in Study 2. The response of 
“desire to learn” also increased in frequency. Career specific reasons were also offered 
less by the alumni, maybe because this reason was less salient, given that most were now 
working. Lifestyle change also appeared less frequently, again possibly due to being 
further removed from the time when they entered university. One of the largest drops 
was in the number wanting to change the world in some way; again, this was likely to be 
due to experience making them less idealistic.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42Five participants’ university reasons and two participants’ degree reasons were not coded, as they could 
not be categorised with any other responses  
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TABLE XXIIa: Overall and order of responses to university reason 
 Overall 
(n=286) 
Overall (%)  1
st response 
(%), (n=143) 
2
nd response 
(%), (n=143) 
Employment 58  20.28  25.17  15.38 
Further education  32  11.19  20.28  2.10 
To learn  32  11.19  13.99  8.39 
Personal growth/dream  21  7.34  8.39  6.29 
Better life  14  4.90  7.69  2.10 
Obligation/expected 13  4.55  7.69  1.40 
Money   6  2.10  0.70  3.50 
Avoid negative effects  5  1.75  2.80  0.70 
Job/Career specific  5  1.75  2.80  0.70 
Lifestyle change  4  1.40  2.80  0.00 
Change the world  1  0.35  0.70  0.00 
Role model for children  1  0.35  0.00  0.70 
Missing and uncoded  94  32.87  6.99  58.74 
 
REASON FOR CHOOSING DEGREE 
Over both degree reasons the most overwhelmingly popular response was again interest 
(see Table XXIIb). It accounted for 60.6% of all categorised reasons and 65.8% of all 
categorised first responses. This was followed by opportunities and job-related reasons 
and then the new category of “others’ idea”. Compared to the undergraduate sample, the 
alumni were even more likely to cite interest as the reason for choosing their degree, with 
support for all other categories decreased. Again, this may be due to the decreased 
salience of other types of reasons over time. The rise of the new category, others’ idea, 
could not easily be explained, but may be a variation on suits skills and abilities, except 
that it was other people who recognised this match, rather than the participants. 
 
TABLE XXIIb: Overall and order of responses to degree reason 
 Overall 
(n=286) 
Overall (%)  1
st response 
(%), (n=143) 
2
nd response 
(%), (n=143) 
Interested 80  27.97  52.45  3.50 
Opportunities 18  6.29    6.99  5.59 
Job related  16  5.59  9.79  1.40 
Others’ idea  7  2.45  4.90  0.00 
Help others  5  1.75  2.79  0.70 
Suits skills/abilities  4  1.40  2.10  0.70 
Money 2  0.70  0.70  0.70 
Missing and uncoded  154  53.85  20.28  87.41 
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Relationship between reasons 
Looking at the relationship between reasons some familiar patterns emerge. Of those 
who gave two reasons (n=59) and the first was employment (30.5%), 27.8% offered 
money as their second reason; however, one-third gave learning as their second reason. 
This was much lower than for the undergraduates, where 43.5% gave money as their 
second reason after employment, and only 12.9% of them cited learning second. The one 
individual who named money as her first reason cited employment second. Overall, 
among those who provided two reasons, 37.3% gave employment as their second reason, 
with learning the next most popular second reason at 20.3%.   
 
Of those who gave two university reasons with further education first (22.0%), 76.9% 
gave employment as their second response. Clearly, the purpose of gaining higher 
education for most was employment. This was higher than among undergraduates 
(where it was 56.7%), but unlike those in Study 2, the alumni did not list career-specific 
reasons second to further education. The remainder of those who offered further 
education as their first reason (and gave two responses) named learning as their second 
reason (23.1%). Only one participant who provided two reasons cited a career-specific 
response, and this was second to learning. Learning was offered as a first reason by 
18.6% of those who gave two responses. The most common second response for this 
categorisation was employment (36.4%) followed by personal growth (27.3%) and 
wanting a better life (18.2%). This was close to what was found among undergraduates.  
 
The number of participants who provided two degree reasons was quite small (n=18). Of 
this group, 55.6% cited interest as their first reason. Sixty percent subsequently named 
opportunities as their second response, followed by 20% job-related and 10% for money 
and helping others. Another 22.2% listed job-related reasons first and, of these, 75% 
cited interest second (the other 25% named opportunities). Two participants who cited 
opportunities first (11.1%) both cited interest as their second reason. Overall, 44.4% of 
those who gave two reasons had opportunities as their second reason, and a further 
27.8% put interest second. The pattern of these results was similar to those found for 
undergraduates, except that a desire to help others was cited far less often. The sample 
size was very small in the case though, so the results may not be comparable.  
 
Overall, there were 105 participants who provided at least one reason for both university 
attendance and their degree. Of those who cited employment as their first university  
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reason (27.6%), 48.3% gave interest as their first degree reason. Opportunities and job-
related reasons both came next with 13.8% each. Of those respondents who named 
further education first (21.9%), 73.9% gave interest as the first reason for choosing their 
degree. A further 21.7% indicated that they had job-related reasons for choosing their 
degree. The next most popular university reason, desire to learn, accounted for 15.2% of 
those who provided responses to both questions. Seventy-five percent of these 
participants gave interest as their first degree reason. These findings were very similar to 
the pattern of results found among undergraduates in Study 2 (also see Appendix XV). 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES BY FIRST AND SECOND 
UNIVERSITY AND DEGREE REASONS 
 
The results of the demographic comparisons show some differences between types of 
reasons favoured for attending university. Again, personal growth was more popular 
among older respondents, while those who cited money and expectations were younger. 
Those making lifestyle changes were also older and so were those aiming for a specific 
job. It was likely that this reason remained salient after participants had left university 
because they had had real life experience first and then went into the area they wanted to 
after university, creating a continuous link. Learning, personal growth and money were 
favoured more by women. This was generally consistent with Study 2, although the 
money group was very small. Higher levels of tertiary education were again found in the 
families of those who felt obligated to attend university, while the lowest education levels 
were again found for those wanting to avoid the negative effects of not having a degree. 
This latter group, along with those wanting to make money, had the highest future 
economic expectations. Those with the lowest expectations again tended to be the older. 
 
TABLE XXIIc: Demographic differences in reasons for attending 
university 
Age  % tertiary educated   % 
Female  Mean Mdn 
Mean 
expected 
situation 
Mother Father Partner 
Employment (n= 58)  70.7  32.6 27.5 3.53  31.0  43.1  39.7 
Further education (n=32)  65.6 31.4  26.0  3.59  37.5  53.1  46.9 
To learn (n=32)  78.1  35.2 31.0 3.25  40.6  34.4  56.3 
Personal growth/dream 
(n=21) 
76.2 39.3  42.0  3.33  28.6  23.8  47.6 
Better life (n=14)  57.1  32.0 29.0 3.50  35.7  7.1  30.8 
Obligation/expected (n=13)  69.2 26.7  27.0  3.50  38.5  46.2  30.8 
Money (n=6)   83.3  23.5  23.0 3.80  33.3  0.0  33.3 
Avoid negative effects 
(n=5) 
60.0 30.2  28.0  3.80  20.0  20.0  0.0  
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Job/Career specific (n=5)  80.0 43.6  50.0  3.20  40.0  60.0  60.0 
Lifestyle change (n=4)  75.0  42.5 45.0 2.75  50.0  25.0  33.3 
Change the world (n=1)  100.0  48.0 48.0 3.00  0.00  0.00  100.0 
Role model for children 
(n=1) 
100.0 25.0  25.0  3.00  100.0  0.00 100.0 
TOTAL UNI REASONS 
(n=133) 
69.2 33.8  28.0  3.47  33.1  34.6  42.1 
 
When it came to reasons for choosing a degree, the demographic differences may not be 
reliable due to the small cell sizes in some cases, even when both first and second reasons 
were considered (see Table XXIId). Opportunities seemed to be a more popular reason 
among women, while men were more likely to have taken someone else’s advice. The 
overwhelming majority though, chose interest, so its demographics were very close to 
those who responded overall. 
 
 
TABLE XXIId: Demographic differences in reasons for choosing 
discipline 
Age  % tertiary educated   % 
Female  Mean Mdn 
Mean 
expected 
situation 
Mother Father  Partner 
Interested (n=80)  68.8  34.2  30.0  3.44  31.3  35.0  44.3 
Opportunities (n= 18)  77.8  29.9 25.5  3.44  38.9 38.9  27.8 
Job related (n= 16)  75.0  33.2 29.0  3.50  0.0  50.0  31.3 
Others’ idea (n= 7)  42.9  36.6 29.0  4.00  57.1 42.9  28.6 
Help others (n= 5)  100.0  30.2  27.0  3.40  0.0  20.0  60.0 
Suits skills (n=4)  50.0  25.7 26.0  4.33  50.0 25.0  75.0 
Money (n= 2)  50.0  26.5  26.5 4.00  50.0  0.0  0.0 
TOTAL DEG 
REASONS (n =114) 
70.2 33.3  28.0  3.51  29.8  36.0  38.9 
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APPENDIX XXIII: DESCRIPTION OF QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
CATEGORIES OF RESPONSES TO UNIVERSITY’S EFFECT ON 
BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES, AND DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN 
RESPONSES 
 
RESPONSE ANALYSES 
Twelve categories were generated from the open-ended responses and were used to 
classify them. Up to three categories were allowed, although most only had one (see 
Table XXIIIa). Most responses did not exactly fit the question, with participants not 
making the (obviously academic) distinction between changes to themselves and changes 
to their beliefs and values. Those who responded “yes” only had no second or third 
categories; however, there were some who replied “no” (to the beliefs and values aspect) 
but still detailed changes to the self. The abstract nature of the actual question was not 
problematic for the analysis as the kinds of responses given still seemed to be tapping the 
area of interest.   
 
TABLE XXIIIa: Overall, and order of preference, for how university 
changed participants 
 Overall   
(n= 429) 
% of all 
responses 
% of 1
st 
responses 
(n=431) 
% of 2
nd 
responses 
(n=431) 
% of 3
rd 
responses 
(n=431) 
Open-minded  56 28.4 27.3 11.2  0.7 
Increased  tolerance  30 15.2 12.6 6.3  2.1 
Expanded  knowledge  29 14.7 15.4 4.9  0.0 
Strengthened  values  26 13.2 16.1 1.4  0.7 
No 17  8.6  11.9  0.0  0.0 
Independence  7 3.6 2.1 2.8  0.0 
PWE  7 3.6 2.1 2.8  0.0 
Yes  5 2.5 3.5 0.0  0.0 
No,  mature  aged  5 2.5 3.5 0.0  0.0 
Became  activist  4 2.0 0.0 2.8  0.0 
Value education more  4  2.0  0.7  2.1  0.0 
Lost  religion  4 2.0 0.7 0.7  1.4 
No, not values related  3  1.5  2.1  0.0  0.0 
Missing and uncoded  231^   2.1  65.0  95.1 
^not in n or % count 
 
By far the most popular response, both overall and as a second type of change, was 
becoming more open-minded, which was distinct from increased tolerance. These 
responses were not necessarily a statement of open-mindedness, but more about 
mentioning a willingness to question their own and other people’s beliefs and  
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assumptions, and indicating an increased use of critical and analytical thinking. It also 
included responses about recognising bias, in themselves or others. For example: “It 
opened my eyes and made me aware of other opinions and more aware of the world in 
general” [F, 26, commerce], “Yes. I have learned to think about situations more carefully, 
to consider consequences of actions…” [F, 61, social science], “Yes. I think University 
helped me to think more laterally, to explore ideas and views in a different way & to 
challenge my own beliefs & values before I ultimately made up my mind” [M, 24, social 
science], “Yes. It taught me to question my existing beliefs & values” [F, 25, psychology].  
 
The second most favoured category overall was increased tolerance ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  w a s  
fourth based on first responses. This category included reported changes whereby the 
participants became more accepting of others and their differences (supposedly the key 
liberalising outcome of tertiary education, according to the preponderance of past 
research). Examples included: “Yes- tolerant of minority groups” [F, 52, social science], 
“Very much so prior to attending uni I had mild racist tendencies & narrow cultural 
acceptance, I now consider myself a much improved person in these areas” [M, 35, 
commerce], “I learned a lot about the diversity of values in the community, and learned 
to appreciate that diversity as an important aspect of life” [F, 31, social science].  
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
The next most popular category overall was expanded knowledge. Participant responses 
classified in this way indicated that gaining information about the world was one of the 
ways that university education had changed them. For example: “Taught how world is 
constructed” [M, 31, social science], "Yes. Exposure to a wider range of values and ideas” 
[M, 48, social science], “University did not change me but made me better informed, 
rounded out my knowledge & information base”  [F, 45, social science],  “I don't think it 
changed my basic ethical beliefs but I have changed my opinions on certain issues as I 
have learned more about them. For example, I am much more "Green" now than I was 
before university” [F, 25, social science].  
 
The next most cited change from further education was a strengthening of pre-existing 
beliefs and values (accentuation effect), which could have followed from a yes or no 
answer to the original question. Examples included: “I don't think it changed my 
fundamental values as such, but it certainly gave me the knowledge/means/voice with 
which to express them & practise them. I had often had a gut feeling that I didn't agree 
with certain positions but didn't understand why or couldn't articulate why- now I am 
able to do that much more effectively” [F, 45, social science], “No, it reinforced them” [F,  
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35, social science], “As a mature aged student I found that the general ethos of Murdoch 
University was in tune with my beliefs & values” [F, 50, social science].  
 
The fifth most common response overall was a straight no, which obviously only 
appeared as a first response. The category of only yes was equal eighth overall, with “no, 
mature aged”, and only five participants gave only this response. The no, mature aged, 
response indicated that the participant’s values and beliefs had not changed because they 
were already well-established. However, the responses in this category did not mention 
whether their values fitted with their university experience, or if they were accentuated 
by it (as in the strengthened category). Examples included: “Not really, I was a mature 
age student so beliefs and values were already entrenched” [F, 48, social sciences], “Not 
really, was pretty set in my views beforehand” [M, 28, commerce].  
 
Independence and PWE beliefs were equal sixth, with the same number of both first and 
second responses (but neither were third types of change). The classification of 
independence included responses about increased reliance on self and confidence in the 
their ability to take care of themselves; for example: “Yes, staying alone overseas make 
me learn to be more independent and understand my parents' hardship in bringing me 
to this world” [F, 25, commerce], “I think going to University made me stand on my own 
to feet. Allowed me to build my self esteem so that I can now stand up for what I believe 
in. I became a new & single parent in my final year at Murdoch & I really believe that 
going to uni gave me the mind set that I could continue to study, be a good single parent 
and work in the field of my choice” [F, 25, psychology]. Similarly, PWE (Protestant Work 
Ethic) responses indicated a greater belief in the individual as responsible for what 
happened in their own life, as a result of attending university. Examples included: “Yes. I 
value hard work & success a lot more now & admire people who have worked very hard 
to stand up for what they believe in & become successful” [F, 21, commerce], “It helped 
me to mature my way of thinking & instilled a sense of responsibility and accountability. 
I make my grades. No one else will push me” [M, 28, commerce].  
 
Equal tenth overall were valuing education more, losing religion and became more active 
in the community. An example of each was: “Not really…I do value education more now, 
because I realise it can be a catalyst to open a lot more doors” [F, 22, psychology],  “Yes. 
In opposition to my church background” [F, 45, social science] and “No doubt…I am 
involved/interested in social justice issues” [F, 46, social science]. The least cited  
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response was that there was no change as their experience of university had no 
relationship to their values. This was essentially the same as the no or “no, mature-aged” 
response. No other types of changes were offered in conjunction with this response. An 
example includes “No. Education only gives me theory training” [M, 31, commerce].                                                     
 
 
Relationship between different categories of reported change 
Of the participants who mentioned becoming more open-minded first, 35.1% gave 
subsequent responses matching the other categories. Of these 30.8% cited expanded 
knowledge second, with another 23.1% indicating increased tolerance for others and 
their ideas. The strengthening of pre-existing beliefs or becoming active both made up 
15.4% of second responses, while there was only one third response of strengthening 
beliefs (with expanded knowledge second).           
 
Of the participants who cited increased tolerance as their first instance of change, 61.1% 
gave a second response, with 45.5% indicating they had also became more open-minded, 
showing the clear link between the two issues. A further 18.2% (n=2) indicated that they 
now valued education more, while one participant each gave becoming active, 
independence, losing religion and the PWE as second responses after increased 
tolerance. There was only one third response, losing religion, after increasing tolerance 
and valuing education.                           
 
Only 31.8% of respondents gave another type of change after expanded knowledge. Of 
these 71.4% indicated they were also more open-minded, while 14.3% (n=1) each 
indicated increased tolerance or a PWE response. Only one gave a third response, 
increased tolerance, after expanded knowledge and open-mindedness. However, of those 
who cited a strengthening of values as their first change, 56.5% gave a subsequent 
change. Of these, 30.8% indicated increased open-mindedness second, with a further 
23.1% each citing increased tolerance and expanded knowledge. Another 15.4% indicated 
more independence, while 7.7% (n=1) became more active. Only 17.4% (n=4) gave third 
reasons, half of these were increased tolerance (after independence and open-
mindedness) and the one each of open-minded (after independence) and loss of religion 
(after open-minded).           
       
Only 11.8% of those naming no as their first response indicated other changes as a result 
of attending university. One indicated expanded knowledge and the other gave a PWE  
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belief. However, 40% (n=2) of those who gave a response categorised as no, mature aged 
as their first response also indicated that they became more open-minded, although none 
provided a third change. Of the three participants who named becoming more 
independent first, two-thirds gave second changes; one was increased tolerance and the 
other PWE belief. However, none of those who gave PWE responses first provided any 
subsequent responses. Only one person each named increased valuing of education or 
losing religion first, but neither gave subsequent responses. Participants cited becoming 
active only as a second response, with increased open-mindedness (50.0%) and 
tolerance (25%), and strengthening existing beliefs and values (25.0%) as first responses.  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN TYPE OF CHANGE RESULTING 
FROM UNIVERSITY ATTENDENCE 
 
TABLE XXIIIb: Demographics for first and second response only 
Age  % tertiary educated   % 
Female  Mean Mdn Mother  Father  Partner 
Open-minded (n=55)  74.5  36.1  33.0  20.0  30.9  36.4 
Increase tolerance (n=27)  85.2  33.9  28.0  29.6  29.6  44.4 
Expand knowledge (n=29)  55.2  36.8  32.0  51.7  48.3  48.3 
Strengthen values (n=25)  76.0  38.4  35.0  36.0  24.0  54.2 
No (n=17)  70.6  29.6  27.0  35.3  29.4  29.4 
Independence (n=7)  85.7  25.7  25.0  14.3  28.6  57.1 
PWE belief (n=7)  85.7  25.3  25.0  14.3  28.6  14.3 
Yes (n=5)  60.0  25.4  26.0  60.0  100.0  40.0 
No, mature aged (n=5)  60.0  40.4  48.0  40.0  20.0  40.0 
Became activist (n=4)  50.0  37.2  37.0  75.0  50.0  75.0 
Value education (n=4)  50.0  36.2  33.0  0.0  25.0  25.0 
Lost religion (n=2)  100.0  35.5  35.5  50.0  50.0  100.0 
No, not values related (n=3)  33.3  29.3  29.0  66.7  66.7  33.3 
OVERALL (n=140)*  68.6  34.1  28.0  34.3  35.0  42.4 
*only those who has at least one response included 
 
TABLE XXIIIc: Chi-square comparisons for demographics 
 Expected  Observed  Chi-value  df  N 
Females Males  2.640  1 46  Open-minded 
Under 30  30 and over  5.077*  1  66 
Females Males  5.734*  1 46  Increased 
tolerance  Under 30  30 and over  0.071  1  66 
Females Males  4.623*  1 46  Expand 
knowledge  Under 30  30 and over  9.091**  1  66 
Females Males  1.251  1 46  Strengthen 
values  Under 30  30 and over  5.541*  1  66 
Females Males  0.096  1 46  No 
Under 30  30 and over  3.218  1  66  
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APPENDIX XXIV: MEAN SOCIOPOLITICAL SCALE SCORES BY 
DISCIPLINE FOR STUDY 1, 2 AND 3 
 
TABLE XXIVa: Overall mean sociopolitical attitudes scores for each 
study 
 
OVERALL   
Study 1  Study 2*   Study 3 
IW 3.77  3.92  3.57 
SW 4.01  4.29  4.54 
IP 2.79  3.49  2.97 
SP 4.08  4.07  4.05 
LS 3.64  4.08  4.01 
RS   3.31  3.07 
CS 3.36  3.52  3.18 
SG 5.86  6.61  5.96 
*converted to score out of 6 
 
TABLE XXIVb: Means sociopolitical attitudes score for psychology 
participants in each study 
 
PSYCHOLOGY   
Study 1  Study 2*   Study 3 
IW 3.88  3.93  3.65 
SW 4.15  4.30  4.38 
IP 2.69  3.37  2.71 
SP 4.32  4.10  4.06 
LS 3.87  4.16  3.98 
RS   3.23  3.01 
CS 3.14  3.40  3.34 
SG 6.31  6.78  6.22 
*converted to score out of 6 
 
TABLE XXIVc: Mean sociopolitical attitudes scores for social science 
participants in each study 
 
SOCIAL SCIENCE   
Study 1  Study 2*   Study 3 
IW 3.40  3.66  3.35 
SW 4.09  4.46  4.86 
IP 2.28  3.28  2.71 
SP 4.21  4.37  4.47 
LS 3.88  4.33  4.42 
RS   2.89  2.48 
CS 2.98  3.17  2.48 
SG 6.53  7.42  6.67  
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*converted to score out of 6 
 
 
TABLE XXIVd: Mean sociopolitical attitudes scores for commerce 
participants in each study 
 
COMMERCE   
Study 1  Study 2*   Study 3 
IW 4.00  4.15  3.73 
SW 3.90  4.17  4.33 
IP 3.21  3.78  3.30 
SP 3.80  3.84  3.67 
LS 3.29  3.82  3.66 
RS   3.71  3.62 
CS 3.74  3.96  3.75 
SG 4.88  5.71  5.13 
*converted to score out of 6 
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APPENDIX XXV: INTERVIEWS TRANSCRIPTS FOR STUDY 4  
 
INTERVIEW 1. 
F1 = Interviewer 
M1 = Interviewee 
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F1: 
M1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F1: 
M1: 
F1: 
M1: 
 
F1: 
M1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Okay, Kevin… 
Mm hm. 
Why don’t you tell me, um, why, why did you change? 
Um, I like Psychology. However, uhhh, I find doing research psychology 
is not what I want to do Psychology for. I want to do counselling 
psychology. And I find that Murdoch University is a very much research-
based psychology. There’s so much statistics. Um, and I’m not a math 
person, I don’t like maths at all. And, um, have to do three stats units, it 
was just too much, I just didn’t like it. Um, I didn’t understand it and 
trying to get information and help for it was really hard. Um, and I failed a 
stats…just number two twice, um, and after that I just gave up, I just 
didn’t like it all. Um, although I do enjoy the psychology, like the cultural 
psychology and um, the counselling course I thought was really good, I 
enjoyed that. But, it just wasn’t going the way I wanted it to go, 
psychology wanted to go, I wanted to do the counselling. And to do a 
counselling course I’ve got to go to Edith Cowan and it’s just, just too far 
away. But I thought, Curtin sorry, it’s too far away. So, um, I sort of made 
a choice. I was given a, I was actually going to give up…um, and just pull 
out, but I thought “give History a go”, and that was my second option 
at…uh…uh, second choice when I started and um, so I give one unit a go 
and I’ve just loved it and I’ve sort of swapped over almost straight away. 
So that was it yeah, I just, I enjoyed the counselling, so I enjoyed the 
psychology, some parts of it, but just the statistics part of it I found was 
just… a waste of time. 
So you’ve moved away from science and kind of faced… 
Yeah. 
…more towards the… 
The human, human, yeah, side of Psychology that’s what I wanted it to be, 
yeah. 
So is it that you really liked that? 
Um, it’s changed a lot since when I was at school. When I was at school it 
was just, this is going back thirty-odd years, it was just, um, dates. You, 
uh, “in 1854, this happened, this happened, this happened”. Now it’s more 
of an interpretation, you can put your own interpretation of what you like 
into History. Um, dates are important, but they’re, it’s more the, events 
surrounding the dates is more important, I think. And this is what I like, 
it’s um… And now I’m getting older, I guess its like a lot of the olders, 
they look back at these things and they can see why these things happened 
and sort of stuff. They give you, it’s just different perspective, I guess, 
History. It’s not so boring; I guess is what I’m sort of trying to say. I just 
find it a lot more interesting.  
 
 
441
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
F1: 
M1: 
F1: 
M1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F1: 
 
M1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F1: 
 
M1: 
 
 
F1: 
 
 
M1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F1: 
M1: 
So it’s looking at the causes that…  
Yeah. 
…that, rather than just…? 
Rather than just the dates and events, it’s actually looking at why these 
things happened. Uh, and then, when you’re doing, um, you get a lot of, 
um, journal articles, or, sorry newspaper clippings, and you sort of see 
what’s happening on the day and what are these events leading up to, 
you’re analysing pictures, you’re analysing, um, a, perhaps, perhaps a 
book cover, why sort of this and stuff, rather than just looking at a date. I 
just found looking at dates is boring, when I was at school. But now, 
History’s moved on a bit, it’s just, a lot more interesting. Mm. 
So do you think that you didn’t really have a, um, a realistic idea of what 
psychology involved before you…? 
Um…no, it wasn’t really explained to me properly when I, when you get 
the book and read the book, um…when I did, um, Tafe…ooohh, eight 
years ago or whatever it was, I looked at the psychology and it looked 
good; the social psych, the cultural psych, um, and this sort of stuff. And 
that sort of introduced, interested me. But, there wasn’t enough emphasis 
on the fact that there is a lot of, a LOT of Maths in there, y’know. And uh, 
and not being a Math person I found it really hard to find help. A lot of the 
tutors were, ‘cause they’ve got so many classes, they’re doing the PhD or 
they’re doing masters, they don’t have a lot of time on their, and their 
access time is maybe two hours a week and that’s it. So if you’re trying to 
get extra help it’s really hard. And even going to the library, there was an 
extra class, a stats class, and even that’s hard to get into. And being a shift 
worker I just don’t have a lot of time to get into these sorts of things. So 
that’s why I really struggled. Um…yeah, that was, that was it. Mm. 
Okay. I think that’s pretty much it. There’s nothing else you want to say 
about…? 
No. I don’t mind, uh, doing these little research things. I’ve done a few of 
them over the, uh, the course of the psych stuff, so it doesn’t worry me, I 
was quite happy to do it. 
So it’s clearly not about, um… “can’t fit in”. You just thought there was a 
difference between what you wanted to do, what you were interested in… 
Well, what I thought… the perception of what I thought psychology was 
to the reality of what Murdoch psychology is was completely different. I 
wanted to do, and I would still like to do the counselling type of 
psychology. Um, so, I’ve sort of thought about, um, uh, Notre Dame does 
psych, but they don’t do any stats psych. And, so I’m sort of thinking 
about heading down that way, just to finish off the degree, ‘cause I only 
had four subjects to go to finish off the degree. Um, but it just got to the 
point where I hated coming here. And, uh, so that’s why I’ve gone on to 
the History side of it. Plus the fact I want to get a bit of paper on the wall 
anyway, just to say I’ve done something. 
(Laughing) Yeah, it’s nice when you get that piece of paper. 
Yeah. 
So, basically, you’re still looking at possibly working in that area and this 
is more of a “you wanted to do it”.  
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This is what interested me. Although, If I could, I’ve, um, I’ve been and 
seen the Education Department about seeing if I can enrol into a second 
major as in the, um, Bachelor of Education. So, that’s what I’d like to do 
as well. ‘Cause I have so much time off through work, um, a friend of 
mine works for one of the Catholic colleges in Mandurah and he was 
saying they’re always screaming out for relief teachers. So he said if you 
can get in and then do your BA, then it will, then there’s a lot of call for 
just relief teachers. So I thought well maybe that’s a sort of way to go as 
well. And, um, I quite like sort of talking to people. Yeah so that’s it 
really. 
Okay. 
(END AUDIO) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTERVIEW 2. 
F1 = Interviewer 
F2 = Interviewee 
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F1: 
Now, sorry, what, um, did you change from? 
From Sociology. 
Would you like to tell me why? 
Why.  Well, I enrolled in Sociology.  But when I started it was totally 
different from what I expected.  It was a lot about the History, to start 
with, and like all the theories and not so much about, um, I thought it 
would be more like Psychology.  More about people in society and how it 
works.  And, ah, second of all, the language it was really, really hard.  It’s 
like the text, everything, it’s so difficult to understand, and since my 
English was really not that good back then, when I tried to read the text, it 
would take me forever and I just felt that it wasn’t something I was 
enjoying while I was doing it.  So then, yeah, and since you, like, 
Sociology and Psychology is quite close, I was doing a couple of 
psychology units and they were, like, much more fun.  So, yeah, I decided 
that it would suit me better and I would enjoy it, instead of being, like, 
struggling with everything, and, yeah. 
Do you think it was more of the focus of what they were talking about in 
Sociology?  The way they looked at things? 
Yeah.  ‘Cause I wanted more about people and, and, how can you say, like 
learn more about people in… 
More, kind of, individual, rather than looking at… 
At the whole picture, yeah.  So, I guess, that’s why, and, yeah, I just… 
But I think the combination of, like, like, social psychology, that’s really 
good.  That’s so much fun. 
It tends to be a bit closer actually to Sociology.  
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Yeah. 
Than, certainly, cognitive psychology anyway. 
Mmm.  So that’s what I like more, the social psychology.  But yes, I 
wouldn’t be able to do, like, just one.  Like, both in the mixture, that’s 
really good and it makes sense.  Yeah. 
So what was it that, um, attracted you to do Sociology to start with? 
I think because, in high school we did social psychology and, for some 
reason, I thought that was Sociology.  But, then when I started, it wasn’t.  
So, yeah.  I think, yeah, I wanted that mixture and, yeah. 
So the mixture of… What do you mean when you say “the mixture”? 
Like, talking about the person as an individual and in society. And as, like 
you work as, the way you work.  In groups or, you know, in with the 
workplace.  In different situations.  And I think that’s more what I 
expected, to have more of that.  Of course it, it wouldn’t be, like, as much 
but, yeah.  And I find that more fun.  So, mmm. 
Did you come in with a specific, kind of, career in mind, or job in mind, 
or…? 
Well I always, until know, I always wanted to work with people in the 
future, working them. But, er, helping them, not working them. 
(LAUGHTER) 
But then, I still haven’t decided.  I just, when I started, I just wanted to 
end my degree, I knew that I wanted to do something that would help 
someone.  So, I’m still not sure what, but, yeah, I just, it could be 
anything.  But I don’t, I think I want to do more, like, maybe social work 
outside, like, not, not so much therapy, sitting in one room, but more, like, 
with bigger groups and, yeah. 
So they both, kind of, mesh well with… 
Yeah.  So I think that’s what…yeah.  Maybe with younger, er, like, young 
teenagers or children, but I’ll see how it, like, goes. 
(LAUGHTER) 
Yeah. 
Ok.  So Psychology’s a much better fit? 
Yeah, much better.  And it’s so much fun, so…  I think it’s important that 
you have fun while you’re doing it.  And not just, really dreading to go to 
uni.  Yeah. 
Did you find differences with the students in sociology compared to kind 
of students in Psychology? 
Well I didn’t do it for very long, ‘cause I was doing the social psychology 
and the Introduction to Psychology.  So the only unit that I was doing in 
Sociology was Introduction to Sociology.  And, no I think that, what I 
remember… 
I think it was all just a big mix… 
Mmm. 
…of people in that class anyway. 
Yeah, so, I just did that one, and then I just found that it’s quite similar.  
Like, I don’t remember thinking “Oh, I’m in a totally different world 
here”.  But yeah.  And it was quite, like, the same students who were 
doing the same units and, so, yeah.  
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Ok.  Is there anything else you want to say about either degree? 
Mmm, no. 
(LAUGHTER) 
Ok. 
Yeah. 
(END AUDIO) 
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Sorry, was…Alex? 
Adam. 
Adam.  Ok.  So, you changed from Psych’ to Business. 
That’s right. 
Can you tell me why? 
Um, I came straight from high school, um, into doing Psych’, and I 
didn’t really have a clear-cut idea of what I wanted to be or anything like 
that.  And my girlfriend at the time started psych’.  And I jumped into the 
lecture theatre to have a bit of a run-down on what the course was about. 
And, ah, yeah, still a bit indecisive, so just thought I’ll do the same as 
what she was doing.  And um, yeah, probably a combination of thirteen 
years straight of education, a few family problems, um, and just not 
knowing exactly what I wanted to do.  I thought, “I’ll just take a year 
out”, and, ah yeah, just, sort of, re-establish exactly where I want to be 
and, um yeah, when I came back, I had a much better idea about what 
would be more suitable for me. 
So how long were you in, um, Psych’ for? 
Oh, I don’t think it was very long.  It was, um, I know I didn’t, I didn’t 
submit an assessment, so it must have been, like, three or four weeks 
only, yeah.  Um, it was both of us withdrew.  So it’s probably a little bit 
of influence of each, on each other, you know what I mean. 
Did you come back with (inaudible)? 
She actually went to Curtin a year after, yeah, a year after, and started 
doing teaching. 
Ok. So why Commerce? 
Um, I think that’s the way my mind is geared, um, is towards business.  
And it’s a lot of where I’m interested, a lot of my interests lie.  But 
having said that I, I do, I really like the psychological aspect.  I’m doing 
marketing management so when it comes to things like advertising and 
promotions and things like that and why people, the intention and 
motivations behind why people buy or why they act in a certain manner, 
um, it’s really still interests me.  So I’ve done, like, consumer behaviour 
units, and stuff like that, so, I still do have an interest in Psychology, and 
I think you can’t look at, you can’t do marketing without that because  
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it’s, it’s a lot of, um, work on perceptions and motivations and things like 
that. But, um yeah, I think that’s just more of who I am: business. Yeah. 
So that kind of connection, that’s what you’re… 
Yeah, and possibly even, now that I come to think of it, the ah, the fact 
that I was looking at six to eight years before I was practising, um, in 
Psychology, as well.  And um, I just wanted to, also, get out and set a 
foundation early in my life, so I can start having a house and everything 
like that, and just, getting ready for a family early. Um, and just, ah, 
yeah, that was a big priority of mine, I didn’t still want to be studying at, 
oh, I better not say. Oops. 
(LAUGHTER) 
And ah. Like yeah. 
I choose to still study. 
Yeah that’s right, I mean, I am, I’m definitely going to cut, I’m, I’ll 
probably be doing masters within the next couple of years.  Um, so I 
definitely do want to study but I just wanted to set that foundation early.  
Um, just, relating back to my family, it hasn’t been done.  I’ve just seen 
some downfalls and I want to overcome that and not make the same 
mistakes, or, go the same path. 
So you’d think about doing your MBA in the future or… 
Definitely, yep.  Ah, I start work next January, so um, yeah. 
So you want to finish school. 
Yeah, I finish this semester.  Yeah.  So um, yeah, definitely an MBA 
maybe masters in marketing management as well.  That’s where I want 
to head at the moment. 
Mmm.  So, um, did psych’, kind of, match your expectations coming into 
it, or was it… 
I probably didn’t get deep enough into the, into the core of it.  Um, it was 
very interesting, just, like, the first few lectures and things like that 
extremely interesting, and, reading though the textbooks and things like 
that, it’s just, yeah, it appeals to me a lot, very interesting.  Um, what I, 
what I expected, in terms of like, how I perceived the unit to be, um, in 
relation to what I expected initially I probably can’t weigh that up 
because I didn’t get deep enough into it.  But the content of the lectures 
was very interesting and it’s what I expected it to be. Yep. 
And you seem very happy in commerce? 
Love it, yep. Absolutely love it.  Yep. 
Um.  So obviously it suits your, suits, you didn’t come into psych’ with a 
specific idea of where it was that you wanted to go with it? 
Yeah. That’s right.  I mean, it was, it was a spur of the moment thing, 
going to that, um, information session, I suppose you would call it.  Um, 
I just thought, “Oh, this sounds good”, and you know I like, um, I’m a 
real deep thinker, like, a real cognitive sort of person.  Um, that’s, that’s 
how my mind operates, but yeah, I think it was just a combination of 
thing just threw me away from it, um, and then, over that year, like, 
when I worked, I just worked part-time and took some time out and had 
some longer time to just think about it. Um, I suppose, probably the time 
would be a huge factor, but also my interest in business is good.  Um,  
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and it does bring components of, like, Psych’, Psychology into it as well. 
But they don’t fit for both you and for what you want to do with it? 
Yeah, and for my objectives as well.  Yeah, my goals in life, um, I mean, 
even when I was doing psych’ I think I had I minor in marketing 
anyway.  I just wanted to make that, that connection between, um, yeah, 
the way people purchase, the way, you know, why they buy stuff and 
things like that.  Um, and even in an organisational sense, how people 
interact, and, in a business environment, why they do things. I mean it’s 
easy enough just to look at behaviour on it own, but, what’s driving that 
is, is what interests me.  So, so yeah. I think I got to combine, um, pretty 
well with this degree, and yeah, especially this last semester, I’m seeing 
it really all come together, all merge.  I’m doing two massive projects at 
one.  Yeah, it’s bringing in everything all together. Yeah. 
Well that’s good. 
Yep. 
Had enough? 
(END AUDIO) 
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Ok.  So you are Psychology? 
Yes. 
And you want to change to…? 
Sustainable Development. 
Ok.  Um, so, why would you like to do that? 
Well it’s actually part of my, um, foundation unit. I, um, because it’s 
multi-disciplinary, they have various readings etcetera, and it’s just the 
readings that related to sustainable development really intrigued me.  And 
so, um, my husband’s also an environmental science student, he’s always 
talking about the same subjects.  He’s sort of gone slightly different 
tangent, but he’s just talking about it a lot, and it’s the direction for the 
future with sustainable development. 
Um, so why did you want to do Psychology originally? 
Originally because I just felt it suited my personality.  I’m quite interested 
in the way people think, but then I was thinking that I can’t just analyse 
the way people think I actually need to apply it to something.  And I think 
that psychology actually will apply to sustainable development in a way.  
You do need to change people’s minds. You need to, sort of, study the 
way they think as well.  So I’ll probably pick up some psychology units 
just to, um, round off my, my degree. 
Ok. Um, so did you come in wanting, into psychology with a specific kind 
of in mind?  
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No, but I really wanted to, ‘cause I had actually, um, started a commerce 
degree when I left school, and hated it with a passion, and, um, never 
completed a degree.  And so when I was looking for something to do, um, 
Psychology seemed to be the best option for the, um, just, ‘cause I came 
from commerce being incredibly boring, I wanted a subject that would 
keep me motivated to, to finish my degree.  I really wanted to finish a 
degree. 
What was the problem with, um, commerce?  Just you’re not interested 
in… 
No.  Economics and stuff like that, no. 
Ok.  Um, so now you’re looking for a career with sustainable 
development or is it just an interest in the subject? 
Um, I will eventually be looking for a career.  I’m not quite sure yet, 
because I don’t think I’ve done enough study to really make up my mind 
what job would be best or what, even what jobs are available in this area.  
It’s quite a new subject, so… 
Ok. Um, so, well you obviously haven’t…have you done any sustainable 
units at all? 
This is my first one: Introduction to Sustainable Development. I’m doing 
it this semester. 
So do you find a better fit between, kind of, what you want to do in 
sustainable development rather than Psychology? 
Um, I haven’t actually done any psychology units, so I don’t really a basis 
for comparison there. It’s just that, um, to tell you the truth, there’s not…I 
did…I couldn’t see, like, a huge range of jobs for me if I completed a 
psychology degree.  I mean, yeah, so.  That was, it sort of, it was sort of 
that I’m not, at the moment I don’t really have an aim to work, because 
I’m just currently, um, staying at home with my kids and I will be doing 
that for quite a few years until they’re, sort of, mid-primary school age.  
Um, there’s no great aim for me to work at the moment, but if I did then 
what I’m doing complements what my husband will be doing. So possibly 
we could start up our own business, something like that. 
Ok. Um, anything else you want to tell me about why you want to do 
sustainable development? 
Um, mainly, well one of the reasons was to finish your degree, because 
we couldn’t see telling our sons “You need to finish your degree”, because 
in, by the time they’re at, sort of um you know, work age they’re going to 
need to have qualifications.  We couldn’t see, it seemed a bit hypocritical 
to say, “You have to do a degree” and not have one myself, and me, my 
husband’s completed his, but we couldn’t, it seemed to hypocritical, we 
couldn’t do that so… 
Ok. That’s all? 
Yep, yep. 
(END AUDIO)  
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Okay, now, um, what class did you say, you’re in psych now, but what did 
you change from? 
Um, I was originally enrolled in the Bachelor of Arts and Sociology and 
then I changed over to Bachelor of Psychology. Yeah. 
Okay. So can you tell me why you changed to Psych’? 
Why (laughter)? Um, I wasn’t ever interested in actually doing a Bachelor 
of Arts and Sociology, I just missed out on getting into Psych by about 
two points or something on my T.E.R. And, instead of waiting around for 
another year and, if or not I could get in, I just went, ‘Oh look, I’ll just go 
in’, do a Bachelor of Sociology, actually do Psych’ units, so I completed 
all the first year units anyway, and then apply for a transfer. I didn’t get in, 
in the first time, but the second time I applied for a transfer I got in, so, 
and, yeah, I, that’s really the only reason I went in under the Bachelor of 
Arts and Sociology, so I could get into Psychology. My intention was 
never to do a Sociology degree, I always wanted to do a Psych degree. 
So… 
So you applied in like the middle of the year, and then… 
No, no, no, I, I went in, um, same with everybody else who did their 
T.E.E. Um, I just started my first year at the Rockingham campus and just 
did, I was enrolled under a Bachelor of Arts and Sociology, but I still did 
Psych units and then I just transferred, um, at the end of my first year. 
Um, I applied to transfer, I didn’t get in, so, my second year I was still 
technically under a Bachelor of Arts and Sociology. Um, applied again at 
the end of my second year, and by third year I was within the Psychology 
stream. So… 
So, you were still doing Psych units? 
Yeah, yeah. 
They didn’t, they didn’t care? Like… 
Nuh. 
I thought people monitored that kind of thing. 
They said to me, ‘We can’t stop ya’. So I did all the, I was, in second year 
I was even on this campus, cause you done, once you’ve done so many 
points, you can start studying on the other campus. So, I, yeah, I was, split 
my time between the two campuses, and yeah, just did it that way. So, I, I 
was doing the degree anyway, I just wasn’t enrolled in it, technically. So, 
yeah, made it easy for me, I got in. 
Wore them down (laughter). 
Yeah. And like I was, cos I live in Mandurah, so it was ideal going to 
Rockingham for most of the week anyway. I only had to come up here 
like once a week until my third year. So, I really didn’t have to start 
coming up here until last year, for my degree. So I was pretty lucky 
(laughter). 
So, um, why did you want to do Psych? 
Um, well, two reasons. One is that my little sister has Down Syndrome  
 
 
449
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F4: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Autism and I’ve seen a lot of the work that, not just from psychs, but from 
speechies and physiotherapies and all that, that have come through our 
house and our lives since she was born. And she’s five years younger than 
me, so I already had, I was five years old, so I was starting to get clued 
into stuff when I was five, you know about what was going on, all these 
people coming into the house all the time. And like, she started to go to 
school, um, y’know, they start doing, well trying, to do like, um, I think 
they to tried (inaudible), tried to get her to do a (inaudible) or something 
like that. And obviously they’re not going to get anywhere with someone 
like her. And, y’know, all the different testing, and then hearing about 
these things from Mum in the background and all that. So I started to get 
interested and then, when I was coming towards the end of High school, 
and y’know, picking your subjects and all that ‘hoo hah’, I was actually 
starting to get interested in my sister and her behaviour at home and how, 
even though she was growing up, her body was maturing as per normal, 
the other dimension to her, you know her brain, her mental side and that 
sort of thing, wasn’t. She was far behind, apart from the obvious, y’know 
she can’t read and write and do that kind of stuff like every, like people 
can, but it was just maturity-wise in terms of, um, she was still listening to 
Spot videos and um, Madeline, and you know, Channel Two sort of 
shows. Whereas kids in that age group would have moved on to other 
things. They’d probably be more into, y’know, magazines and TV shows 
like, I dunno, Home and Away and that kind of stuff. So, she started to get 
my interest and um, yeah, I just, y’know, I got really interested in her 
Behaviour. Why was she different, what was going on inside of her head? 
And noticing that if we, sometimes if you say, “Sarah…” 
(BREAK IN AUDIO) 
 
(LAUGHTER) 
Um, the other thing was like sometimes you’d say to her, y’know, “Come 
on Sarah, it’s time for you to go and have your bath” and it’s then, 
“Noooo!”. But you knew that if you did certain things you could get her to 
do what you wanted her to do. And if you just conditioned her to doing 
things. And I was starting to, y’know, using these techniques, I hadn’t 
even gone to Uni and learnt them yet, but I was finding we were using 
them anyway at home and yeah, it just got me interested and then coming 
to Uni, I’ve gone, “Oh, I know about that…”, all the way through. The 
other, um, reason why I was interested in doing Psych is just because I 
wanna be in a field that is different all the time. Like, you’re challenged 
and all that. I work at Kmart at the moment to get me through Uni and all 
that, and I’m as bored as all hell. Y’know, I do the same thing, like a 
monkey, every time when I go to work, y’know? And it is boring, it’s the 
same thing over and over again. I have no interest in going to work. I 
don’t look forward to going to work. I look forward to holidays and the 
end of my shift. I can’t get out of there quick enough at the end of my 
shift. It’s like that, and I don’t think you should feel that way when you go 
into work. You should be like, “Yeah, that’s not so bad. I don’t mind 
going to work”. And, obviously you’re going to have bad times at work,  
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but on the whole you should actually enjoy what you’re doing. So, I 
thought Psych would be something that would give such a, a range of 
things I could actually do at the end of the day. Keep me going, keep me 
interested (laughter). Yeah. 
So, did you come up with a specific kind of career direction in mind, 
or…? 
Um, yeah I thought I’d end up in developmental psychology, like in 
maybe doing school psych or something like that. In that kind of field. 
But, um, as time’s gone on I’ve changed my plan (laughter). I’ve um, 
yeah, I did come in with that thought in my head that I would end up 
doing school psych or something like that, but that’s not so much any 
more. Yeah. 
So, what do you think you will do now? 
Um, I’d rather work with adults for a while. I’d rather, and I’d like to keep 
away from university and all that sort of stuff. Like, I, I just want to get 
out of institutions to do with Education and all that kind of thing. I just 
want to get as far away as possible from it at the moment. Um, I actually 
have managed to get a job with a company in Mandurah called Pure 
Personnel, and they are like an employment agency for people with like 
um, disabilities and stuff like that. And, working as a support worker, 
training these people up in their jobs and, um, yep, you’re involved in 
creating like checklists and um, methods of teaching them how to do 
actually do their job and stuff like that. So, I am kind of still, like you’re 
still teaching and all that kind of thing. But, it’s in a completely different 
context. Y’know, it’s, it’s not like I’m teaching Maths and English and all 
that ‘hoo hah’, I’m teaching them how to actually do a job y’know and 
there’s, there’s sometimes like really, really easy jobs, like packing fruit 
into bags or washing cars or something like that because you can only 
employ them to the level of their ability and all that sort of thing. So, 
yeah, that’s the kind of field, like more of an industrial psych type of job, 
that’s where I’m headed instead. Yeah (laughter). 
Okay, is there anything else you want to tell me? Oh, we obviously know 
why you changed… 
Yeah. 
Not much to talk about there (laughter). No, um… 
I mean the Sociology degree was just not me anyway, it wasn’t, I learnt 
some stuff in it, but I really can’t say I enjoyed it. It wasn’t… 
What was it that you didn’t like? 
Um, I really hated the, it was really, um what’s the word, it’s like I was 
pondering my navel all the time and trying to, I just felt like I was, I 
dunno…it was… 
It’s more abstract? 
Yeah, it was something that I’d come fresh out of High school, I wouldn’t 
know anything about the world, I was not at that level yet, y’know. And I 
still am not at that level. It would take a good five years of me out there in 
the wide world learning about life before I could come back and actually 
sit down and pay attention in class, y’know because… I used to sit there 
and wander off and look at the walls and y’know, you’d think about  
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whatever else I had to do sort of thing because I could not understand 
what they were talking about half the time and I know a lot of people say 
that Psych’s harder than Sociology, but I found it the other way around. 
Sociology was just a huge battle for me to try and understand, like, all the 
modernist thought and, uh, I dunno, I can’t even remember it, y’know. 
That’s me, and I just used sit there going, “uuuhhh” like in class. I actually 
fell asleep, stone cold asleep, in a lecture one day cos I just could not take 
it anymore. It just, I dunno, Psych just seemed more, a little more 
scientific, a little bit more, y’know, “here’s some facts”. And learning 
things like that it would just seem a little bit more realistic to me. Yeah, 
whereas, the other stuff, it felt like they were teaching us the past a lot, 
like, we were focussing on the past; we weren’t moving forward a lot of 
the time. So, yeah, it was frustrating for me. But, like I was, what, 
seventeen years old going on eighteen years old. I didn’t know nothing 
about anything back then and I probably still don’t. So, yeah. I don’t think 
seventeen-year-olds should be doing those sorts of subjects. 
So, Psych’s a much better fit for you in terms of…? 
Oh yeah. 
…what you want to learn about, I guess? 
Yes, yep, yeah. I just couldn’t see where Sociology fit in with any job. 
Like I couldn’t, I, I was at Uni for a job, not just to learn stuff and enrich 
my brain or whatever other people come here to do. I’m here because I’m 
trying, this is one step towards my career, y’know. I’m, it’s a very 
systematic sort of thing, how I’m looking at it. This is just one step I have 
to take to get to where I want to get to. I can’t get certain jobs unless I’ve 
got this degree, that’s how I kind of look at it. Whereas I think a lot of 
people were there, in the classes that I was in, because they just wanted to 
discuss the world and the nature of life and all this other ‘hoo hah’. And I 
just used to sit there going, “okay, I can’t see where the practical side of 
this is, for me, y’know”. And, it probably is down to age again and 
maturity and all that kind of stuff, I don’t have what they had. They were, 
like, mature-aged students, most of the class were like, y’know, at least in 
their forties. Y’know, there was probably only about three of us that were 
out of school in the classes. And we used to sit there the whole time going 
“huh huuuh” (laughter). Yeah, so. 
Okay. 
That’s me in a nutshell (laughter). 
(END AUDIO) 
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Okay, So, um, tell me why you changed. 
Um, okay, I changed because, um, I had always been interested in study, 
I’m not a sort of arty crafty person, but I’ve always pursued something, 
either at Tafe or, um, y’know, I’ve done History and I’ve done Japanese at 
Tafe. Um, so I decided to do an adult T.E.E. cos I hadn’t done that, um, 
when I was at school. It was called junior then. Um, so I did that and then 
it just seemed to be I really did it for an interest. I had two small babies 
and, um, I really did it just for a bit of intellectual stimulation. And, uh, 
but it seemed that everybody that I did it with, a lot of more mature-aged 
people were, the intention was to go onto Uni and do something. Um, so I 
think I just got caught up in that, whereas really my intention had been 
just to pursue it as an interest in something outside the domestic sort of 
range. Um, yeah and, so I didn’t really know much about any sort of 
degree courses, but I had had an interest on, y’know, any of the sort of 
humanitarian type, um, yes… And uh, yeah, so I think, uh, I got hold of a, 
um, the different Universities sort of handbooks and I looked through 
there and I saw Sociology and didn’t truly understand what it involved, 
but um, I think just a brief description gave me enough insight into 
thinking, “Oh, I like the way people work and, y’know, we respond and 
that sort of thing”. So, sorry I’m a bit nervous here. Um, so yeah 
(laughter). Ridiculous isn’t it? Um, yeah, so I think I, I chose to do 
Sociology just based on a little bit of information that gave me a little bit 
of insight cos it sounded really interesting. Um, but I didn’t pursue it, I 
withdrew almost as soon as I had enrolled or just before I was due to start. 
Because, I think to be perfectly honest, I probably lacked the confidence 
and felt that I might be taking on a little bit too much, um, especially with 
having a family. And I think by that stage I was aware of some conditions 
that I could defer for a period of time and so the option wasn’t completely 
closed. So that’s what I did. And then, um, I never really pursued it, I did 
some other things, I was nursing for many years and, uh… 
So, when was that? 
Uh, I nursed for twenty years…sorry, I didn’t… 
When would you have started your first degree…? 
Yes, I was nursing then, but I was, I wasn’t actually working, I was home, 
but I was registered and, yeah um, yeah but, I think I thought I’d just like 
a change. And um, yeah, so…where was I up to? Um… 
You’d been nursing for… 
Yeah, so then I withdrew from the Sociology and um, I went back nursing 
actually and I was working part time at Fremantle hospital for a years. 
And um, then I had a break from that, and then I did a course at um, Edith 
Cowan as a teacher assistant, uh, cos I thought I’d like to work with 
children and development. And again I think I lacked the confidence to 
think that I could do teaching so I didn’t pursue that, um, but I thought I 
could cope with teacher assistant. Uh, sort of read an outline, girlfriend  
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had one, so I did that. And uh, then I, subsequent to that I worked for five 
years in a pre-primary, in a local Catholic school. Uh, and I quite enjoyed 
that, but I think, um, y’know I had always had an interest in psychology, 
um, in that sort of area. I had a mother who was very depressed and had 
some problems when I was growing up. Um, and I think, y’know, I felt I 
had a fairly good understanding of depression and those basic, well not 
basic, but a lot of those sorts of things. And um, along with that I had a 
neighbour who, um, had Bipolar disorder and I knew her very well and 
I’ve seen her over the years, sort of have, y’know acute episodes 
and…And so, y’know, there was a lot of things maintained that interest 
that I had. I also had a sister that did her psychiatric training. Um, and I 
worked as a secretary on a part-time basis many years ago for a 
psychiatrist in Leederville. Yeah, so I had a little bit of exposure there to 
people that had some psychiatric problems. And uh, so I guess the interest 
was just always maintained, and um, then I think I just thought to myself a 
few years ago, um, really seriously about pursuing it, not letting it be any 
later. Uh, because I, y’know, wasn’t prepared to begin then, it was 
probably really going to be too late for me to apply to the real world. I 
mean people always say, “You’re never too old and it’s never too late”, 
but I’m fairly realistic and I didn’t really want to be studying when I’m 
sixty. Y’know I want to have something under my belt and put it into 
practice. Yeah, so um, that, that’s really why I changed, because I think 
from the outset I chose something that, er, wasn’t really what I, um, 
wanted. Um, but I think there was a fair degree of ignorance there, 
probably not unlike my children are experiencing now. I have one at Uni 
and one doing the T.E.E. And they don’t really understand what the 
courses involve, and um, then how you can apply them once you have 
them. Um, so I think that was the case with me, because I’d only really 
ever, um y’know, I’d never really looked at a, um, a handbook for a 
university cos when I did my nursing it was hospital based training. So 
um, I hadn’t really had to deal with any tertiary issues and my children 
were too, were still small. Yeah, so is there anything else you wanted me 
to talk about? 
Um, so did you find that Psych kind of matched your expectations…? 
Yes it did. Yeah, very much. Um, I think now that I’ve just begun my 
fourth year, um, I’m, um, I’m really enjoying it and I…But I think from 
the outset again, I probably wished I’d had a little more confidence and 
uh, wished I hadn’t been quite so anxious. Um, I’m feeling now probably 
the most confident I’ve ever been and the least anxious and I’m sort of 
reflecting back and thinking, “well I wish I’d been like this when I 
began”, but you can’t change, you can’t change that. So, y’know, that’s in 
the past and that’s not the real issue. Um, but, yeah, it has been, I think 
um, probably Methods was something that I had no idea about. I mean 
certainly I can appreciate the value, and one must do it. But, for someone 
that basic sort of math ability, that was a real, a little bit of a problem. And 
even essay writing, I mean it was all pretty difficult for me, um, but, but, 
I’m very committed and very motivated and I have a very supportive 
family. So um, I had many other strengths that seemed to either balance  
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out or sometimes even outweigh that bit of anxiety and lack of confidence 
that I used to have (laughter). Yeah, so um, yeah and…Did you want me 
to talk about what I’d like to do or…I don’t want to go off the track or… 
I was just going to ask um, y’know, did you come into it with the idea of a 
career? Are you saying that…? 
Yes I did. Yes, yes definitely. Um, um, but um, unfortunately I’m still not 
sure where I’m headed. Um, I think because I’m, um, somewhat older 
than a lot of the other students I’ve had a lot of exposure in my previous 
employment, um, and simply just life experience, um, to a range of issues. 
And so, I have an interest in, um, child development, and clinical psych, 
and even the occupational side. I’m doing one of those units at the 
moment, that’s pretty interesting. Um, so I think it’s a little more difficult 
for me to choose a particular stream because I have an interest in a lot of 
areas. Um, I wish I was a little bit more focused and something would just 
really jump out and make me think, “Well that’s what I really want to 
pursue”. One thing that probably stands out more than anything else in 
terms of, um, an area that I would desire to work in is probably with 
minority groups. Um, I have a pretty big interest in Aboriginal issues, um, 
refugees, things like that.  So I, I wouldn’t be surprised to think ahead 
y’know several years that I might be working in an area like that. But, 
y’know, I’ve always liked clinical as well. Um, mm, mm. But I suppose, 
um, I’m a bit concerned about thinking too strongly about clinical because 
I know it involves, uh, a considerable amount of further study. Um, yeah, 
and y’know, I’m not, I don’t think you’re ever too old either, but like I 
said before I’m realistic and I don’t always want to be studying, I want to 
actually be doing something. So, um, yeah…And, and, to be quite frank I 
hadn’t, never had, I have a family of three children at home, I have aging 
elderly parents on one side and my mother on the other side who is blind 
and quite dependent, so it’s… We’re always busy, my children play sport, 
my children study, um, y’know, there’s just always something going on. 
So there’s never been really a great deal of leisure time for me to sit down 
and really, um, y’know, pursue, um, y’know what are the areas that I 
really am interested in and where would I like to work and if I didn’t do 
this what would happen there and, yeah…So, that’s a bit of embarrassing 
because every, y’know, at this stage the first thing most people say is, 
“where are you going to work?” or “What do you want to do?” and its, I 
feel a bit inadequate saying, “I don’t know”. So, I don’t if other people 
experience that. But um, yeah, so uh, but I’m, I’m sort of optimistic… 
Do you think you’re going to do postgrad study or do you think you’ll go 
out to work next year? 
Um, um, I’m not really sure. Um, I don’t mind study, I quite like it. Um, 
but yeah, I’m not really sure. I think after this semester, I think with the, 
with the long break coming, the Christmas break, I’ll have a little bit of 
time to collect my thoughts and, um, and really explore my options, um, 
yeah. But I’m, y’know, even though some people say, “jobs are very 
scarce” and other people say, “Oh yes, y’know, there’s a lot of jobs out 
there”. I sort of feel optimistic that I will get work. Um, and even if I 
didn’t I would be prepared to work on a voluntary basis in some area that I  
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think that I would like or I feel I could make a difference for. Um, six 
months or a year, um, money has never been a big issue in our house. We, 
we own our house, we’re pretty fortunate, but we don’t have any money, 
owning your own house doesn’t really give you any extra cash. So things 
are always very tight, um, with school fees, and um…But we’ve never 
really had to learn to adjust because we never really had really high 
incomes. But, that’s a good thing, and I quite like that because it makes us 
very adaptable and um, y’know…So money isn’t the be all and end all. So 
I don’t, like a lot of my friends say ridiculous things like, “Oh well 
y’know, you’re going to be earning 30 and 50”. And I’m thinking, “Well 
it’s a bit unrealistic”, they don’t know that, they’re saying that without 
really having much idea. And, um, y’know, I’d be happy to work on a 
voluntary basis. I mean I’ve been really dying to get into the soup kitchen 
in Parry street in Fremantle for years, but there is always something, it’s 
always I’ve just increased my hours or I’ve just decreased them, or one of 
my children’s starting High school, or one of my children’s doing T.E.E. 
There just always seems to be a reason why I don’t get that time. But that 
is really what I desire to do, that sort of thing. Um, and so if I ended up 
working, y’know, in a voluntary capacity to hopefully give me a bit of an 
edge to get a position ultimately, um, I’d be more than happy to do that. 
So, um, the post-graduate study costs money doesn’t it? Is that right?  
Mmm hmm. 
Yes. So that may not sort of be an option immediately, but uh yeah…So 
um, yeah. But I think with Psychology, y’know, it does have um, a broad 
application, um, but I, I suppose an underlying theme I feel, y’know, with 
such a degree is that, y’know, you’re generally helping people. It all 
sounds probably a bit corny does it? But, um, yeah. So anything else you 
want me to know? 
No, that should be fine. 
(END AUDIO) 
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Okay, so, um, you changed into Psych from Sociology? 
Yep. 
Okay, um, so, tell me why? 
Why? Um, I never wanted to do Sociology. Um, I always wanted to do 
Psych and my grades weren’t good enough to get into Psych. So, I used 
the, within Sociology and did all Psychology units and then went to the 
Chairperson of Psychology and he transferred me over. 
Okay. So why did you want to do Psychology? 
Um, I originally wanted to do it to help people. Um, yeah like I just 
thought I had something to offer to people. So that’s why I wanted…And 
Psych is the obvious choice for like… 
And you didn’t think Sociology had the same kind of…? 
I felt as though Sociology, you could be an academic or you could be a 
researcher, but there wasn’t really an opportunity in the same way.  
Not very practical? 
Yeah. 
Okay, and has Psych lived up to your expectations? 
Well it did until this year when I did my prac. Um… 
So you’re in fourth year? 
Yeah. And then I just realised I don’t want to be a Psych at all. 
(Laughter) 
So did you come in with a specific career in mind in psych, or…? 
Oh, to go, to go into Clinical stream. Yeah, eventually. I wanted to do… 
But not now? 
Not now (laughter). 
Okay, so you did, you did take some of the Sociology units? 
Yeah I did do Sociology units. And they were interesting. Um, but I just 
didn’t see it as though it was leading anywhere, like that I could get a job 
in. 
Okay, and did you find the people in Sociology different from the people 
Psychology, um, in terms of the other students? 
Yeah, they were more mature-aged students in Sociology. Um, people 
were a lot more flexible, um, they were nice. Not that Psychology people 
aren’t nice, but, um, they were definitely different. Yeah, um, I’m not sure 
why. I guess it’s just like; it’s a different way of thinking. 
What do you think is the kind of, the big difference between um…? 
Between like a career in Sociology or just like a Psychology, I mean a 
Sociology degree? 
Yep. 
The degree? Um, well it’s just a different discipline. I mean, I suppose the 
assignments are different, the way that the, like the lectures are different. 
Um…it’s a lot broader. Well, actually no it’s not, take that back. Um…it’s 
really hard, um… I suppose just because they’re different disciplines, then 
you’ve got to treat, like they’re treated in different ways. Um, one’s not  
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better over the other, it’s just that that’s the way that one was teached, 
taught, because, um…Like Psychology is more disciplined, I guess, 
you’ve got to do things a certain way, whereas Sociology you don’t. 
As I’m aiming more at the content, like, what did you find different with 
the content? 
Okay, in Psychology, the content, I find you’ve got to, you can’t really 
express your own opinion it’s more you’ve just got to find the research to 
back up what you want to say, whereas you can’t find anything new. Um, 
Sociology, you do have your own opinions and you just need to, um, you 
have to back up what you say, but it’s, you still, you have your own 
opinions. Yeah. 
Do you find that Psych is more individual focused rather than being more 
kind of social systemic focused than social psychology? 
Yeah, Sociology’s more community-orientated. Yeah. 
Okay, um, so you liked Psychology up until this point? You were happy 
with your decision? 
Yeah. Yeah I was until, until the prac. Yep. But it also could just have 
been the place where I, the placement that I had. Um, but yeah, I was 
happy with Psych. 
So what do you think you’re going to do now? 
I’ll probably get a job, um, using my qualification, but not, like in a 
related field, but not what I originally intended to do. Um, I don’t, I don’t 
know. Not HR, but, um…um…an interesting job just using my 
qualifications, not actually progressing to be a psychologist. 
Okay, so you’re not thinking of doing post-graduate study, or…? 
Nup, not at the moment. 
Okay, not thinking of doing any other kind of study? 
Uh-uh. 
Okay, wanting to get out of here? 
Yep (laughter). 
(END AUDIO) 
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So, you started off doing Accounting and then you changed to 
Psychology? 
Mmm hmm. 
Do you want to tell me why? 
Why? Okay, um, my first degree is basically an avenue for me to earn 
enough and to make sure that my family is comfortable. So, that’s really 
something I select on (inaudible) reasons. You know, and I guess at that 
point in time I wasn’t sure what I like and y’know, it’s just nice to flow  
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F1: 
along with the system and, y’know, just get something basic. And 
psychology now is basically an interest, a passion. It helps me to get 
where I want. 
Um, where is it that you want it to go? 
Um, I like to do community service and I like to work in hospital, um, 
dealing with more emotions and those things. Yeah, and eventually I 
hope to be able to set up a home for the homeless. Yeah, so I think 
Psychology helps a lot. 
So that, but that wasn’t what you planned originally, when you started 
doing…? 
No. In fact, I do not think I know a lot, um, what I want at that point in 
time, maybe like eighteen, nineteen years old. You just flow along the 
system and, the education system in Singapore is a little different. Maybe 
at that point in time people are not so open to the choices you have out 
there. So there are basically some things, and I think that more people’s 
concern is mainly to get a lot of money, to survive. And at that point in 
time, I guess, um, for me it’s not (inaudible). So, being able to be 
independent financially is (inaudible)…I just want to do my parents 
proud and get a basic degree. 
So have you found Psych was what you expected? 
Um, yes, pretty much, so far. I hope that it will carry on and, and um… I 
think actually I have interest in Psychology since (inaudible) and I 
wanted to do it, but I wasn’t sure that I can make it and the prospects for 
being a Psychologist is not high in Singapore and, y’know, for those 
reasons I (inaudible). I think it’s more practical to choose a Commerce 
degree. 
Okay, um, have you found, uh, cos you did, you did accounting in 
Singapore… 
Mmm hmm. 
Um, uh, what to ask you. So did you want to, did you have the idea of 
helping people initially or was it, and you just decided to put that aside to 
earn money or did that kind of develop as you got a bit older? 
I think I have little bit of an intention to do something to help people, but 
the intention is not strong enough and the passion is not there yet. I was 
just floating along trying to find something that I liked to do and stuff 
like that and the idea of being able to help others, actually strengthened 
as I grow older and experience more things I guess. 
Okay, so do you think that you will be looking for work in Psychology or 
going back to accounting? 
No, no. I hope I don’t go back to accountancy, unless I’m really poor and 
have to go back to accountancy. Yeah, I really hope to stay in this line, 
y’know, if I can. 
Okay. 
(END AUDIO)  
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What, um, degrees did you switch from? 
Commerce to Politics. Or Commerce to Arts, whatever you call it. 
So, Politics now? 
Yep. 
Alright, so do you want to tell me why you did that? 
Um, a unique case. It wasn’t a straight swap; it was quite a long gap in the 
middle. I left my commerce degree in my second year, which was 1993, 
um, because of work commitments and then I didn’t come back and take 
up politics until 2000. So there was a huge gap there. The reason for 
politics is I decided, um, I wanted a change in my career. I was basically 
working in a marketing capacity and, um, I realised that I only had a few 
years left that, basically I’d enjoy, that I’d still be enjoying it for and then 
I’d want a change. Um, I enjoy, um, enjoy teaching. Um, I’ve taught, um, 
piano to kids before as a sort of side. And I’ve, um, also taken kids classed 
in Karate. So I thought, um, I’d enjoy doing, um, doing a politics degree, 
which is my passion and then a Dip Ed afterwards and going into 
teaching. 
Okay, so why did you want to do Commerce initially? 
Oh…I mean going back at when you’re seventeen and at school, I don’t 
think everyone knows what they want to do. The reason I chose Politics is 
cos I really wasn’t sure, and I looked at all the courses and that gave me 
the broadest, the broadest lot of avenues towards the end of the degree. 
Politics or Commerce? 
Commerce, gave me the broadest…So when I was, this was when I was 
back at school. And also I knew I was gonna be going, I guess I really 
didn’t put that much thought into it either because I knew I was gonna be 
going away for a year after school, going to live overseas for a year. So, 
Commerce just seemed to be something that was, was broad and had 
options that I could look at afterwards. But I didn’t enjoy it. 
Didn’t enjoy it? 
Nup. 
That was going to be the next question.  
(LAUGHTER) 
Why did you want to leave? 
Um, combination of things. I worked, even though I was enrolled full-
time, I worked full-time, um, from day one. And, it was just a 
combination of things and a job offer, which just, um, it was a lot of 
money at the time, and, I had to make a choice. So that’s the choice I 
made. 
There was never any thought of coming back to doing Commerce? 
To finish the Commerce degree? Um, not really because I worked that job 
for quite a few years and my interests changed, or developed is probably a  
 
 
460
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
 
 
 
 
F1: 
 
M3: 
 
 
F1: 
 
M3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F1: 
 
M3: 
F1: 
M3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F1: 
better, a better word. Um, and, I think study’s, any sort of study or tertiary 
study is a lot easier, and um, a lot more, a lot more fun. It can be a lot of 
fun if you’re studying something you enjoy and Politics is a passion, so… 
No there was no thought of coming back and finishing Commerce. 
So did you come back primarily with looking at, um, the different career 
of doing teaching? 
Absolutely. Absolutely. Um, I probably would’ve, um, I probably 
would’ve done, done a degree part-time anyway, just for interest’s sake. 
But yeah, that was my primary motivation. 
Okay. Um, do you kind of notice, basically I’m trying to get, do you, do 
you think it’s a better fit for you to be in Politics than to be in Commerce? 
Oh absolutely. Um, it, I mean it just, it comes down, it comes down to, I 
think to your passions in life and what drives you. And, um, I’m 
politically active out in the big wide world. Um, and, and, it, it’s just what 
interests me. So I would say it’s a lot, um, I don’t want to say easier, but 
it, it holds your interest more. If I came back to do a Commerce degree, 
um, I was already working in marketing anyway and so, which is sort of 
one half of that Commerce, that Commerce thing if you like. And, um, to 
come back and finish a Commerce degree just so I could, then get a job 
doing exactly what I was doing seemed pointless. 
Okay, anything else you wanted tell me about doing Politics versus 
Commerce? 
Um… 
Is it quite, quite different? 
Yeah, it, it’s very different. I think the main difference is, and I’ve done, 
ah, Commerce I did internally, I’ve done a lot of my politics externally, 
but the times that I have been on campus, um, especially doing second and 
third year units, you notice a real difference in the size of the classes and 
the fact that even, even when I’ve been external and I’ve only turned up 
for two or three lectures, the lecturers know who you are and know what 
you’re doing. And doing a Commerce degree, when we’re in the big 
lecture theatre, which I think holds 404 people, and it’s standing room 
only at the back, um, it’s really just a numbers game. Um, and I like to, I 
like to have contact with my tutors and my lecturers. And I guess the other 
biggest difference, because of the, the uh, time delay, is the internet and 
email and that has, have just absolutely, I mean I don’t know what it 
would be like now in Commerce, but it’s certainly a huge difference. It 
makes it a lot easier, and a lot easier communicating with, um, the staff at 
uni. 
Okay. 
(END AUDIO) 
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APPENDIX XXVI: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SOCIOPOLITICAL 
ATTITUDES SCALES IN STUDY 4 
 
 MEAN  MEDIAN  MODE  SKEW  KURTOSIS 
IW 3.63  3.50  *  -0.20  -1.29 
SW  3.80 3.87 4.25 -0.60  -0.85 
IP  2.94 3.17 3.83 -0.38  -1.46 
SP 3.30  3.33  *  0.70  0.23 
LS  3.37 3.20 3.00 1.47 2.31 
RS  2.61 2.50 1.75 0.12 -1.28 
CS 2.86  2.83  *  0.27  -0.26 
SG 5.78  5.54  *  0.15  -0.45 
*multiple modes 
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APPENDIX XXVII: PARTICIPANTS’ SCORES ON OTHER VARIABLES 
IN STUDY 4 
 
TABLE XXVIIa: Subjective variables 
 
 FINANCIAL  SITUATION  EASE  OF 
EMPLOYMENT 
SUBJECTIVE 
CLASS 
  Current  Future  (1 to 4)  (1 to 7) 
P1  4 5 1 2 
P2  3 4 3 3 
P3  2 4 3 3 
P4  2 4 4 3 
P5  2 4 2 5 
P6  2 3 4 4 
P7  3 5 3 4 
P8  3 3 4 4 
P9  4 4 1 5 
 
 
TABLE XXVIIb: Other variables 
 
 Party 
Identification 
Guaranteed-
Jobs 
Guaranteed-
Income 
Equal-Income 
P1 ALP  5.0  5.0  5.0 
P2 Other  4.0  5.0  4.0 
P3 LP  2.0  2.0  1.0 
P4 LP  3.0  3.0  3.0 
P5 LP  3.0  4.0  3.0 
P6 LP  3.0  4.0  2.0 
P7 GP  3.0  4.0  2.0 
P8 Other  3.0  4.0  1.0 
P9 ALP  5.0  4.0  3.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 